IR 05000244/1993018
| ML17263A516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1993 |
| From: | Keimig R, David Silk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A515 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-93-18, NUDOCS 9401140033 | |
| Download: ML17263A516 (13) | |
Text
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connnission Region I Docket/Report:
License:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Dates:
Inspectors:
50-244/93-18 DPR-18 Rochester Gas and Electric Company (RG&E)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station November 16-18, 1993-Je~
D. Silk, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Specialist E. Knutson, Resident Inspector, R. E. Ginna J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist W. Maier, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, T. Moslack, Sr. Resident Inspector, R. E. Ginna R. Plasse, Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point L. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley (
')c> Cjg ate Approved:
R, Keimig, ief, Em gency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards date SCOPE Announced inspection of the full-participation emergency preparedness exercise.
Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was good.
The players correctly identified, classified and declared the events in a timely manner using the appropriate Emergency Action Levels (EALs). No overall exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. Two areas for potential improvement were identified: damage control team members in the OSC were not qualified for the appropriate respiratory protection equipment, and the protective action recommendation following the General Emergency declaration was untimely.
940ii40033 93i230 PDR ADaCK 05000244
TABLEOF COXH~22P8
Persons Contacted.......................................
2 Ml Scenario Planning.............................,.........
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Exercise Scenario Summary...............................
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Exercise Finding Classifications...............................
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Simulator Control Room (SCR)...............................
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Technical Support Center (TSC)...............................
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Operations Support Center (OSC)..............................
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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Joint News Center (JNC)..............................
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Overall Response Timing
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Conclusions
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Exit Meeting o
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
¹ T. Alexander
~¹ W. Backus
- R. Beldue
¹ R. Carrol
¹ A. Harhay
¹ T. Marlow
¹ R. Mecredy
- ¹ P. Polfleit
- ¹ R. Watts
¹ J. Widay Manager, Nuclear Assurance Technical Assistant to Operations Manager Corporate Nuclear Emergency Planner Manager, Operations and Technical Training Manager, Health Physics/Chemistry Manager, Quality Performance Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production Onsite Emergency Planner Director Corporate Radiation Protection Ginna Plant Manager Entrance meeting attendees on November 16, 1993
¹ Exit meeting attendees, on November 18, 1993 The inspectors also interviewed and observed other licensee personnel.
2.
Scenario Planning The exercise objectives and scenario were submitted to the NRC in a timely manner.
These were reviewed by the NRC and the final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
On November 16, 1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the scenario.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities at appropriate times to meet certain exercise objectives.
3.
Exercise Scenario Summary The scenario started with the turbine throwing a blade through a low pressure turbine casing (an Alert). The ensuing high vibrations on the turbine resulted in the operators tripping the plant and entering the Emergency Operating Procedures and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
A fire then developed in the Charging Pump Room causing the "C" Charging Pump to trip.
After the fire was extinguished, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
occurred that required safety injection (Sl) to be actuated and a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared.
A small crack developed in a pipe coming from containment that caused radiation levels within the auxiliary building to increase.
Then, due to a variety of mechanical and electrical failures, no SI fiow was injected into the reactor coolant system and a General Emergency (GE) was declared.
Radiation levels in the auxiliary building increased significantly as reactor vessel water level decreased and a radiological release to the environment occurred through the auxiliary building. When electrical power was restored, SI flowwas re-established, the release was stopped, and the scenario was terminate.
Activities Observed The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff.
The following activities were observed:
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Selection and use of control room procedures.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
Direction and coordination of emergency response.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
Communications/information flow and record keeping.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses.
Issuance of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
Accountability of personnel.
Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
5.
Exercise Finding Classifications Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
R~*
gl i'*'S flu
'iuly p
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a plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
Exerc W kn:
less than effective Emergency Plan implementation that did not, alone, constitute overall response inadequacy.
Ar f r P n i 1 Im r v m n an aspect that did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but that merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective action.
6.
Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The operators reacted promptly to abnormal plant conditions and implemented the appropriate procedures.
The Shift Supervisor announced that he had assumed. the position of Emergency Coordinator (EC) and then quickly and correctly classified the event as an Alert approximately eight minutes after the occurrence.
The emergency response command and control function was effectively transferred from the SCR to the Technical Support Center approximately one hour after the Alert declaration.
Throughout the exercise, the operators performed their emergency preparedness duties well.
The operators also demonstrated good overall performance.
On several occasions, the SCR Foreman initiated reviews of overall plant conditions to ensure that equipment availability and
alarm conditions were known and understood by the crew.
Operators demonstrated good personnel safety concern during the charging pump fire scenario by de-energizing the operating charging pump prior to the fire brigade entering the Charging Pump Room.
Operators were proactive as demonstrated in transferring a 480-volt vital bus to the emergency diesel generator when a potential problem was identified with its associated normal supply transformer.
No SCR strengths, weaknesses, or areas for potential improvement were observed.
7.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was staffed and activated promptly following the Alert declaration.
There were good communications ofplant conditions between the SCR and TSC. For example, conditions for the SAE classification were promptly recognized and the event was declared following the manual SI actuation.
The offsite notifications associated with the SAE were completed in a timely fashion.
The EC demonstrated good command and control in the TSC throughout the exercise.
As equipment problems developed, the TSC's development ofstrategies to limitplant vulnerabilities to additional equipment failures was excellent.
The EC quickly informed the EOF when conditions for a GE were met.
Also, during the exercise, an orderly shift turnover was demonstrated by TSC personnel.
No TSC strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
8.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
Performance by OSC personnel was generally very good.
The Plant Maintenance Assessment Manager (PMAM)was in place shortly after the Alert declaration and assisted the SCR staff as needed.
Command and control of in-plant repair teams was generally effective.
Communications with Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and emergency responders was effectively maintained while teams performed repair actions.
The PMAM demonstrated a
proactive approach regarding plant repairs by discussing priorities and needs with the TSC staff while remaining aware of the status of in-plant teams and repair activities as plant conditions changed.
The status of damage control teams (DCTs) was readily apparent.
The OSC maintained a DCT status board that indicated the DCTs, the DCT tasks, personnel on the DCT, and the task completion status. Repair priorities were constantly updated verbally after discussions with the EC when plant conditions warranted.
The OSC's method of tracking DCTs was determined to be adequate and improved since the last exercise.
An area for potential improvement was identified during the formation of a repair team to restore power to a valve to secure the leaking pipe in the auxiliary building. Specifically, due to the radioiodine concentrations in the vicinity of the motor control center, the health
physics/chemistry manager recommended an air fed respirator forpersonnel radiation protection.
The available electrical maintenance personnel, however, were not qualified for this type of respirator.
The licensee's ability to ensure that respirator-qualified personnel staff the ERO will be reviewed in a future inspection (Inspector Followup Item 50-244/93-18-01).
Due to the need to restore power to the valve (MOV-851A), the EC waived the respirator qualification requirement.
A special work permit (SWP) was subsequently issued, providing protective clothing (PCs), respirator, and dosimetry requirements.
The inspector accompanied the repair team in the field. The repair team identified the PCs required in the SWP without donning them. This was a drillsmanship problem because itconflicted with the exercise scenario that stated that in-plant teams were to don respiratory protection and PCs prescribed by health physics and chemistry personnel.
No OSC strengths or weaknesses were identified.
9.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was promptly staffed and actuated.
EOF personnel maintained good, detailed communications with the TSC regarding plant status.
Prompt updates were made to status boards throughout the exercise.
The Recovery Manager made frequent briefings of plant conditions to keep EOF personnel apprised of the current situation.
EOF personnel conducted an excellent turnover due to detailed briefings and well kept logs. Overall, the EOF functioned well and was found to be well equipped and organized.
An area for potential improvement was noted regarding a failure to issue a timely protective action recommendation (PAR).
When a GE is declared, a PAR is to be issued with the 15-minute notification.
The licensee's notification form (EPIP 1-5, Attachment 3a) lists four choices for PARs: 1) There is no need for protective actions outside the site boundary, 2) Need for protective action is under evaluation, 3) Sheltering recommended, and 4) Evacuation recommended.
During the exercise the GE was declared at approximately 1015. At 1025, the licensee issued a "PAR" of "Need for protective action is under evaluation."
This "PAR" was not acceptable to the NRC because it made no recommendation.
The issuance of a PAR recommending no action would have been acceptable under the circumstances.
The reason for the licensee's "PAR" was due to changing plant conditions.
The licensee was prepared to issue a PAR based on plant conditions at the time of the GE declaration.
However, prior to making the offsite notifications, plant conditions changed such that the PAR also changed.
The licensee took time to evaluate the latest plant conditions to develop the appropriate PAR.
In the meantime, the 15-minute notification needed to be made for the GE declaration and, since a change in plant status was occurring, the licensee did not issue a specific PAR.
The licensee finally and correctly issued a PAR to shelter at 1055.
This was 40 minutes after the GE had been declared and did not meet the 15 minute goal.
The timeliness of PAR issuances and the PAR choices on the licensee's notification form willbe evaluated in a future exercise (Inspector Followup Item 50-244/93-18-02).
The dose assessment performance in the EOF was good.
The survey teams were mobilized quickly. The initialboard plotter assumed a strong leadership role in organizing team members.
The dose assessment staff was active in performing "what if"calculations early in the scenario before radioactive releases started occurring.
The only performance issue was some minor confusion regarding the definition of a "radiological release."
At 1030 the dose assessment staff recognized that radiation levels started increasing, but did not initiate any dose projections.
By the licensee's definition a "radiological release" is when a radiological release exceeds the Technical Specification (TS) limit. The dose assessment staff was waiting for the TS limit to be exceeded before performing dose projections.
There was no reason for the dose assessment staff to wait for the limitto be reached before performing a dose projection, especially in light of the fact that they had previously performed "what if" dose projections.
Other minor issues were some inaccurate forms that were used during the exercise, The radiological data update form had TS limits for some monitors located where it was not clear to which monitors they referred.
Also, the transparency used to display data did not have room for the containment high range monitors, R-29 and R-30.
These were required to be listed separately on the site board. Despite these minor issues, the dose assessment staffperformed well during the exercise.
No EOF strengths or weaknesses were identified.
10.
Joint News Center (JNC)
e The JNC was well equipped with good visual aids and new word processors for reporter usage and had a well orgamzed press briefing area with a good layout for press releases.
The JNC had knowledgeable technical staff and consultants that provided clear and accurate briefings and answered questions from reporters.
During the activation of the JNC, the licensee provided good security measures.
Overall, the JNC's performance was very good.
No JNC strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
11.
Overall Response Timing Unless indicated as "not applicable", the following table lists the times of significant exercise occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SE), and General Emergency (GE) classifications,.
These include simulated emergency occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S &L) notifications, NRC notification, ERO call-out, and ERF activation and full staffing.
The ERO was timely in carrying out its function RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMI~TABLE MILESTONE UE Al
'SE GE Occurrence Recognition Declaration NA 0730 NA 0730 NA 0736 0910 0910 0913 1005 1005 1015 S &L Notifications NRC Notification ERO Call-out NA 0742-47 NA 0753 NA 0738 NA NA NA 0926-0931 1025-34 TSC Activation TSC Fully Staffed OSC Activation OSC Fully Staffed EOF Activation EOF Fully Staffed PAR Issued NA NA NA 0830 NA 0752 NA 0830 NA 0758 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0912 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1055 12.
Licensee Critique On November 18, 1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The licensee's critique was assessed as very good because it was thorough and critical in addition to identifying all discrepancies noted by the NRC. No licensee critique inadequacies were identified.
13.
Conclusions Overall, the licensee's performance was assessed as good.
The licensee's ERO personnel manned their respective ERFs and took appropriate responsive action during the exercise.
Events were quickly identified and properly classified.
Offsite notification were timely except for the issuance of the PAR at the GE declaration.
There was noted improvement from the last exercise in the tracking of teams dispatched from the OSC. However, the licensee was not able to demonstrate that personnel reporting to the OSC would be qualified for the appropriate respiratory protection equipment.
Non-respirator-qualifiied OSC team members slightly delayed the initiation of mitigation activities.
EOF personnel made the correct PAR and PAR update based upon plant conditions and dose projection. Generally, communications within and between the ERFs was good throughout the exercise.
At the conclusion of the exercise, the licensee had met all of the exercise objective.
Exit Meeting The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings as mentioned above.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and stated that they would be reviewed for appropriate corrective action.