IR 05000213/1979013
| ML19254E378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1979 |
| From: | Graham P, Keimig R, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E374 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-79-13, NUDOCS 7911010011 | |
| Download: ML19254E378 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGilLATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-213/79-13 Docket No. 50-213 License No. OPR-G1 Priority:
Category:
C
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at:
Haddam, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
May 1-4, 8-11, and 23-24, 1979 W
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W@ M 8/8/77 Inspectors:
V T. Fg S,tetka,[ Reactor Ins e tor dite sign 6d (5/-4 11-3/79)
d/7f79
/ k abc-6, P. 'lT.* Graham, Reactor Insp(ector dath silgned 9311/ 9)
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La'za# s, Reactor Inspector ddte signed 5-Approved by:
e h(m kn b 79 R.' R. Keimig, Chief, Reactqr Projects datpsfgn6d Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 1-4, 8-11, and 23-24,1979 (Report No. 50-213/79-13)
Areas Inspected:
Special, unannounced inspection to review lice.nsee actions taken in response to IE Bulletins 79-06,79-06A, and 79-06A, Revision 1.
The inspection involved 96.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> on site by three regional based inspectors.
Results:
Three items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction -
Failure to adhere to procedures; Infraction - Failure to use approved procedure to perform ~ valve lineup;. Infraction - Use of inadequate procedure).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Blewett, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- N. Burnett, Operations Supervisor T. Campbell, Instrument and Control Supervisor J. Deveau, Training Coordinator
- R. Dilaura, Quality Assurance Technician
- J. Ferguson, Engineerina Supervisor
- R. Gracie, Operations Assistant
- R. Graves, Station Superintendent
- M.
Morris, Staff Engineer
- R. Traggio, Assistant Station Superintendent The inspectors also, interviewed several other licensee persornel during the course of the inspection.
These encloyees included operations and engineering personnel.
- Present at the exit interview of May 11, 1979.
- Present at the exit interview of May 11 and May 24, 1979.
2.
Review of Operator Training A review of training records and discussions with licensed operators on each shift was conducted to verify the adequacy of licensee administered operator training.
The review and discussions verified the following:
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That operators have received training on any procedure changes initiated as a result of Bulletins 79-06,79-06A and 79-06A, Revision 1; That operators have been instructed on the specific measures
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which provide assurance that engineered safety features would be available if required, including measures for returning such systems to operable statas following maintenance and testing;
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That operators have been instructed on the specific and detailed meas es to assure that automatic actuations of emergency safety features are not overridden except as permitted in the bulletin;
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That operators have revie'.;ed plant automatic actions initi-ated by reset of enginee'ed safety features that could effect the control of radioactive liquids and gases; and 1282 Cl:
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That plant operators and supervisory personnel have been instructed in the provisions and directives for early NRC noti.~ication of serious events.
All operators interviewed appeared knowleogeable of the events described in the Bulletins and of plant changes made as a result.
The licensee issued Operating Department Instruction (ODI) No.118, Prompt Report to NRC of Uncontrolled or Unexpected Condition of Operarion, on April M, 1979, to provide guidance to the operators for es tablishing ano _aintaining a continuous communication channel with the NRC.
The licensee also issued 001 No. 39, Verification of the Availability of Regt. ired Safeguards Equipment When Perform-ing Maintenance and Returning to Service, levision 1, dated April 30, 1979.
These ODI's and signoff sheets, demonstrating that operators had received onsite traininc, were included in the inspector's review.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Review of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
A detailed review of the ESF was conducted to verify by ind_ependent examination of records, procedures and equipment that ESF are operable according to TS requirements and that licensee's procedures and administrative controls provide adequate assurance of continued operability, a.
Valve lineups were reviewed for the following systems using the system procedures noted below.
These system procedures were compared to current system diagrams to verify adequacy of the lineups.
(1) Auxiliary Feedwater System
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NOP 2.18-1, Startup-Filling and Venting Feedwater System, Rev. 0;
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N0P 2.1-1, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Rev. 5; Valve List E, Lineup of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Steam Supply to Turbine Drives; and,
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SUR 5.1-13, Auxiliary Feed Pump Monthly Functional Test, Rev. -: (Reviewed valve lineup that was under ravision).
The actual salve positions for all accessible valves that could affect system operation were verified by observation on May 2 and 3, 1979.
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(2) Core Cooling Systems and Containment Spray System NOP 2.12-1, Core Coeling System Lineup for Shutdown
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aid at Power Operation, Rev. 7;
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SUR 5.1.4, Hot Operational Test, Rev. 4;
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NOP 2.1-1, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Rev. 5; Valve List D, Charging Pump Lineup; NOP 2.6-2, Volume Control:
Normal and Alternate
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Operation, Rev. 3; and, Locked Valve Check List, Rev. 3, dated 7/26/73.
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The actual valve positions for all accessible valves that affect system operation were verified by observa-tion on May 3, 9 and 10, 1979.
(3) Containment Air Recirculation System NOP 2.13-1, Reactor Containment Atmosphere Contrv.
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System Air Recirculation,.Rev. 1 The actual valve positions for all. accessible valves that provide cooling water to the system were verified by observation on May 9, 1979.
(4) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System NOP 2.9-1, Residual Heat Removal System, Placing
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System in Service, Rev. 5.
The ar.tual valve positions for all acc:ssible valves that affect system operation were verified by observa-tion on May 9,. 1979.
(5) Service Water System
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NOP 2.24-1, Placing Service Water Header In Service, Rev. 1.
The actual valve positions for all accessible valves that affect system operation were verified by observa-tion on May 4 and 9, 1979.
During this review, the inspector noted a number of valves that were on the system drawings but not on the 128;2 Cl C
valve lineups. These valves were also checked for valve lineup.
(6)
Emergency Diesel Gentrator (EDG) System
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Locker Valve Check List, Rev. 3, dated 7/it'/73; and,
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NOP 2.24-1, Placing Service Water Header In Service, Rev. 1.
The actual valve positions for all accessible valves that affect system operation were verified by observa-tion on May 4 and 9, 1979.
The inspector noted that the licensee has no valve lineup for the EDG Starting Air System.
The inspector reviewed drawing 16103-26045, entitled, " Boundary Diagram - Diesel Generator Starting Air System," and then subsequently verified by observa-tion on May 4, 1979 that this system was properly lined up to start the EDG's.
(7) Emergency Electrical Systems
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NOP 2.16-1, AC and DC Distribution Normal Configura-tion, Rev. 3.
The actual breaker and switch positions for all applicable circuitry was verified by observation on May 9,1979.
In addition, the inspector's review of electrical system drawings identified additional circuit breakers that were not ind uded in N0P 2.16-1.
These breaker positions were also verified by observation on May 9, 1979.
b.
Review of the valve / breaker lineups and drawings identified in Paragraph "a" above revelaed significant discrepancies between system drawings and the lineups.
(1) The general discrepancies were as follows:
Drawings update'd while valve / breaker lineups were
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not;
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Valve / breaker lineups updated while drawings were not; Valve lineups nonexistant (e.g., EDG air start);
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Valves or breakers appearing on one document (i.e.,
a drawing or lineup) but not appearing on the other document; 1282 Cl'
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Incorrect valve or breaker desigaation and
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descriptions;
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Valve numbers not ap? earing on drawings;
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Valve positions different than shewn on lineup (however, correct for proper system operation);
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Valv positions for the same valve is different on different valve lineups though operating conditions may be the same (e.g., the locked valve list was different than other valve lists in tnet a valve positioned on one list was locked on the other list).
As the result of Quality Assurance Audit A70039, con-ducted on April 9, 1979, the licensee initiated a program to revise drawings ard some procedures to be consistent with present "as-bui't" plant conditions.
An outside vendor was hired to accomplish this work.
The licensee will considerably exoand this program to include all drawings and valve / breaker lineups that involve safety-related systems.
The licensee will complete valve / breaker lineup revisions by May 21, 1979; this is an unresolved item (213/79-13-01).
The licensee will revise all applicable drawings to be consistent with "as-built" plant conditions; this is an unresolved item (213/79-13-02).
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(2) Some system-specific discrepancies identified were as follows:
a.
Core Cooling System
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'/alve SI-V-866 (Leak Detection Pressure Indi-cator Isolation) is shown as open in NOP 2.12-1 and SUR 5.1-4, however, was actually shut; Seal Flow valves for the HPSI and LPSI pumps
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were not shown on valve lists.
A modification was made to add seal flow to the "A" LPSI pump and this was not identified or the valve lineup or drawings (a check of the valves on May 4 verified the valves were open as required);
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Flow control valve FCV-110A and its isolation valves are not on the valve litacps.
FCV-110 is isolated but is designated as in-service on the valve lineups; and,
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Valve SI-V-878 was omitted from the aoproved valve lineups and was only inclu.ied on an unapproved " Locked Valve Check List."
Failure to adhere to procedures NOP 2.12-1 and SUR 5.1-4 is contrary to TS 6.8.1 and is an item of noncompliance (213/79-13-03).
Use of an unapproved procedure to perform a system valve lineup is contrary to TS 6.8.2 and is an item of noncompliance (213/79-13-04).
b.
Residual Heat Removal System Valve RH-MOV-21 (RWST to RHR a ction) is shown open on the valve 'ineup but is actually closed.
This valve should be closed as foun' 'ad was temporarily changed approximately two weeks ago on the valve lineup as such, however, no temporary procedure change was initiated.
Failure to initiate the temporary procedure change is contrary to the requirement of procedure QA 1.2-6.4, Temporary Procedure Change.
Failure to adhere to procedure QA 1.2-6.4 is cont.ary to 15 6.8.1 and is considered to be part of the item of noncomoliance (213/79-13-03) identified in Paragraph 3.b.(2)(a).
c.
Service Water System
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Valves for the Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Coolers are not on the lineup; and,
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Service Water pump discharge isolation valves are not on the valve lineup.
d.
EDG System
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No valve lineup for the air starting system; Valve lineup for the fuel oil supply system is
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not complete and is only included on an unapproved 2 Cf'
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" Locked Valve Check List."
In addition, it was determined that valves used to isolate the 40,000 gallon fuel oil tank from the 5,000-gallon tanks were closed though they were required to be locked open.
The valve for EDG 2A was tagged closed, however, the valve for EDG 2B was not tagged nor logged in the tag-out log as being shut.
It was also determined that the fuel oil pump discharge valves were not locked open as specified.
This problem was caused by an inadequate valve lineup and inadequate valve labeling.
Upon notification of this finding, the licensee opened both valves.
A licensee resentative stated that the reason these valves were closed was due to leakage past the flow control valves (FCV's).
After the isolation valves were opened, the FCV for EDG 2A leaked and the applicable isola-tion valve had to be reshut.
A maintenance request was issued
',o repair the valve.
Failure to have an adequate valve lineup is contrary to the require.nents of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and QAP 5.0 and is an item of noncom-pliance (313/79-13-05).
e.
Emergency Electrical Systems No breaker. lineups existed for individuai pump motors, fan motors, and heaters that are required for ESF.
Specific discrepancies, cther than the items of noncompliance, are considered to be part of unresolved items (213/79-13-01) and (213/79-13-02)
identified in Paragraph b.(1).
c.
The administrative controls imposed by the licensee to assure praper " return to service" of ESF components following test and maintenance activities were reviewed for adequacy.
This review included verification that tagging practices on control panels do not provide potential for obscuring system status indicators.
The following procedures were reviewed:
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ODI No. 39, Verification of the Availability of Required
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Safeguards Equipment When Performing Maintenance and Returning to Service, Rev. 1 (4/30/79);
QA 1.2-5.1, M=intenance Requests and Work Permits,
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Rev. 6; QA 1.2-11.1, Operational Surveillance Tests, Rev. 2;
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QA 1.2-11.3, Retest / Test Requirements, Rev. 3;
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QA 1.2-14.2, Equipment Control (Locking and Tagging),
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Rev. 1; and, OPI No. 93, Station Tagging Instructions, Rev. 2.
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The licensee revised procedure QA 1.2-14.2 on May 18 to include a precaution to assure tags do not obscure system status indicators.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Surveillance Test / Maintenance Procedure Review a.
The inspector reviewed the following Surveillance Tests /
Maintenance Procedures to assure that a system / component is returned to an operational lineup:
QA 1.2-5.1, Maintenance Requests and Work Permits,
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Revision 7, dated May 11, 1979; QA 1.2-11.3, Retest / Test Requirements, Revision 3, dated
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April 24, 1979; Operations Department Instruction No. 39, Verification
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of the Availability of Required Safeguards Equipment When Performing Maintenance and Returning to Service, Revision 1, dated April 26, 1979; M 8.5-15, Maintenance of High Pressure Safety Injection
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Pumps, Revision 2, dated December 1, 1978; M 8.5-16, Maintenance of the Low Pressure Safety Injection
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Pumps, Revision 1, dated October 1, 1975; M 8.5-20, Maintenance of Emergency Diesel Air Start
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Motors, Revision 2, dated December 1, 1976; 1282 Cl'
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M 8.5-26, Maintenance of High Pressure Safety Injection
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Pump Motors, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1975; M 8.5-27, Maintenance of Low Pressure Safety Injection
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Pump Motors, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1975; M 8.5-30, Maintenance of Service Water Pump Motors,
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Revision 1, dated October 27, 1975;
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M 8.5-31, f.ontainment Air Recirculation Fans, Original, dated Octroer 15, 1974; M 8.5-33, Maintenance of Residual Heat Pump Motors;
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Revision 1, dated October 3, 1975;
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M 8.5-40, Maintenance of Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pumps, Revision 1, dated March 21, 1977;
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M 8.5-99, Maintenance of Residual Heat Removal Pumps, Revision 1, dated October 3, 1975;
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M 8.5-92, Maintenance of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers, Original, dated February 14, 1975;
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M 8.5-105, Maintenance of Service Water Pumps, Revision 3, dated December 1, 1978;
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PM 9.5-6, Preventive Maintenance of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Motors, Original, dated February 1,1975;
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PM 9.5-7, Preventive Maintenance of Lsw Pressure Safety Injection Pump Motors, Original, dated February 1,1975-PM 9.5-10, Preventive Mainteance of Service Water Pump
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Motor, Original, dated January 8, 1975; PM 9.5-13, Preventive Maintenance of Residual Heat
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Removal Pump Motors, Revision 1, dateu October 3, 1975;
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PM 9.5-21, Semi-Annual Test of Emergency Diesel Redundant System, Revision 7, dated February 28, 1979;
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PM 9.5-36, Preventive Maintenance of the Emergency Diesels, Revision 3, dated April 26, 1979;
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PM 9.5-43, Emergency Diesel Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, Revision 2, dated June 28, 1978;
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PM 9.5-74, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Trip Test,
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Revision 1 dated December 24,1978;
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PM 9.5-75, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Trip Test, Revision 1, dated December 24, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-13, Auxiliary Feed Pump Monthly Functional Test, Revision 4, dated May 19, 1977;
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SUR '.1 a
' ' a t h l,\\ lontainment Recirculation Fan Damper and.ilt. Inspection, Revision 3, dated August 25, 1977; SUR 5.1-103, In-Service Inspection (ISI) Pump Surveil-
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lance, Revision 2, dated August 4, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-96, ISI of Service Water Motor Operated Valves (MOV's), Original, dated April 14, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-87, ISI of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to Refuel-ing Water Storage Tank MCV, RH-MOV-874, Original, dated April 14, 1978; SUR 5.1-83, ISI of RHR Inboard and Outboard Isolation
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MOV's, Original, dated April 14, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-7, Functional Test of the Containment Spray Valves, Revision 1, dated April 6, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-111, ISI of Emergency Generator 2B Service Water Isolation Valve, SW-A0V-130, Original, dated April 12, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-110, ISI of Emergency Generator 2A Service Water Isolation Valve, SW-A0V-129, Original, dated Aoril 14, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-116, ISI of Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump Control Valves, MS-PICV 1206A and 1206B, Original, dated April 14, 1978; SUR 5.1-112, ISI of Service Water Pump Discharge Check
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Valves, Original, dated April 12, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-98, ISI of Auxiliary Feed Pump Discharge to Containment, FW-MOV-35, Original, dated April 18, 1978; i282 c'a,
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SUR 5.1-21, Containment Recirculation System-Charcoal
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Filter Spray Valve Operational Check, Revision 1, dated April 6,1978;
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byM 0 A 3, Periodic Check of the Containment Trip Valves and Containment Recirculation Fan Dampers, Revision 3, dated March 7, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-18, Test of Emergency Diesel Generator, EG2A, With Partial Loss of AC Coincident with Core Cooling Actuation, Revision 4, dated November 23, 1977;
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SUR 5.1-19, Test of Emergency Diesel Generator, EG28, With Partial Loss of AC Coincident with Core Cooling Actuation, Revision 4, dated November 23, 1977;
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SUR 5.1-4, Hot Operational Test, Revision 4, dated August 25, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-17, Emergency Diesel Generator Manual Starting and Loading Test, Revision 2, dated August 31, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-124, ISI of Auxiliary Feed Pump Cischarge Check Valves and Check Valve Downstream of FW-MOV-35, Original, dated March 9, 1979;
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SUR 5.1-22, Containment Recirculation System Fan ;ooler Inspection, Revision 1, dated January 23, 1976;
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SUR 5.1-104, Boric Acid Pump Weekly Functional Test, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-20, RHR System Leakage Inspection, Revision 1, dated January 28, 1977;
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SUR 5.1-16, Check for In-Leakage to Engine Cylinders and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Availability, Revision 2, dated May 1, 1977;
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M 8.5-13A, Maintenance of Charging Pump, lA, Revision 3, dated May 18, 1978;
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M 8.5-338, Maintenance of Charging Pump,1B, Original, dated June 23, 1978;
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M 8.5-61, HEPA-F;1ter (FL-71) Charcoal Absorber Replace-ment, Original, dated February 1,1975; 1282 c:
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M 8.5-62, HEPA-Filter (FL-72) Element Replacement,
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Original, dated February 1, 1975;
." 8.5-63, Replacement of Prefilter (FL-70-1A, FL-70-1B)
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Filter Elements, Revision 1, dated April 6, 1978;
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M 8.5-96, Maintenance of Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers, Revision 1, dated December 17, 1976;
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M 8.5-98, Maintenance of Primary Plant Service Water Filters, Original, dated February 14, 1975;
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PM 9.5-18, Preventive Maintenance of Battery Charger Panels, Revision 1, dated September 1, 1976; PM 9.5-19, Station Batteries Test Discharge, Revision 2,
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dated April 26, 1979; PM 9.5-69, Emergency Diesel Generator Trip Test, Revision 1,
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dated May 18, 1978; PM 9.5-73, Charging Pump Trip Test, Revision 1, dated
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December 24, 1978;
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PM 9.5-86, Emergency Diesel Generators 2A and 2B Insulation Test, Revision 2, dated April 26, 1979;
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PM 9.5-95, Preventive Maintenance of Vital Bus Inverters, Original, dated December 1, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-14, Auxiliary Feed Pump Flow Capacity Test, Revision 0, dated February 1, 1975;
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SUR 5.1-122, ISI of Low Pressure Safety Injection and Core Deluge System, Original, dated r bruary 4, 1979; e
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SUR 5.1-92, ISI of RHR to Charging Pump Suction M0V's, Original, dated April 14, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-60, Auxiliary Containment Spray From Fire System, Revision 2, dated August 31, 1978;
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SUR 5.1-61, Auxiliary Steam Generator Feedwater Supply, P-81, Revision 2, dated December 24, 1978; and,
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SUR 5.1-115, ISI of Boric Acid System Air Operated Valves, Manual Valves and Primary Water Makeup Check Valve, Original, dated April 14, 1978.
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b.
Findings (1) SUR 5.1-17, Emergency Dierel Generators Manual Starting and Loading, utilizes a data collection form for the operators to log pertinent data.
The inspector noted that several entries from several previous tests were outside of the " normal or expect i range" of values but did not indicate a problem with the diesels since these particular data were not related directly to diesel operation (e.g., grid voltage).
A licensee representa-tive acknowledged the inspector's comments and committed to a procedure change by May 25, 1979.
The item is unresolved (213/79-13-06),
(2) SUR 5.1-124, ISI of Auxiliary Feed Pump Discharge Check Valves and Check Valve Downstream of FW-MOV-35, did not contain a step-by-step return to normal as did all other Surveillance Tests.
A licensee representative ackn:w-ledged this fact and committed to a procedure change that would give specific " return to normal" guidance.
This item is unresolved (213/79-13-07).
(3) SUR 5.1-4, Hot Operational Test, had two discrepancies that have been previously identified as items of noncom-pliance (213/79-13-03) and (213/79-13-04) in Paragraph 3.b.2.a.
C.
The inspector reviewed the latest Surveillance Test on each ESF system to verify that the acceptance criteria were met.
With the exception of the discrepancies identified in Para-graphs 4.b.(1) and 4.b.(3) above, there were no additional items cf noncompliance or unresolved items.
5.
Surveillance Procedures for Pressurizer Pressure Functional Test The inspector dis:ussed with the licensee the incorporatic.1 of Bulletin 79-06A Revision 1 into the surveillance procedures for the pressurizer pressure and level functional test.
The licensee commented that it was not necessary to reconnect the three pres-surizer level leads to perform the surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables due to the system logic.
The licensee is requesting further guidance from Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) with respect to the Surveillance Testing, but in the meantime has committed to a procedure change to the Surveil-lance Test prior to the next surveillance (scheduled in approri-mately 2 weeks).
This item is unresolved (213/79-13-08).
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6.
Administrative Control for Return to Service The following procedures were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the administrative controls to assure ESF systems are returned to an operable condition:
QA 1.2-5.1; Maintenance Requests and Work Permits, Rev. 6; QA 1.2-11.3; Retest / Test Requirements, Rev. 3.
No inadequacies were identified.
7.
Licensee Use of Independent Verification Methods The inspector interviewed licensee. representatives to determine if the licensee utilizes " independent verification of valve / breaker /
d switch alignments when performing those alignments following extended outages and after maintenance / test activities.
The licensee stated that though there are some independent verifica-tions made, there are no procedural requirements to make such verifications and as such these are not routinely performed.
The inspector had no further questions on this item at this time.
8.
Partial Actuation of Safety Injection (SI) to Control Pressurizer Level The inspector queried licensee operators to determine if the licensee requires partial actuation ("one train") of SI to assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine operation in the event a pressurizer level transient occurs.
The charging system for this facility consists o one positive displacement pump (33 gpm) and two centrifugal pumps (360 gpm each).
During normal operation, one of the contrifugal pumps runs continuously to control letdown and makeup flow.
If an operational transient reduced pressurizer level, the running pump would auto-matically inject more water via the makeup line (the charging flow control valve is controlled by pressurizer level), thus controlling the level.
If the transient was great enough to exceed the capa-it.y of the running charging pump (as detected by a drop in the
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cuarging discharge header pressure) the standby centrifugal pump would start automatically tu assist in the level makeup.
The operators stated that during operational transients they have not lost pressurizer level indication and have not had the standby charging pump start to maintain pressurizer level The plant appears to have an excess charging capacity.
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Partial actuation of safety injection would not help an operational transient situation because the HPSI pump pressure is 1,400 psig against the normal system pressure of about 2,000 psig.
The charging pumps would provide the necessary makeup.
Based on this information, the licensee does not require or apparently need partial SI actuation to control pressurizer level.
The inspector had no further questions on this item at this time.
9.
Reactor Coolant (RC) Pump Operation Philosophy As stated in the licensee's response to Bulletin 79-06A, the operating philosophy for the reactor coolant pumps is being reviewed by the Nuclear System Steam Supplier (NSSS) (Westing-house).
The licensee is presently involved in an ACRS meeting held on May 10, 1979 in which the NSSS will provide their evalu" ation ano conclusions concerning RC pump operatic-during LOCA and steam break accidents.
The preser. ation reviewed by the inspector indicates that the NSSS is recomm+ciding that RC pumps be tripped when such accidents occur.
This item will be the subject of further review.
The licensee has changed procedure E0P 3.1-4, Loss of Coolant Accident, to clarify when the RC pumps should be shut down.
The inspector had no further questions on this item at this time.
10.
Criteria for Reactor Coolant Pump Operation and for Maintenance of 50 F Subcooling The inspector discussed these issues with eleven reactor operators to verify that they are aware of the criteria to maintain at least two reactor coolant pumps operating in the event of a high pressure injection and that they know how to determine the 50 degrees sub-cooling specified in Bulletin 79-06A.
These discussions indicate that the operators are knowledgeable with regard to these criteria.
The licensee also has revised or is revising the following procedures to address this issue:
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E0P 3.1-4, Loss of Coolant;
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E0P 3.1-5, Steam Generator Tube Failure; and,
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E0P 3.1-7, Abnormal Steam Flow.
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These procedures will be revised to include subcooling curves.
In addition, the licensee has installed a curve showing the 50 F subcooling band on the main control board.
Procedure E0P 3.1-4 was revised on May 18, 1979.
Procedures E0P 3.1-5 and E0P 3.1-7 remain to be revised.
These revisions will be completed by May 25, 1979.
This item is unresolved (213/79-13-09).
11.
Requirements for Dry Steam Generator Feeding The licensee does not have procedures for feeding dry steam generators.
The licensee specifies in E0P 3.1 7, Abnormal Stean Flow, to not add water to a hot dry steam generator.
This approach is based on the assumption that not all steam generators will be boiled dry.
The inspector had no further questions on this item at this t'me.
12.
Safeguards DC Bus Battery Monitoring The inspector's review of the 125 volt DC one line drawing identi-fied an apparent problem with battery status monitoring.
Specifi-cally, the battery is c',nected to the bus via a fuse and all monitoring of the DC system and battery charging is accomplished via tne bus which is downstream of the battery fuse.
If the fuse between the battery and bus were removed or failed (blown), the battery would be disconnected from the bus.
Since the bus voltage would be maintained by the battery charger and all monitoring of DC system condition is off the bus, there would be no indication that the battery has disconnected and was discharging.
The licensee has no TS requirements to conduct weekly or monthly battery surveil-lance tests and does not conduct such tests, therefore increasing the possibility of the battery being out of service.
This issue was discussed with licensee representatives who stated that they believed there was indication available to warn them if this event occurred, however, personnel knowledgeable in this matter were presently unavailable.
This issue will be reviewed and corrective action taken if required.
This item is unresolved (213/79-13-10).
13.
NRC Review of Bulletin Responses The licensee's responses to Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A, Rev. 1 dated April 24, 1979, May 14, 1979, and May 18, 1979 were reviewed both in office and onsite to confirm the validity of the licensee's actions.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items fo'r which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 3.b.1, 3.b.2, 4.b,(1), 4.b.(2), 5, 10, and 12 of this report.
15.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the cone'usion of the inspection on May 11, 1979 and May 24, 1979, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting, the unresolved items and items of noncompliance were identified.
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