IR 05000220/1998009
| ML17059C244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059C243 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-98-09, 50-220-98-9, 50-410-98-09, 50-410-98-9, NUDOCS 9809220045 | |
| Download: ML17059C244 (36) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION:
REGION I
Docket/Report Nos.:
50-220/98-09 50-41 0/98-09 License Nos.:
DPR-63 NPF-69 Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation P. O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093 Facility:
Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Scriba, New York Dates:
July 5 - August 15, 1998 Inspectors:
B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector L. A. Peluso, Radiation Specialist D. M. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. A. Skokowski, Resident Inspector 9809220045 9809i0 PDR ADQCK 05000220
, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 50-220/98-09 & 50-41 0/98-09 July 5 - August 15, 1998 This NRC inspection report includes reviews of licensee activities in the functional areas of operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a six-week period of inspections and reviews by the resident staff and regional specialists in the areas of emergency preparedness and environmental monitoring.
OPERATIONS In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious.
No performance concerns were identified in this area.
MAINTENANCESURVEILLANCE During preparations for maintenance on the Unit 1 containment spray system, the markup for isolation of the system was inadequate, resulting in a breach of the primary containment integrity. This issue remains open pending the NRC inspectors'eview of NMPC's completed root cause analysis and determination of corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
(EEI 50-220/98-09-01)
ENGINEERING At Unit 1, an inadequate engineering evaluation of a 1997 configuration change resulted in a non-conformance with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, by opening the core spray high point vent valves to address GL 96-06 thermal over-pressurization concerns.
Upon identification, NMPC took prompt and appropriate corrective actions.
This licensee identified and corrected violation of Appendix R was not cited.
(NCV 50-220/98-09-02 During Unit 2 surveillance testing, NMPC identified that both control room air conditioning units were running in parallel, contrary to the intended design.
This design vulnerability could have potentially resulted in the system being inoperable, under certain design basis accident scenarios.
This licensee identified and corrected violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was not cited.
(NCV 50-410/98-09-03)
PLANT SUPPORT Overall performance in this area was good.
No concerns were identified during the inspectors'n-office review of a number of Emergency Plan implementing procedure SUMMARYOF ACTIVITIES Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) Activities Unit 1 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (Unit 1) maintained full power throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (Unit 2) was conducting power ascension and startup testing following the completion of the sixth refueling outage.
Full power was achieved on July 12.
On July 19, power was reduced to 55% to allow swapping feed pumps, power was restored to 100% the same day.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff Activities Ins ection Activities The NRC resident inspectors conducted inspection activities during normal, backshift, and deep backshift hours.
In addition, specialists from Region I conducted in-office inspections in the areas of emergency preparedness and environmental monitoring. The results of these activities are integrated into this inspection report (IR).
U dated Final Safet Anal sis Re ort Reviews While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors verified that the UFSAR descriptions were consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
The only notable exception was discussed in Section E8.4, related to both Unit 2 control room air conditioning units running in paralle I. OPERATIONS
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments 71707
'sing NRC Inspection Procedure 71707, the resident inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
The reviews included tours of accessible areas of both units, verification of engineered safeguards features (ESF) system operability, verification of adequate control room and shift staffing, verification that the units were operated in conformance with Technical Specifications (TS), and verification that logs and records accurately identified equipment status or deficiencies.
In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues 08.1 Closed VIO 50-220 EA96-079-2024: Failure to Notif NRC of Unit 1 Blowout Panels bein in a Condition Outside Desi n Basis 92901 In 1993, the licensee identified that the Unit 1 reactor and turbine building blowout panels would not relieve until a pressure greater than that described in the UFSAR.
NMPC failed to promptly report this condition outside the design basis of the plant, as required by 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors completed an in-office review of the docketed correspondences between NMPC and NRC regarding this violation, including NMPC's April 27, 1998, final reply to the violation. Based upon the review of docketed material, discussions with the NRC Office of Enforcement, and verification of actions taken by NMPC regarding this issue, this violation is closed.
08.2 Closed LER 50-410 98-02 Su lement 01: Violation of Technical S ecification 6.2.2.b 90712 The technical details associated with this Licensee Event Report (LER) were described in NRC IR 50-410/98-02,Section 08.4.
The inspectors completed an in-office review of the additional information provided in Supplement 01 and found it acceptable.
LER 50-410/98-02, Supplement 01, is closed.
Topical headings such as 01, MS, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline.
Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.
The NRC inspection manual procedure or temporary instruction that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report sectio e
08.3 Administrative Closure of Ins ection Follow Item 50-220 97-04-05 During NRC inspection 50-220/98-17,the inspectors reviewed the technical details associated with the inspection follow item (IFI) 50-220/97-04-05,but erroneously referred to item IFI 50-220/97-04-01.
Item number 50-220/97-04-01 was a Non-Cited Violation and was opened and closed in NRC IR 50-220/97-04.
No additional inspection was required to close IFI 50-220/97-04-05.
This item is closed.
08.4 Administrative Closure of Ins ection Follow Items IFls The below listed IFIs were re-examined and determined to have minimal regulatory significance.
These IFls are being administratively closed without additional NRC inspection:
50-410/96-07-1 5 50-220/96-1 3-02 50-220/97-04-01 50-41 0/97-80-02 Long Standing Hardware Problems No Trending of Out-of-Tolerance Calibrations Low DifficultyAssociated with the Written Examination for Licensed Operator Requalification Training Engineering Evaluation and Corrective Actions for RHR "B" Full Flow Test Valve II. MAINTENANCE IVI1 Conduct of Maintenance M1 ~ 1 General Comments 61726 62707 Using NRC Inspection Procedures 61726 and 62707, the resident inspectors periodically observed various maintenance activities and surveillance tests.
As part of the observations, the inspectors evaluated the activities with respect to the requirements of the Maintenance Rule, as detailed in 10CFR50.65.
In general, maintenance and surveillance activities were conducted professionally, with the work orders (WOs) and necessary procedures in use at the work site, and with the appropriate focus on safety.
Specific activities and noteworthy observations are detailed in the inspection report.
The inspectors reviewed procedures and observed all or portions of the following maintenance/surveillance activities:
~
N1-ST-Q25
~
N1-PM-S1
~
N1-ISP-044-005 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water Quarterly Test Operator's Rounds Guide High Water Level Scram Discharge Volume Instrument Channel Functional Calibration
Surveillance activities are included under
"Maintenance."
For exampie, a section involving surveillance observations might be included as a separate sub-topic under M1, "Conduct of Maintenance."
~
N1-ISP-036-008
~
WO 98-01 949-01
~
N1-ST-Q6A
~
N2-OSP-EGS-M@001
~
N2-OSP-CSL-Q@002 High Reactor Pressure
- Emergency Cooling 5. Low
,Reactor Pressure
- Core Spray Permissive Instrument Channel Test/Calibration Inspection and Cleaning of Containment Spray ¹121 In-Line Strainer ¹80-09 Containment Spray System Loop ¹111 Quarterly Operability Test Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Division I and II Low Pressure Core Spray Pump 5, Valve Operability Test and System Integrity Test M1.2 Inade uate Marku Resulted in a Breach of Unit 1 Primar Containment lnte rit a.
Ins ection Sco e
61726 During planned maintenance on the Unit 1 containment spray system, a torus low pressure annunciator alerted the control room operators to a breach in primary containment integrity. The condition existed for five (5) hours before it was discovered.
The inspectors reviewed the DER, the markup, the associated work orders, and the procedure that controlled the generation of markups.
In addition, the inspectors discussed the event with the individuals involved and,Unit 1 management.
b.
Observations and Findin s On August 4, 1998, during planned maintenance on the Unit 1 containment spray system, NMPC discovered that primary containment integrity had been inadvertently breached.
Specifically, the isolation of containment spray strainer ¹121 for maintenance was inadequate, in that closure of the heat exchanger vent valves was not included on the markup.
This resulted in a leakage path from the torus air space, through the open vent lines to the containment spray system, to the reactor building atmosphere via the disassembled strainer.
The leakage path had been open for about five hours, when a torus low pressure alarm was received in the control room. The Station Shift Supervisor (SSS) promptly recognized the cause and directed the vent valves to be closed, which re-established primary containment integrity.
The inspectors reviewed the work order, the associated markup for the planned maintenance, the system prints, and the NMPC implementing procedure for markups (GAP-OPS-02, "Control of Hazardous Energy and Configuration Tagging).
The inspectors also discussed the event with Unit 1 Operations management and the licensed operators responsible for the generation and approval of the markup.
As of the end of the inspection period, NMPC had not completed the root cause evaluation or determined the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
This issue, which is an apparent violation of NRC requirements, willremain open pending
receipt and review of the associated LER required to be submitted to the NRC, in accordance with 10CFR50.73.
(EEI 50-220/98-09-01)
c.
Conclusion During preparations for maintenance on the Unit 1 containment spray system, the markup for isolation of the system was inadequate, resulting in a breach of the primary containment integrity. This issue remains open pending the NRC inspectors'eview of NMPC's completed root cause analysis and determination of corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
(EEI 50-220/98-09-01)
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues M8.1 Administrative Closure of Unit 1 Items Referenced in NRC IR 50-410 98-12 During the NRC inspection of the Unit 2 Maintenance Rule implementation, the inspectors reviewed the technical details of the below listed Unit 1 open items and all were closed.
The results of this review were documented in NRC IR 50-410/98-12. However, due an administrative oversight the Unit 1 docket number was not included in the cover letter and inspection report.
This serves to administratively close the below listed Unit 1 items:
URI 50-220/96-1 2-02 Effectiveness of the expert panel, including untimely reviews associated with (a)(1) systems IFI 50-220/96-1 2-03 Engineering evaluation to provide a basis for the risk ranking downgrade of the diesel fire pump IFI 50-220/96-1 2-04 VI0 50-220/EA-97-007-1013 Review balancing of reliability and unavailability Failure to include a number of systems, structures, and components within the scope of the rule VIO 50-220/EA-97-007-1023 Ineffective goals and monitoring for the (a)(1)
and (a)(2) systems III. ENGINEERING E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 General Comments 37551 Using NRC Inspection Procedure 37551, the resident inspectors frequently reviewed design and system engineering activities and the support by the engineering organizations to plant activitie E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues E8.1 Closed VIO 50-410 EA96-474-2033: Debris Found in the Unit 2 Su ression Pool Downcomers - Inade uate Corrective Action 92903 In 1995 during the fourth refueling outage (RFO4) at Unit 2, NMPC did not adequately clean the suppression pool. Specifically, the cleaning did not include the removal of debris from of the downcomers.
[A downcomer is a hollow steel vent pipe which penetrates the drywell floor, and connects the drywell atmosphere to" the water in the suppression pool, The suppression pool is filled with water and provides for the rapid condensation and cooling of the steam-water mixture which would result from a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).] This was identified by NMPC during RFO5 in October 1996.
NMPC had initiated a deviation/event report (DER) in May 1995, documenting that most of the debris removed in RFO4 was located beneath the downcomers.
The NRC determined this was a violation of 10CFR50,
'Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," in that controls were not established to assure that a condition adverse to quality was identified and appropriate corrective action taken.
NMPC identified in their response to the violation that the root cause for the violation was a lack of a questioning attitude with respect to the location of the material in the suppression pool and a lack of sensitivity to the issue of foreign debris potentially clogging the strainers forremergency core cooling system pumps.
In addition, NMPC admitted that there were multiple missed opportunities to have determined that a downcomer inspection was warranted.
With respect to the overall adequacy of the Nine Mile corrective action program, as defined in procedure NIP-ECA-01, "Deviation/ Event Reports," NMPC stated in their response to the violation that they considered the DER program to be fundamentally sound.
However, the program was enhanced, to include:
(1) written guidance for dispositioning DERs, (2) categorizing DERs based on significance, and (3) a requirement that formal root causes for Level 1 DERs be performed by qualified personnel.
In addition, to prevent recurrence, the practice of an acting branch manager approving the DER disposition was discontinued and, in the absence of a branch manager, the approval was to be escalated to a senior manager.
The inspectors reviewed the Notice of Violation response, dated May 12, 1997, and determined that the root cause and corrective actions were acceptable.
The resident inspectors routinely review significant DERs and observe management meetings where DER dispositions are discussed.
Generally, the DER disposition and corrective actions have improved since this event and senior NMPC management expectations have been adhered to. This violation is closed.
E8.2 Closed LERs 50-410 97-15 Su lements 01 5 02: 0 enin Between Reactor Buildin and Reactor Buildin Auxiliar Ba 90712 The issues associated with this LER were described in NRC IR 50-410/97-12, Section E8.1. The inspectors completed an in-office review of the additional
information provided in the Supplements and found it acceptable.
The LER Supplements are closed.
Closed LER 50-220 98-13: Valve Re ositionin Caused Non-conformance With A
endix R Safe Shutdown Anal sis Ins ection Sco e
92700 On June 4, 1998, Nine Mile Point engineering personnel discovered that some requirements of the Unit 1 10CFR50, Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, were not satisfied.
The inspectors assessed the licensee's immediate actions, root cause analysis, and planned corrective actions.
With respect to immediate actions, the inspectors discussed the actions with the SSS and reviewed applicable plant drawings.
With respect to the root cause and planned corrective actions, the inspectors reviewed the associated DER and LER, applicable licensee procedures, specific engineering documents, the Unit 1 UFSAR and the Unit 1 System Design Basis Document.
In addition, the inspectors verified the completion of the LER in accordance with 10CFR50.73.
Observations and Findin s As a result of a previous violation associated with the Unit 1 Fire Protection/
Appendix R Program, NMPC performed a design verification review of their Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE).
During this review, NMPC engineering personnel discovered that some requirements for the Unit 1 10CFR50, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis were not satisfied.
Specifically, two 1-inch manual valves (40-26 and 40-27) downstream of the core spray system high point vent lines were opened to preclude post-LOCA thermal over-pressurization concerns, as addressed by Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, "Ass'urance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity during Design-Basis Accident Conditions." The valves had previously been closed to satisfy Appendix R high/low pressure interface/inventory loss pathway concerns.
The specific Appendix R concern is a control room fire which causes a loss of alternating current (AC) power.
During this event, the reactor vessel must retain sufficient coolant inventory until power is restored.
The Unit 1 Appendix R analysis determined that with the maximum leakage allowed by TS, makeup to the vessel would not be required for the initial eight hours of the event.
With valves 40-26 and 40-27 open, and with the spurious operation of two motor-operated valves (MOVs) and one air-operated valve, a leak path could potentially be established from the core spray spargers, within the reactor vessel, through the core spray system to the reactor building equipment drains.
This potential pathway could result in leakage that exceeds the amount assumed in the analysis, and adversely impact the ability to maintain coolant inventory (i.e., keep the reactor coolant water level above the top of active fuel) during the eight-hour period that AC power is assumed unavailabl The licensee's immediate corrective actions were to verify that the MOVs were closed and to tag open the associated circuit breakers.
The Unit 1 UFSAR, Appendix 10B, "Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis," Section 5.9 4.3, allows electrical isolation of components as a means to resolve potential spurious operation.
Therefore, this configuration ensures conformance with the Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, and satisfactorily addresses the GL 96-06 thermal over-pressurization concern, Based on discussions with the SSS and a review of the applicable plant drawings and UFSAR sections, the inspectors concluded that these immediate actions were acceptable.
NMPC evaluated the consequence of the event and concluded that the probability of multiple hot shorts was very small, and the probability was likewise very small of sufficient leakage through this pathway to cause the core to become uncovered.
Therefore, based on the above, this event did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
Additionally, NMPC completed a probabilistic assessment of the event that concluded that there was no significant increase in core damage frequency.
Nonetheless, the failure to provide adequate protection against possible spurious operation of equipment that could adversely impact the safe shutdown capability is a violation of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G.2. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the
'RC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 50-220/98-09-02)
The inspectors verified that the LER was completed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.
Specifically, the description and analysis of the event, as contained in the LER, were consistent with the inspectors'nderstanding of the event.
The root cause and corrective and preventive actions as described in the LER were reasonable.
This LER is closed.
Conclusion At Unit 1, an inadequate engineering evaluation of a 1997 configuration change resulted in a non-conformance with the 10CFR50, Appendix R, Safe Shutdown Analysis, by opening the core spray high point vent valves to address GL 96-06 thermal over-pressurization concerns.
Upon identification, NMPC took prompt and appropriate corrective actions.
This licensee identified and corrected violation of Appendix R was not cited.
(NCV 50-220/98-09-02)
Closed LER 50-410 98-17: Control Room Ventilation S stem lno erable due to Ori inal Desi n Deficienc 92700 Ins ection Sco e Observations and Findin s On May 20, 1998, during performance of a surveillance test to verify the loss of offsite power (LOOP) function of the emergency diesel generators, NMPC identified that both control room air conditioning units (ACUs) were running for a short period of time. This was not one of the expected responses to the test, and DER 2-98-1459 was written to evaluate the acceptability of both ACUs operating in
parallel.
On June 2, NMPC determined that the parallel operation of these safety-related ACUs could adversely impact their design function. The control room ACUs are designed to cool safety-related equipment in the control room and to maintain control room habitability following a LOCA coincident with a LOOP. Specifically, if both ACUs were to start and run in parallel, one or both of the ACUs could trip due to low flow. The start logic would consequently have to be manually reset, before the tripped ACU(s) would automatically restart.
If both ACUs tripped or the operating ACU were to become inoperable, the system would not be able to automatically maintain the control room environment.
Although not designed for parallel operation, NMPC's investigation revealed that the start logic permitted this configuration.
The system ducting was designed for single ACU operation only. NMPC determined the root cause to be inadequate verification and independent review of the original design provided by the Architect/Engineer.
Unit 2 engineering determined that control room temperature alarms would alert the operators early enough to initiate manual actions to restore at least one ACU to maintain the control room temperature below design limits. Corrective actions included a modification to the control logic for the system, and a review of all other safety-related ventilation systems for similar design vulnerabilities.
This original construction design vulnerability resulted in the control room ventilation system being potentially inoperable, which is contrary to 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.
However, this licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-410/98-09-03)
The inspectors verified that the LER was completed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.
Specifically, the description and analysis of the event, as contained in the LER, were consistent with the inspectors'nderstanding of the event.
The root cause and corrective and preventive actions as described in the LER were reasonable.
This LER is closed.
Conclusion During Unit 2 surveillance testing, NMPC identified that both control room air conditioning units were running in parallel, contrary to the intended design.
This design vulnerability could have potentially resulted in the system being inoperable, under certain design basis accident scenarios.
This licensee identified and corrected violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was not cited.
(NCV 50-410/98-09-03)
IV. PLANT SUPPORT Using NRC Inspection Procedure 71750, the resident inspectors routinely monitored the performance of activities related to the areas of radiological controls, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, and fire protection.
Minor deficiencies were discussed with the appropriate management, significant observations are detailed below. Specialist inspectors in the same areas used other procedures during their
reviews of plant support activities; these inspection procedures are listed, as applicable, for the respective sections of the inspection report.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues R8,x Closed LER 50-410 98-16: Missed Technical S ecification Surveillance Re uirementof Meteorolo ical Wind S eed 90712 The details associated with this LER were discussed in NRC IR 50-220/98-05, Section R1.2. The inspectors completed an in-office review of the LER and verified that it was completed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.
Specifically, the description and analysis of the event, as contained in the LER, were consistent with the inspectors'nderstanding of the event.
The root cause and corrective and preventive actions as described in the LER were reasonable.
This LER is closed.
P3 EP Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Review of Emer enc Plan and Im lementin Procedures 82701 Based on NMPC's determination that the changes to the Nine Mile Emergency Plan and the below implementing procedures did not decrease the overall effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, and a limited review of the changes, the NRC acknowledges that the changes did not required NRC approval, in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q).
The NRC willinspect the implementation of these changes in a future inspection to confirm that they did not decrease the overall effectiveness of the emergency preparedness function.
Procedure EPIP-EPP-02 EPIP-EPP-03 Title Site Emergency Plan Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2 Search and Rescue EPIP-EPP-05 Station Evacuation EPIP-EPP-06 EPIP-EPP-07 EPIP-EPP-08
'n-plant Emergency Surveys Downwind Radiological Monitoring Off-Site Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Revision
8
2
8 EPIP-EPP-09 EPIP-EPP-10 EPIP-EPP-1
EPIP-EPP-1 3 Determination of Core Damage Under Accident Conditions Security Contingency Event Hazardous Material Incident Response Emergency Response Facilities Activation and Operation
Procedure EPIP-EPP-1 5 EPIP-EPP-1 6 EPIP-EPP-20 EPIP-EPP-22 EPIP-EPP-23 EPIP-EPP-25 EPIP-EPP-27 EPIP-EPP-30 EPMP-EPP-01 EPMP-EPP-02 EPMP-EPP-04 EPMP-EPP-05, EPMP-EPP-'08 Title Emergency Health Physics Procedure Environmental Monitoring Emergency Notifications Damage Control Emergency Personnel Action Procedures Emergency Reclassification and Recovery Emergency Public Information Procedure Prompt Notification System Problem Response Maintenance of Emergency Procedures Emergency Equipment Inventories and Checklists Emergency Exercise/Drill Procedure Emergency Preparedness Program Self Assessment Maintenance, Testing and Operation of the Oswego County Prompt Notification System Revision
3
2.3
4
3
12,13,14
1
FS Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F8.1 Closed LER 50-410 98-19: Fire Proofin Missin from Beam 90712 On June 17, 1998, NMPC identified that a structural beam in the Unit 2, Division II emergency switchgear room was not properly coated with fire proofing. This was identified as a result of a similar deficiency at Unit 1. The beam was subsequently re-coated, and no additional significant deficiencies were identified. This failure to ensure the plant was in a condition consistent with the design basis constitutes a
violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
V. MANAGEMENTMEETINGS X1 Exit Meeting Summary At periodic intervals, and at the conclusion of the inspection period, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
The final exit meeting occurred on August 21, 1998.
During this meeting, the resident inspectors'indings were presented.
NMPC did not dispute any of the inspectors findings or conclusions.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report, and discussions with NMPC representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain safeguards or proprietary informatio ATTACHMENT1 PARTIALLIST OF NMPC PERSONS CONTACTED Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration R. Abbott D. Barcomb D. Bosnic
'.
Burton H. Christensen J. Conway B. Holloway R. Dean A. DeGracia S. Doty K. Dahlberg G. Helker A. Julka C. Merritt P. Mezzafero L. Pisano N. Rademacher R. Randall V. Schuman R. Smith C. Terry D. Topley K. Ward D. Wolniak Vice President, Nuclear Engineering Manager, Unit 2 Radiation Protection Manager, Unit 2 Operations Manager, Training Manager, Security Vice President, Nuclear Generation Manager, Unit 1 Chemistry (acting)
Manager, Unit 2 Engineering Manager, Unit 1 Work Control Manager, Unit 1 Maintenance Plant Manager, Unit 2 (acting)
Manager, Unit 2 Work Control Director, ISEG Manager, Unit 2 Chemistry Manager, Unit 1 Technical Support Manager, Unit 2 Maintenance Manager, Quality Assurance Manager, Unit 1 Engineering Manager, Unit 1 Radiation Protection Plant Manager, Unit 1 Vice President, Nuclear Safety Assessment 5 Support Manager, Unit 1 Operations Manager, Unit 2 Technical Support Manager, Licensing iNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551 IP 61726 IP 62707 IP 71707 IP 71750 IP 82701 IP 90712 IP 92700 IP 92901 IP 92903 On-Site Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program In-Office Review of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Follow-up - Operations Follow-up - Engineering A-1
Attachment 1 (cont'd)
ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND UPDATED OPENED 50-220/98-09-01 50-220/98-09-02 50-410/98-09-03 EEI Inadequate markup resulted in a breach of primary containment integrity NCV Appendix R safe shutdown analysis not satisfied due to a core spray valve repositioning NCV Control room ventilation inoperable due to design
'eficiency CLOSED 50-220/98-09-02 NCV 50-410/98-09-03 NCV 50-220/97-04-05 50-220/96-1 2-02 IFI URI 50-220/96-1 2-03 IFI 50-220/96-1 2-04 IFI 50-220/EA97-007-1013 VIO 50-220/EA97-007-1023 VIO 50-220/EA96-079-2024 VIO 50-410/96-07-1 5 50-220/96-1 3-02 50-220/97-04-01 IFI IFI IFI 50-410/97-80-02 IFI 50-410/98-02-01 50-41 0/97-1 5-01 LER LER 50-410/EA96-474-2033 VI0 Appendix R safe shutdown analysis not satisfied due to a core spray valve repositioning Control room ventilation inoperable, due to design deficiency Poor reliability of the Unit 1 simulator full-core display Effectiveness of the expert panel, including untimely reviews associated with (a)(1) systems Engineering evaluation to provide a basis for the risk ranking downgrade of the diesel fire pump Review balancing of reliability and unavailability Failure to include a number of systems, structures, and components within the scope of the rule Ineffective goals and monitoring for the (a)(1) and (a)(2)
systems Failure to notify NRC of Unit 1 blowout panels being in a condition outside design basis Long standing hardware problems No trending of out-of-tolerance calibrations'ow difficultyassociated with the written examination for LORT Engineering evaluation and corrective actions for RHR
"B"full flow test valve Debris found in the suppression pool downcomers-inadequate corrective action Violation of TS 6.2.2,b Opening between reactor building and reactor building auxiliary bay A-2
Attachment 1 (cont'd)
50-410/97-1 5-02 50-220/98-1 3 50-41 0/98-1 7 50-41 0/98-1 6 50-410/98-1 9 LER Opening between reactor building and reactor building auxiliary bay LER Valve repositioning caused non-conformance with Appendix R safe shutdown analysis LER Control room ventilation system inoperable due to original design deficiency LER Missed TSSR of meteorological wind speed LER Fire proofing missing from beam UPDATED none LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACU CFR DER EA EEI ESF FPEE GL IR LER LOCA LOOP MOV NCV NMPC NRC RFO RHR SSS TS UFSAR Unit 1 Unit 2 VIO WO Air Conditioning Unit Code of Federal Regulations Deviation/Event Report Enforcement Action Escalated Enforcement Item Engineered Safeguards Feature Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Generic Letter
Inspection Report
Licensee Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
Motor Operated Valve
Non-Cited Violation
Nine Mile Point Corporation
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Refueling Outage
Station Shift Supervisor
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Nine Mile Point Unit 1
Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Violation
Work Order
A-3