IR 05000244/1993015
| ML20046D267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1993 |
| From: | Della Ratta A, Keimig R, King E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046D260 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-93-15, NUDOCS 9308170138 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20046D267 (8) | |
Text
.
..
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-244/93-15 Docket No.
50-244 License No. DPR-18 Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester. New York 14649
.
Facility Name:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
!
Inspection At:
Ontario. New York
Inspection Conducted:
July 19-23.1993 Inspectors:
./
d 03-o - f3 I
A. Della Ratta, Physical Security Inspector date W dY Y
cr'-cf93 E. B. King, PhyslBal Sec6rity Inspector date
-
u
'
,,
Approved by
/- r-5'5
'
-
,
R. R. Keimi ief, Safeguards Section date Facilities Ra 'ological Safety and Safeguards Branch
,
Areas Inspected: Management Support, Security and FFD Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control
!
of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Imks, Keys and Combinations, Alarm Stations and
{
Communications; Power Supply; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; and
'!
Security Training and Qualification.
Results: The licensee's program was found to be directed toward public health and safety.
In the areas inspected however, a noncompliance with an NRC requirement was found
involving inadequate search of packages prior to entering the protected area. Security program upgrades and enhancements, and attention to the program remained evident.
1 9308170138 930806 PDR _ADDCK 05000244 G
PDR_n.
i
a
.
DETAILS 1.0 Kev Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensee and Contractor Personnel
- R. Mecredy, Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production
- J. Widay, Plant Manager
- M. Marchionda, Superintendent, Production
- W. Dillon, Manager, Corporate Security
- R. Wood, Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- R. Teed, Security Training Coordinator
- T. Porter, Security Systems Specialist
- S. Eckert, Access Authorization Administration
- C. Forkell, Jr., Manager, Electrical Engineering
- B. Stanfield, QA Engineer
- B. Leadbetter, Security Engineering
- D. Leeper, I&C Foreman
>
- M. Greenberg, Electrical Engmeer
- E. Palmer, Training Supervisor - Wackenhut Corporation j
- R. Dratt, Security Training - Wackenhut Corporation
!
- R. Albrecht, Assistant Training Supervisor - Wackenhut Corporation
- R. Benne, Site Security Supervisor - Wackenhut Corporation 1.2 U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission (NRC)
T. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector
- Indicates those present at the exit interview.
>
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel and members of the
'
contract security force during this inspection.
2.0 Management Support and Audits
,
2.1 Manacement Support Management support for the licensee's physical security program was evident.
The inspectors noted the active monitoring by corporate management of the
-
program upgrades and enhancements to ensure that the work remained on schedule.
t Since the last physical security program inspection in October,1992, (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-244/92-16), the following actions were taken:
Completed the perimeter intrusion detection equipment upgrade; o
r
- e =" n
...
.
,
.
.
- Completed the installation of the camera towers and closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras around the protectcd area (PA) perimeter; Installed new state-of-the-art computer hardware for the CCTV system;
and Completed straightening of the perimeter barrier.
- Additionally, the inspector determined that the site security force totalled 71 on July 23,1993, and the attrition rate to date in 1993 is less than 5 percent.
Based upon review of the security program and the efforts undertaken to upgrade and enhance it, the inspectors determined that the program is continuing to receive appropriate management attention and support.
2.2 Audits During the previous inspection, the inspector noted that the licensee's annual Quality Assurance (QA) audit of the security and fitness-for-duty (FFD)
programs was in the process %ing conducted. During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the report of tC audit (combined Quality Assurance Audit of the security and fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs, No. 92-29: BKS, dated December 9,1992). The audit report documented two findings and three observations, none of which were indicative of programmatic weaknesses.
The audit was very comprehensive in scope, and the results were reported to the appropriate level of management. The audit team included a technical specialist from another nuclear plant. A review of the licensee's response to the audit findings indicated that corrective actions were adequate and that the programs were being properly administered. Accordingly, Inspector Follow-Up Item (IFI) 50-244/92-16-01, previously assigned to the review of the QA aufit report, is closed.
.
3.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers. Detection and Assessment Aids 3.1 Protected Area (PA) Barrier The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the PA barrier on July 19 and 22,1993. The inspectors determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved security plan (the Plan).
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
3.2 PA Intrusion Detection Aids The inspectors observed surveillance testing (ST) of the perimeter detection aids on July 72,1993, and determined that they were installed, maintained, tnd operated as committed to in the Plan. However, three of the 27 intrusion detection system (IDS) zones were defeated at one location in each zone. The licensee immediately implemented compensatory measures and provided an I&C technician to monitor the system. The inspectors confirmed that the three zones had been tested satisfactorily during the previous ST. The I&C technician corrected the deficiencies. The three zones were retested under the observations of the inspectors and the results were satisfactory.
3.3 PA and Isolation Zone Lichtine The inspectors conducted a lighting survey in the PA and isolation zones on July 20,1993 from approximately 9:30 to 10:30 p.m. to determine iflighting levels met the minimum requirements of 0.2 footcandles. The inspectors were accompanied by the licensee's Security Training Coordinator. The inspectors determined by observation and use of the licensee's calibrated light meter that the station's lighting system exceeded the minimum requirements. The inspectors also found that the isolation zones were maintained clear to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.
3.4 Assessment Aids The inspectors noted through observations and discussions with licensee management that the assessment system upgrades were completed. The upgrades have been very effective in correcting the previously identified weaknesses. The inspectors observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
3.5 Vital. Area WA) Barriers The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of selected VA barriers on July.
21, 1993. The inspectors determined by observation that the VA barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan.
3.6 VA Detection Aids The inspectors observed testing of selected VA detection aids on July 21, 1993, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Pla ;
.
I
.
Except as noted in Section 3.2, no other deficiencies were identified in these areas.
4.0 Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel. Packages and Vehicles 4.1 Personnel Access Control The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:
4.1.1 The inspectors verified by observations that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges
,
and key cards.
4.1.2 The inspectors verified by observations that the licensee was i
implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan.
The inspectors observed both plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods on July 20 and 21,
1993. The inspectors' interviews with members of the security force and licensee security staffincluded questions to determine
,
understanding of personnel access procedures.
4.1.3 The inspectors determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their access badges as required.
'
4.1.4 The inspectors verified through a review that the licensee had escort procedures for visitors into the PA and VAs.
4.1.5 The inspectors verified through a review of procedures that the licensee had a mechanism for expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that mechanism was adequate for its intended purpose.
4.1.6 The inspectors verified through a review of records that the licensee took precautions to ensure that unauthorized names could not be added to the access list by having a member of management review the list I
every 31 days and by limiting the access computer program to essential individuals.
-
4.2 Package and Material Access Control The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA at the main access control portal. The inspectors reviewed the package and material control l
t
.
.
procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.
However, on July 22,1993, the inspectors accompanied by a Security Supervisor, observed a security officer at the off-loading dock who_ did not search approximately 20 packages, which were required to be searched, prior to release into the protected area. The security officer opened the packages.
but did not search the contents of the packages. The Security Supervisor implemented immediate corrective action by relieving the security officer of his duties and having the unsearched packages searched by another security
,
officer. The security officer involved was provided with hands-on retraining in package searching procedures.
The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan, dated May 1, l
1991, Revision A, Section 5.6.1, " Material and Package Search," states, in
'
part, that most material and packages for delivery into the PA are brought to the off-loading portal. After being properly identified and authorization determined, the material and packages are appropriately searched for devices
'
such as firearms, explosives and incendiary devices, consistent with radiation and practical considerations with five identified exceptions. - The failure to
>
appropriately search the packages, which were not excepted, prior to granting
the packages into the protected area is an apparent violation of NRC
!
requirements (VIO 50-244/93-15-01).
4.3 Vehicle Access Control The inspectors determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to
!
the PA. The inspectors determined that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA, with identification verified by a
security force member (SFM). The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle
!
search procedures and observed that at least two SFMs control vehicle access
at the main vehicle access portal. These procedures were consistent with the commitments in the Plan. On July 21 and 22,1993, the inspectors also
!
observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and j
the licensee's security staff regarding vehicle search procedures.
j Except as noted in Section 4.2, no other dem '7ncies were isntified in these areas.
5.0 Imcks. Keys and Combinations On July 22,1993, the inspectors reviewed the security lock, key and core procedures l
and determined they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectors l
also reviewed the protected and vital area key and core inventory logs, and discussed lock, key and core procedures with members of the licensee's security and operations
,
staff. No deficiencies were noted.
i t
a
.
.
.
6.0 Alarm Stations and Communications l
The inspectors observed the operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined that they were operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspectors and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors verified that the CAS and SAS operators were not required to engage in any operational activities that would interfere with assessment and response functions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee conducted communications with the local law enforcement agency as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
!
7.0 Emergency Power Supph The inspectors verified that there are several systems (batteries, dedicated diesel generator within a VA, and plant on-site AC power) that provide backup power to the security systems. The inspectors reviewed the test and maintenance records and procedures for these systems and found that they were consistent with the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
8.0 Testing. Maintenance and Comnensatory Measures The inspectors reviewed testing and maintenance records for security-related equipment and confirmed that tests were conducted, maintenance was performed and records were maintained as committed to in the Plan. The inspectors found that, routinely, corrective maintenance was completed in one to three days and did not appear to increase the use of compensatory measures. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
9.0 Security Training and Oualification
!
The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification (including physical) records for seven security force members (SFMs). The firearms requalifications records were also reviewed for armed SFMs and security supervisors
,
in the sample. The inspectors determined that the training and qualification had been r
conducted in accordance with the security training and qualification (T&Q) plan and that it was properly documented.
On July 22,1993, the inspectors observed security tactical response training which included two tactical response drills. The inspectors determined by observations that '
'
the licensee's tactical response program had been enhanced through the efforts of the training department. This was evident in the manner in which the drills were developed, controlled, and critiqued.
i
,
e e
T
.,
-.
..
._
..
,
.
!
.
Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite i
knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results
indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of thejob requirements. No
deficiencies were noted.
10.0 Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the
_
.
conclusion of the inspection on July 23,1993. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented. The licensee representatives present acknowledged the inspection findings.
i
!
.
.
S f
!
,
!
i
>
'i
)
i
,
I