IR 05000237/2005002
| ML051250208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/2005 |
| From: | Julio Lara Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-05-002 | |
| Download: ML051250208 (29) | |
Text
May 5, 2005
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 FIRE PROTECTION TRIENNIAL BASELINE INSPECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2005002(DRS); 05000249/2005002(DRS)
Dear Mr. Crane:
On April 1, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 1, 2005, at the Dresden Station and during a telephone conference call on April 22, 2005, with Mr. D. Bost and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance, which involved a violation of NRC requirements, was identified. However, because the violation was of very low safety significance and because the issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a Non-Cited Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Dresden Nuclear Power facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Julio F. Lara, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000237/2005002(DRS); 05000249/2005002(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
Site Vice President - Dresden Nuclear Power Station Dresden Nuclear Power Station Plant Manager Regulatory Assurance Manager - Dresden Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Manager Licensing - Dresden and Quad Cities Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000237/2005002(DRS); 05000249/2005002(DRS); 03/14/2005 - 04/01/2005; Dresden
Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Fire Protection Triennial Baseline Inspection.
This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. One Green finding associated with a Non-Cited Violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. The licensee failed to specify the correct number of turns in a hot shutdown procedure for partially opening a valve relied upon to mitigate a fire. The incorrect number of turns specified in the procedure could have caused a significant delay in performance of safe shutdown actions in the event of a fire. Once identified, the licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program to revise the affected procedures.
This finding was more than minor because the procedural error could have caused a significant delay in the performance of safe shutdown actions in the event of a fire. The issue was of very low safety significance because the licensees analysis showed that sufficient margin remained for the performance of the safe shutdown actions. The finding was a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which required procedures affecting quality to be of a type appropriate to the circumstances. (Section 1R05.5b)
Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 operated at or near full power at the start of the inspection. On March 24, 2005, a Unit 2 reactor scram occurred. Unit 2 was returned to full power on March 27, 2005.
Unit 3 operated at or near full power throughout the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection
The purpose of this inspection was to review the Dresden Nuclear Power Stations (DNPSs) Fire Protection Program (FPP) for selected risk-significant fire areas.
Emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors used the DNPSs Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) to choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire zones chosen for review during this inspection were:
Selected Fire Areas and Zones Fire Area Fire Zones Description RB2-II 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Second Floor Reactor Building TB-III 8.2.5.E Unit 3 West Corridor and Trackway TB-III 8.2.6.E Unit 3 Mezzanine Floor For each of these fire zones, the inspection focused on the fire protection features, the systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, determination of licensee commitments, and changes to the FPP.
.1 Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.1, required the licensee to provide fire protection features that were capable of limiting fire damage to structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safe shutdown.
The SSCs that were necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown were required to be protected by fire protection features that were capable of limiting fire damage to the SSCs so that:
- One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) was free of fire damage; and
- Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72-hours.
Specific design features for ensuring this capability were specified by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire area selected for review in accordance with the criteria discussed above. Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. This review included the fire protection safe shutdown analysis.
The inspectors also reviewed the operators ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the actions.
The inspectors reviewed the DNPSs Updated Safety Analysis Report and the licensees engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, technical specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and deviations) to determine the licensing basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, required separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, required that, if the guidelines cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration should be provided.
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire zones, the inspectors reviewed the licensees Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of a fire in accordance with the criteria discussed above.
This included a review of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions and to make the necessary repairs to reach cold shutdown within 72-hours.
The inspectors also reviewed procedures to determine whether or not adequate direction was provided to operators to perform these manual actions. Factors such as timing, access to the equipment, and the availability of procedures, were considered in the review.
The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems, fire area barriers, penetration seals, and fire doors to ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment was free of fire damage. To accomplish this, the inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems, fire barriers, construction details, and supporting fire tests for the installed fire barriers. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee documentation, such as deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings, carbon dioxide pre-operational test reports, smoke removal plans, Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) reports, SSA, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes to verify that the fire barrier installations met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that SSCs important to safe shutdown be provided with fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of fire damage. Options for providing this level of fire protection were delineated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where the protection of systems whose function was required for hot shutdown did not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, were required to be provided that was independent of the cables, systems, and components in the area. For such areas, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3, specifically required the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to be physically and electrically independent of the specific fire areas and capable of accommodating post-fire conditions where offsite power was available and where offsite power was not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees SSA and Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) to determine whether the licensee had appropriately identified and analyzed the safety related and non-safety related cables associated with safe shutdown equipment located in the selected plant fire zones in accordance with the criteria discussed above. The inspectors review included the assessment of the licensee's electrical systems and electrical circuit analyses.
The inspectors evaluated a sample of safety and non-safety related cables for equipment in the selected fire zones to determine if the design requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 were being met. This included determining that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground would not prevent implementation of safe shutdown.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified that the licensee evaluated their post-fire safe shutdown circuit analysis using a method that was not consistent with the methodology described in the NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2004-003, Revision 1, Risk-Informed Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections, issued on December 29, 2004. The licensees position was that the RIS guidance was outside DNPSs licensing basis.
Description:
During the inspectors review of the licensees FPP, specifically the review of Issue Report (IR) 00311499, Potential for Multiple Spurious Actuations During Fire, dated March 11, 2005, the licensee stated that the RIS guidance exceeded the Dresden licensing basis, which only required DNPSs consideration of any and all spurious signals taken one at a time. The licensee stated that the RIS 2004-003, Revision 1, guidance and/or methodology was not within the DNPSs licensing basis.
Based on the licensees position, as stated in the IR, the inspectors requested the licensee to provide a basis supporting their position with respect to the RIS. On March 24, 2005, the licensee provided a position paper and supporting documentation.
The position paper and supporting documentation did not specifically state that the NRC approved DNPSs methodology for analyzing fire induced spurious operations based on a single spurious operation.
Further discussions between the licensee and the NRC on April 13, 2005, did not provide new, additional information. As a result, the NRC concluded that a thorough review of DNPSs licensing basis was necessary and additional inspection effort was warranted to evaluate the licensees FPP. Therefore, pending review and completion of additional inspection activities concerning the DNPSs FPP, this issue is an Unresolved Item (URI) (URI 05000237/2005002-01(DRS);05000249/2005002-01(DRS)).
.4 Alternative Shutdown Capability
Title 10, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.1, required the licensee to provide fire protection features that were capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of fire damage. Specific design features for ensuring this capability were provided in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where compliance with the separation criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, could not be met, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided that was independent of the specific fire area under consideration. Additionally, alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be able to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions and achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72-hours and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the post-fire safe shutdown, the reactor coolant process variables must remain within those predicted for a loss of normal alternating current power, and the fission product boundary integrity must not be affected (i.e., no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary).
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions in accordance with the criteria discussed above. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Operational Implementation of Alternate Shutdown Capability
The DNPSs FPP described the means by which safe shutdown could be achieved to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L. The DNPSs safe shutdown analysis identified the minimum number of components and plant systems necessary for achieving Appendix R safe shutdown performance goals.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees operating procedures, which augmented the post-fire safe shutdown procedures to determine if the licensee complied with the criteria discussed above. The review focused on ensuring that all required functions for post-fire safe shutdown and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The review also looked at operator training, as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, having very low safety significance (Green) for failing to specify the correct number of turns in a hot shutdown procedure for partially opening a valve relied upon to mitigate a fire. The incorrect number of turns specified in the procedure could have caused a significant delay in performance of safe shutdown actions in the event of a fire.
Description:
Safe shutdown actions for a significant fire in Fire Area RB2-1 (Unit 2 Reactor Building) were outlined in DSSP 0100-B1, Hot Shutdown Procedure - Path B1.
The procedures Attachment E, U2 EA [equipment attendant] Actions, specified local manual actions that initiated cooling using the isolation condenser. Step 1.c of DSSP 0100-B1 (Revision 26), Attachment E, directed operators to manually open valve MO 2-1301-2 by engaging the handwheel and cranking the valve to its backseat or until completing 553 turns. Valve MO 2-1301-2 was normally an open valve. However, the licensee determined that, if the valve had spuriously closed in the event of a fire, the valve would have to be manually opened at least halfway to provide adequate steam flow to the isolation condenser. When the inspectors questioned the licensee on how long it would take to perform this procedure step, the licensees engineering personnel determined that the valve only required 190 turns to open the valve halfway for an estimated time of 10 minutes. However, given the procedural guidance to open the valve by cranking it to its backseat or until completing 553 turns, an operator would have fully opened the valve. Licensee engineering personnel estimated that it would take 18.5 minutes to fully open the valve manually. Licensee operations personnel estimated the amount of time it would take to complete the actions (including fully opening valve MO 2-1301-2) to initiate isolation condenser cooling specified by DSSP 0100-B1, E, to be 31 minutes. The estimates were based on a combination of walkdowns of portions of the procedure and judgement. The walkdowns did account for taking an alternate route so as to avoid entering the affected fire area. The inspectors noted that the calculated evaluation of fire scenarios (i.e., Calculation GE-NE-A22-00103-56-01-D, Dresden and Quad Cities Extended Power Uprate Evaluation, Task T0611: Appendix R Fire Protection (Dresden Station), Revision 1)concluded that, under worst case conditions, operations personnel would only have 32 minutes to initiate isolation condenser cooling. The inspectors concluded that the procedure error could result in a significant delay in performance of safe shutdown actions in the event of a fire. The delay was significant because it could result in a significant reduction of margin from 9.5 minutes to 1 minute for performing operator actions.
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that failing to specify the correct number of turns to manually open valve MO 2-1301-2 halfway was a performance deficiency warranting a significance determination evaluation. The inspectors concluded that the finding was greater than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, issued on June 20, 2003. The finding involved the attribute of protection against external factors (fire) in that the procedural error resulted in a significant delay for performing safe shutdown manual actions in the event of a fire.
The inspectors completed a significance determination of this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, dated December 1, 2004, and IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, dated February 28, 2005. Based on review of IMC 0609, Appendix F, the inspectors concluded that the finding affected the post-fire plant response procedures element of the post-fire safe-shutdown finding category.
However, since the licensees analysis showed that sufficient margin remained for the performance of the safe shutdown actions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Enforcement:
The licensees Quality Assurance Program (QAP) is the method for complying with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. The QAP is defined in NO-AA-10, Quality Assurance Topical Report [QATR], Revision 72, and its implementing procedures. The licensees FPP and supporting operational activities are defined in the QATRs Appendix A and F as meeting augmented quality requirements.
The QATR stated that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements shall be used for augmented quality requirements.
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Procedure DSSP 0100-B1 was a procedure for activities affecting quality in that the procedure directed operators to manipulate safety-related equipment such as valve MO 2-1301-2.
Contrary to the above, as of April 1, 2005, DSSP 0100-B1, Revision 26, was not a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances in that Step 1.c of DSSP 0100-B1, E, specified the incorrect number of turns for manually opening valve MO 2-1301-2 halfway. The incorrect number of turns specified by the procedure had the potential to cause an operator to fully open valve MO 2-1301-2, thereby, significantly delaying performance of safe shutdown actions used to initiate isolation condenser cooling in the event of a fire. The licensees engineering staff entered this finding into the licensees corrective action program as Issue Report (IR) 00315437 on March 21, 2005, to revise the affected procedures. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000237/2005002-02(DRS);05000249/2005002-02(DRS)).
.6 Communications
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.H, required that a portable communications system be provided for use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown. This system should not interfere with the communications capabilities of other plant personnel. Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure to fire damage.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties to determine compliance. The inspectors conducted a review to determine that adequate communications were available to support safe shutdown implementation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Emergency Lighting
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J., required that fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual eight-hour minimum battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire zones.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the fire zones and the access/egress routes to determine that adequate emergency lighting existed in accordance with the criteria discussed above.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Cold Shutdown Repairs
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.5, required that equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems should be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Materials for such repairs shall be readily available onsite, and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine if any repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown. The inspectors determined that the licensee did require repair of some equipment to reach cold shutdown based on the safe shutdown methods used. The inspectors reviewed the procedures for adequacy.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Fire Barriers and Fire Zone/Room Penetration Seals
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.M, required that penetration seal designs be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed visual inspections of selected three-hour rated barriers to ensure that the barrier installations were consistent with the criteria discussed above. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the fire loading for selected areas to ensure that existing barriers would not be challenged by a potential fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Fire Protection Systems, Features and Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the material condition, operations lineup, operational effectiveness, and design of fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, manual fire fighting equipment, fire brigade capability, and passive fire protection features. The inspectors reviewed deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings, and fire hazard analysis reports to ensure that selected fire detection systems, sprinkler systems, portable fire extinguishers, and hose stations were installed in accordance with their design, and that their design was adequate given the current equipment layout and plant configuration.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to determine that adequate compensatory measures were put in place by the licensee for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features. The inspectors also reviewed the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to assess whether or not the licensee was identifying issues related to fire protection at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, work orders, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Bost and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 1, 2005. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
A telephone conference call was made on April 22, 2005, with other members of licensee management to identify the URI discussed in Section 1R05.3b.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
No interim exits were conducted.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- C. Barajas, Shift Operations Superintendent
- J. Bashor, Work Management Director
- P. Bembnister, Fire Protection System Engineer
- G. Bockholdt, Maintenance Director
- D. Bost, Site Vice President
- M. Dillon, Fire Protection Contractor
- R. Gadbois, Operations Director
- D. Galanis, Design Engineering Manager
- J. Griffin, NRC Coordinator
- D. Gullott, Corporate Licensing
- M. Kanavos, Site Engineering Director
- A. Khanifar, Nuclear Oversight Manager
- M. Kluge, Design Engineering
- D. Knox, Design Engineering
- A. Mauro, Operation/Fire Marshall
- J. Ondish, Design Engineering
- C. Pragman, Corporate Fire Protection
- R. Ruffin, Operations
- P. Salas, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- P. Simpson, Corporate Licensing Manager
- J. Sipek, Engineering Programs Manager
- C. Symonds, Training Director
- D. Wozniak, Plant Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- J. Lara, Engineering Branch 3 Chief
- C. Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
A2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
URI Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analysis Not Consistent with RIS 2004-003 (Section 1R05.3b)
NCV Safe Shutdown Procedure Failed to Specify Correct Number of Turns for Opening Valve (Section 1R05.5b)
Closed
NCV Safe Shutdown Procedure Failed to Specify Correct Number of Turns for Opening Valve (Section 1R05.5b)
Discussed
None.
A3