IR 05000244/1985021
| ML17254A625 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1985 |
| From: | Gramm R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17254A624 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.25, TASK-TM 50-244-85-21, IEB-80-21, IEB-80-2L, NUDOCS 8511070356 | |
| Download: ML17254A625 (14) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-244/85-21 Docket No. 50-244 Licensee No.
DPR-18 Pr iority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
Inspection at:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted:
September 1,
1985 through October 19, 1985 Inspector:
M. A. Cook, Resident Inspector, Ginna Approved by:
Robert A.
ramm, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Section No.
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Date Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on Se tember
1985 throu h October
1985 Re ort No.
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k resident inspector (185 hours0.00214 days <br />0.0514 hours <br />3.058862e-4 weeks <br />7.03925e-5 months <br />).
Areas inspected included: plant activities during routine power operations; licensee action on previous findings; surveillance testing; Offsite Review Committee; Onsite Review Committee; IE Bulletin follow-up; Annual Emergency Exercise; maintenance; spent fuel shipments; LERs; and inspection of accessible portions of the facility during plant tours.
Results:
In the ten areas inspected, no violations were identified.
A recent negative trend in station housekeeping was observed by the inspector and detailed in paragraph ll.
Recent operational problems with the rod control system are discussed in paragraphs 3 and 12.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspector interviewed and talked with operators, technicians, engineering and supervisory level personnel.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item (82-10-02):
RCP seal integrity during SI and loss of offsite power.
The inspector observed that during a Safety Injection (SI), concurrent with a loss of offsite power, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
seal integrity could be jeopardized due to the lack of cooling flow.
Coolant charging pumps are tripped automatically on a SI signal.
Upon a loss of offsite power, the operating component cooling water pumps are deenergized.
As a result, RCP seal injection is lost and cooling flow to the thermal barriers is lost.
The inspector determined that the component cooling system is powered automatically from the emergency diesel generators during the automatic load sequencing after a loss of offsite power.
Consequently, RCP seal cooling flow is only momentarily interrupted.
A similar review of this item was performed and documented in Inspection Report No. 50-244/84-19 paragraph 4.d.
under an implementation review of TMI Action Plan (NUREG 0737) item II.K.3.25, "Effects of Loss of AC Power on Pump Seals".
Licensee response to item II.K.3.25 is documented in Maier to Crutchfield letter dated January 19, 1982.
NRR approval of the licensee's response is documented in Crutchfield to Maier letter dated July 2, 1982.
(Open) Violation (82-12-01):
Failure to implement adequate housekeeping controls.
This violation resulted from an apparent laxity in overall housekeeping practices observed by an inspector during a
1982 reporting period.
The corrective actions taken in response to this violation included an immediate plant cleanup effort and an ad-hoc committee review of administrative controls on housekeeping.
Emphasis of the committee review was to make improvements in surveillance such that housekeeping problems were identified before conditions deteriorated to an unacceptable level.
As noted in paragraph 11 of this report, the inspector has observed that current surveillance practices and management oversight in the area of housekeeping are still lacking.
This item remains open pending further review and demonstrated improvement in licensee management attention to housekeepin.
Review of Plant 0 erations a.
Throughout the reporting period, the inspector reviewed routine plant operations.
The reactor operated at 100% power this inspection per'iod with the following exceptions:
On September 16, 1985, a power level reduction was initiated to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3. 10.4.4 for control rod inoperability.
The power reduction was stopped at approximately 86% after the cause of the control rod problem was identified and corrected.
(Details of this event are discussed further in paragraph 12.)
On September 22, 1985, a planned load reduction was initiated to perform major tie line insulator repai rs and in-plant maintenance.
During the load reduction, a plant computer rod deviation alarm was received indicating two rods in control bank D were greater than 12 steps from the bank D step counter.
Preliminary investigation by I & C technicians determined that bank D control rods C-5 and C-7 were indicating, by measured Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) detector output,
steps higher than the two remaining rods in bank D.
Control board IRPI for bank D rods remained in agreement with each other and the bank D step counter, although the computer rod deviation alarm stayed locked in.
The licensee declared the bank D IRPI inoperable and commenced verification of rod positions by incore neutron flux mapping.
Four successive flux maps, performed as power was reduced, demonstrated actual bank D control rod position to be the same as bank D step counter demand position.
I & C Technicians performed a recalibration of the bank D IRPI to align indication with the bank step counter demand position.
The bank D IRPI was declared operable at 10: 15 A.M. and the forced shutdown was ended.
It is recognized that the IRPI system is extremely temperature sensitive.
The combination of inward rod movement, power reduction and subsequent RCS temperature decrease contributed to the rod position indication drift.
On September 28, 1985, the reactor was manually tripped from approximately 50% due to turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)
problems.
Early in the evening, turbine intercept, stop and control valve drifting was experienced.
Reactor power was reduced and turbine control placed in manual while troubleshooting the EHC problem.
Control room operators were unable to maintain proper turbine control as the EHC problem further degraded and the reactor and turbine were manually tripped at 10:05 P.M..
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Post-Trip Review data and found no discrepancies.
With one minor exception, all safety systems responded properly to the manual trip.
The rod bottom light for control rod H-02 did not illuminate and operators commenced immediate boration as required by Emergency Procedure (E)-20,
"Immediate Boration".
The licensee determined that the H-02 rod bottom light did not illuminate because of dirty contacts on one of the rod bottom bistable relays.
The relay was wiped clean and the light illuminated properly.
The licensee identified the cause of the EHC problem to be a
tube leak in the EHC fluid/service water cooler.
The leak resulted in the introduction of water into the EHC system.
Repairs were effected, the reactor returned to criticality September 29 and the unit synchronized with the grid at 3:37 A.M. September 30, 1985.
The manual reactor trip ended a continuous run of 114 days started on June 7,
1985.
The inspector verified that the events described above were properly reported to the NRC via. the Emergency Notification System (ENS) in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.72.
b.
During the inspection, accessible plant areas were toured.
Items reviewed include radiation protection controls, plant housekeeping, fire protection, equipment tagging and security.
A plant housekeeping review is detailed separately in paragraph 11.
c.
Inspector tours of the control room this inspection period included review of shift manning, operating logs and records, and equipment and monitoring instrumentation status.
d.
Safety system valves and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required for the applicable plant mode as specified by Technical Specifications and plant lineup procedures.
This verification included routine control board indication review and conduct of a partial systems lineup check of the Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems on October 7, 1985.
4.
Surveillance Testin a.
The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the test procedure was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance; test instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; the test was performed by qualified personnel; and the test results satisfied Technical Specifications and procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly resolved.
b.
The inspector witnessed the performance of a portion of the following tests:
Periodic Test (PT)-5.20,
"Process Instrumentation Reactor Protection Channel Trip Test (Channel 2 White)", Revision 31, dated 7/31/85, performed on September 16, 198 PT-16, "Auxiliary Feedwater System",
Revision 42, dated 3/13/85, performed on October 4, 1985.
Offsite Review Committee On October 3, 1985, the inspector observed Meeting No.
149 of the licensee's Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Board (NSARB).
The meeting was held at Ginna Station and chaired by Harry G. Saddock, Executive Vice President, RGEE and NSARB Chairman.
The inspector observed the conduct and reviewed the NSARB meeting agenda to ascertain whether the Offsite Review Committee is functioning in accordance with Technical Specifications and its Charter.
The inspector reviewed the current NSARB Charter and a draft revision to the Charter to verify consistency with current Technical Specifications.
No inconsistencies were noted.
The inspector verified that Board member qualifications, NSARB meeting frequency and quorum requirements were satisfied.
No discrepancies were noted.
Onsite Review Committee The inspector observed the conduct of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting No.85-105 held on September 18, 1985.
The inspector attended the meeting as a nonparticipant to observe the general conduct of the meeting and to verify the provisions of Technical Specifications regarding the PORC were satisfied.
A subsequent review of the meeting minutes was conducted to confirm that the decisions and recommendations of the Committee were properly documented and acted upon.
No discrepancies were noted.
IE Bulletin Follow-u The inspector reviewed licensee actions on the following IE Bulletin to determine that the written response was submitted within the required time period, that the response included the information required, that adequate corrective action was committed to and that licensee management provided adequate dissemination of the bulletin and the response.
The review included discussions with licensee personnel and observations of the item discussed below.
IE Bulletin 80-21:
"Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
, dated November 6, 1980.
This bulletin addressed a discovery made by Pennsylvania Power and Light Company of cracked valve yokes cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc. of Newark, New Jersey for the Anchor Darling Valve Company.
Analysis of the cracked yokes by Anchor Darling Valve Company determined that the valve yoke material had tensile and yield strengths below minimum ASTM material specifications.
No casting defects were identified.
Bulletin 80-21 required all licensees to determine if any valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems have valve parts cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc..
Valves identified as having parts made by Malcolm
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must have their mechanical properities verified and the defective parts or the entire valve replaced'he licensee received verification from all valve manufacturers who supplied safety-related valves to Ginna Station that Malcolm foundry valves or components were not used.
In addition, the inspector determined that the licensee performed hardness testing and visual inspection of all valve yokes supplied by Anchor Darling, including both stainless and carbon steel valves.
The licensee found no discrepancies.
The licensee's response to Bulletin 80-21 is documented in White to Grier letter, dated December 5,
1980.
This bulletin is closed.
8.
Annual Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise On September 26, 1985, the licensee conducted an Emergency Preparedness Exercise to demonstrate the response capabilities of the station and offsite support facilities, including state and local emergency response organizations.
A team of NRC inspectors observed the exercise and conducted a critique with the licensee on September 27, 1985.
The results of the NRC team review are documented in Inspection Report No.
50-244/85-20.
9, Plant Maintenance a.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; personnel qualifications; radiological controls for workers protection; and reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
b.
The inspector witnessed the following maintenance activity:
Minor maintenance performed October 16, 1985 on the lA service water pump in accordance with Maintenance Procedure (M)-11. 10. 1,
"Minor Inspection of Service Water Pump", Revision 5, dated January 25, 1984.
No discrepancies were noted.
10.
Review of S ent Fuel Cask Shi ments As of the end of this inspection report period, the licensee had received 34 spent fuel assemblies from the West Valley Demonstration Project in West Valley, New York.
The inspector has periodically reviewed licensee receipt inspection, radiation/contamination surveys, cask unloading and decontamination activities.
No discrepancies have been note ~
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v Health Physics technician coverage, radiological control practices, cask decontamination methods, guality Control oversight and general supervisory control and involvement in the spent fuel cask activities appear to be appropriate.
1. ~Hk During routine plant tours, the inspector observed general housekeeping practices and identified a negative trend in overall plant cleanliness and housekeeping.
The inspector conducted a comprehensive plant walkthrough this inspection period and presented a
summary of housekeeping and cleanliness discrepancies to licensee management.
Although no items identified presented an immediate health or safety concern, it appears that insufficient management and plant personnel attention has been given to this area and that general plant cleanliness and housekeeping is not up to standards.
12.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings and concerns and agreed that more positive measures must be instituted to make improvements in plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
The inspector observed immediate response by plant management to address this problem.
guality Control personnel, department managers and shop personnel have been involved in this effort.
The inspector will continue to monitor plant housekeeping and management involvement in elevating and maintaining plant cleanliness standards'he inspector is tracking this finding in conjunction with open inspection item number 82-12-01, previously discussed in paragraph 2.
Licensee Event Re orts LERs The inspector reviewed the following LERs to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, the description of the cause was accurate, and adequate corrective action was taken.
The inspector also determined whether further information was required, and whether generic implications were involved.
The inspector further verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and station administrative and operating procedures had been met; that the event was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within the Technical Specification limits.
85-16:
"Inoperable Rod Position Indicating System".
On September 16, 1985, while operating at 100% reactor power, the control rod position indication system was made inoperable to replace the +13 VDC and -13 VDC power supplies which were suspected of causing Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) fluctuations.
The system was inoperable for three minutes while replacing the power supplies and an additional 27 minutes while performing the system alignment.
While performing the necessary retest of the IRPI system, another problem was identified with the rod control system which is detailed in LER No. 85-1 ~
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85-17:
"Control Rod Insertion and Bank Overlap Violation".
Upon completion of the control rod position indication system power supply replacement and system alignment, detailed in LER No. 85-16, the post-maintenance testing identified another control rod system problem.
While performing Periodic Test (PT)-1,
"Rod Control System Testing", with bank D control rods selected, only two rods in bank D moved and two rods in bank B responded to the same motion signal.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that rod control power cabinet 1BD was inadvertently selecting the two bank B rods due to a faulty firing circuit card in the cabinet.
The firing circuit card was replaced and the control rod system was successfully retested.
Subsequent evaluation of the failed circuit card by Westinghouse revealed that this particular card failure would not result in any rod control non-urgent or urgent failure alarms which would alert the operators in the control room of a fault.
As a
compensatory measure, Operations shift Auxiliary Operators must periodically check the local rod control cabinet status lights to verify the proper control rod groups are selected.
The inspector followed licensee actions to identify, troubleshoot and correct the rod control system problems detailed in LERs 85-16 and 85-17.
The licensee proceeded cautiously and conservatively in addressing the problems and bringing them to final resolution.
The inspector had no further questions.
13.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts 14.
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the reports contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
Within this scope, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector:
Monthly Operating Reports for August and September 1985.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report, does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.