IR 05000249/1989026

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Insp Rept 50-249/89-26 on 891215-900124.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Activities Including Review of Program,Procedures & Observation of Work Activities
ML17202G783
Person / Time
Site: Dresden 
Issue date: 02/07/1990
From: Danielson D, Schapker J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17202G782 List:
References
50-249-89-26, GL-87-05, GL-87-5, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, NUDOCS 9002220101
Download: ML17202G783 (7)


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report N /89026(DRS)

Docket N License No. DPR-25 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Post Off ice Box 767 Chicago, I~ 60690 Facility Name:

Dresden Station - Unit Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morris, IL 60450 Inspection Conducted:

December 15 and 18, 1989, and January 10-11, 17,

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23-24, 1990

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Inspector: /* *. 7..

~.,/- ;{ __

./ J_,. F. Schapke

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Approved By:

D. ~anielson, Chief Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary

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-<; 7 ft)

Date

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Date

Inspection on December 15 and 18, 1989, and January 10-11, 17, 23-24, 1990 (Report No. 5o-249/89o26(DRS))

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Areas Inspected:

Routine unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI)

activities including review of program (73051), of procedures (73052), of.

observation of work activities (73753) of data review and evaluation (73755);

of licensee action on previous inspection findings (92702), and of insp~ctio~

of* the drywell containment for degradation (GL 87-05)(92703).

Results:

0

!SI.activities were accomplished within the guidelines of Section XI requirement the licensee'~ augmented inspection program of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) susceptible piping was performed in accordance with the corrtmitments made in response to GL 88-0 The liCensee adequately demonstrated the ability to properly implement the ISI program including augmented inspection of IGSCC susceptible pipin PDR ADOCI<, osooo;.1L!C)i..

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DETAILS l;

Persons Contac~ed Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) *

  • L. Gerner, Technical Staff S~perintendent
  • M. Strart, Te~hnical Staff Supervisor

. * Harba~zewski, Technical Staff Group leader

  • G. Bergan, Nuclear Safety
  • K. Peterman, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
  • R. Falbo, Regulatory Assurance Assistant

~. Whitman, ISI Coordinatbr F. Dundek, Vtsual Examination Inspector J. Kotowski, Production Superintendent Gen~ral Electric Company (GE)

T. Brinkman, Level III S. Meeker, Level III R. Parr, Level II _

J. Halley, Level.II Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection (HSB)

T. Waldbillig, ANII U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)

S. DuPont, Senior Resident Inspector D. Hills, R~sident Inspector

. The NRC inspector also contacted and interviewed other litensee and contractor personnel~

  • Denotes those present at the exit me.eting on January 24, 199.

A~tion Taken on Generic Letter (GL) 87~05 Ins ection of Unit 3 *

onta rnment Background Significant corrosion was found to have thinned the drywell skin at.

  • oyster Creek Station in November 1986 in a location adjacent to the sand cu~hion. The cushion is located just below the torus ~ent lines on the outside of the drywell skin. The cushion's purpose is to provide a tran~ition from the rigid support ~t the bottom of the dr ywe 11 to a 11 ow movement of the ski *
  • Licensee Action In the Summer of 1987, the licensee inspected the drains to the sand cushions and ~etermined that they were plugged due.to sand entrapmen The plugged lines were cleared and the water from the drains was determined to be mildly corrosive; no biological corrosive ~lements

. wer~ presen *

During the previous outage the licensee initiated an inspection program to:measure the thickness of the drywell skin in the sand cushion area. Twenty-two core drillings in the concrete surfate to

  • the drywell liner were made *. The core drillings were made at the top and bottom sections of the sand.pocket area (11 at the top and 11 at
  • the bottom).

The azimuth sections were selected based on sand pocket location and accessibility. Ultrasonic thickness measurements of the

.drywell wall were performed.. The as-designed nominal wall thickness*

was.l.0625". All areas inspected e~ceeded the designed nominal wall thicknes The ultrasonic examinations provide assurance that the drywe 11 wa 11 was not degraded due to the trapped water discovered when the plugged drain lines were cleared. * The licensee subsequently implemented surveillance of the sand pocket drains to assure the drains remain functional and to ascertain the source of leakag No leakage was detected during op~rations; leakage only occurs after the refueling cavity is floode The licensee inspected the refueling pool. bellows for degradation and found the bellows to be intact with no cracks or possible leak paths observed. *The licensee ii currently investigatin~ other possible leak paths and will report the findings to the NRC at completion of the inquir The licensee plans contin~ed surveillance of the sand pocket drains and to re-inspect the drywell liner with ultrasonic thickness measurements at least every five (5) year The next scheduled UT is planned.for refueling outage Rl The licensee's action in response to Generic Letter 87-05 appears to beadequate to assure the drywell containment liner does not degrade due to moisture entrapment in the sand pocket area * * Inservice Inspection (ISI) Unit 3 (73051, 73052, 73753, 73755, 92702) This was the first outage of the third period in the setond ten year interval. The licensee contracted with General Electri~ Company (GE) to perform ultrasonic (UT), magnetic particle (MT), liquid penetrant (PT) and visual (VT) examination. Examinations were perfotmed in accordahce with ASME Section XI, 1977 Edition, Summer 1979 Addend The GE procedures were reviewed and.approved by a CECo Level III that was EPRI qualifie IS! Proc.edure Review The NRC inspector reviewed the following NDE procedure. *

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0 CECo, Norideitructive Testing (Inservice Inspection) OAP 11-8, Revision CECo,

~ultrasonic Calib~ation/Linerity Procedure," NOT C-10, Revis ion 1 CECo, "Component Examination Detail Instruction for VT-3/4 Examination", Revision l~

CECo, "Preservice and Inseivice Ultrasonic Inspection of Similar and Dissimilar Metal Pipe Welds at Nuclear Station,"

NDT-C-2~ Revision 1 GE, "Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Examination Personnel_," FQP-03, Revision CECo, "Ultrasonic Inspection of the Vessel Nozzle Inner R~dii at Nuclear Stations," NDT-C-10, Revision 1 CECo,

"Ultra~onic Inspection of Flange Ligaments Between Threaded Bolt Holesi" NDT-C-11, Revision 1 CECo, "Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Vessel Welds to NRC Reg. Guide 1.150 for Boiling Water Reactors,~ NDT-C-30-79, Revision CEC6, "Beam spread and Refrac~ed Angle Determination to NRC Reg. Guide 1.150 for Boiling Water Reactors," NDT-C-31-79, Revision CECo, "Nonaqueous Red Dye Liquid Penetrant Examination for Section XI Class IWB and OWC Components for Nuclear Stations,~

NDT-D-2, Revision CECo, "Visual Examination - Welds, Pr~ssure Regaining Bolting, *

and Component Internals," VT-1-1, Revision 2~

CECo, "Visual Examination - System Hydrostatic and Leak Tests,"

. VT-2-1, Revision CECo, "Visual Inspection Performed for Section XI," VT-3/4, Revision 1.

CECo, "Magnetic Particle Examination fbr ASME Section XI Class IWB and IWC Components for Nuclear Stations," NDT-B-1, Revision No violations or deviations were id~ntifie '*.,. Review of ISI Data, Material, Equipment and NOE Personnel Certifications The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents and determined that the applicable QA/QC requirements were met:

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ISI data report Ultrasonic instruments, transducers, and couplant certification Liquid penetrant, cleaner and developer certificat~on Mag~etic particle materials and equipmen NDE personnel certifications compliance to SNT-TC-lA requirement *

No violations_ or deviations were identifie Observations of Work and Work Activities (ISI) The NRC inspector observed nondestructive examinations in progress on the foll6wing components and pipin *o

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Ultrasonic examination of the Reactor Vessel Closure Head circumf~rential welds:

Magnetic particle examination of Reactor Vessel Head circumferential wel Visual examination of Reactor Vesselinternals via remote camera *

. Ultrasonic examination set-up and calibrations of Iso Condenser piping welds and Shroud Head Bolts. *

Visual examination of supports in accordance with ASME Section XI, VT 3/4 requirement The NRC inspector also observed calibrations of ultrasonic equipment prior to and after the examinations referenced above, and discussed NOE procedures and exam_ination findings with the Levels II and III examination personnel; Examinations performed by the cognizant personnel were adequate in meeting the safety objeetives of the ASME Section XI requirement *

(IGSCC)

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The licensee replaced the Unit 3 Recirculation piping during the Fall 1985/Spring 1986 outag No Recirculation piping welds were scheduled for inspection this outag (Classified as category "A" in accordance with GL 88-01.)

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A total of fifty-seven (57) IGSCC susceptible piping welds were examined in accordance with the sampling plan which follows the requirements of GL 88-0 No IGSCC indications were found on the examination for the fifty-seven piping welds.*

Examination services were provided by GE using approved Co11111onwealth Edison Cocipany (CECo) procedure CECo nondestruitive examination.

(NOE) personnel were utilized for review and resolution 6f the examination result CEC6 and GE IGSCC UT examination p~rsonnel were qualified at the EPRI NOE Center after September of 198 The NRC inspector observed examinations of two IGSCC welds in progress including calibration of UT equipment, and reviewed examination data and results of all the IGSCC susceptible weld inspections. The NRC inspector also reviewed the licensee's

. response to GL 88-01 and verified commitments *made in the response were performed this out~g The 1 icensee *misplaced the ca 1 ibration block for Class II, 12

diameter Iso Condenser supply line weld A similar calibration block was borrowed from the licensee's LaSalle Station. The licensee's Level III u~trasonic examiner verified th~ attenuation measurements to assure *acoustic similarity. The material type (stainless steel) was the same as the original calibration block, and the design was as required by the ASME Section XI, Appendix III requirement *

The )icensee's ISi examination~ complied with ASME Section XI and NRC regulatory requirements, augmented examinations in atcord~nce with GL 88-01 were performed with no IGSCC detected this outag Vfsual Examination of Component Supports The NRC inspector observed visual examinations of piping support~

performed by the ISI contractor for the licensee. The contractor inspector was qualified in accordance with the ASME Section XI requirements for VT 3/4 inspector certification. Observations were performed in.accordance with applitable ptocedure requirement Two out of the six supports inspected had no component drawings on fil These two supports were identified as "no action supports", due to their elimination from the design pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-14 and

. Mark I modifications. However, the "no action supports" were not removed but were left in plac Inspection of these supports is required to assure operating transients have not degraded them; thereby causing degradation of supported piping and component The NRC inspector consult~d a Region III NRC Specialist concerning "no action supports" and IE Bullet in 79-14 modification The specia 1 ist inspector provided background and detailed information referencing these modification The NRC specialist inspector also provided previous NRC insp~ction findings concerning ISI inspections *

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Previous NRC inspection findings {237/87006-0lD; 249/87001-0lC)

which reference CECo procedures {DTP-2 "lnservice Inspection Plant" and OAP 18-8 "Non-destructive Testing {Inservice Inspection)") were found to have inadequate instructions or acceptance criteria concerning spring can settings. Additionally, Violation 237/87006-0lE; 249/87011-010, referehces drawing ISI 200, Sheet.l of

  • 3, Revision A, did not include new supports, deleted supports, or new support numbers that resulted fr.om IE Bulletin 79-14 and Mark 1 modification ~eview of the above violations' corrective actions was performed previously and found acceptable. This review was performed as additional assurance of implementation on these corrective actions
  • and included observation of inspection activitie ReView of these d6cuments confirmed corrective actions were implemented for the cited defic1encie Isometri~ drawings identify the new supports and_ "no action supports" and the referenced procedures have been revised to direct the inspector to take appropriate action for inspection of spring can setting Further review of CECo specia 1 process procedure VT-3/4-1 11Visua 1

'Inspection Performed for Section XI, 11 Revision 1, and Component Examination Detail Instruction {CED!) for 11Examination of Constant and Variable Spring Type Component Supports," Revision 1, was

performed. These procedures provide detailed instructions for performance of visual examination rif ~pecific component suppo~t These procedures comply with the requirements of ASME Section XI, 1971 Edition through 1984 Winter Addenda, Paragraphs IWA 2213 and IWA 2214, a~d provide the necessary inspection details t6 assure the spring settings comply ~ith design requirements~

The. licensee's ISI program, procedures, and examinations complied with the NRC regulatory and ASME Section XI requirement.

Exit Meeting The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives {denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of th~ inspection on January 24, 1990, and during subsequent telecons with Messrs. G. Whitman, D. Fisher and M. Horbaczewski

  • on February 5 and 7, 199 The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspecti_on activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspection finding The inspector also di~cussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspector. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary. -

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