IR 05000244/1979006
| ML17244A568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1979 |
| From: | Keimig R, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17244A567 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-79-06, 50-244-79-6, NUDOCS 7906260509 | |
| Download: ML17244A568 (22) | |
Text
Report No.
79-06 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Docket No.
50-244 License No.
DPR-18 Pr iority Category Licensee:
Rochester Gas 5 Electric Cor oration 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit
Inspection at:
Ontario.
N Y.
Inspection conducted:
M~~ch 10-13.
979 Inspectors:
H., J.
Raymond, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
.
R. Keimi
, Cgief, gepctor Projects Section No.
'5+ ROMS Branch iL date signed/y d
e si'gned Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on March 10-13, 1979 Re ort No. 50-244/79-06)
~AI:.,
p i
i p
i bg gi based inspector (22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />).
Inspection areas (3):
witness of core reload activities; witness of outage maintenance activities; and review of pipe support and restraint surveillance program, including independent examination of installed pipe supports.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April, 77)
V'9 6626 OS%
s~, uy P (4
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DETAILS
.1.
Persons Contacted Mr. L. Boutwell, Mechanic Foreman Mr. L. Depew, Shift Foreman Mr.
R.
Hayes, Mechanic Mr.
R. Junot, Shift Foreman
~Mr. J.
Larizza, Technical Engineer
"Mr. T. Meyer, Nuclear Engineer
"Mr. J.
Noon, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr.
H.
Rose, First Class Machinist
"Mr. B.
Snow, Plant Superintendent Mr. S. Spector, Maintenance Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection, including members of the operations,,health physics, refueling, maintenance and general office staff.
"denotes those present at exit interview.
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2.
Refuelin Activities a ~
Refuelin Prere uisites The inspector verified by record review, observation and discussions with licensee personnel that the following refueling prerequisites were completed.
(1)
requirements established by Technical Specifications 3.2.1, 3.8, and 3.11 (2)
refueling machine and tool checkout, including bridge, crane and interlock testing (3)
containment and spent fuel pool ventilation and radiation monitor verifications (4)
fuel storage pool cooling capacit 'ls 4b
b.
References (1)
RF 10. 1, Auxiliary Building Crane Interlock Checkout, Rev.
2, 1/18/79 (2)
RF 8.3, Core Load Periodic Equipment Status Check, Rev.
10, 5/12/77 (3)
RF 8.2, Fuel Handling Instruction Pre-loading and Periodic Valve Test, Rev.
13, 4/25/78 (4)
RF 53, Cycle VIII-IXRefueling, Rev.
0, 2/12/79 (5)
FP-RGE-R8, RE Ginna Refueling Procedure Cycle VIII-IX, Rev.
0, 2/9/79; inclusive of changes through PCN 79-609, dated 3/9/79 (6)
RF 8.0, Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement Pre-requisite and Precautions, Rev.
8, 4/4/77 (7)
RF 2A, Requirements for Reactor Vessel Head Removal, Rev.
6, 7/12/78 (8)
RF 2B, Required Valve Lineup for Reactor Head Removal, Rev.
6, 4/25/78 C.
(9)
RF 2D, Filling the Refueling Canal, Rev.
8, 4/19/78 (10)
Shift Foreman's Log for the period 2/10 to 3/10/79 (11)
Official Record for the period 2/10 to 3/10/79 (12)
Technical Specifications 3.2, 3.8 and 3.11 Fuel Handl in Activities The inspector verified by direct observation and record review that fuel handling activities were being conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures and Technical Specification re-quirements.
The following areas were inspected:
(1)
Core subcritical monitoring during refueling and during fuel shuffle suspensions of activit \\
(2)
Core shutdown margin established by maintaining a boron concentration of at least 2000 ppm B in the reactor cavity, RHR system and spent fuel pit.
(3)
Fuel manipulations over the core and spent fuel pit, as well as fuel tranfers from the reactor cavity to the spent fuel pool, were conducted in accordance with refuel-ing procedures.
(4)
Fuel accountability was maintained in accordance with RF 53.
(5)
Refueling area housekeeping was controlled to prevent loose articles from falling into the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool.
(6)
Core internal and reactor vessel component/equipment was stored to protect against damage.
(7)
Refueling crew, staffing conformed with proc'edure RF 53 and Tech Spec requirements.
(8)
Reactor cavity and spent fuel pool water level and temper-ature were maintained as required by the Tech Specs.
(9)
An SRO with no other concurrent duties supervised all fuel handling activites in the containment and licensed operators (ROs and SROs) monitored fuel handling from the control room.
(10)
Communications were maintained between the control room, the spent fuel pool area, the refueling bridge operator and the fuel transfer carriage operator as required by procedure.
(11)
Containment and auxiliary buil"ding integrity and ventilation was maintained as require d.
Fuel Shuffle Mitnessin The inspector arrived onsite at 8:00 p.m.
on 3/10/79 and observed plant system status from the control room.
The shift forman informed the inspector that fuel shuffle activites had been temporarily suspended since 3:00.p.m.
on 3/10 due to poor visibility in the reactor cavity.
Core relo'ading was about one-third complete.
Reactor cavity water became clouded aft'er CROs started the low pressure purification pump, apparantly due to fine debris in the mixed bed demineralizers.
The inspector verified that plant system. status and core monitoring were in confromance with procedural and Technical Specification requirements during the evening of 3/10/79.
The fuel shuffle resumed at about 8:00 a.m.
on 3/ll/79 after cavity water clarity improved.
The inspector witnessed refueling activities in the control room, containment and spent fuel pool area during the afternoon and evening shifts on 3/ll/79.
Approved refueling procedures were available and in use by refueling personnel, and fuel status boards were maintained as required during fuel movement.
Minor difficulties experienced during the reload included:
(i) fuel assembly insertion into the core with less than four-sided lateral support from adjacent assemblies; and, (ii)
periodic noise problems on source range channel N32, resulting in intermittent increases in channel output.
Refueling personnel suspended core loading during periods when channel output was questionable.
Investigation of the N32 channel by I8C personnel identified no cause for the problem.
The inspector noted that increases in N32 output was erratic and would occur at times when fuel was not being loaded into the core.
The inspector also observed N32 response during the loading of core positions Ell and E12, core locations between N32 and a source assembly, to verify that the channel was responding to subscritical multiplication.
Licensee evaluations and dispositioning of problems encountered during the fuel shuffle were appropriate.
No items of noncompliance were identified with refueling activitie.
Outa e Maintenance The inspector reviewed the maintenance activities scheduled during the period from March 10-12, 1979 with licensee personnel and noted the.status of jobs in progress as displayed on the plan-a-log.
Safety-related maintenance in progress during the inspection was observed to verify:
work was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with approval procedures, including the completion of prerequisite conditions; adherence to established controls for removing a system from service and returning a system to service; controls were established for post maintenance testing; and, appropriate health physics controls were established and followed.
References (1)
M 11.8J, RCP Major Maintenance Inspection-Mechcanical, Rev.
1, 5/6/78 (2)
M 11.8K, RCP Motor Minor Inspection, Rev.
2, 6/13/78 (3)
M 11.8G, RCP Post Maintenance Operations Check, Rev.
3, 9/23/76 b.
(4)
SMP 1056, 3/12/79 RCP Maintenance During the performance of M 11.8J on the lA RCP, with the motor uncoupled from the pump, attempts to turn the motor manually failed to obtain the break away point with a 300 ft-lb rotational force applied.
Failure to acheive motor break away at 300 ft-lbs indicated a possible lube oil tube leak in the oil lift system.
(No pre-shutdown problems were noted in 1A RCP operation by CROs).
The inspector witnessed the work in progress on 3/12/79 to disassemble the RCP motor upper
4S
sections to investigate the lube oil system piping. Maintenance personnel identified a broken lube oil line in the vicinity of the lower friction ring, located below the motor flywheel and racket assembly.
Mork was in progress to repair the lube oil line at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector had no further questions regarding the work activities in progress on 3/12/79 or in the licensee's repair plans.
This item will be examined on a subsequent inspection, pending completion of licensee's review regarding the cause of the line failure, and a determination of whether further corrective actions are appropriate (244/79-06-01).
4.
Pi e
Su ort and Restraint Surveillance The licensee's established program for surveillance of pipe support, restraints and component support structures was reviewed to verify program conformance with Technical Specification and regulatory requirements.
References (1)
M 40.0, Surveillance and Maintenance of Hydraulic Snubbers, Rev.
10, 8/15/78; including PCN 78-1334 dated 6/29/78 and PCN 78-1494 dated 8/2/78 (2)
M 40.2, Hydraulic Snubber Maintenance Procedure (Bergen Patter'son),
Rev.
6, 12/28/77, including PCN 77-2402 dated 12/15/77.
(3)
M 40.3, Inspection and Maintenance of Spring Hangers, Rev.
3, 6/1/77; including PCN 79-900 dated 5/5/78 and PCN 79-901 dated 5/15/78.
(4)
M 40.5, Hydraulic Snubber Maintenance Procedure (ITT Grinell), Rev.
2, 1/9/78; including PCN 77-2404, dated
'12/15/77.
(5)
M 40.6, Steam Generator Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Leakage Test and Inspection, Rev.
0, 3/16/76, including PCN 78-135 dated 2/3/78, PCN 78-403 dated 3/24/78 and PCN 78-607 dated 4/13/7 (6)
M 40.8, Functional Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers, Rev.
3, 10/29/78, including PCN 78-790 dated 5/9/78, PCN 78-1326 dated 6/9/78 and PCN 78-2246 dated 10/17/78.
b.
Procedure Review The technical content of procedures listed in item (a) above (including changes thereto)
were reviewed to verify that the procedures are adequate for their intended function and to ascertain that provisions for the following are incorporated:
(1)
categorized listing of pipe support and restraints, specifying component location, inspections required and system designation.
(2)
identification of required inspection intervals.
(3)
examination of hydraulic fluid level, piston and/or resevoir vents, fluid leak indications and indications of freeze-up conditions.
(4)
snubber testing, including provisions for prerequisite conditions, acceptance criteria, identification of parameters to be measured and designation of lock up velocity and bleed rate.
C.
(5)
sample testing of hydraulic fluid for contaminants.
(6)
identification of snubbers tested, including their location and associated piping system, requirements for data/findings to be recorded for review and evaluation by licensee management.
The inspector identified no inadequacies regarding procedure requirements.
Com onent Ins ection The inspector conducted a hands-on examination of dynamic and fixed pipe supports, including associated support structures, identified below to verify that acceptable conditions exist in regard to the following:
corrosion and deterioration deformation of support plates, extension rods and connecting joints tightness of bolts, nuts and washers bleed holes open and free of foreign material lubricants applied as required fasters securely attached indications of freeze-up signs of physical damage interference between pipes and supports spring hanger positions conform with "hot" and "cold" settings deformation of support structures from forced bending existence of cracks or similar indications on support structure welded surfaces Items examined during an inspection tour of containment, intermediate building and outside areas on 3/12/79 included the following:
entification Number ubbers S stem/Location AFM-25,26,28,29 AFM"10, 13 FM-3 FM"81 FM 30 H7, H8 AS-l46 Top Fixed Su orts
"A" Feedwater(FDW)/CTMT
"B" FDM/CTMT
"A" FDW/CTMT
"B" FDW/IB (outside)
"B" FDM/IB PZR Relief/CTMT MS/IB (outside)
PRH-11,
AFM-ll, 30 MS-13, 14,
RH-10 Fl<-1, 2,
PZR/CTMT FDM/CTMT MS/$ B (outside)
RHR/CTMT FDW/CTNT Except as noted below, the inspector had no further comments regarding the items inspecte (1)
Sunbber MS-146 To Examination of snubber NS-146 Top revealed the presence of grease/fluid along the snubber shaft external to the piston chamber, with signs of possible corrosion.
This information was presented to the Maintenance Engineer for licensee followup and evaluation.
This item will be reviewed on a subsequent inspection to determine the results of the licensee's evaluation and dispositioning for MS-146 Top (244/79-06-02).
d. ~PS The licensee's snubber/restraint surveillance program was discussed with the Maintenance Engineer to review the program status and identify work in progress during the present outage.
The licensee came into the current outage on a six month inspection interval for,snubbers requiring a visual inspection.
Snubber functional testing is in progress per procedure N
40.8.
Hands-On inspection of supports are being conducted in accordance with M 40.0 and is about 95K complete.
Eight Bergen Patterson snubbers, removed for overhauling, will have spring coils replaced to correct problems identified in IEB 78-10.
Since the last plant shutdown, four snubbers (NS-146 Top, MS-146 Bottom, FW 30, NS 14) were removed and functionally tested.
MS-146 Top and MS 146 Bottom failed the functional test, as reported to NRC: Region I in LERs 78-06.
During this outage, eight additional snubbers (AFW-31, FW-5, AFW-10, FW-80, FW-82, MS-160, NS-148 and H-3) were removed for functional testing.
All passed the functional test except FW-82.
As a result, snubbers MS-22, MS-159, H-5 and FW-25 were removed for testing.
All four snubbers have reportedly passed the functional test.
The inspector discussed with the Maintenance Engineer the Tech Spec requirements for adjusting the snubber visual inspection frequency based on the number of problems identified during the previous inspection interval.
The inspection frequency will be defined pending licensee completion and formal review of the surveillance program finding The inspector had no further comments on this area at this time, but informed the licensee that current surveillance programs results and inspection records from the previous inspection interval will be reviewed by NRC: Region I on a subsequent inspection (244/79-06-03).
5.
Exit Interview A management meeting w'as held with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 13, 1979.
The purpose, Scope and findings of the inspection were discusse V