IR 05000237/1989021

Insp Repts 50-237/89-21 & 50-249/89-20 on 891031-1103.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Review of Exercise Scenario & Observations

ML17202G718
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	11/30/1989
From:	Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17202G717	List: IR 05000237/1989021 ML17202G716
References
50-237-89-21, 50-249-89-20, NUDOCS 8912130252
Download: ML17202G718 (33)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

R~ports No. 50-237/8902l(D.RSS.); No. 50-249/89020(DRSS) *

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Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Litense No. DPR-19; No. DPR-25 Licen~ee: Commonwealth Edison P:o.. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:. Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morri~, *illinois* *

Mazon Emergency Operations Facility, Mazon, Illinois Inspection Coriducted: October 31 - November 3~ 1989

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• ~*.**.?7~

Inspectors:

. E. Fosfer

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• *.

earn Leader *

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Accompanying Personnel: D. Barss

Approved By:

F. McManus D. Hills I.A ') S,....& W. 's'n'e 11, Chief Radiological Controls and Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary.

~fly Da e

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. \\\\/3o/ 8,)

.Date lnspectio~ on October 31 - November 3, -1989 (Reports No; 50-237/89021 (DRSS);.No. 50-249/89020(DRSS))

• Areas Inspected~ Routine, announced inspection of the Dresden Stati~n's annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), and observations by four NRC rep~esentatives of key functions and locations during the ~xercise (IP 82301).

Results:

No vi6lations of NRC requirements were identifi~d. The licensee demonstrated a good response toa hypothetical scenario involving equipment failures and a large radiological rel~ase. Minor problems were*observe Overall exercise performance was good, and exercise critiques (problem self-identification) were excellen.r.

• DETAILS NRt Observers and Areas bbserved J. F6ster, Control Room (CR); Technical Support Center (T~C);

. *operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations FaCi 1 ity (EOF), Joint Public information Center (JPIC)

f. McManus, EOF, JPIC *

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O. Hills, CR

. Bar~s, TSC Per~ons Co~tacted Commbnwealth Edison

• E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager

• R. Holman, E.P. Coordinator

• C. Oshier, Lead HP ALARA/Oper. _

• J. Zucchi, Assistant Security Director

• E. Mantel, Service Directo *D. Sharper, EP Cooidinator

• T. Gilman, EP Supervisor

• R. ~aight, Emergency Planner

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• R. Falbo, Regulatory Assurance.Assistant J. Harrington, Quality Assurance R. Book, Jr., Training (Exercise Development Team)

W. Stoffels, Work Analyst (Exercise Development Team)

R. Whalen, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor M. Ersens, GSEP Trairier

_

G. Frankovich, Maintenance St~ff D. Wandless, Maintenance Staff E. Chapman, Maintenance Staff

• Denotes those attending the NRC exit interview held on NQvember 2, 198 The in~pectbrs also tontacted other licens~e personn~l during the course of the inspectio.

General An announced, daytime exercise of the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan was conducted at the Dresden Station on November 1, 198 The exercise tested the licensee's emergency support organizations**

capabilities to respond to a-simulated accident scenario resulting in major -release* of radioactive effluen This was a p~rtial exercise fo offsite personne State ~nd local counties participated to a limited exten Offsite response activities were observed by represent~tives of the Fed~r~l Emergency Man~gement Agency.(FEMA).

Their findings will be contained in a separate repor *

Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the.198 exercise and Attachment 2 describes the 1989 exercise scenari ~

General Observations Procedures This exercise was. conducted in accordance with 10 CF_R Part 50,

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Appendix E requirements usin~ the Commohwealth Edison Generating

_Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP), the Dresden ann~x to the GSEP, an the* Station Emergency Plan Implementing Protedutes (EPIPs). Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timel If the scenario events had been_ rea 1, the actions.taken by the 1 i censee *

would have been sufficient to.mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the

~ublic's health and safety~ Observers The licensee's controllers/evaluators monitored and critiqued this exer_ci se a 1 ong with four NRC observer Exercise.Critique A critique was held with the licensee and NRC r~presentatives on November 2, 1989, the day after the exercis Licensee personnel

_ discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses as identified by their exercise controllers/evaluator The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknes:ses deve 1 oped by the NRC exercise evaluation team during the exit intervie A public critique was scheduled the following day; but no members of the public or media representatives attended, and the meeting was cancelle. * Specific Observations (IP 82301) Control Room (CR)

The central desk area of the Control Room (CR) for Dresden Units 2 and 3 was utilized fo~ this exercis A plant simulator is.available onsite, but was not utilited. Operators could approach control panels and describe areas they would check for reactor parameters or manipulations they would make, but equipment was not allowed to change statu A Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) monitor in drill mode was available, as was a "point history" termina '*

CR :exercise performance was exce 11 en CR personnel correctly

. classified emergencies based on the Emergency Acti_on Level (EAL) _

scheme, anticipated changes in emergency classification, and notified on and. offsite personnel properl The Shift Supervisor delegated*

ijuties well, and the shift operators demonstrated knowledge of their~

• procedures, including emergency operating procedures and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).. Noise was maintained at a low level throughout t.he exercis.

Briefings could have been more formal and frequent, but all personnel were kept well aware of plant events and*concern Upon notification that high winds were bein~ experienced outside ~f

. the plant~ the itaff reviewed the Tornado Warning procedure (DOAOl0-2) and the applicable Emergericy Action Level A call was placed to the meteorological consultant to obtain the latest information as to expected condition The initiative was taken to trend wind speed on the Point History terminal, in anticipation of*

meeting wind speed ~nd duration times requiring emergency classificatio *

. As the exercise progressed, a good decision was made to reduce the unit electrical load as.a method of reducing the temperature on an overheating recirculation pump b~aring. This action was prevented by an exercise controller in order to preserve the.scenario timelin W~en the (scenario) reactor co~e Dscillations began,. this was immediately recognized by operators, and the proper *actions were rapidly taken, per procedur Initially, CR personnel C:fassifi~d the impact of a tornado onsite as an Unusual Event, but changed their classification to an Alert about six minutes late These classifications were proper, given the information available at the time of classification (a call from, Security regarding tornado damage was delayed).

Timely notifiCations of offsite authorities were made following the emergency classificatio No mention was made of the Unusual Event c 1 as*s.i f i cation. during the not i fi cation to the NRC-Duty officer, but he did not request.anything beyond the minimum information.

. Public Address S~stem (PA) announcements advised plant personnel of emergency classifications, but failed to note the reason for the classificatio In a real event, this COl!ld _result in many plant personnel calling the Control* Room to determine the cause of the emergency, tying up te 1 ephone 1 i nes and -distracting the operators..

Based upon the above findings,.this portion of t~e licensee's ~rogram was acceptabl However, the following item is recommended for improvement:

The procedure for notification of plant staff of an emergency classification should be modified to require advisement of the reason for the classificatio Technic~l Support Center (TSC)

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The Technical Support Ceriter (TSC) was rapidly activated and assumed its emergency responsibiliti~s well within established timeframe Packets containing necessary staticinary supplies.were passed out t all TSC s:tati6ns. - Nameplates, identifying both position title and indiv.idual 's name, were available* for each key manager in the TSC.*

A very large emergency telephone directory was prominently mounted on the wall:

The.Station Director.quickly set TSC pri6ritie~ and conducted frequent briefings.which were very timel These briefings provided excellent information to all managets and staff of both the TSC and DS TSC staff members were attentive during bri~fings. Noise lev~ls were maintairied l~w and phone conversations-were stopped in o~der to ~ear the briefing *

GSEP logs were started and initially well maintained by key position However, as events progressed ~ore rapidly, some of these logs fell behind events, particularly the Station Director's log, which at one point was over an hour behind,

The Security Director established access control for the EOF as a precautionary measure well in.advance of its' activatio TSC staff tr.ended various reactor parameters, and properly dee l ared *

the Site Area Emergenc The State was.notified within 10 minutes of the declaration of the Site Area Emergency classificatio Habitability was appropriately monitored *in the TSC, and personnel cautioned to avoid-areas with (scenario) elevated radiation level Concern for maintaining radiation exposures As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achieveable (ALARA) were eviden Procedures were obtained-from appropriate emergency lockers and generally used correctl The Security Director did not have a procedure providing guidance as to the content of contacts wit~

station evacuee reception area These nci~ifications could have be~n better organized as to emergency information, number of likely evacuees, travel, routes, evacuee needs, et Accountability was completed in approximately 27 minutes, but

.security personnel did_not appear to have confidence in the accour:itabil i ty results, and were still 11 clarifying" their results some thirty minutes later. Several lists of unaccounted for personnel were develop~d on scrap pape A standard format for such lists should be develope Some recent.changes had been made in the accountability procedure, based_on the results of pre-exercise drills, but additional enhancements may be needed for accountability to function mbre efficientl...

A handwritten memo was develop~d and xeroxed to provide information flow to the Rad/Che~ Dir~ctor on offsite field team results. This form appear~d to be worthwhil~, and should be procedUf~lize The calibration sticker on the TSC Area Radiatior) Monitor (ARM)

indicated a* due date of October 31, 1989, with calibr~tion last completed July 31, 1989.. * 1he cognizant Instrumentation and Control Technician was contacted and a corrected calibration sticker

~ndicatirig a* six mo~th calibration frequency was*att~ched to the AR This equipment was recently added to the facility, and it did not appear that it was currently li~ted on a GSEP surveillanc.

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Security directed roving patrols to inspect for additional wind damage to doors and fencing after the tornado touched dow _ The Operations Director effectively used large Dresden Emer~ency=

Operations Procedure (DEOP) flow charts to identify and ensure implementation of appropriate actions.*

During ihe exercise, it was observed-that the plant page could not be heard in the TS The volume of the plant page. sy_stem is adjustable,

• and_.was apparently adjusted to a very low leve The switch for the TSC public address (~A) system connection to the

. OSC was inadvertently left in the 11off 11 position during the initial TSC briefin Contact was *subsequently made with the o*sc to verify they could hear TSC PA announcement.

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When the State was notified that command and control had shifted t~ *

the TSC, the ~orm used was inad~ertently marked as an Unusual ~vent, when actually an Alert had already been declare *

Stat~s boards were used, but not always kept updated in a timely fashio For example, at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> the plant status board still had some data developed ~t 0920 hour0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> This old.data was used to

. provide updates to various contact A communicator was d~dicated to establish and m~intain an open line

~ith the NR **T~e information provided to the.NRC was frequentl unverified and presented in'a manner which w~s not clear ~nd concise..

When a question developed over why the State was making a public notification which seemid ~nappropriate, the Station Director consulted with the State Liaison stationed in* the TSC for *

cl ari fi cat fon.

. The NRC Duty Officer mistakenly made an ENS ca 11 to the site during the exercise, while attempting to contact the Browns Ferry sit Additional confusion was created when Dresden TSC personnel answered the ENS call without* immediately identifying their statip '

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1989 GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBER-1, 1989 OBJECTIVE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:

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Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonw.ealth Edison Generating Station-Emergency Plan (GSEP) to protect the public in the:

event of a major accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power S.tation..

Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a daytime

. Exercise in acco.rdance with NRC guidelines~

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:

1)..Incident Assessment and Classificatio Demonstrate the capability to assess-the accident conditions,, to determine wh.ich Emergency Action_ Lev,el (EAL) has been reached and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSEP within 30

• minutes of plant conditions warranting classification *

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(CR, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to perform *timely Core Damage Assessments.*

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(TSC, EOF)

2)

Notification and Comml.Ulication OQlOD/l/wjm Demoii.st.rate the. capabil_ity to notify the applicable offsite State and local organizations within fifteen

_(15) minutes of declaring an accident classification.*

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(CR, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to notify the RRC as soon as possible and within one (1) hour of the initial incident *

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(CR) Demonstrate the capability to contact pertinent organizations that would normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this Exercise (e.g., Murray.& Trettel, General Electric, etc.).

~ (TSC~ EOF)

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-d. **. Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up_

information/updates to the State and RRC within thirty (30) minutes of major plant condition changes or at least hourl (TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC upon reques (CR, TSC, EOF)

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1989 GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBER 1, 1989 OBJECTIVES 3)

Radiological Assessment OOlOD/2/wjm* Demonstrate the abiiity to collect, doctnnent and trend plantradiologicd survey information and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions for personne (OSC, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the capability of the Operation& Support Center (OSC) to implement proper Health-Physics practices and r' simetry issuance for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched to. radi.ologically

controlled.areas in-plant *

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(OSC)

. Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center (OSC) to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Main~enance Teams di~patched from the OS ""' (OSC)

d~ Demons-trate the capability to calculate offsite dose projections based on Field Measurement (TSC,-EOF) Demonstrate the ability to make Protective Action Recommendations (P~s).

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(CR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability of plant personnel to perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individuals.*

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(OSC) Demonstrate the capability to collect, analyze samples and communicate -results using the PASS equipment in accordance with procedures and proper con~amination contro'l techniques under adverse condition (OSC)

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DRESDEN IDJCLEAR POWER STATiON 198.9 GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBER 1, 1989 OBJECTIVES 3)

Radiological Assessment (cont'd)

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(' Demonstrate the ability of the_Fieid Teams to collect and assess environmental samples in accordance wtih procedures and proper.contamination control techniques using samplirig equipment and communcation methods under the conditions of the scenari (TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to assess TSC Habitability under adverse conditions~

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(TSC)

4)

Emergency Facilities Demonstrate the capability to activate and -staff the 3D -

on-site Emergency Response Facilities within sixty ~

J~

minutes and in: accordance with procedure (CR, TSC, OSC, CJBH) (.)~;:::..-

Demonstrate the capability to activate and staff the Emergency Operations Facility in a tim~ly manner *

..:... (EOF)

Demonstrate the capability to record and track major*

plant status information relative to Exercise events using Plant Status Board (TSC, OSC, EOF)

Demonstrate the capability to track and document, on

• Status Boards and Logs, all dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team activities and in-plant job statuse :-- (TSC, OSC)

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5).

Emergency Direction and Control

• 0010D/3/wjm Demonstrate the ability of the individuals in the GSEP Organization to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities as specified in (;eneric.GSEP and position-specific procedure (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC) Demonstrate the ability of the Managers and Directors to exert command and control in their respective facilities according to the duties and responsibilities specified in Generic GSEP and position-specific procedure (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF)

DRESDEN NUCLEAR, POWER STATION 1989 GSEP ExERCISE NOVEMBER *1, 1989 OBJECTIVES S)..

Emer:$ency Direction and Control (cont'd) Demonstrate the ability of the-Shift Engineer.and the OSC Director to coordinate and prioritize Operations

. *and Maintenance activities during abnormal ~d

~ergency situation (C~, OSC)

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.. Demonstrate the ability to requisition, acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or ~ontrol.tmsafe or abnormal plant condition (CR, TSC, EOF)

e *. Demonstrate the capability to assemble and accotmt for all on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of sotmding the evacuation alar (TSC) _ Demonstrate the ability of each Facility Dire-ctor/Manager to conduct appropriate periodic

• briefings/updates 'covering plant status, event classification and plant activities in. progres (CR~ TSC, OSC, EOF) Demonstrat.e the ability to prC)vide access.for-and interface with, the NRC Site Tea (EOF)

6) * Offsite Agency Coordinatfon OOlOD/4/wjm Demonstrate the capability of the Emergency Response Organiza*tion to coordinate the direction o-f the emergency response and exchange information with the

• States, Offsite Field Teams and local Emergency

Operations Centers (EOCs) via CECo liaison personnel, CollllllUnicators and on-site personnel.-

- (Tse; EOF) Demonstrate the ability to discuss Protective Action Recommendati.ons (PARs) with. the State agencie (EOF)

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• DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER.. STATION 1989 GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBE_R 11 1989 OBJECTivES 7)

Public Information Demonstrate the ability of the JP!C Coordinator or -

designee to staff the JPIC at.all times and respond to Press request (JPIC)

b~ Demonstrate_the abilityof CECo to coordinate and

.exchaiige event information for Press conferences with

• the State agencie *

(JPIC) Demonstrate the ability to prepare accurate Press

reieases and Press conferences within ninety (90)

minutes of the events during Site and General_Emergency classification phase (JPIC)

. Demonstrate the ability to u~e visual aids and other resources to support Press release/Press conference informatio (JPIC)

e *. Demonstrate the ability to.coordinate the transfer of *

j.nformation between the EOF Public Information Staff and the JPIC Staf (EOF, JPIC) Demonstrate lthe ability to perform rumor control including ERFs transferring information regarding.

rumors to the JPIC and the issuing of appropriate and timely press releases dealing vi.th the rumors by th JPI (TSC, EOF, JPIC)

8)

Recovery OOlOD/5/wjm Demonstrate the capability of the Emergency Response Organization to identify the requirements, criteria and *

implementing procedures for recover (TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the capability to identify work priorities, procedures and programs-which are required to return the plant to a normal operating statu (~SC,. EOF)

(CR, TSC).

OOlOD/6/wjm DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1989 GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBER 1, 1989 OBJECTIVES

• designates the primary areas where demon~tration of the Objective may occu Dependen't on Exercise co.nditions and steps taken by the Station,.not all areas specified. may need to demonstrate that Objective.*. Key for abbreviations:

• CR

= Control Room TSC = Technical Support. Cente*r OSC =Operations Support Center (includin.i-Environmental Field Teams)

EOF = Emergency Operations Facility

• DRESDEN* NUCLEAR POWER STATION *

. GSEP EXERCISE NOVEMBER 1, 1989

'INITIAL CONDITIONS (0715 -

0740).

Unit 3 is shutdown for refueling and defueled with_ fuel.handling in progres Unit 2 is currently at 95% power and has been operating at high, power levels for the last six* (6) month The weather.has been unseasonably warm and storm warnings'are in effect due'to a predicted meeting of a warm front currently in the area arid a* large cold fro~t from Canada~ Severe thtmderstorms have caused*disruptionof'

electrical ser'Vice over a large* area.* The Load Dispatcher calls the*

Control Room to issue a Severe Storm Warning/Tornado Wit.tch and -

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requests that Unit 2* remain on line. to help.maintain system loa At 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />, a phone. call is received in the Control Room by Dresden employee who lives near Coal. City (wit.hin five miles of the site) rep9rting a tornado sited just north of Coal City..He informs

.the Control Room that *the tornado is headed. north towards the* plant *

. EXPECTED ACTIONS.

Precautionary measures.should be started. Unit 2 should remain at

• power due to the*Load Dispatcher's request *

ALERT (0820 - 0940).

At 0820, a tornado touches down on the site in the contractor parking lot, crosses the management parking lot lifting *a parked car and forcing it through the Security Fence (25' east of the Main Gate) and

. into the side of the Security Die.sel Buildin Damage occurs to a portion of the "E" field and double fence which requires Security Force actions and repairs to the fe~ce.* The car damages the wall of the Security Diesel Building.*. A fault which occurs 011 an incoming

. power line results in the* loss of the UD.it 2 Auxiliary Transformer 22 and subsequent automatic transfer of auxiliary power. * The 2A Recirculation Pump is removed from_ operation as a result of low lube

• oil level and elevated bearing temperature EXPECTED ACTIONS The Control Room should d~clar~ an Alert due to a tornado touching down in a vital are (EAL 6.o).

Damage inspections should be initiated. Security Patrols should be established due to the loss of the "E" Field and damage to the fenc Repairs to the "E" Field and Security Fence should be started. The loss of Transformer 22 should be investigated.and repairs initiated. Unit 2 will remain on*line honoring the Load Dispatcher's reques ooJjD/l/wjm

DNPS '89 GSEP E Group 1 isolation ~as anticipated due*to increasing.trends and, a~propriate preparations were mad However, when Group 1 isolation occurred the Station Director, who was talking to the EOF, missed the anhouncement of the event and did not realize this had occurred *

until six minutes later..

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. Emerg~ncy depressurization was considered to reduce the release rat This was a* very correct -and perceptive decision on the part of the players~ This ~ction was not permitted by controllers iri ~rder to

• . maintiin the scenario tfmelin TSC ventilation was shifted to emergency mode in accordance with procedure DOP 5750~16. The operator checked to ensure a differential P.ressure existed across the filter~ initially and occasionally during the period of operatio However, no guidan~e was provided to determine what was an ac~eptable differeritial pressur Recovery operations were adequately discu*ssed using established

• procedure Priorities were established and additional resource needs identifie The Particulate, Iodi*ri*e and Noble Gas (PING) monitor associated*

with the TSC vehttlation syst~m ~as never operated.* A subsequent

• review indicated that Procedure DOP 5750-16 (TSC Ventilation) does not contain instructions or reference toother procedures which could pro*vide guidance on the PING operatio EPIP 165-51, step A 14 directs the Rad/Chem Group Leader to assign someone to activate the PING,~but this apparently never occur~e Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items are recommended for improvement: *

• The ste~s of checking.the volume level of the plant page system and correctly setting the public address system switch for the OSC should be added to *th~ TSC activation checklis *

Additional enhancements may be needed*for accountability to function efficientl Installation of an accountabili:ty card reader system should be considere ' Operational Support Center (OSC)

The exercise scenario was very challenging for personnel in the OS It was a stressed and active area throughout the exercise, and overall performance was goo Noise levels were, at times, high, but players were strongly advised to keep the noise level dow Sta~us ~oards were well utilized to track significant plant events, team composition, task, dispatch time, estimated time of returni employee's total exposure for the day, exposure limits, and other informatio An electronic i::opyboard was util'ized for team tracking

inf6rmati_on, enabling rapid copying of team information. _While teams were well tracked, further improvement is possible, and

~ecommendations as to status boa~d improvement f6r additional efficiency wer~ provided to station Emergency Preparednes~ per~onne As with other facilities, a board with emergency telephone.numbers was prominently poste Teams were well tracked and.debri'efings appeared to be adequat The relevant procedure (~PIP 160-S2) required the use of a team debriefing form (EPIP 400-S6), but there was no indication that this form was beihg utilized during team debriefings.*

The status board for 11 Events 11 fell.down several* times, and was*

eventually.placed ~n ~op of an open.filing cabinet doo *Based ~pon the above findings, this portion oi the licensee 1s program

~as acceptable; howeve~, the following items should.be considered for improvement:

All status *boards should have some form of holder, even if it is only a temporary wal 1 attachment.-,

The OSC boards utilized for tracking available workforce and inpla~t team~ ~hould be revised for additional efficienc Emergency Operations facility (EOF)

The Emergency Operations Facility for Dresden is.located at Mazon, Illinois, and is shared with the LaSalle and Braidw6od sites. *As such, the Mazon EOF participates in a number of drills or exercises per year~ The EOF was efficiently staffed and activated within established timeframe~,

The management*and.first line supervisors meetings were productive,

~nd useful for keeping the upper tier of management fully informed of plant status and plant conc~rn The release path,. via the Isolation Condenser, was very quickly identifie Several problems in utilizing the Illinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form were observ.e The NARS form for the General Emergency (GE) was not_ fully filled ou The message transmitted by, block 11; message received by, block 12; and the time/date message received, block 13 were not filled fo as required by procedur NARS form number 6 detailing a windshift did not have blocks 12 and 13 complete In addition, the windshift information was not transmitted to the State ~ntil 18 to 20 minutes following the*

windshif A radioactive ~elease was in progress during this perio While State p~rsonnel have access to onsite meteorological data

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through their computer links with the plant computer; the formal

. notification oJ the State after the wind *shift was considered untimel Deficiencies in properly completing and communicating utilizing the NAR_S formwere considered an Open Item (No. 50-237/21-01). *

Briefing* presentations in the EOF were incons1st~nt in quaiity and frequenc Initial bri~fings were goo How~ver, as the exercise progress~d the frequency and d~tail of the briefihgs deteriorate Nea~ to the end ~f the exercise, seni6r EOF management demonstrated Recovery decisionmaking.. A procedure and checklist were utilized, and there wa~ very good di'scussion of the technical and logistical concerns which would have to be addressed in an actual inciden Some clarification may be required.of the items contained on Page 2 of the above checklist, as some participants incorrectly assumed tha Recovery could not be entered as long as conditions existed which *

would call for an Alert or Unusual Event classification, or would be cont~ary to the unit *technical specification Following discussion, the proper decision*to enter the Recovery phase was made at appr.oximately 1350 hour0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br /> *

Discussibn with Emergency Preparedness personnel indicated that a revision to the Generating* stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) was forthcoming which would require that Recovery be declared when emergency actions are not required for higher emergency classifications (Si~e Area Emergency, G~neral Emergency), and lower classifications "terminated".

This should clarify actions required at the e~d_ of an emergency situatio *

The EOF lacks a method of displaying both the Protective Action *

Recommendation (PAR} made by the licensee and the protective actions_

adopted by the State, wh_i ch may not be consistent with the utility PAR..

Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the above Open Item, this ~ortion of the licensee's program was ~cceptable, however, the following item is recommended for improvement:

An appropriate status board should be developed which can display both the licensee Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) and the PAR actuall~ implemented by the Stat *

• Field Monitoring Teams Field monitoring teams were not directly observed during this exercis Field monitoring team~ appeared to be appropriately controlled ari~

information developed from field surveys.appeared to be properly focorporated into dose-projections.

. Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable. _

9 *Exercise Scenario Review and Control (IP 82302)-

The l ic_ensee Exercise Objectives. and draft scenari.o were submitted to the NRC for review in ~ccordance.with-established NRC timeframe Commen~s

. w~re provided to the licensee on Oct6ber 13,. 1989, following review of the

• draft st~nario:

No major-deficiencies.were. not~d~ but several minor*

deficiencies/questions were passed on and were subsequently corrected:

The license~'s scenario was sufficiently thallengi~g for a partial ex~rcise; *

including: multiple equipment failures,- and assembly/ accountabilit The degree of challenge.in an exercise scenario is considered when asse~sing observed exercise weaknesse As noted earlier in this report, the.scenario was particularly challenging for the dperatio~s S~~port Center (OSC).

Overall, exercise control was considered adequat Some minor problems*

we.re observed, howeve A prob 1 em discovered the day prior to the exercise (both.Control Rod Drives designat~d as out of servi~e) had n~t been corr~cted, and was immediately identified by exercise Control Room.

personne Some of the early inplant teams dispatched from the lunchroom area lacked contr6llers; this was.identified and correcte The C6ntrol Room Controfler allowed the operators to terminate vessel injection, which threw them off of the timeline (reactor water level was not as would.be expected).

The Radiation Technician surveying the contaminated Control Rod. Ori ve worker w*as not aware of proper exercise conduct, and seemed unsure of his r6l * *

• During discussion o*f e*nteri ng the Recovery phase, management personne 1

• were advised that the field monitoring teams had not detected any ground*

deposition of radioactive materia Considering that the release was from fuel failure (fuel gap fission p~6ducts), and unfiltered, the. scenario should have pr6vided for *same ground depos~tion~

Based upon the *above findings; this portion of the licensee's progra~ was acceptable. *

- Licensee Cri t i,gues The licensee held a Controller exercise critiqu~, and a critiqu~ where the

• conclusions of the Controller/Evaluat6~s presented their findings to the player NRC personnel attended several critiques, and determined that the self-critique process was weJl performed~ Significant NRC identified exercise defi ci enci es had a 1 so been i dent i fi ed by 1 i censee perso*nne 1, as well as numerous other item *

Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl.

Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be.reviewed further by the inspector and which involves some actions on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An Open Item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.d of this report.

. 10

• Exit Interview (IP 30703)

The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on November 2, 1989, with the representatives denoted in Section 2.. The NRC

• Team Leader discussed.the scope antj findings of the inspectio Nq _

• ~iolations of NRC requirements were idehtifi~d: The licen~ee demonstrated a good response tci a hypothetical scenario involving equipment failures.

and a large radiological:releas Minor problems were observe Overall exercis~ performance was good, and exercise critiques (problem self~identification) were excellen *

The lic~nsee was also asked if a~y.of the information discussed during the exit interv1ew was proprietar The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary..

Attachmerits: Dresden 1989 Exercise Scope and Objectives Dresden 1989 Exercise Scenario Outline

'

~ 11

NOVEMBER. 1, 1989 DAYTIME DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1989 GSEP EXERCISE November 1, 1989 SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION OITSITE AGENCYPARTICIPATION:

PURPOSE:

• ILLINOIS

- PARTIAL

• .Test the capability 9f the basic-elements within the Commonwealth Edison Compaily GSE The Exercise will include mobiliza.tion _of CECo personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergenc CECo FACILITIES ACTIVATED:

• CONTROL ROOM

• TSC

.* osc

• EOF

• .JPIC- *

CECo FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATED:

• CEOF (CCC)

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

The "Exercise" Buclear Duty Officer will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time.basis. The "Exercise" Ruclear Duty Officer and the balance of the Recovery Group will be prepositioned close to the Mazon EOF_ to permit use of personnel from distant location *

Commonwe*lth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors_whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the E!Xpense of using contractor services to siinulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth-Edison will arrange to provi~e actual tra:iisportation ana*

• communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercis Commonwealth -

Edison will provide unforeseen actual *assistance only to the extent that the resou~ces are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan /1/wjm

,,.

• SITE EMERGENCY (0940 - 1055)

At 0930, in accordance with approved procedures, the speed of the

• operating Recirc. Pump is decreased to 43% which* results in reactor core power oscillation The reactivity oscillations are indicated by alternating (2-3 second period) LPRM HI-LO lights~ The Control Room initiates a manual SCRAM in accordance with procedure Rods fail to insert resulting in ~ ATWS condition. Operators should close the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System 2-0301-25 valve which allows rods.to be sl~wly insert_e ThiS stops the core oscil.lations but -

does not terminate the.ATW The only.operable CRD Pump fails preventing further rod insertio Damage to fuel cladding occurs and

• • Main Steam Line (MsL) radiation levels increase. At 1055, MSL rad leveis have exceeded three times the normal level which results in a Group i.Isolation and Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure~

ExPECTED ACTIONS

.

.

The Control Room should initiate a Manu&l SCRAM due to the reactivity

. oscillation A Site Emergency, should be declared due to the ATWS (EAL 3k).

CRD Pump repairs should be initiated.;. Proper procedural actions should be taken in response ~o the ~losure. of the MSIVs due to high radiation *

.00330/2/wjm DNPS '89 GSEP E. ~.

....

-.*

,..

.

.*

GENERAL EMERGENCY (1055 - 1300)

The pressure transient and power spike cau~e additional fuel damage *.

Reactor pressure increases, safety valves lift and quickly reseat resulting in steam; and primary system radioactivity being released to

. *Primary Containmen When reactor pressure has been. greate.r than 1070 psig for 15 seconds, the Isolation Condenser ini tiatei Primary.

Containment radiation levels, pressure, and temperature start to increase along with Torus temperatur By 1100, Containment Radiation levels exc_eed 2000 R/hr *.

Torus temperature continues to incre~se which requires the injection of Standby Liquid Control (SLC).

At approximately 1130, the Isolation Condenser develops a tube bundle break and~ H1Radiation alarm is received from the Isolation Cond~er Vent Radiation Monito A Group 5 isolation signal is -

received but does not compiete. an isolation of all the Isolation Condenser Valves.* If Operators attempt to close the Isolation

• .Condenser Steam. Inlet Valves, the valves do ri.ot close due to the tube break causing high differential pressure across the Motor.Operated Valves. 'A discharge to the.environs occurs which results in offsite doses.at the State of Illinois Rueter Stokes Monitors of

. approximately 750 mR/ht *. In addition, the TSC will experience elevated radiation levels due to shine from the radiation released from the Isolation Condenser,* as w~ll as radiation fr.takers alarming on high backgroU:n A worker returning from work on the CRD pump will be contaminate~ by a hot particle upon returning to the OS If SLC is injected and control rods are inserted after CRD Pump repairs are completed, reactor power and* pressure decreas When reactor pressure decreases sufficiently, the differential pressure across the Isolation Condenaer isolation valves is decreased allowii:ig

.the isolation valves to be closed, terminating the release of radioactivity to the environmen EXPECTED ACTIONS A.General Emergency should be declared due to.high containment radiation level (EAL 2 "r"). SBLCwill be injected due to failure of the controi rods to insert. Protective Action Recommendations *

recommending evacuation out to at ieast five miles should be made. to the State. Actions to close the Isolation Condenser Isolation Vaives should be started but will not be successful. Radiation controls wil need to be implemf!Dted for*work on the Isolation Condenser valves and CRD pum Environs Field Teams will be sent*to measure the plum Estimates of radioactivity source terms will-be made from Field Team results. Special evaluation should be made of the TSC habitability and the ctintaminatd_worker should be decontaminate Standby Liquid injection is completed and the reactor is shutdown~

0033D/3/wjm DNPS '89 GSEP Ex~

RECOVERY PHASE ( 1300 '.'.'" 1500)

A twenty-four (24) hour time jump occurs at 1300. All necessary work*

.* to maintain the reactor in cold shutdown has occurre Surveys of the on-site and offsite environs have been taken with results showing

,. fairly high Iodine 131 contamination on-site but only minimal contamination offsit Containment rad levels have decreased* *

• . _dramtically Wti*~V~f9~~l'lo91:~&

~flifwr~. 1/t:f~*

Containment.air and reactor: water samples have been obtained and*

analyzed for radioactiVit *

EXPECTED ACTIONS

• .Determination if conditions warrant recovery and planning for Recovery Phase work:shotil.d take plac Clean up pf on-site contamination from tlfe Isolation Conden8er t1Jbe break should be given

. priority. * Core damage assessments should be ma~e based on reactor water sample results~ Evaluation should be made as to whether the containment should be vented to reduce radiaiton levels to allow entry into recovery or to wait for decay to reduce containment radiation level / 4/wjm *

_ DNPS. '89 GSEP E ?.

.

.

EVENT:

TORRADO.WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA, AND DAMAGE.TO SECURITY EQUIPMENT "E" FIELD AND SECURITY FENCE *

. - DESCRIPTION:

At 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />, a tornado is sited by* a Dresden employee that lives near Coal City, who calls to inform the Station that.the tornado is headed north in *the direction of the plant. At 0820, the tornado strikes and crosses the east end of the station security fence 25 feet east. of the_ main gate, damaging some of the security "E" field equiPment and fence *.. Also damaged was the Security Diesel Generator CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

. EXPECTED ACTIONS:

- MOCK UPS SIMULATED:

. Building which is a-vital are In accordance with security procedures, *security must b established at*the point where the security fence, "E"

. field, and Security Diesel. Generato.r Building. vital area are damage The Acting Station Director must properly c.lassify the event and take appropriate actions in accordance vi.th procedures *.

Security shall establish control of all *affected security area The Acting Station Director should properly classify the event and make proper notifications *. An act.ion plan for repairs should be ;implemente Fence parts will be obtained _and transported to the damage site. A temporary fence repair will be simulate OOlSD/l/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

l. '

'

EVENT:

DESCRIPTION:

CHALLENGING

.ASPECTS:

ExPECTED ACTIONS:

MOCKUPS/

SIMULATION:

LOSS OF TJUNSFORMER 22 Following the reports of a tornado passing through the site security boundary, several annunciators alarm in the control room for the 34kv and 138kv switChyard The storm whiCh is in the immediate area has resulted in a fault whiCh has occurred on 138kv Line 120 Dtie to a failure of the l38kv Line 1205 Circuit breaker to open, the Local Breaker Backup (LBB)

circuitry has initiated a trip of the 138 kv L0904 circuit*

br~aker and the. 138kv Bus Tie ~-2 circuit breaker _r~sulting in a loss.of transformer 22 whi~ is supplied from 138kv Bus.*Auxiliary power has transferred to transformer 21 and no loss*_

. of equipment or busses has occurre The operators must recognize that a fault has occurred on 138kV Line 1205 and that. the LBB circuitry has tripped result~ng in loss of transformer 22*.

' The operators should dispatCh a High Voltage Operator (HVO) to the 138kv switchyard to determine the cause o( the alarms and check for any relay targets.which h&ve occurre Concurrently, the Joliet Load Dispatcher (LD) should be notified of t~e loss of line 1205 and the resulting.loss of transformer 22 and subsequent transfer of auxiliary powe ori.ce the determination is made that a fault occurred on 138kv Line 1205, and the LD_

notified'; the op~rators should take action as directed by the

. LD to restore Transformer 22 to servic *

. Actions would include manually tripping the l38kv Line 1205 circuit breaker and opening the associated disconnect The 138kv Line 0904 circuit breaker and 138kv Bus Tie 1-2 circuit breaker. should then b.e closed in order to-energize 138ltv Bus 1 and ultimately Transformer 2 Once Transformer 22 has been energized, auxiliary power should.be transfered back to its normal configuratio NONE OOlSD/2/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

J" EVENT; RECIRC PUMP.TRIP/REACTIVITY OSCILLATIONS DESCRIPTION:

Operating_ at 95% power, a trip of the 2A Recirc Pump occurs~

Following the trip_of the Recirc PUmp, Core Flow is reduced to

• the point on the Power vs. Flow map where instabili t_ies occu Reactor power starts to oscillate 8-10% as shown on the APRM recorders and LPRM hi-lo indicating light '

CHALLENGING-ASPECTS;

• * -. The Ope_rator must reconglze that the. Recirc Punip has tripped

.and complete required actions in accordance with appr:oved station procedure The Operator must also *recognize the fact EXPECTED ACTIONS; SUCCESS FAILURE *

PATHS;.

MOClmP SIMULATED;

• that the erractic APRM indJcations are due to reactivity oscillations. The Operator must take actions in order to terminate the reactivity oscillation.

The Operator shall complete the required actions in regards to the Recirc Pump trip. _The Operator should determine where he is currently operating. on the Power.vs Flow Map and start to insert co~trol rods in order to exlt the unstable region

- causing the oscillations to sto Suci=essful performance would include performing proper operator actions in accordance with appro~ed procedures for a tripped recirc pum The operators must.determine that the unit is

• operating in the unstable region o.f t4e j'ower vs. Flow Map and

.* take appropriate corrective actions to exit the unstable regio l

.

.

.

.

BONE 0015D/3/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

• '

EVENT:

--.-

SCRAMIATWS DESCRIPTION: *The.Operator manually SCRAM& the reactor in order to terminat the oscillations. The control rods fail to insert upon de-energization of the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

CHALLERGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTE ACTIONS:

MOCKUPS SIMULATED:

.

.

'

.

.

.

..

.

..

.

.

.

• Following the ATWS, the emergency operating*procedures direct the Operator to close the CRD System Charging Header manual isolation valve 2-0301-2 Since the 2A CRD Pump is Out-Of-Service, it will be essential that the 2-0301-25 valve.*

be closed before any control rods can be iriserted from the

• Control Roo After several control rods have been inserted, the reactivity osciiiations wi_ll sto *

• *

The Control Room Operators must realize that the SCRAM lights

• are illuminated on the 902-5 panel full core display and that all eight RPS lights are de-energize ThiS.will inform the Operator that *the SCRAM inlet* and outlet valves are ope The Operators should know from various indications such as rod position, reactor power, etc. that the control rods have not inserte Once the 2-0301-25 valve is c.lo$ed; the Control Room Operator must start inserting the control rods~

By this time, a Qualified Nuclear Engineer (QBE) should be in the Control Room advis.ing. the Operators as to priority of control rod*

insertions in order to reduce reactor power as quickly.as possibl The Control Room Operator must realize that the SCRAM lights are OD the full core display and that the CRD System 2~0301-25 valve must be closed in.order to insert the ~ontrol rods using

. the c:Rn Hydraulic Syste An equipment* attendant must be dispatched from the OSC ~o close the 2-0301-25 valv When ~he valve is closed, ~he Equipment Attendant should inform the Control Roo Operators should insert,control rods on a priority basi NONE 0015D/ 4/wjin.

7-ll-89 (1040)

..

.

j EVENT:

DESCRIPTION:

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:.**

MOCKUPS*

SIMULATION:

CRD PUMP REPAIRS Unit 2A.CRD Pump is OOS due* to a seal failure. All work,

• including coupling al~~ent, has been completed and only the coupling assembly remaina. - Shortly. after control rod insertion starts, flow and-pressure indications decrease on."B" Pump *.

Upon investigaton by operations, the "B" Pump is found to have a.damaged seal assembly and as a result, the pump trip Mechanical Main~enance will assess the situation of the CRD Pumps and realize that to complete the repairs of the "A" Pump would take only a short tim Repair to the "B" Pump could no be completed in a timely manner considering the current

-

cori.diti_on A wor.k crew will be sent to complete the repairs to* the "A" Pump allowing. continued insertion of control rod A mockup will be used (or completion of repairs to the coupling assembl OOlSD/5/wjm 7-11.,-89 (1940).

. '"

.*

.*DESCRIPTION:

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTE ~CTIONS:

MOCIC UPS SIMULATED:

RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL

• After returning from CRD pump repair work, a.Mechanical Maintenance individual detects contamination of approximately 50,000 cp Thiscontaniination was discovered' on the outer side of left ankle while performing*a whole body frisk at the

• entrance to* the OSC *.

'\\.

The Rad Protection personnel assigned to the OSC will rieed to determine the source of contamination and the skin exposure to the individua The contamination must.be removed in accordance with approved Radiation Protection procedure Whole body frisking should be per:formed by.personnel.returning.*

from potent.ially contaminated areas in the plan The

.

contaminated worker should detect contamina~ionof. = 50,000 cpm ~bove backg~ound and-notify Radi~tion Protection personnel at the OS Radiation Protection should determine the amount and extent' of the.contamination and notify HealthPbysics for assistance in skin dose calculatio Decontamin_ation should be performed iri accordance with Radiation Protection procedure The OSC Supervisor.should dispatch.Radiation Protection

~ersonnel to retrace the path of the contaminated indivdual in an attempt to locate the source of contaminatio NONE 0015D/6/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

..

EVENT:

DESCRIPTION:

CHALi..ENGING ASPECTS: *

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

MOCK UPS SIMULATED:

MsIVs CLOSE ON THREE TIMES NORMAL MAIN STEAM.LINE RADIATION LEVELS

.

.

.

'

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The Main Steam lsolation_Valves (MSIV) are designed.to isolate the Main Steam Lines (MSL) at the Primary Containment* by closing automatically within 3 to 5 seconds from pre-determined trip signals. With the fuel damage that occurred due to the reactivity oscillations and the ATWS, the MSIVs close on-a

• Group I Isolation High Radiation Trip Slgnalof 3 X normal *

. With the hydrogen addi~ion selector switches for the MSLs in the"ON" position, the average Group I Setpolnt i approxima.tely 8. 5 X 103 mRih The Group I. Isolation Closure *

• of the MSIVs will remove the main condenser as a heat sink and

- with an ATWS in progress, reactor pressure will rapidly increas When Reactor Pressure reaches 1070 psig fot 15 **

seconds, the Isolation Condenser will automatically initiat Continued increase in pressure will occur to the point of safety/relief valve actuatio *

.Operations personnel must assess the situation with the MSIV closure and realize that reactor pressur,e will bicreas*e causing the relief valves to open, and the safety valves to cycle, th~

Isolatio.n C.ondeilser to initiat The Operating,crew should take manual control of the electromatic relief valves and the Isolation Condenser in accordance with the DEOPs to control reactor* pressure. Torus

.cooling must be ~nitiated and Primary Contai~ent pressure and

temperature monitored and c.ontrolled in accordance with the DEOP )

Operations personnel should recognize that the MSIVs have

'closed ~ue to a Group I Isolation signa )

Once the Group I Isolation is recognized as having been caused by MSL High Radiation, efforts should be taken to contain the high radiation within t~e Primary Containmen )

The Operator should recognize the reactor pressure increase and that the safety valves have cycle ROB D/7/wjm 7:-11-89 (1040)

• "'

,*

. *"-',... *. ***

EVERT:

DESCRIP'rIONi

.

.

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIONS:'.

MOCK UPS SIMULATED:

.

.

.

.

.

ISOLATION CONDENSER. TUBE BREAK AND RELEASE TO ENVIRONS Shortly after the automatic initiation of the Isoiation Condenser occurred, annunciator :s,;.J, "ISO CONDENSER VERT HI RADIATION" alarms on the.902-3 pane A large break has occurred in the Isolation Condenser tube bundle causing radiation levels in the Isolation Condenser Vent to increas A large release of Primary System radioactivity to the

.environment occurs *. The release to the BnvironS is detected on the State of Iliinois Reute.r Stokes Radiation Monitors and the

• • State will call the Station with a.notification. of elevated Reuter Stokes reading The Operators must refer to the. approp_riate annunciator

• • procedure for. actions to be taken in association with a high*

radiation.reading in the Isolation.Condenser ven Based on the vent radiation monitor elevated readings; the. Operators should conclude that a*tube* leak exist * The extent of the ~elease wn1 *need to be assessed by the Rad Chem Director through the use of Environs Team Re~ommendations for protection of the.public will need to be made based on Environs and Plant Dat The Opera.tors should refer to the. appropria"te procedures for the *Isolation Condenser Vent Hi Radiation Alarm and an Isolation Condenser Tube Lea The Operators may or may not

. request samples to be taken on the shell side of the Isolation Condenser by the.Radiadon"".'Chemistry Department *.

.

.

The TSC upon being 'notified the elevated of Reuter Stokes readings should send Environs Teams into the fiel Based ori field data provided by the Environs Teams, The TSC should make proper recommendations for protection of the public.*.

Bo mockups will be utilized for the Isolation Condenser tube

• break *

0015D/8/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

/

• EVENT:.

ISOLATION CONDENSER FAILURE TO ISOLATE DESCRIPTION:

In accordance with approved operating procedures, the Operators should attempt to isolate. the Isolation Condenser by placing the associated control switches tothe closed position~ Valves 1301-3 and 1301-4 indicate that they have closed following a group 5 isoloation signa The Isolation Condenser Steam Inlet isolation valves 1301-1 and 1301""."2 have dual indication The valves have failed to*.

CHALLENGING AS'PECTS;.

SUCCESS/

FAILUR PATHS:

MOCK UPS SIMULATION;

. close due to* the increased steam flow in* the Isolation Condenser Steam inlet lin The motor operators for the

.. valves have tripped on high torque and hav~ failed to clos the valves due to the increased differential pressure created across the valve di'sc Radiation levels on the vent radiation monitors are continuing to increase indicating a failure of the Isolation Condenser to isolate.* Primary system steam is being released uncontrollably to the environmen The Operators must recognize that the Steam Inlet isolation valves failed to close on the Group 5 isolation signal and take the necessary actions in order to achieve_ a full isolation of the Isolation Condense This is necessary in order to stop. an uncontrolled release of primary system steam to the environmen Successful performance would be for the Operators to conclude that the Isolatidn Condenser has failed to isolate due to the inability of the 1301~1 and 1301-2 valves to close against the extreme differential pressure created across the valve disc No uiockups will be utilized for the. Isolation Condenser failure to isolate *

0015D/9/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

DESCRIPTION:

CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

MOCK UPS SIMULATED:

.

.

.* TSC RAD LEVELS INCREASE TO GREATER THAlf 5 mR/hr During the release.to the Environs due to the Isolation Condenser Tube break,.the TSC gamma radiation levels increase to 10 mR/hr. * Radiation levels remain elevated Un.til such time that the Isolation Condenser Isolation :valves are *closed terminating the release to the environ The OSC will need to evaluate the radiological conditiQns outside and inside.the TSC and take the proper radiation *

protection steps based on the evaluations. '.

The OSC will dispatch Radiation Protection Team.members to the TSC to survey the immediate are The OSC Supervisor should initiate the prope'r rad,iation protection steps and* make

recommendations to the Rad Chem Director based on Survey Team assessment Proper Sigil.S *and barriers will be available in the OSC for use by team members in establishing radiation protection bo\\Dldarie OOlSD/10/wjm 7-11-89 (1040)

~*

DESCRIPTIO]lf:

. CHALLENGING ASPECTS:

EXPECTED ACTGIONS:

MocmPS/

SIMULATIONS:

JPIC ACTIVITIES The JPIC will be activated and operated in accordance with the GSEP in relati9n -t.o the events at the Dresden Station *

The JPIC staff will be challenged with providing accurate, coordinated and timely information-to the Media from the information provided to the EOF from the Statio A scenario 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time~jump will provide*& challenge to the JPIC staff to provid updated information appropriate to the new condition Media Monitoring and Rumor Control activities will challenge the Communications Services at the CECo Corporate offices. An added challenge will be provided by the placement of a Mock.Press consisting 9f ten people which provides for a more realistic atmosphere for the. Spokesperson Rormal channe.ls of information flow will be* established between the Duty Officer, Communications Services, Dresden Station and the EO Press releases and Media briefings will be generated,

_ through coordnation with non-CECo JPIC representatives, within*

• the established timefranies and presented in the JPI A Mock Press of three (3) teievision reporters, three (3) radio reporters and four (4) newsvriterswili' be used in the JPI OOlSD/11/wjm 7-ll~89 (1040)