IR 05000213/1979002

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IE Insp Rept 50-213/79-02 on 790130-0201.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preparation for Refueling, Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities, & Followup on Previous Insp Findings
ML19282C661
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 02/21/1979
From: Caphton D, Higgins J, Kalman G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19282C658 List:
References
50-213-79-02, 50-213-79-2, NUDOCS 7903300507
Download: ML19282C661 (10)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.

50-213/79-02 Docket No.

50-213 License No. DPR-61 Priority Category C -- Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at: Haddam, Connecticut Inspection conducted: January 30- February 1,1979 1!Jo!77 Inspectors: W [ 'C.~ Ai s, Reactor Inspector date sighed k YNk9 w G. Kalman, React r Inspector 'date signed 0-lb 79

W . Re it e GtQr Inspector date signed Approved by: 4,[[ // / j

D.' L. Caphton, Chief, Nuclear Support 'date signed Section 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary: Inspection on January 30 - February 1,1979 (Report No. 50-213/79-02): Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of preparation for refueling, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, and followup on previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 70 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC regional based inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

Region I Form 12 7903300 N (Rev. April 77)

, . . . DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • R. Blewett, Quality Assurance Supervisor M. Cochran, Assistant Outage Coordinator J. DeLawrence, Engineer
  • R. Eppinger, Reactor Engineer
  • J. Ferguson, Engineering Supervisor R. Graves, Station Superintendent M. Morris, Technical Assistant K. Steinmeyer, Health Physics Foreman R. Thomas, Associate Engineer
  • R. Traggio, Assistant Station Superintendent The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other li-consee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection, including reactor and auxiliary operators and staff engineers.
  • denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/76-09-05): The licensee has not yet established controls for venting potentially contaminated gases during local leak rate testing but stated that the need for these controls would be evaluated and that they would be established as required during the current refueling outage.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/76-09-06): The licensee's representa-tive stated that measures would be established during the current outage to ensure that conservative values are obtained for penetra-tions with low leakage rate.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/76-09-12): In a letter from the li-censee (Counsil) to the NRC (Ziemann) dated November 13, 1978, the licensee has committed to performing air lock testing in accord-ance with the NRC's stated position by the conclusion of the 1979 refueling outage. A procedure to accomplish the subject testing has not yet been prepared and approve. .

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/76-09-13): The licensee's representa-tive stated that the test for penetration P-60 would be modified before it is completed during this outage.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/77-20-02): The lice 7see's representa-tive stated that this item would be reviewed and that temperature measurements as required would be taken for the local leak rate tests conducted during the current outage.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/77-20-03): The licensee's representa-tive stated that he would review his technique for converting leakage at a higher pressure to the equivalent leakage at Pa and establish an appropriate conversion to be used for the current refueling outage.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (213/77-20-04): The licensee's representa-tive stated that all procedures using the effluent collection method with a water displacement rig would be reviewed and modified as necessary to ensure that all leakage through the containment isolation valves is accounted for in the final leak rate.

(0 pen) l'nresolved Items 213/76-09-01, 02, 03, 04, 08,10 and 11): These items have all been adequately addressed on site by the li-censee and are the subject of exemption requests to the NRC con-tained in various letters between 1975 and 1978. These items remain open pending NRC review and disposition of the requested exemptions.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (213/76-09-09): The licensee has modified the various local leak rate test procedures to require that test connections be shut, capped and red tagged after the completion of each test.

The inspector witnessed these controls being implemented during the inspection.

This item is resolved.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (213/77-20-06): On December 2,1977, the licensee submitted LER 77-24/3L which addressed the excessive leakage of panetration P-38.

This item is resolved.

(Closed) Unresolved Items (213/77-18-01 and 213/77-20-08): The licensee instituted a training program for new fuel inspections.

The training program and inspector certifications were examined and no discrepancies were identifie.

(Closed) Noncompliance (213/77-20-07): The licensee revised pro-cedure QA 1.2 - 7.2 to delete the requirement for tagging new f uel assemblies.

The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.

3.

New Fuel Receipt a.

Scope The procedures and documentation related to the receipt of 51 new fuel assemblies for Core IX were reviewed.

The fuel inspection reports were checked and the qualifications of the licensee fuel inspectors were verified.

b.

Documents Reviewed SNM 1.4-1, Rev. 3, Receipt and Removal of New Fuel -- from Carrier, including completed check-off sheets.

SNM l.4-2, Rev. 3 and Rev. 4, Removing New Fuel from -- Shipping Container, including completed check-off lists.

-- SNM 1.4-3, Rev. 3, New Fuel Detail Inspection, including completed check-off lists.

RAP 6.3-5, Rev. 3, Receipt of Radioact'ive Materials.

-- New Fuel HP Survey Sheets.

-- Fuel Vendor Shipping and Inspection Documents.

-- QA 1.2-7.2, Rev. 3, Fuel Assembly Receipt Inspection.

-- c.

Findings No discrepancies were identified in the fuel vendor shipping documents.

The licensee fuel receipt documents were complete and no inconsistencies were noted.

The qualifications of licensee's fuel inspectors were verified to be consistent with the facility training progra. .

Health Physics (HP) survey sheets of the fuel delivery trucks and the individual fuel assemblies ware completed for all the fuel shipments.

The inspector noted that the HP radioactive materials receipt procedure, RAP 6.3-5, did not reference these survey sheets.

The licensee's HP representative stated that these surveys were performed as a matter of practice and that they were not referenced in any plant procedures. The licensee's representative stated that these survey sheets would be incorporated into an appropriate procedure prior to the next refueling.

This item will be reviewed in a subse-quent inspection (Item No. 213/79-02-02).

4.

Refueling Preparations a.

Documents Reviewed The inspector reviewed the following documents to verify that the licensee had approved and technically acceptable procedures for the forthcoming refueling.

-- Procedure FP-CYW-R8, " Refueling Procedures for Cycle VIII-IX, Connecticut Yankee" dated January 28, 1979 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company PDCR #297 " Cycle -- 9 Refueling" with Safety Evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 SPL 10.3-13, " Fuel Shipping Procedure" Original, dated -- January 26, 1979 Letter from CY to NRC dated October 14,1977, " Fuel -- Handling Accident (FHA) Inside Containment" With the exception of the below items, the inspector had no further questions on the procedures reviewed.

b.

Fuel Handling Accident Analysis The licensee assumed in his analysis of the unlikely Fuel Handling Accident inside containment, that the Purge System was operating to maintain a negative pressure on the contain-ment and that the Containment Air Recirculation System was started within 10 minutes after the accident.

The inspector noted that requirements for these systems were not specifically delineated in the refueling procedures.

The licensee issued

.

Temporary Procedure Change, TPC 623, to FP-CYW-R8, which added the appropriate requirements to the prerequisite list for fuel handling.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

c.

Fuel Shuffle During the review of the fuel shuffle portion of FP-CYW-R8, the inspector noted that the following two items of ANSI N18.7 paragraph 5.3.4.5 were not included in the procedure.

(1) There are no specific procedural requirements for a qualified individual to continuously monitor neutron flux during fuel bundle insertion into the core.

The procedure did specify requirements for an inverse count rate plot.

(2) There was no procedural provision for reverifying prere-quisites after an interruption in fuel handling.

These two items are considered unresolved and are designated item no. (213/79-02-01).

5.

Surveillance The inspector reviewed several licensee procedures associated with Type B and C leak rate testing.

All inspector concerns were covered in previous inspection findings and are updated in para-graph 2 above.

Additionally the inspector accompanied licensee personnel during the performance of the Type B tests on the con-tainment dome top vent flange and the side penetration flange.

The test of the top vent flange was performed in accordance with procedure SUR 5.1-65 and results appeared satisfactory.

The operators were unable to complete the test of the side flange due to a frozen pressure gauge, but stated that it would be re-performed at a later date.

The inspector had no additional questions in this are. Pipe Support and Restraint Systems a.

Scope The inspection consisted of a document review of hydraulic snubber inspection procedures and reports.

The completed contractor's 10 year inservice inspection (ISI) program for Class I pipe support systems was reviewed.

The licensee's representative stated that the pipe support ISI program for Class I and II systems would be handled via a contractor in the future and that the Class III systems would be inspected by licensee personnel.

The licensee's ISI procedure for Class III pipe supports was reviewed and the pipe support inspector qualification program was checked for compliance with appli-cable standards.

b.

Documents Reviewed SUR 5.1-73, Rev. O, " Flow and AP Test of Neutron Shield -- Tank Damper Flow Restrictors", including completed check-off lists.

SUR 5.1-78, Rev. 2, " Snubber Inspection, Visual", in- -- cluding completed check-off lists.

SUR 5.1-121, Rev.0, " Hangers Inservice Inspection".

-- QA 1.2-2.3, " Certified Inspection Personnel at Connecticut -- Yankee".

c.

Findings The inspector questioned the applicability of hydraulic snubbers visual inspection requirements relative to four neutron shield tank snubbers.

Following a discussion with licensee representa-tives, the inspector concurred that the basis for the existing visual surveillance requirements for hydraulic snubbers was not applicable to the four water-filled snubbers in question.

No items of noncompliance were identified in the area of snubbers and pipe support The licensee's representative stated that the eight feed water line hydraulic snubbers were scheduled to be replaced with mechanical snubbers during the current refueling outage.

The inspector noted that this change would require a Technical Specification (TS) change.

Plant start-up without the hydraulic snubbers would be contrary to TS 3.19A. The licensee representa-tives expressed the intent to submit a TS change as soon as possible. This matter is unresolved and is designated (Item No. 213/79-02-03).

7.

Maintenance Activities a.

Documents Reviewed Connecticut Yankee (CY) Quality Assurance Procedure No.

-- QA 1.2-5.1, " Maintenance Requests and Work Permits" -- CY QA 1.2-10.1, " Installation Inspection" CY QA 1.2-11.3, " Retest Requirements" -- General Outage Work Request for CY 79 Refueling No.

-- EN006, " Waste Liquid Tcst Tank Modification and Effluent Line Relocation" Work Permit No. EN0002, " Steam Generator Blowdown Piping -- Relocation" CY QA 1.2-2.4, " Housekeeping Requirements" -- -- CY Special Maintenance Procedure No. SPL 10.5-153, " Steam Generator Blowdown Piping Relocations" General Outage Work Request for CY 79 Refueling No. EN- -- 024, "Feedwater Line Snubber Replacement" CY Special Maintenance Procedure SPL 10.5-149, "Re- -- Snubbing Feedwater Piping in Containment" -- CY Work Permit No. EN0010, "Re-Snubbing Feedwater Piping in Containment"

.

General Outage Work Request for CY 79 Refueling No.

-- EN001, "Long Term Core Cooling" -- CY Work Permit No. EN00ll, "Long Term Cooling Modifica-tion Installation" CY Special Maintenance Procedure SPL 10.5-154, " Electrical -- Connection of FCV-110A" CY Special Maintenance Procedure SPL 10.5-157, "Long -- Term Cooling Modification Installation Procedure for FCV-110A" b.

Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee procedures referenced above for several major maintenance activities scheduled during the refueling outage.

The procedures were verified to include administrative controls for: -- Approval of work activity -- Preparation and r.storation of applicable plant systems QA Inspection Hold points -- Precautions (safety requirements) for special processes -- -- Operational readiness testing following maintenance completion No discrepancies were identified and the inspector had no further questions in this area.

8.

Unresolved Items Items about which more information is required to determine accept-ability are considered unresolved.

Paragraphs 4.c and 6.c of this report contain unresolved item. .

9.

Exit Interview At the inspection's end the inspectors held a meeting (see Detail 1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.

The unresolved items were identified. }}