IR 05000250/1991014
| ML17345A842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1991 |
| From: | Hunt M, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A841 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-91-14, 50-251-91-14, NUDOCS 9105290286 | |
| Download: ML17345A842 (19) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.IN.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/91-14 and 50-251/91-14 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
~
9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket NoseI 50-250 and 50-251 License NoseI DPR-31 and DPR-41 e
Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
April 15-19 and April 22-26, 1991 Inspectors:
. Hunt, earn Lea er Team Members:
M. Miller R. Moore S. Elrod Approved by:
hym ock, ief Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety ae one Date Signed Scope SUMMARY This special, announced inspection was conducted to review the design and field implementation of the electrical distribution system enhancement related to the upgrading of the emergency power system.
Results In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Design documentation adequately supported electrical distribution system design criteria.
Design requirements were appropriately entered into post-modification testing.
Design engineering personnel were knowledgeable and involved in ongoing EPS enhancement project activities.
Field implementation was noted to be generally of high quality, however more attention was required in sequencer installation to assure consistent quality implementation.
9i05290286 9i052i PDR ADOCK 05000250
(1l
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- P. Banaszak, Lead Electrical/Instrumentation Engineer
- C. Bible, Electrical Supervisor, Production Engineeri
- W. Bladow, equality Manager W. Busch, Staff Electrical Engineer J. Freyre, System Engineer
- S. Hale, Engineering Project Manager
- G. Hollinger, Operations Training Supervisor
- M. Huba,(JPN)
Juno Plant Nuclear
- D. Jenkins, Electrical Engineer, PEG
- M. King, (JPN)
Juno Plant Nuclear
- J. Knorr, R.
C. Supervisor
- R. Kundalhar, Project Engineer, JPN
- L. Pearce, Plant Manager
- T. Plunkett, Turkey Point Site Vice President
- D. Powell, Licensing Superintendent
- M. Powers, System Protection Supervisor
- R. Sipos, Director of Construction T. Sweeney, Electrical Engineer, PEG
- D. Weeks, Senior Engineer, JPN ng Department (PEG)
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel.
EBASCO Inc.
Employees R. Gonzales D. Sehi NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. Butcher
- L. Trocine
- Attended exit interview Background Turkey Point initiated the implementation phase of an Emergency Power System Enhancement Project in November 1990.
Design development for this project began in 1987.
Major modifications implementing the enhancement project were PC/M 87-263 for the new EDG installation and PC/M 87-264 for the plant tie-ins to the EDS.
Various other modifications accomplished
installation of new electrical equipment and Unit 3 EDG upgrades.
Electrical modifications related to the EPS Enhancement Project include change-out of the load sequencer system and addition of new safety-related buses, load centers, and chargers.
Mechanical modifications include the installation of two new EDGs with supporting structures and systems, and upgrades to the existing EDGs to the capability of the new EDGs.
The two existing EDGs were designated for Unit 3; the new EDGs were designated for Unit 4.
Overall, the enhancement project encompasses major construction and engineering activity on-site.
Project activities require considerable interface activity between plant, design, and construction organizations.
Both nuclear units are shutdown for the duration of this project.
The current status of the Project at the date of this inspection was as follows:
~
Mechanical
- all modifications to install the new Unit 4 EDGs have been completed.
Phase I testing, which verified the functional performance of the diesels and supporting systems, was satisfactorily completed.
Unit 3 mechanical modifications were being implemented, but not completed.
Electrical - all equipment was installed and in the process of being wired, i.e.,
cables pulled and terminated.
One sequencer and one 4. 16 kV bus modification was completed.
This work must be completed prior to performance of Phase II testing which was scheduled for the May - July, 1991 time period.
3.
Purpose The purpose of this inspection was primarily to review the design of the EDS resulting from the EPS Enhancement Project.
Electrical DC and AC calculations were reviewed to assess the electrical design associated with the Enhancement Project.
Mechanical calculations and performance tests were reviewed to assess the mechanical design.
Additionally, this inspection reviewed various aspects of ongoing field implementation, incorporation of design requirements in pre-operational testing, design engineering involvement in modification installation, and licensee quality organization's involvement.
4.
Electrical Design a ~
125 VDC System The inspectors reviewed calculation 18712-115-E-03, Voltage Drop at Vital 125 VDC Buses for a
Minimum Spare Battery Voltage of 108.6 Volts.
The purpose of this calculation was to determine the voltage drop at the vital DC buses 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B when the spare battery is connected to each of these vital buses with a
minimum spare battery terminal voltage of 108.6 VDC.
This calculation demonstrated
that the spare battery can replace any of the existing station batteries and meet the operating voltage requirements for the various components connected to each of the DC vital buses as long as the spare battery terminal voltage is 108.6 VDC.
A partial review of spare station battery system short circuit calculation 18712-115-E.D2 was conducted.
A basic calculation assumption was that short circuits while the spare battery was paralleled with one of the vital buses batteries for a short time was not considered, because this action is only momentary.
New disconnect panels were added to each battery between the battery and its distribution bus.
This panel contains a
1600 amp battery fuse which was in series with the battery terminal cables and the disconnect switch at the distribution bus.
The disconnect panel also contains an 800 amp isolation breaker which when closed connects the battery to a
load bank for testing purposes.
Calculations were performed that verified that the battery fuse coordinates with the down stream loads.
However, during testing if the isolation breaker should trip the calculations show that the battery fuse may begin to melt.
The calculation calls for the fuse to be replaced if this should occur.
Since this was a
new calculation the information was not yet incorporated into the battery surveillance procedures.
This item will be reviewed during a later inspection.
Calculation No.
EC-089, DC Control Loop Lengths, was reviewed.
The purpose of this calculation was to determine the maximum allowable loop length of the dc control circuits for the new 4.16 kV switchgear 3AD and 4AD, the existing 4. 16 kV switchgear 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D, the new 480 VAC load centers 3H and 4H, and the new Unit 4 Diesel Generators 4A and 4B control panels.
The maximum loop lengths of the dc control circuits permit the trip and closing operation of the 4. 16 kV and 480 VAC circuits breaker when the battery voltage is at the minimum 105 VDC.
The calculation results limited the loop lengths to 3500 feet of No.
AWG conductor and 5600 feet of No.
AWG conductor.
There are no control circuit loops that exceed these values even when figured at elevated temperatures.
A NRC design validation inspection finding 250,251/89-203-23 which concerned the DC voltage at certain components when the battery terminal voltage is 105 VDC resulted in calculation No. 18712-473-E-01, DC Voltage Drop Calculation, for safe shutdown components being performed.
This calculation was to evaluate the existing cables and components as they existed prior to the enhancement or as originally designed.
The calculation concluded that all DC components have adequate voltage at the devices to meet their minimum voltage rating.
To assure this conclusion, the licensee conducted tests of various tripping and closing coils for 4. 16 kV breakers to verify that they
will operate at a minimum battery terminal voltage of 98.87 VDC.
The end of life battery terminal voltage allowed by Technical Specification is 105 VDC.
This review was conducted to verify that an unreviewed safety question did not exist.
These tests are documented in Safety Evaluation Report No. JPE-PTN-SELJ-88-030.
The inspectors reviewed calculation EC-136, Existing Stationary Battery Cell Sizing and Voltage Drop Calculation, which was performed to verify that the existing station batteries 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B were properly sized with the new additional EPS Enhancement loads and new configuration.
Additionally, the calculation was to demonstrate that the batteries supply their required loads to meet station blackout requirements.
The calculations incorporated the addition of the battery isolation cabinet which was added.
The licensee added an additional conductor to the two existing battery terminal cables which were disconnected from the distribution bus and connected to the isolation cabinet.
Three conductors were connected between the isolation cabinet and the distribution bus.
The result was an increased voltage at each distribution bus.
The results of the calculation verified that the new load profiles can be served by the existing station batteries without the terminal volt'age dropping below 105 VDC minimum voltage.
However, due to the additional blackout load conditions the expected life of the batteries is shortened.
The battery life is determined by testing which has in the past identified the-need for battery replacement.
In general, it appears that the assumptions used in the calculations examined were conservative and based on sound engineering principles and practices.
The 125 VDC calculations appropriately incorporated applicable design requirements for the EPS enhancement.
AC System Design The team conducted an electrical design inspection of the worst case load paths in the 4.16 kV and 480 VAC emergency power systems in Units 3 and 4.
These load paths were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the design modifications and engineering calculations for short circuit and breaker coordination.
In addition selected calculations for Unit 4 were reviewed for cable ampacity and voltage drops, cable sizing, short circuit analysis, transformer protection, protection relay coordination, and transient load analysis.
The worst case load path for the, Unit 4 4. 16 kV emergency power system was from the main switchgear Bus 4B to new Bus 4D feeding the 280 kW component cooling water (CCW)
pump motor.
The worst case load path from the 4. 16kV emergency power system to the 480 VAC was from 4.16 kV Bus 4B to 480 VAC motor control center MCC 4D feeding the 100 hp containment cooling fan motor.
Both of these paths were analyzed with 4. 16 kV Bus 4B being fed from three different sources.
The sources were the new emergency diesel generator EDG 4B, auxiliary
transformer VA TR 4 and startup transformer ST TR 4.
The calculations for the similar load paths in Unit 3 were also reviewed.
For these load paths and modifications the team reviewed portions of the following selected calculations:
Calculations 18712-342-E.-01 - Load Center Transformer Protection and Circuit Breaker Coordinators
- for 4. 16 kV/480 VAC transformers 4x04, 4x05, 4x06, and 4x07.
Calculation 18712-342-E-01
- Breaker Setting and Coordination Calculation - for addition of MCC 3L, 3M, 4L, and 4M.
Calculation EC-155 Voltage Drop On Emergency Generator Leads-for EDG 4A and 4B.
Calculation EC-145
-
SB1 Voltage Analysis For Electrical Auxiliary System - for NRC Branch Technical Position PSB-1 for relay setpoints for the modifications to Units 3 and 4.
II Calculation EC-141 - Shor t Circuit and Voltage Drop Analysis-For Electrical Auxiliary System for worst case load paths
'previously discussed.
EC-128 - Ampacity and Voltage Drop - for cables from (a) 4. 16 kV Bus 4B to 4D, (b) 4. 16 kV Bus 4D to CCW Pump Motor 41211C, (c) 4. 16 kV Bus 4D to intake cooling pump motor 4P9C.
EC-132 - Ampacity and Voltage Drop - for cables from,(a)
480 VAC load center LC 4A to MCC 4J and (b) 480 VAC load center 4D to MCC 4K.
EBASCO Report No.
FLO 53-20.5004 Revision 9 - Emergency Power System Enhancement Project Relay Coordination Study - for worst case load paths previously discussed.
The team determine the calculations and studies reviewed were adequate for the modifications being performed by the licensee.
However, the team identified the breaker coordination settings for the 100 hp containment cooling fan motors 3V3A and 4V3A on 480 VAC MCC 3D and 4D were close although within the worst case instantaneous trip tolerance.
The licensee agreed to change these settings of 1400 Amp in 3D and 1350 Amp in 4D to 1200 Amp.
These changes will be reflected in Figures 20 and 21 of EBASCO Report No.
FLO 53-20.5004.
The team reviewed the preliminary transient load analysis for diesel generators 3A and 3B.
This analysis was used to determine the minimum voltage dips during automatic load sequencing.
This analysis was performed by computer program EMTP.
The worst case loads were for Load Block 2 when the safety injection (SI)
and residual heat removal (RHR)
pumps were started.
The team reviewed this preliminary analysis since the final transient analysis has not been completed.
Overall, the team determined the AC system design was satisfactory in the areas inspecte Mechanical The mechanical design aspects of the EPS enhancement project reviewed during this inspection included air start system capacity, fuel oil storage capacity, piping stress and HVAC design calculations for the Unit 4 EDGs.
The review also included HVAC design for the electrical equipment room housing the added battery chargers and load center.
General observations included licensee continued design engineering involvement in design change implementation.
Mechanical calculations were reviewed which established the design capacity requirements for air start system receivers and fuel oil storage.
Although the air start system capacity calculations were not conclusive, performance testing for the TS required five start attempts verified the air receivers were adequately sized.
Assumptions, methodology and conclusions in the fuel oil storage calculations were reasonable and verified adequate capacity as required by TS. It was notable that the TS requirements for fuel storage was
EDGs at continuous run for seven days rather than four EDGs.
Piping stress analysis for EDG support system piping was reviewed.
This review verified that all associated piping was evaluated in accordance with the assigned piping classification and that all piping was appropriately evaluated for classification.
The actual stress analysis was accomplished by a software program.
This review verified appropriate limiting piping stress values for the piping section evaluated.
The licensee had appropriately evaluated supporting piping system code classes and inputted this information into the computer program.
Program results demonstrated that the limiting stresses were not exceeded in the piping applications.
Documentation of the seismic evaluation and test of the air receiver safety relief valves demonstrated the integrity of'hese valves during a design basis seismic event.
HVAC calculations for spaces associated with EPS enhancement project were reviewed.
Primarily this consisted of HVAC associated with the new (Unit 4)
EDG building spaces and the electrical equipment room housing the new chargers and load centers.
Additional electrical equipment added to existing EDG spaces (Unit 3) provided negligible additional heat load to these spaces.
The EDG room temperature limit was 122'F based on local electrical equipment specifications.
EBASCO calculations87-261.6008
"EDG Building, Diesel Generator Room Ventilation" and EC-098,
"Heat Losses Associated with the new EDG Building Electrical Equipment" established the ventilation requirements to maintain ambient temperatures in this space.
The calculations address ambient temperatures with the EDG operating and also the standby (non-operating)
conditio While the calculations generally verified adequate ventilation was provided, there were design inputs which were not fully accurate in the portion of the calculations addressing EDG non-operating ambient conditions.
The ventilation air flow exit area value used in the calculation did not accurately reflect field conditions.
These design input values could impact the determination of ventilation requirements for the space during the EDG standby condition.
The licensee responded promptly to this issue by initiating an evaluation.
This evaluation and subsequent calculation revision will be reviewed on follow-up inspections of the EPS enhancement project.
HVAC calculations were reviewed for the EDG building control panel room, the diesel oil transfer pump room, and the new electrical equipment room.
The calculations verified the HVAC for these spaces was appropriate.
Unit 4 mechanical modifications have been fully installed.
Phase I
testing has been satisfactorily completed.
This testing verified functional operability of all EDG systems and components within the EDG building.
This included a 24-hour and 72-hour continuous diesel run.
Phase II testing which will include EDG power tie-ins to the plant electrical distribution system and sequencer operation has not been performed.
This testing will be accomplished in conjunction with the electrical modifications implementing the EPS enhancement project.
Unit 3 EDG upgrade modifications were being implemented during this inspection.
The change out of the turbocharger and the modification to the EDG control system to provide an idle start capability did not impact fuel consumption requirements and related design calculations.
The additional two air start motors provide increased reliability of the air start system but do not significantly impact air start capacity requirements.
Previous operational configuration was alignment o'f 2 of 4 air start receivers to the existing two air start motors.
Overall, review of the mechanical design aspects of the EPS Enhancement Project demonstrated appropriate incorporation of design requirements.
A continuity of engineering involvement was evident on the project.
The mechanical engineer assigned to the project was knowledgeable of the diverse mechanical applications of the project and demonstrated effective interfaces with other technical organizations.
The individual was involved in the design change development activity and reviewed actual construction of the diesels on the vendor site.
Field Implementation The inspector reviewed work practices and field implementation of approved design for several electrical power enhancement installations in progress, as discussed below.
The review included physical condition of the cabinets and components, wiring and termination practices, cabinet mounting practices, cleanness of equipment, and protection of equipment during installatio Battery chargers The electrical power enhancement included installing new battery chargers.
Four were observed, 3AI - just landed on its foundation, 3Bl - nearing turnover to the test group, and 4A2 and 482 - turned over to the test group.
Preservation and physical condition of the cabinets and components were excellent.
The wiring and termination practices used by the vendor to wire the door-mounted controls and indicators were excellent.
The wire was trained well and tied frequently with Nylon tie wraps.
An Agastat plug-in timing relay was observed tied to its socket by a Nylon tie wrap in three of the four battery chargers inspected.
This unusual configuration was not discussed in vendor manual AA550, Solid State Controls Inc.
400 Amp Battery Charger Model BCSI 2400.
The licensee determined that the cabinet was seismically qualified with this relay tied down and proceeded to change the vendor manual and procure an information label for the cabinet interior.
This corrective action was acceptable.
Buss brand KAZ actuators were installed in the cabinet and numbered as F326, F327, and F328 - implying a fuse application.
Though not fuses, these have been improperly used as fuses previously in the industry.
In this case, review of the vendor manual drawing showed them being appropriately used in parallel with a high amperage fuse to actuate a small switch in a signalling circuit.
This application was acceptable.
Ten Watt resistor R-66 on Circuit Board 21400 was mounted with ample clearance between it and the vertical circuit board, but was supported by its connecting wires.
The upper wire was glued to the center of five watt resistor R-16 just above it.
This unusual configuration was neither discussed in the vendor manual nor pictured in a photograph of the circuit board included in the manual.
The licensee determined that the vendor did manufacture the circuit board in that configuration and had determined that the actual resistor power dissipations and temperatures involved were moderate and weIl below any resistor ratings.
Since the licensee does not plan to repair these circuit boards but to treat them as one spare part, detailed documentation of the unusual configuration was not required.
This condition was acceptable.
Field wire entering the top of the battery chargers at the left rear was tie wrapped back to stick-on Nylon tie wrap mounts on three of the four battery chargers.
The licensee determined that the vendor did not use stick-on mounts at all.
These mounts were used generally at the discretion of the craftsman without guidance.
The licensee was evaluating the use of s'uch mounts on a more generic basi Vendor manual AA550 required the cabinets be bolted to the foundations using four 5/8 inch bolts torqued to 100 ft-lbs.
Implementation of this requirement was reviewed on a sample basis.
For the sample selected, this requirement was translated to process sheet 90-637 and torquing was verified by gC in inspection report E-90-2694.
This implementation was acceptable.
b.
Rosemount Level Transmitters The mountings for Rosemount model 1152xx level transmitters for diesel oil storage were observed.
These were mounted with four bolts with nuts and lock washers as required. by Change Request Notice I-0753.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
c.
Bus Loading Sequencers The electrical upgrade included instal'ling a digital sequencers to control the 4. 16 kV safety bus loading sequence for each of the four buses fed by the Emergency Diesel Generators following a loss of power.
Each was mounted about two feet from its associated field wire termination cabinet, a part of the old sequencer cabinet, and will utilize the terminal boards therein for connecting to existing field wiring from loads being controlled.
The wiring between the two cabinets consisted of a 4-to-5-inch-diameter umbilical of
gage control wires laced together but unsheathed.
A closed wireway was being installed between the cabinets near the top.
The intent was to treat the wireway as part of the cabinet interior.
Only one of the four sequencer cabinets observed had been turned over for test, but it still had significant work in progress in the adjacent field wire termination cabinet.
The general condition of the new sequencer cabinets was excellent.
Control wiring was well laced and trained.
The umbilical for the cabinets being installed was heavily cushioned by the workmen where it exited the cabinet side.
There were, however, several observations of less favorable conditions.
One side of the 4A sequencer door contained wire termination with poorer workmanship than the other cabinets involving lugs mounted two-deep but not back-to-back.
While technically satisfactory, the licensee was considering upgrade of this workmanship.
A number of the edge connector terminal screws were recessed such that either the wire or the terminal -lug must be bent to make the installation.
In this case, the lugs were straight and the wire bent at about a 45-degree angle as it left the lug.
The licensee's wiring standard 5610-E-756 addressed bending lugs one time up to 90-degrees, and the minimum bend radius of wire and cable, but not bending the conductor itself at the point where it left the bare terminal lug.
There were also several
wires bent at 90-degree angles at the lug at terminal boards in the back of the cabinet.
These vendor wires appeared to be disturbed during field work.
Since this was vendor wiring, it was not evaluated because of an unclear standard.
The licensee was considering upgrades to the wiring standard in this area; The umbilical did not appear to be well supported at the point where it turned from vertical to horizontal and entered the tray between the cabinets.
Though insulated, the bottom corner was not radiused.
The small control wires on the bottom were supporting a significant load.
The licensee was considering installation improvements in this area.
The cable tray between the cabinets was not joined to the cabinets well.
Significant gaps with exposed interior wire were obvious.
The licensee was considering this situation in coordination with the support improvements discussed above.
Spare low-voltage conductors in the field termination cabinet were spared in various manners.
The electrical standard only stated that, if desired, a certain type Raychem brand end cap could be used.
It did not communicate requirements such as minimum taping and labeling of spares.
The licensee was considering changes to this standard.
Though the installation of the bus loading sequencers was only partially complete, it was apparent that more detailed attention would be required to obtain a satisfactory finished product.
d.
Cable Pulling Numerous instances were observed where small cables were partially pulled, then neatly coiled and hung out of the way, perhaps awaiting associated equipment installation.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
Cable pull activities for CWO A512 (Pull Package A-PT-148) were well controlled.
This pull consisted of three 750 MCM, lead sheathed, 4160 kV cables, and ran from three reels on top of the new emergency diesel generator building down through the roof, through about 30 feet of vertical conduit to a manhole where it made a free air bend to horizontal, then through about 300 feet of conduit, interrupted by free air at another manhole, to the exit pull point-manhole 703.
Construction supervisors and gC inspectors were stationed at appropriate locations.
The pull was coordinated using headsets at the various points.
Pulling load limits had been pre-calculated and the load cell was continually monitored.
During the pull, the crew identified a pinhole in the sheath prior to the cable reaching the gC inspection point, notified gC, stopped while the defect was documented and repaired by taping, then proceeded with the pul The pinhole prompted a review of cable traceability.
Review of the cable reel tag data, the pull card, and data, stenciled on the cable left it unclear how the individual cables could be traced back to manufacturer in case generic defects were found.
The three reels had tags containing identical data except cable length and then another tag with the reel number.
The cable itself did not have the reel number attached
- each had a test number relating to manufacturing tests.
It was found that for the large Kerite brand cables, the shipping documents related test number to reel number.
For reels of smaller-size general purpose cable where the cable would be cut as needed, the cutting process required guality Control to tag the cut piece with the cable data from the reel.
This was acceptable and the inspector had no further questions in this area.
6.
gA Involvement The inspectors reviewed a
gA audit which demonstrated the organization's quality oversight involvement.
The document was Audit gAD-PTN-90-039, EDG Phase I, Design.
The audit was comprehensive and used the methodology of
.NRC SSOMI audits.
The audit was issued April 15, 1991.
The following findings from the audit demonstrate the design review aspect of the quality oversight involvement.
Findin I:
Se aration Desi n
Installed conduit did not match design criteria for HELB as analyzed in PC/M 87-264 and associated calculations.
Findin 2:
Undervolta e Rela s
Review of past relay settings as-found data has shown that the settings are not consistently repeatable with respect to the technical specification tolerances.
Findin 3:
Potential Loss of Safet Bus a.
Calculation FLO-53-20-5004 incorrectly implies that the undervoltage relays could spuriously trip if worst case relay tolerances occur.
b.
PC/M's87-258, 87-264 and NRC correspondence L-91.-70 are not consistent with regards to their description of the automatic transfer of LCH.
Findin 4:
Desi n In uts Not Pro erl Verified a.
Calculation EC-145 (PSB-1) did not utilize the worse case voltages to verify starters will not drop out.
b.
Calculation EC-141 utilized a
75 percent voltage at the MCC's rather than using the more restrictive values stated elsewher The licensee was activly pursuing resolution of these findings.
Their disposition will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
7.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 19, 1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
8.
Acronyms and Initialisms AC DC EDG EDS EPS HVAC kY MCC PC/M QA QC SSOMI TS V
VAC VDC Alternating Current
,Direct Current Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Distribution System Emergency Power System Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Kilovolts Motor Control Center Plant Change/Modification Quality Assurance Quality Control Safety System Outage Modification Inspection Technical Specification Volts Volts-Alternating Current Volts-direct Current