IR 05000244/1979005
| ML17244A527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1979 |
| From: | Crocker H, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17244A525 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-79-05, 50-244-79-5, NUDOCS 7905240306 | |
| Download: ML17244A527 (18) | |
Text
U;S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-244/79-05 Docket No.
50-244 License No.
DPR-18 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Cor oration 89 East Avenue Rochester New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E.
Ginna. Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at:
Ontario, New York Inspection conducted:
March 5-8, 1979 Inspectors:
G.
P.
uhas, Radiation pecialist date igndd date signed Approved by:
H.
W. Crocker, ng Chief, Radiation Support Section, FFNIS Branch R
date signed
~ date igned Ins ection Summar:
Ins ection on March 5-8; 1979 Re ort No. 50-244/79-05 R,
p
11 dd p
of the radiation protection program durping routine refueling operations including:
procedures; planning.and preparation; training; exposure control; posting and area control; surveys;. and followup on previous inspection findings.
Upon arrival.at 7:00 p.m., March 5, 1979, areas where work was being conducted were examined to review implementation of radiation safety practices and procedures.
'his inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on site by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
Cl
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- B. A. Snow, Station Superintendent
- E. L.. DeMerritt, Supervisor, Chemistry and Health Physics
- D. Filkins, Senior Chemist
- R. Watts, Technical Assistant D. Morrill, Training Coordinator
- denotes those present at the exit interview on March 8, 1979.
The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other li-censee employees and contractors including, members of the health physics, maintenance and training staffs.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s (Closed)
Noncompliance (77-06-02):
Failure to provide a radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate when individuals are present in high radiation areas.
The licensee was issued Amendment No.
18 to Provisional Operating License No.
DPR-18 on March 31, 1978.
This amendment modified the Technical Specifications to provide alternative methods to assure proper radiation monitoring while individuals are present in high radiation areas.
The licenseo has revised procedure Health Physics HP-4.3 to insure one of the appropriate alternatives is delineated on the Special Work Permit (SWP) forms.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (78-03-07):
Failure to post and barricade the pressurizer cubical.
The licensee has installed a self-closing gate at the entrance to this area.
In addition, the licensee has implemented procedure A-54.6, "Health Physics Tour" to insure ade-quate posting and barricading is maintained.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (78-03-08):
Failure to provide locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry to an area near the regenerative heat exchanger.
The licensee has installed a chain link enclosure that has been locked to prevent unauthorized entry into this are (Closed)
Noncompliance (50-244/78-03-11):
Failure to perform a
survey necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.101.
Pro-cedures HP-1.1, "Issuing Personnel Dosimeters" and HP-1.3,
"Ex-ternal Exposure Records" have been revised to address documentation of dose assessments made in the event an individual's film badge becomes lost or damaged.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (78-03-13):
Failure to furnish reports of individual s exposure to radiation and radioactive materails.
The licensee furnished the required reports.
In addition, the admini-strative staff has been increased and procedure HP-3.1,
"Exposure Reports to Individuals and the NRC" has been revised.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (78-03-14):
Failure to ship radioactive materials in accordance with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 71.3.
Procedures RD-9, "Preparing Waste for Shipment on Storage" and RD-10, "Shipping Radioactive Material" have been revised.
Procedures gCIP-21, "Shipping Package LL-50-100 Inspection" and gCIP-22,
"Shipping Package HN-100 Series 1 Inspection" have been implemented.
A review of those records for shipments of radioactive materials performed during 1979 indicate compliance with the re-quirements specified in 10 CFR 71.3.
Procedures The following procedures were reviewed to determine if recent changes have been made in accordance with Administrative Procedure A-19,
"Changes in Written Procedures" and are consistent with Section 11.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
Procedure No.
A-l.l A-54.6 RF-2 Title Locked Radiation Areas Health Physics Tour Reactor Refueling Outage Operations and Activities RF-2A Requirements for Reactor Head Removal
M-43.2 SM-79-2417.2 HP-3.1 Initial Radiological Survey
"B" Steam Generator J-Tube Modification Exposure Reports to Individuals and the nuclear Regulatory Commission No item of noncompliance was identified in this area.
Plannin and Pre aration The licensee's planning and preparation for this outage have pro-vided an adequate supply of equipment and personnel to insure the radiation protection program is fully implemented.
The station health physics staff has been agumented with twelve contractor supplied health physics technicians.
Half of these technicians have worked at this station during previous refueling outages.
The licensee has provided station health physics technicians to supervise the activities of these temporary personnel in accordance with the requirements of procedure A-50.9.3, "Health Physics Technician Training and Responsibility Limits".
$ n addition, health physicists have been assigned to provide round the clock management support.
Tours of the facility indicate an adequate supply of calibrated in-strumentation and equipment has been made available for use.
To maintain the supply of protective clothing, the licensee has contracted a portable dry-cleaning system.
This system is operated by the contractor's representative under this facility's license.
The operator received training by the licensee and operates the system in accordance with the licensee's radiation protection pro-cedures.
From a review of records, discussion with the operator, and licensee representative, the inspector learned that this process appears to have decreased the liquid effluent input from the normal contaminated laundry by a factor of two thirds.
Measurements made by the inspector of the residual radioactivity on ten items of protective clothing indicated no level greater than 2 mrad/hr at contact.
No item of noncompliance was identified in this are.
~Tnainin The names of fifteen individuals were selected from those that had participated in the steam generator maintenance performed during this outage.
Records were reviewed to verify that these individuals had received the training specified in 10 CFR 19.12, "Instruction to workers."
The licensee provided this instruction in two ways.
First, each individual. completed the "General Employee Training" then all received specialized job specific training using the steam generator mock-up.
From the record review, the inspector noted that many of the individuals have been previously involved in steam generator eddy current testing and received retraining on about an annual basis.
The twelve temporary health physics technicians reported to the facility one'eek'rior: to this outage for training and familiari-zation.
During this week,'.,each individual completed the "General
~
Employee Training",
a review of selected facility procedures,
'and familiarization with the licensee's equipment and instrumentation.
No item..of. noncompliance.wasridentified.in this'area.
~
~
6. ~EC a.
The inspector reviewed the exposure records of 15 individuals selected at random from the licensee's exposure control records.
These records reviewed against the following requirements:
Area Dosimetry Re uirement
CFR 20.202, HP-l.l, "Issuing Per-sonnel Dosimeters" External Exposure Internal Exposure Exposure Records
CFR 20.101, HP-1.2, "External Exposure Limits"
CFR 20.103
CFR 20.401, HP-1.3, "External Exposure Records,"
HP-3.2, "In-Plant Reporting of Current Exposure"
In the three instances noted below, a difference in dose as measured by the individual's pocket dosimeter and film badge was observed.
In each case, procedure HP-1.5,
"Dosimeter Discrepancy Evaluation" had been implemented, and the dose to be assigned to the individual is indicated.
Individual Pocket Dosimeter
~Fil
d A
2100 mrem 1800 mrem B
1660 mr em 1550 mrem C
2000 mrem 1500 mrem Dose Assi nment 1800 mr em 1550 mrem 1935 mrem A review of exposure records for February 1979 indicated five instances where individuals had reported their film badges lost.
Records show the evaluation required by Section 5 of HP-l.l had been completed.
The licensee stores personnel dosimetry on open racks located in the Guard House.
Careless acquisition of this dosimetry was considered to be responsible for several of these lost badges.
The licensee is contemplating alternative methods of personnel dosimetry storage and issue.
b.
Two jobs were reviewed to establish if the licensee had made every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures
"as low as is reasonably achievable" (ALARA).
(1)
The lower core internals package was removed from the vessel and placed in the reactor cavity for a scheduled inservice inspection.
An aluminum bridge had been constructed to allow access over the submerged internals.
The Health Physicist and his staff established that the whole body dose rate to individuals standing on the bridge would be 270 mrem/hr.
The licensee took three measures to reduce the working dose rate.
These in-cluded:
minor modification to permit increasing the reactor cavity water level by about eight inches; the aluminum bridge was abandoned in favor of the manipulator crane; and the manipulator crane platform was shielded with lead blankets.
These actions reduced the whole body dose rate to 80 mrem/hr.
The licensee estimates the cost of reducing the dose rate was
$600.
A review
'f Special Work Permits (SWP)
No. 709, 726 and 784 for
work over the internals package indicate the licensee's actions may have resulted in a savings of 5.4 MAN-REM in the performance of these tasks.
(2)
During transfer of irradiated fuel through the fuel trans-fer tube,. surveys have shown transient dose rates of up to 140 mr/hr per two minutes.
An access way in the per-manent shielding is blocked with stacked concrete bricks.
The transient dose rate measured inside the bricks was 60 R/hr.
Since these bricks are not secured the licensee has provided a locked chain link fence as a, temporary measure to minimize any potential dose from the fuel transfer.
In addition, a permanent lead and steel sheild will be installed at cost of about
$10,000 to replace the stacked bricks and chain link fence.
The measures wi:Tl'esult in a very small MAN-REM savings but are ex-pected to prevent a potentially large single exposure.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
7.
Postin and Area Control a.
The inspector toured the restricted areas several times to verify compliance with the following requirements:
Area Posting Re uirement
CFR 20.203, Technical Specification 6.13, Procedures HP-5.2, and HP-6.2.
Area Control
CFR 20.203, Technical Specification 6.13, Procedures HP-1.4, HP-1.6, HP-4.1, A-l.l, and A-3 All areas inspected were adequately posted and properly con-trolled.
b.
The following SWP's were in progress and reviewed by the inspector during tours of the containment buildin SWP No.
970 972 975 Title Repair Spring Hinges Grease Fan Bearings Fuel Movement 968 981 Accumulator Level Transmitters Instrumentation Repair The requirements of Technical Specification 3.11,
"Fuel Handling in the Auxiliary Building" were reviewed in conjunction with SWP No. 975.
C.
Many other SWP's were reviewed to evaluate their adequacy and implementation.
On February 19, 1979, an individual suffered a fatal heart attack while working under SWP 445,
'J'ube Modification".
Based on a review of records and from discussion with idividuals involved, it appears that no re-gulatory requirements expressed in 10 CFR 19 or 10 CFR 20 were violated.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has conducted an independent review of this matter.
Implementation of procedure A-54.6, "Health Physics Tour" was reviewed for this outage.
These tours are being completed and their findings appear revelant and consistent with enhance-ment of the radiation protection program.
No item of noncompliance was identified in this area.
8.
~Surve s
a.
Independent measurements were made and records reviewed to determine compliance with the below listed requirement.
-
~
Area General Radiation Airborne Activity Contamination Steam Generator Re uirement
CFR 20.201 HP-4.3, HP-5.1 L
CFR 20.103(a),
HP-12.3 HP-6.1, HP-12.5 M-43-2 b.
Records indicate that the licensee has effectively applied process and engineering controls to limit concentrations of radioactive material in air.
At the time of inspection, no individual appears to have inhaled a quantity of radioactive materials in excess of 25K of that which would result from inhalation for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> in any one week at the uniform con-centrations of radioactive material in.air specified in Appendix B, Table I, Column 1 of 10 CFR 20.
In order to remove the lower vessel internals package, the incore flux thimbles had to be retracted to a position slightly below the reactor vessel.
This retraction was per-formed according to procedure RF-14.1.1,
"Thimble Retraction Procedure for Plant Refueling".
Since the thimbles were being withdrawn further than normal, the health physics staff anticipated the need to closely survey the area near the Sump A hatch.
When withdrawn, the thimbles produced a whole body dose rate of 3 R/hr in the area outside this locked hatch.
The dose rate in the same location is recorded to be 25 mr/hr during the 1978 outage.
The licensee secured the area with locked chain link fence to prevent unauthorized access to the Sump A area.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 8, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this repor l