IR 05000250/1991030
| ML17348B132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1991 |
| From: | Hunt M, Jape F, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348B131 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-91-30, 50-251-91-30, NUDOCS 9110080024 | |
| Download: ML17348B132 (6) | |
Text
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+tI.*~4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
10'I MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/91-30 and 50-251/91-30 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DRP-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted July 22 - August 9, 1991 Inspectors:
P.
Ta o
u t Others contributing to this inspection:
M. Thomas, Inspector, Region II M. Miller, Inspector Region II Approved by:
F.
ape, hief Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
/ go 9'/
ate Signed z~
0/
ate
>gne ate igne Scope:
SUMMARY This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of witnessing the Integrated Safeguards/Load Group Separation Preoperational Test for Units 3 and 4 ~
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee's overall preparation, training and management involvement was evident during the performance of 14 separate integrated safeguards tests between multiple units.
The preparation and training given to plant personnel resulted in no personnel errors except as noted below.
Management's involvement assisted in obtaining the appropriate and prompt resolution of problems identified during the safeguards tests.
9i10080024 9i0925 PDR ADOCK 05000250 PDR
A licensee identified procedure violation occurred during the establishment of prerequisites for a test of Unit 3 train A safeguards equipment and components.
Specifically, the nitrogen test rig used to initiate the safety injection actuation signal via high and high-high containment pressure switches (H8HHCP)
was incorrectly connected to Unit 3 train
HSHHCP switches.
The violation is not cited because the criteria specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy,Section V.G were satisfied (Paragraph 2).
REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees
¹*W. Bladow, Quality Manager
¹*J. Donis, Operations Support Supervisor
¹*S. Hale, Engineering Manager
¹H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor
¹*V. Kaminskas, Operation Superintendent
- J. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
- R. Kundalkar, Project Engineer
¹*L. Pearce, Plant Manager
¹*T. Plunkett, Site Vice President
¹*D. Powell, Licensing Superintendent
¹"A. Zielonka, Technical Department Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
¹R. Butcher
¹G. Schnebli
¹L. Trocine 2.
- Attended exit interview on August 9, 1991
¹Attended exit interview on August 16, 1991 Witnessing of Preoperational Test 0804. 115, Integrated Safeguards and Load Group Separation Test, Unit 3 and 4 (70315, 70316)
The inspectors witnessed the majority of those integrated safeguards tests identified in preoperational test procedure 0804. 115, Revision
dated July 6, 1991.
These tests were witnessed during a three week period from July 22, 1991 through August 9, 1991.
The engineered safety features (ESF)
of the individual trains (A and B) of each Unit were tested to demonstrate that ESF equipment are capable of performing their design function during a design basis accident conditions (LOCA or LOOP/LOCA) and to load shutdown system equipment to the EDG for safe reactor shutdown in response to a
LOOP.
To accomplish the individual train tests on each Unit, the simultaneous train tests for each Unit, dual train test and to verify train independence the test procedure contained the following test Safety Injection (SI) with Offsite Power Available - Train 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B e
Loop Followed by SI - Trains 3A, 38, 4A and 4B Unit 3 SI Followed by Unit 3 and Unit 4 LOOP
Unit 4 SI Followed by Unit 3 and Unit 4 LOOP Train 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B SI Coincident with Units 3 and Unit 4 LOOP (Train 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B Bus Independence).
The inspectors noted that the plant operators and startup engineers had received detailed training on the tests contained within preoperational test procedures 0804. 115 and the expected system response.
In addition, the inspectors attended a briefing given by the test director (Plant Supervisor) prior to performing the detailed test procedure sections.
The briefings covered expected operating sequence of plant systems, actions required of plant operators, data to be taken and precautions of the test procedure.
The inspectors verified that the official test copy being used was the latest revision and approved changes to the test procedure had been incorporated.
The inspectors accompanied plant operators to verify on a sample basis the establishment of test prerequisites, installation of test equipment and the alignment of ESF components and equipment as required by the test procedure.
During the performance of the individual sections of the preoperational test procedure the inspectors stationed themselves at panels in the control room to observe ESF system response to the initiation of an SI actuation, LOOP actuation, or a combination of SI/LOOP actuation as specified by the test.
Particular attention was given to observing the shedding of non-essential equipment from the emergency buses, the sequencing of ESF component and equipment onto the EDG and the response of the EDG with regards to voltage, frequency and total KW load.
Following the performance of each test section appropriate appendices were used to record and verify the alignment and operation of all ESF components.
The sequence of event recorders and EDG chart recording were reviewed to verify proper response of the EDGs and ESF load block sequencing and timing.
The inspectors noted that if any component did not go to its safeguards position during the test it was documented, evaluated and corrected by the Engineering and Technical Support Group.
The repair of identified problem ESF components was routinely completed prior to performing the next section of the test.
This approach allowed for an early retest of the effected component.
ESF component problems during the safeguards test were minimal.
Two of the more significant component problems and a personnel error that occurred during safeguard testing along with the corrective actions are discussed below:
Preoperational Test Procedure (POP)
0804.115, Section 9. I, SI with Offsite Power Available - Train 3A.
The initial condition for this test required that EDG-3A to be parallel with offsite power and loaded to 2500 kw.
Offsite power.
was aligned to electrically feed the 4kv-3A bus from the auxiliary transformer.
Test objectives specified that upon initiation of the SI injection signal,
verify that EDG-3A output breaker opens, and rejects the 2500 kw load without tripping the EDG and that the EDG continues to operate in the standby mode.
In addition, the SI signal initiates a "fast transfer" of offsite power source from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer.
Train 3A ESF load sequencer identified the period of time when the breaker was open as a loss of power.
The ESF load sequencer initiated the SI/LOOP program in lieu of SI only program.
The licensee issued Change Request Notice (CRN)
E-12582 and E-12583 to Plant Change/Modification (PC/M)87-264 to provide the necessary timing of the
"fast transfer" scheme to permit all the ESF load sequencers to properly respond to an SI signal with offsite power available.
Section 9. 1 of POP 0804. 115 was subsequently repeated satisfactorily.
POP 0804. 115, Section 9.7, LOOP Followed by SI-Train 4A.
One of the test objectives of this section was to operate the 4A-EDG at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (two hours at 110 percent of full load and
hours at 100 percent load)
then secure the EDG and within five minutes initiate the LOOP followed by a
SI signal.
During the
hour run a
ground was detected and traced to the permanent magnetic generator (PMG) of the 4A-EDG.
The PMG operates through a shaft geared to the EDG main gearing system.
The function of the PMG is to provide a
VDC source of power used in the EDG exciter and field flashing circuitry.
The licensee secured from the test and shutdown EDG-4A.
The inspection of the PMG indicated shaft misalignment which allowed the rotor to contact the stator resulting in excessive damage to both components.
The damaged PMG was replaced with a new PMG in accordance with the manufacturers instructions and in the presence of a
vendor representative.
Subsequent retest required taking clearance measurements, horizontal and vertical vibration measurements at ambient conditions, following a ten minute run of EDG-4A at idle speed and after a
25 minute run of EDG-4A at 100 percent full load.
The PMG measurements showed satisfactory results and section 9.7 of POP 0804. 115 was repeated in its entirety satisfactorily.
POP 0804. 115, Section Train 3A SI coincident with Units 3 and
LOOP (Train 3A Bus Independence)
No SI signal was received when high and high-high containment pressure was simulated by a nitrogen test rig connected at the containment pressure switches.
The licensee review of this item showed the nitrogen test rig to be connected to the 3B train containment pressure switches in lieu of 3A train containment pressure switches.
The licensee determine that a
failure to follow the procedure steps of POP 0804. 115 assigned to startup personnel had occurred.
The licensee corrective actions included a
discussion of this event at subsequent pre-test briefing; Startup personnel who have procedure step sign off responsibilities were required to review, O-ADM-031, Independent Verification; Startup Procedure SFP-2, Startup
Test Control General Guidelines was revised to include independent verification requirement.
The inspectors reviewed this item and concluded that the violation would not be cited because the criteria specified in the NRC Enforcement Policy,Section V.G were satisfied.
3.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August
and August 16, 1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.