IR 05000213/1979007
| ML19257D083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1979 |
| From: | Devlin J, Nimitz R, Jason White NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257D080 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-79-07, 50-213-79-7, NUDOCS 8001310344 | |
| Download: ML19257D083 (22) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
--
Region I Report No. 50-213/79-07 Docket No.
50-213
~
License No.
DPR-61 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Naa:e:
Haddam Neck Plant Investigation at:
Haddam, Connecticut and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Investigation ccnducted:
Mar 5-9, 16 and 20-23, 1979 Investigators:
w #ed O.
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S /7-79 C. O. Ga P,
nvestigation Specialist date signed G/4/
r44 J/ R.17hite, R i,i Specialist
' dat6 si ec Yb u
/W f
R/L. Nimitz, RadiaYion Specialist (Intern)
cate signed
.
c te s gned Approved by:
[d'
'($c
$ )/ 7$'
/ d. W. Devlin, Chief, Security and Investigation
/ date signed v'
Section, Safeguards Branch Investigation Summary:
Investigation on March 5 - 9,16 and 20 - 23,1979 (Report No. 50-213/79-07)
Areas Investigated:
The investigation covered several allegations relating to the Radiation Protection Program during the 1979 refueling outage at the Haddam Neck facility. The allegations were made in writing by a member of the contractor health physics group on February 24, 1979 and by saveral members of the licensee and contractor health physics staff during the course of the investigation. The investigation involved 81 man-hours on site by one NRL investigator.
Results: An inspection of the Radiation Protection Program had been initiated previously on February 14, 1979 and was performed concurrently with this in-vestigation during the period of March 5-9, 1979. Thirteen items of noncompli-ance some of which were identified during the inspection and some during the concurrent activities, are described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/79-06.
1845 210 Region I Form 143 g g 9 3 31 03h (Rev. Octcber 1977)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS A.
Allegations and Investigation Findings This investigation involves allegations that were introduced by a letter dated February 24, 1979 to the Regional Director of the NRC-Region I.
Subsequent review by the NRC established seven (7) allegations related to the radiation protection program at the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant, Haddam Neck, Connecticut.
These allegations are described and numbered 1 through 7 below.
During the course of the investigation, an additional allegation was voiced by various members of the licensee and contractor health physics personnel.
This allegation is described and numbered 8 below.
Allegations 1.
Although the Health Physics Staff was aware of the potential refueling problems due to the evidence of leaking fuel prior to shutdown, it was totally unprepared to handle the health physics problems associated with a major outage.
Health physics personnel were consequently understaffed, underequipped and undersupplied for the outage, a condition which resulted in several problems in the area of health physics.
The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated and resulted in thirteen (13) items of noncompliance with respect to 10 CFR 19, 10 CFR 20, the licensee's Technical Specifications and Administrative Procedures.
(Details, Paragraph D.1 and NRC Inspection Report 50-213/79-06).
2.
Health physics supervisory personnel failed to evaluate in a timely manner the existence of an alpha contamination problem, did not take appropriate actions to identify the problem, nor appropriate precautions once the problem was identified and acknowledged.
The NRC investigation found the allegation to be substantiated.
(Details, Paragraph D.2).
3.
Following an incident whereby a worker was affected by an improperly cleaned respirator, health physics supervision did not take appropriate action to identify the cause of the problem and take responsible emergency actions.
The reason for this incident was the absence of an effective QA/QC program for respirator cleaning and maintenance, respirators being used without being bagged and inadequate training in the proper use of respirators.
The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substan-tiate this allegation that appropriate action had not been taken following the incident but did identify circumstances which indicated a breakdown in accepted safety practices.
(Details, Paragraph D.3).
1845 215
4.
Despite the objections of contractor health physicists, the licensee performed hydrolasing activities in the reactor cavity with only minimal precautions and despite contra-indications by means of smear survey data which indicated that severe airborne contamination would result from such activites.
As a result of these activites, several workers were exposed to unnecessarily high airborne radioactivity concentrations.
The NRC investigators found this allegation to be substantiated.
(Details, Paragraph D.4).
5.
The lower level annulus of the containment building was barricaded to such an extent as to impede normal egress under emergency condi-tions.
The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to sub-stantiate this allegation (Details, Paragraph, D.5).
6.
Following a contamination incident outside of containment on February 21, 1979, cleanup operations resulted in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity which may have exceeded 10 CFR 20, Appendix C limits.
The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substan-tiate this allegation.
(Details, Paragraph D.6).
7.
Staytime logs are being doctored because several individuals have exceeded applicable NRC limits with respect to airborne activity.
Some records indicating increased levels of activity have been deliberately disposed of and the computer is being used to cover up these activities.
The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substan-tiate this allegation but did identify conditions which indicated a breakdown of accepted health physics practices (Details, Paragraph D.7).
8.
An undue amount of pressure was placed on health physics persori el
'
by both licensee and contractor personnel to have operations per'ormed within established schedules.
The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated.
(Details, Paragraph D.8).
1845 216
.
B.
Management Meeting A management meeting was held at the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station on March 9, 1979 in order to review the preliminary findings of this investi-gation and to examine the various areas of concern as identified during the radiological inspection being conducted concurrently with the investi-gation.
A second management meeting was conducted in the NRC-Region I (Philadelphia) office on March 16, 1979 to discuss NRC concerns in the area of radiological protection and the licensee's responsiveness to these concerns.
The attendees 7t these meetings are listed below.
- W. G. Counsil, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations (Northeast Utilities)
- J. Kufel, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations (Northeast Utilities)
- J. P. Cagnetta, Director, Nuclear and Environmental Engineering (Northeast Utilities)
- R. H. Graves, Station Superintendent, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station R. C. Traggio, Assistant Station Superintendent, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station
- R. C. Rogers, Supervisor, Radiological Assessment Group (Northeast Utilities)
H. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station P. Steinmeyer, Health Physics Foreman, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station.
- Denotes attendees at March 16, 1979 meeting in addition to March 9, 1979 meeting.
1845 217
.
.
III.
DETAILS A.
Introduction This investigation was initiated as a result of written allegations received on March 1, 1979 by the Director of NRC-Region I via letter dated February 24, 1979.
These allegations related to various problem areas in the licensee's radiation protection program.
B.
Scope of Investigation This investigation included an examination of pertinent documents and records at the Haddam Neck site; actual measurements of radiation levels; interviews and contacts with individuals; and observations by the investi-gators.
C.
Persons Directly Interviewed and/or Contacted During the NRC Investigation 1.
Licensee Personnel W. G. Counsil, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations (Northeast Utilities)
J. Kufel, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations (Northeast Utilities)
J. P. Cagnetta, Director, Nuclear and Environmental Engineering (Northeast Utilties)
R. H. Graves, Station Superintendent, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station R. P. Traggio, Assistant Station Superintendent, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station R. C. Rogers, Supervisor, Radiological Assessment Group (Northeast Utilities)
H. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor, Haddam Nack Nuclear Power Station P. Steinmeyer, Health Physics Foreman, Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station In addition, fourteen (14) additional employees (Northeast Utilities and/or Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station) were interviewed during the course of this investigation.
2.
Westinghouse Electric Company Nine (9) employees of Westinghouse were interviewed during the course of this investigation.
3.
Rad Services, Inc.
Six (6) employees of Rad Services, Inc. were interviewed during the course of this investigation.
1845 218
4.
Chem-Nuclear System, Inc.
Five (5) employees of Chem-Nuclear System were interviewed during the course of this investigation.
D.
NRC Findings and Conclusions Related to Allegations NOTE:
In order to protect the identity of those individuals interviewed during the course of the investigation, alphabetic symbols have been assigned to each individual as appropriate within the context of this report.
1.
Allegation No. 1 a.
Allegation Although the Health Physics Staff was aware of the potential refueling problems due to the evidence of leaking fuel prior to shutdown, it was totally unprepared to handle the health physics problems associated with a major outage.
Health Physics personnel were consequently understaffed, underequipped and undersupplied for this outage, a condition which resulted in several problems in the area of health physics.
b.
NRC Findings NRC investigators were able to confirm that the licensee was aware of the existence of failed fuel as early as August of 1977 and that the problem had escalated steadily until January of 1979 when an estimate of 0.1 to 0.2% failed fuel was deter-mined using various water chemistry parameters.
The licensee also informed the NRC that the problem had been identified and recognized as a potential health physics problem since even minor entries into containment were causing logistical problems as the airborne concentrations of xenon had risen to levels exceeding 150 uCi/cc, the highest concentrations that had been recorded to date in containment on a routine basis.
NRC investigators reviewed the overall health physics program at the site as it pertained to the refueling outage in general and specifically with respect to areas of a.) worker radiation protection training, b.) contamination control, c.) air sampling programs, d.) RWP requirements, e.) use of respiratory equipment f.) dosimetry records, g.) counting and sample analysis and h)
the overall ALARA program.
The results of this review identified 1845 219
thirteen (13) items of noncompliance (eleven (11) infractions and two (2) deficiencies).
The details of this review and the resultant items of noncompliance are documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/79-06.
The NRC investigators also noted that the level of supervision provided throughout the outage was not commensurate with the level of responsibilities present.
This shortcoming was further aggravated by the absence of the normal Health Physics Supervisor due to medical problems.
The NRC noted further that the instru-mentation available during the initial stages of the outage was inadequate to accurately assess the health physics problem areas being encountered.
c.
NRC Conclusion Based on a detailed review and evaluation of the licensee's Health Physics Program by NRC investigators and supported by various statements by licensee and contractor personnel, the NRC concluded that the allegation is substantiated and resulted in thirteen (13) items of noncompliance related to the licensee's failure to meet various requirements with respect to 10 CFR 19, 10 CFR 20, the licensees' Technical Specifications and Adminis-tration Procedures.
2.
Allegation No. 2 a.
Allegation Health Physicis Supervisory personnel failed to evaluate in a timely manner the existence of an alpha contamination problem, did not take appropriate actions to identify the problem, appropriate precautions once the problem was identified and acknowledged.
b.
NRC Findings NRC investigators were able to confirm that alpha contamination had been identified by the licensee as early as January 11, 1979 when
surveys of the charging pump area indicated levels of 50,000 dpm/cm within the metering pump cubicle of that area.
Routine surveys were not performed for airborne alpha contamination due to the licensee's belief that airborne concentration of beta gamma contamination would be more restrictive than existing alpha levels.
On February 11, 1979, the containment area was evacuated due to concern related to alpha airborne concentrations therein.
Initial evaluations of the alpha concentrations were delayed due to (a) lack of proper analytical equipment and (b) the presence of high naturally occurring radon concentrations in air samples taken outside of containment *.
Samples were sent to independent offsite laboratories for analysis at this time.
1845 220
- Due to the low levels of suspected alpha air concentrations within containment, concentrations could not be differentiated from the normal ambient level On February 13, 1979, an individual from the Radiological Assessment Section (RAS) of Northeast Utilities was assigned to the site to help determine the presence and extent of the alpha problem. It was not until February 18, 1979 that the licensee begantggsetheMPCforunidentifiedairbornealpharsdiation (6 x 10 uCi/cc) as their criteria for the use of respirators although no protection factor was taken for the use of the respirators when determining actual exposures.
On February 22,1979,Ryythen recommended the modification of the MPC level to 4 x 10 uCi/cc as a result of preliminary isotopic identification of plutonium on the air particulate filter analized by the licensee's contractor.
Following further againraisedto1x10{gnofpreliminarydata,theMPCwas site specific verificat uCi/cc, approximately 30 times more restrictjvethantheMPCusedforunidentifiedairbornebetagamma (3 x 10 uCi/cc).
The NRC investigation did note that the lack of experience on the part of the site health physics staff and the lack of properly operating and appropriate survey and analytical equipment significantly delayed the resolution of the problem.
Problems related to the general area of the evaluation of airborne concentrations were reviewed and evaluated.
Details may be obtained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/79-06.
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC investigators found this allegation to be substantiated.
3.
Allegation No. 3 a.
Allegation Following an incident whereby a worker was affected by an improperly cleaned respirator, the health physics supervisor did not take appropriate action to identify the cause of the problem and take responsible emergency actions.
The reason for the incident was the absence of an effective QA/QC program for respirator cleaning and maintenance respirators being issued without being bagged and inade-quate training in the proper use of respirators.
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators developed the following chronology of the above incident which occurred on or about February 22, 1979.
1845 221
Prior to the incident, respirators were being cleaned using soap and water, then allowed to air dry.
The masks were then checked for smearable contamination and if clean (less than 1000 dpm), sprayad with disinfectant and reissued.
Due to the high demand and rapid turnover of this equipment *, the masks were not reissued in plastic bags.
When it was discovered that sweating and inovement on the wearer's face was causing the release of some of the fixed contam-ination, a final alcohol rinse was added to lower these levels.
On the day of the incident, the licensee discovered that industrial solvent used to degrease machinery had inadvertantly been placed in one of the 5 gallon containers labelled " alcohol".
When it was discovered that the contents of this container had been used in the final rinse of the respirator facepieces, an attempt w&s made to recover all facepieces cleaned in that manner.
The licensee believed that all affected facepieces had been recovered until a worker was brought by a Health Physics Tech into the Health Physics Foreman's office, apparently in severe respiratory distress.
The Foreman stated that he was annoyed by the technician's manner of reporting this incident because the technician's excitement appeared to further excite the worker who was already quite upset.
The Foreman stated that the worker was sent immediately to the company nurse and subsequently to the emergency room of the local hospital.
The Foreman stated further that a sample of the industrial solvent was sent to the hospital and the company physician was notified.
After treatment at the hospital, which included various blood tests, the worker was sent iack to the plant and placed on light duty for the remainder of the shift.
That evening when the worker went home, he reported having problems (i.e., headaches, nausea, dizziness, etc).
When he repc ted these conditions to the nurse on the morning of February 23,19',J, the nurse sent him home and checked on him every couple of hours.
When the symptoms continued on the following day (February 24, lW9), the nurse ordered him to return to the hospital where he remained for approximately two days prior to his release.
No further problems were noted subsequent to his release from the hospital.
- The licensee stated that individuals would check out " clean" masks with a
"Frisker" and frequently discarded the mask as unacceptable when the "ac-ceptable fixed contamination" was detected.
These actions were believed to have aggravated the mask problem.
1845 222
.
.
With respect to the licensee's QA/QC program for respiratory cleaning and maintenance, the investigators noted that the licensee, though utilizing respiratory protection equipment, did not take credit for such equipment since its program (Respiratory Protection) was not in complete accord with 10 CFR 20.103(c) which requires that such a program meet the specifications of Regulatory Guide 8.15," Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection," and had not informed the Commission of any intent to make allowances for such equipment as specified in 10 CFR 20.103 (e). A QA/QC program in this area was therefore not required. The investigator, however, did emphasize the need for occupational safety considerations exclusive of those related to the radiological hazards involved.
The fact that the mask had not been bagged was judged as not to be a factor leading to the incident itself as the affected piece of equipment would have been used even had it been sealed in a plastic bag.
From the standpoint of training with respect to the use of the respirator, the investigators found this training to be commensurate with their intended use but depended upon in plant health physics personnel to provide additional direction and training as necessary to assure the safety of the workers.
The investigators noted that although no regulatory requirements were violated relative to this particular incident, it did indicate a breakdown in accepted safety practices in that the individual worker did not realize that the mask should have been removed at the first sign of respiratory distress and that precautions should have been taken to prevent industrial solvents from being used to clean respirators. An infraction level item of noncompliance relative to overall training was identified during the special inspection conducted during this investigation and is documented in Section 5 of NRC Inspection Report 50-213/79-06.
4.
Allegation No. 4 a.
Allegation Despite the objections of contractor health physicists, the licensee performed hydrolasing activities in the reactor cavity with only minimal precautions and despite contra-indications by means of smear survey data which indicated that severe airborne contamination would result from such activities.
As a result of these activities several workers were exposed to unnecessarily high airborne radioactivity concentrations.
1845 223
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators reviewed records of surveys taken prior to the hydrolasing activities conducted within the reactor cavity and confirmed levels of removable contamination which would have indicated the undesirability of hydrolasing with the protective equipment originally designated for the operation (e.g., simple respirators and rain suits).
Acceptable health physics practices would have dictated other courses of action such as (a) further precleaning prior to hydrolasing, (b) full cleaning with a less severe method than hydrolasing or, (c)
having selected hydrolasing as the cleaning method under these conditns, more appropriate protective equipment such as supplied air.
The investigators also determined that when hydrolasing activities were initiated, resultant high airborne activities required that the containment building be evacuated and that containment hydrolasing work could only be continued with supplied air and containment access limited to only those individuals performing the activity.
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated.
Items of noncompliance resulting from activities are documented in Section 6.b of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/79-06.
5.
Allegation No. 5 a.
Allegation The lower level annulus of the containment building was barricaded to such an extent as to impede normal egress paths under emergency conditions.
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators noted that on February 14-15, 1979, as part of the NRC Special Inspection effort, NRC inspectors identified several high radiation areas (greater than 1000 mrem /hr) that were not locked or otherwise controlled in ac-cordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.13
"High Radiation Area", which states in part that high radiation areas in excess of 1000 mrem /hr shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry into such area.
Within the Reactor Containment Building, these high radiation areas were identified in several locations within the inner annulus, areas accessible from three (3) access points in the lower level 1845 224
containment and from four (4) circular stairway access points on the charging floor of containment.
This failure on the part of the licensee to secure these areas resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance and is documented in Section 7 of NRC Inspection Report 50-213/79-06.
Upon notification that these areas were uncontrolled, the licensee initiated interim action to make these areas inacces-sible until the specific high radiation areas could be identified and individually locked or controlled. All but one of the seven (7) access points described above were locked so that the licensee could maintain positive control over entry to these areas.
As soon as the specific areas were identified and secured, normal access to the general area was regained.
The investigators noted that during the above referenced identi-fication process, there was only one point of ingress and egress into the lower level annulu.s of the containment building.
The investigators noted that access to this area was controlled and limited during this time period (less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) and while potentially impeding normal egress under emergency conditions, the risk involved appeared to be significantly less than that of accidently entering an unknown high radiation area.
c.
NRC Conclusions The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substantiate this allegation insofar as the actions taken did not appear to significantly increase tne overall risk to the health and safety of the workers in this area.
6.
Allegation No. 6 a.
Allegation Following a contamination incident outside of containment on February 21, 1979, cleanup operations resulted in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity which may have exceeded 10 CFR 20, Appendix C limits.
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators noted some discrepancy with respect to the date of the actual occurrence and subsequent cleanup operations but details involved indicated a single incident which occurred sometime between February 17 and 18, 1979.
During this time, 1845 225
while draining the reactor cavity into the refueling water storagetank(RWST),itwasnotedthatdyetotheradioactivity concentration of the cavity water, (2x10 uCi/ml) and the volume of water (275,000 gallons) prevented its transfer to the RWST due to a concentration limit of 23 Ci.
It was then decided to divert the liquid via the reactor coolant processing system to the boron waste storage tank.
Due to extremely cold temperatures, the line outside of contain-ment to this tank was frozen and consequently the liquid backed up via a degassifier, blowing a rupture disc.
The liquid collected in the bottom drain of the stack which was later found to be plugged with debris and leaked out into the yard via a manway.
According to the licensee, approximately 25 gallons of liquid were inadvertently discharged into the yard outside of containment.
The contaminated area was roped off and access paths to the containment were rerouted and metal grating was placed drun to minimize the spread of contamination.
Cleanup efforts ware hampered by snow, ice and very cold temperatures.
Some cf the frozen material was removed in 55 gallon drums and the remainder was washed into the storm drain system.
The investigators noted that tne storm drain system leaves the site at one point only and discharges into the main discharge canal which has a normal dilution flow of from 6,000 to 93,000 gallons per minute.
According to the Chemistry Supervisors, the storm drain discharge point was sampled periodically to ensure that 10 CFR 20 Appendix C was not exceeded.
The investi-gation confirmed their findings.
On March 8, 1979, during a routine tour of the facility, NRC investigators noted contaminated water was again issuing from the manway at the base of the stack.
The details of this release are covered in Section 10 of NRC Inspection Report 50-213/79-06 and again it was determined that Appendix C limits were not exceeded.
The release and subsequent actions did reveal a significant breakdown in accepted health physics practices and could have led to a more serious situation, if proper action had not been taken immediately.
c.
NRC Conclusion The NRC investigators found no evidence and/or information to substantiate the allegation but did identify conditions which indicated a breakdown in accepted health physics practices.
1845 226
.
7.
Allegation No. 7 a.
Allegation Staytime logs are being doctored because several individuals have exceeded applicable NRC limits with respect to airborne radioactivity.
Some records indicating increased levels of activity have been deliberately disposed of and the computer is being used to cover up their activities.
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators noted that the licensee intended to control exposure to airborne concentrations of radioactivity by continuously assessing the intakes of personnel for the purpose of establishing a " limitation of workinr times" as specified in 10 CFR 20.103 (b)(2).
The licensee's method to establish this limitation was described by the Temporary Procedure change to RAP 6.1-4, Revision 3, " Determining Airborne Radioactive Concen-trations and the Allowable Staytime."
The investigators noted that the staytime logs used to implement the above referenced procedures was maintained through February 11, 1979 whereupon it was abruptly terminated.
The investigators noted further that on this date the containment was evacuated due to increased concerns over alpha contamination.
Due to the failure on the part of the licensee to maintain the staytime log and subsequently not providing any precautionary procedure to assure that intakes of radioactive material by any individual within any period of seven consecutive da"s was below the 40 MPC-hours control measure specified in 10 CFR 20.103 (b)(2), at least 11 persons had exceeded this control measure by an unknown extent. This finding resulted in a item of noncompliance, details of which are documented in Section 6.C of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/79-06.
The NRC investigators were able to determine that the termination of the staytime logs, although resulting in a noncompliance, was done by the licensee primarily because of maintenance and effectiveness problems beina encounterad in keeping it up to date and not by any deliberate attempt to " doctor" the records to cover up a potential overexposure.
The licensee stated that inorder to be effective, the staytime logs had to t-maintained in an up-to-date status in order to take appropriate precautionary actions during the ongoing ortage.
The licensee stated further that the entire staytime 1845 227
.
.
.
log had to be recomputed on more than one occasion due to various incorrect assumptions made in its calculation, a situation compounded even further on February 11, 1979 when an unidentified alpha problem was discussed.
Due to the fact that the log would have to be recalculated again and in all probability, not be current as needed, a decision to. terminate its use was made.
Initl3placeonFebruary 18, 1979 the licensee decided to use 6 x 10 uCi/cc for the unidentified airborne alpha radiation MPC for the use of respirators since no other information on isotopic content was available.
It was also decided to perform the overall dose assessment of exposures received using the computer in conjunction with air survey results and records of staytimes as documented on Radiation Work Permits (RWPs).
The NRC investigators determined that the problems encountered in maintaining the staytime log along with its termination upon the identification of an alpha contamination problem might have given the appearance of a "cause-effect" relationship which might have been interpretted as an attempt on the part of the licensee to cover up potential overexposures.
This misconception was further added to by the licensee's decision to perform the overall dose assessment by computer.
From the standpoint of deliberately destroyed survey records, a licensee employee stated that he had seen copies of what appeared to be official survey records laying in a trash can.
These records were retrieved by the employee and presented to the investigators for further action.
The investigators determined through various interviews with licensee personnel that the surveys in question were taken on February 12, 1979 immediately following the identification of the significant alpha contamination problem in containment.
The investigators noted that these surveys may have been counted on survey equipment not specifically designed to count alpha contamination but which had been modified to do so by varying the high voltage level to the detector.
Concurrent with these evaluations, other smears of the same survey areas were sent out for independent evaluations by non-licensee laboratories and somewhat later counted again by the licensee using a calibrated proportional counter.
The NRC investigators noted that none of the values shown on the discarded survey forms indicated levels in excess of NRC limits and that other survey records were available covering the same survey locations and approximate time periods.
The investigators were not able to identify the individual responsible for disposing of the survey records but determined that the results of the surveys did not substantially affect the licensee's overall evaluations of the situation.
1845 228
.
c.
NRC Conclusions The NRC investigators found no evidence and/or information to substantiate the allegation but did identify conditions which indicated a breakdown in accepted health physics practices.
8.
Allegation No. 8 a.
Allegation An undue amount of pressure was placed on health physics person-nel by both licensee and contractor personnel to have various operations performed within established schedules.
b.
NRC Findings The NRC investigators interviewed several licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this investigation and various individuals volunteered comments relative to what they believed to be significant pressure on the part of operations personnel and contractor management personnel to meet operations schedules despite valid health physics concerns which might have delayed schedules.
The comments included the following:
-- Individual B stated that "CY was not receptive to our help (in health physics)."
-- Individual D stated that " Westinghouse people wanted to put on the head bolts without wearing respirators.
Health Physics said 'No way'.
Then we got the word from upstairs that it would be done (without respirators)"
-- Individual F stated that " Westinghouse didn't want to wear face masks.
When I approached them about it, they said,
'You need us (to do the job) more than we need you' and threatened to walk off.
They didn't wear respirators."
-- Individual F stated that operations personnel told him "CY does not have the time to explain its entire ' modus operandi'
to everyone. (Explitive deleted) the NRC, (explitive deleted)
the rules and regulations, the job is going to go on."
-- Individual I stated that "If they (Westinghouse) didn't want to wear hard hats, CY just got out of their way."
1845 229
.
.
-- Individual J stated that "They (Westinghouse) don't want us to do anything, especially finding things they didn't want. They wished we would leave. When we didn't want to go into a high radiation area they said 'If you're so damned afraid of it, what are you doing in this job (health physics)."
-- Individual BB stated that he was told that "The outage was schduled to be four weeks long and that is how long it is going to be."
-- Individual T stated that he was told " Don't stop the outage."
-- Individual V stated that "the problem (high airborne activity) with the hydrolasing was due to operations wanting it done that way to save time."
The investigators also investigated a specific incident involving an altercation which occurred between a health physi _cs supervisor and an operations supervisor concerning operations within containment. The health physics supervisor stated that contractor employees had arrived on site with prior radiation exposure during the calendar quarter which had to be factored into the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) being prepared for this job. According to the health physicist, the operations supervisor came storming into his office, angry that the job was being delayed and threatening to post the unsigned RWP before the exposure limits had been evaluated.
During another incident, the health physicist stated that the containment became filled with smoke and was closed pending the results of air samples to check on airborne activity. Again the operations supervisor asserted that health physics had no right to make such a decision (to close containment). The plant superintendent was then contacted and the health physicist's decision was allowed to stand.
When interviewed by NRC investigators, the operations supervisor stated that he never threatened anyone, but, " unconsciously...
may have intimidated some of the HP's."
The supervisor said it was due primarily to his flammable personality rather than any conscious effort to disregard health physics concerns.
The supervisor stated that when health physics was caught by surprise by the contamination levels experienced during the outage that their credibility rapidly diminished.
This poor state of affairs was further compounded by the loss of the primary Health Physics Supervisor.
1845 230
.
.
c.
NRC Findings The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated to some degree with respect to licensee management personnel but to an even further degree with respect to contractor personnel and supervision.
The investigators found the Plant Superintendent to be generally supportive of health physics decisions.
The investigator noted however, that the loss of health physics credibility compounded with the unexpected problems of this outage led to situations where accepted health physics practices may have been circumvented in order to maintain operations schedules.
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