IR 05000250/1991005
| ML17348A900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1991 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348A898 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-91-05, 50-250-91-5, 50-251-91-05, 50-251-91-5, NUDOCS 9103120102 | |
| Download: ML17348A900 (12) | |
Text
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lP UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/91-05 and 50-251/91-05 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
January 12 through February 1,
1991 Inspectors I
. But er, S nior esi ent nspector t
>gne Schne i,
R ident Inspector Da Ssg ed Approved by:
roc',
esident nspector en>a, c ion ie Division of Reactor Projects Da e
Ss ne te gne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspector inspection entailed direct inspection at the site in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, engineered safety features walkdowns, operational safety, and plant events.
Results:
Within the scope of this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe plant operations.
One violation was identified.
VIO 50-250,251/91-05-01 Failure to follow a quality instruction in that a
design change was not adequately incorporated into an operational surveillance procedure (paragraph 6).
9103120l02 9l0228 PDR ADDCK OS000250 Q
REPORT DETAILS
'ersons Contacted Licensee Employees T. V. Abbatiello, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- J. Arias, Jr., Technical Assistant to Vice President L.
W. Bladow, Quality Manager T. A. Finn, Assistant Operations Superintendent R. J. Gianfrencesco, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent
- S. T. Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor K. N. Harris, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations E.
F. Hayes, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
- R. G. Heistermaa, Assistant Superintendent of Electrical Maintenance
- V. A. Kaminskas, Operations Superintendent
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor J.
A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor G. L. Marsh, Reactor Supervisor H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor L.
W. Pearce, Plant Manager, Nuclear
- T. F. Plunkett, Site Vice President
- D. R. Powell, Superintendent, Plant Licensing K. L. Remington, System Performance Supervisor C.
V. Rossi, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- G. M. Smith, Service Manager, Nuclear R.
N. Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor J.
C. Strong, Mechanical Department Supervisor
- F. R. Timmons, Site Security Superintendent M. B. Wayland, Maintenance Superintendent J.
D. Webb, Assistant Superintendent Planning and Scheduling
- A. T. Zielonka, Technical Department Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsman, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector
- G. A. Schnebli, Resident Inspector
- L. Trocine, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview on February 1,
1991 Note:
. An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in paragraph 1.,
Plant Status Both units are still defueled with the dual unit outage ongoing.
Outage progress remains on schedule with the following major work either accomplished or in progress at the end of this inspection 'period:,
The Unit
and 4 Reactor Vessel ISI internal inspections were completed, and the internals and vessel heads were reinstalled.
Cable pulling continues on schedule with approximately 23% completed.
Both units'CS loops are drained to allow for RTD bypass loop elimination.
The Unit 3 main generator has been removed and shipped by barge to the vendor for refurbishment.
Control room panel modifications are in progress, to accommodate the new diesel generators.
Control room floor modifications are in progress, with installation of the underfloor cable trays and raceways on schedule to tie in with cable installation.
The new load sequencers are in place.
The new A and C 480-volt load center transformers are in place, with conduit replacement in progress.
Changeout of transformers is on schedule for turnover to the Startup Group.
Changeout of the 3S and 4A battery changers is in progress.
4A EDG preoperational testing continues.
The 72-hour sh'akedown run was completed on January, 28, 1991, and the 35 consecutive start testing commenced on January 30, 1991.
The new cooling water manifolds for the 4B EDG were installed and tested satisfactorily on January 30, 1991.
Pre-operational testing will commence in the near future after the installation of new vendor supplied parts.
ISI system hydrostatic testing continues with 6 out of 53 tests completed.
The ICW structure inspection was completed, and it was determined that no upgrades are required at this time.
However, due to the ICW structure availability during the dual unit outage, the licensee plans to upgrade the 3Bl ICW structure starting in mid-Februar The ICW pipe-crawl throughs to determine ICW pipe conditions 'have been completed on both units.
UT of the 'pipe wall to determine thickness showed no significant degradation.
Currently, 6 pipe joints on Unit 4 and 60 pipe j'oints on Unit 3 are being repaired and are scheduled to be completed by the end of February.
The Security System upgrade continues with the installation of vital area barrier steel grating, installation of ported coaxial cables and zone testing in pro'gress, installation of CCTV towers, and preparation for SAIC computer acceptance testing.
Additionally, component level testing of security equipment continues with 139 of 815 tests completed, and the security simulator has been connected in the NEB.
3.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliances to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observation, and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was evaluated to ensure the responses were timely and corrective actions were implemented within the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
VIO 50-250,251/90-14-02.
Concerning the failure to follow procedure resulting in an i"noperable SI system flow path when RCS temperature was greater than 350 degrees F.
The licensee responded to this violation by letter L-90-269 dated July 20, 1990.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions required for this issue and found them to be adequate.
This issue is closed.
4.
Followup on Inspector 'Followup Items (92701)
(Closed)
IFI 50-250,251/89-54-03.
Concerning followup on the final root cause of accelerated terminal block corrosion.
The licensee documented the results of the root cause evaluation in report ERT-89-023.
The inspectors reviewed the report and considered the licensee's evaluation to be adequate.
This issue is closed.
5.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and
CFR Part 21 Reviews (90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee Event Reports and/or
CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and
resolved,'nd violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
When applicable, the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applied.
(Closed)
P21 50-250,251/89-01.
Concerning Brown Boveri Kline Circuit Breakers Rebound Spring.
An FPL engineering evaluation concluded that the seismic testing performed on the breakers enveloped the maximum seismic accelerations postulated for the location of the breakers at the plant.
The evaluation demonstrated that modification of the breakers is not required for nuclear safety; however, they recommended the addition of the rebound springs in order to comply with the manufacturer's recommendation.
REA-TPN-89-178, PC/M 89-501, and PC/M 89-502 were issued to add rebound springs to the subject breakers during the current dual unit outage.
This issue is closed.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified that the test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TS; testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
TP-646, GM Portable Diesel Generator DTS 4DE01A-M-01001, 72-Hour Endurance Run; and Preoperational Procedure 0804.037, Emergency Diesel Generator 4A System Preoperational Test Phase I.
The inspectors determined that the above testing act'ivities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the TS.
At 10:15 p.m.
on January 18, 1991, the fire header between PIV-28 and PIV-39 was declared to be out-of-service due to flow in excess of the acceptance criteria for PIV-25 and PIV-40 as found during performance of Sections 7.1.15 and 7.1.16 of 0-0SP-016.30, Annual Fire Main Post Indicator Valve (PIV) Leak Test and System Flush.
Compensatory measures were directed to be taken per TS 3.7.8.2 for fire zones
and 54 being out-of-service.
This required the establishment of backup fire protection measures.
Following the development and incorporation of OTSC No. 8758
and the, subsequent successful testing of PIV-25 and PIV-40 per O-OSP-016.30, the fire header, between PIV-28 and PIV-39 was returned to service at 3:25 a.m.
on January'9, 1991.
The inability to isolate and leak test a portion of the fire header piping during performance of Sections 7.1.15 and 7.1.16 of O-OSP-016.30 was identified to be a problem with the original test procedure and not with the valves themselves.
A 'design change involving the addition of fire header piping as reflected in PC/M 88-503 was not adequately incorporated into O-OSP-016.30.
Although this procedure was not listed in the PC/M Engineering Package as being affected by the design change, it was identified as, being affected on a
Reviewer Comment Sheet dated February 19, 1990.
The flush portions of this procedure were revised to incorporate the change, but the need for the isolation of an additional PIV to leak test this portion of the fire header piping was not recognized.
A few minor procedural and drawing discrepancies were also brought to the attention of the system engineer.
TS 6.8.1.a requi res that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with the requirements and recommendations of Section 5. 1 of ANSI N. 18.7 - 1972.
Section 5. 1 of this ANSI recommends that written policies be provided to control the issuance of documents, including changes, that prescribe activities affecting safety-related structures, systems,.
or components.
For the preparation of permanent plant changes or modifications, paragraph 5.4.3 of gl 3-PTN-1, Design Control, requires that Department PC/M Coordinators review proposed Engineering Packages in accordance with the guidelines provided in Appendix C of this procedure.
Additionally, for the final review and approval of PC/M packages, paragraph 5.5.2 of gI 3-PTN-1 requires that minimum quorum reviews, as determined by the Technical Department, also be performed in accordance with the guidelines provided in Appendix C of this procedure.
Appendix C of gI 3-PTN-1 provides guidelines for departmental review of PC/Ms for effects on procedures and requires the identification of the extent that applicable procedures are affected.
Contrary to this, a design change involving the addition of fire header piping as reflected in PC/M 88-503 was not adequately incorporated into 0-0SP-016.30 resulting in the inability to isolate and leak test a portion of the fire header piping during performance of Sections 7.1.15 and 7.1.16 of O-OSP-016.30 on January 18, 1991.
This item will be tracked as VIO 50-250,251/91-05-01; Failure to follow gI 3-PTN-1 in that a design change reflected in PC/M 88-503 was not adequately incorporated into O-OSP-016.30.
One violation was identified.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed an inspection of a temporary system designed to provide fire water emergency makeup to the SFP heat exchanger.
This was accomplished by reviewing the procedures governing this temporary
system (TP-685 for Unit 3 and TP-660 for Unit 4, Fire Water Emergency Makeup to the Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger)
and by performing a complete walkdown of all accessible equipment back to the applicable CCW isolation valves.
The following criteria were used, as appropriate, during this inspection:
systems lineup procedures matched plant drawings and as-built configuration; housekeeping was adequate, and appropriate levels of cleanliness were being, maintained; valves in the system were correctly installed and did not exhibit signs of gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling; hangers and supports were made up properly and aligned correctly; valves in the flow paths were in correct position as required by the applicable procedures with power available, and valves were locked/lock wired as required; local and remote position indication was compared, and remote instrumentation was functional; and major system components were properly labeled.
The equipment observed during this walkdown met the applicable criteria referenced above, and the: procedures governing this temporary system appeared to be adequate.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
8.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly implemented; gC hold points were established and observed
h quired.'ire prevention controls were implement'ed; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance w'th the approved gA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
Troubleshooting No. 4 Blackstart Diesel NVARS Swinging; Troubleshooting Unit 3 SFP Transfer Canal Liner Leak; and Repair of Fire Water Jockey Pump P234B.
For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that these activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
9.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
Th spectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, e inspe conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and monitored instrumentation.
The inspectors verified proper valve/switch alignment of selected systems, verified maintenance work orders had been=
submitted as required, and verified followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs, and verified the return to service of affected components.
By observation and
~ direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan was being implemented.
The implementation of radiological controls and plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions were also observed.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, 'auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings were conducted to obser've plant equipment'conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.
n addition, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of systems which are currently required to be operable/functional in order to verify proper valve/switch alignment.
Th licensee conducted a safety evaluation to define the control of plant e
icn configuration during the dual unit emergency power system enhancemen t t
Procedure TP-645 Defueled Operations Without Emergency Diesel Generators, was issued to proceduralize the requirements determine'd in the safety evaluation to be in effect from the time both units enter the defueled condition and both EDGs are removed from service.
Also, portions of the revised TSs became effective when both units entered the defueled conditio As a result of routine plant tours and various operational observations, the inspectors determined that the general plant and system material conditions were satisfactorily maintained, that plant security program was effective, and that the overall performance of plant operations was good.
In addition, the inspectors verified the critical elect'rical system lineup, verified that the'equired number of blackstart diesel generators was available, walked down the temporary system designed to provide fire water emergency makeup to the SFP heat exchanger, and observed operator training on the GM portable diesel generator.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager-Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
An exit meeting was conducted on February 1,
1991.
The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.
No proprietary information was provided to the inspectors during the reporting period.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
" The inspectors had the following findings:
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 50-250,251/91-05-01 VIO - Failure to follow gI 3-PTN-1 in that a design change reflected in PC/M 88-503 was not adequately incorporated into O-OSP-016.30 (paragraph 6).
Acronyms ANSI a.m.
CCTV CCW CFR DTS EDG ERT FPL GM ICW IFI ISI LCO MVARS
- NEB NRC OSP OTSC and Abbreviations American National Standards Institute ante meridiem Closed Circuit Television Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Discipline Test Schedule Emergency Diesel Generator Event Response Team Florida Power 5 Light General Motors Intake Cooling Water Inspector Followup Item Inservice Inspection Limiting Condition for Operation Megavars Nuclear Entrance Building Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Surveillance Procedure On-The-Spot Change
P21 PC/M PIV p.m.
PTN QA QC QI'CS REA RTD SAIC SFP SI TP TPN TS UT VIO
CFR Part
Plant Change/Modification Post Indicator Valve post meridiem Plant Turkey Nuclear Quality Assurance Quality Control Quality Instruction Reactor Coolant System Request for Engineering Assistance Resistance Temperature Detector Science Application International Corporation Spent Fuel Pit Safety Injector Temporary Procedure Turkey Point Nuclear Technical Specification Ultrasonic Nondestructive Testing Violation