IR 05000172/1970002

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Special Insp Rept 50-172/70-02 on 700909.Noncompliance Noted:Grab Samples Not Collected,Diesel Generator Not Started on Weekly Basis or Checked,Operating Instrumentation Not Maintained & Safety Committee Failed to Meet
ML20127E804
Person / Time
Site: 05000172
Issue date: 10/02/1970
From: Robert Lewis, Peery W, Seidle W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127E447 List:
References
FOIA-84-737 50-172-70-02, 50-172-70-2, NUDOCS 8505200216
Download: ML20127E804 (10)


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U. S. ATOMIC EERGY COMMISSION

REGION II

DIVISlCN OF COMPLIANCE '

Report of Inspection C0 Report No. 50-172/70-2 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (RER)

Licensee:

License No. R-86 Category E

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Date of Inspection:

September 9, 1970 Date of Previous Inspection:

March 3-4, 1970

. Inspected By:

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'Date R. C. Lewis, Reactor Inspector (In Charge)

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1/u 70 W. W. F er~, Cd stion Specialist

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Reviewed By:

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Date W. C. Seidle, S&nior Reactor Inspector

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SCOPE A special announced inspection was conducted at the 3 Mwt pressurized water, unshielded research reactor located at the Lockheed-Georgia Nuclear Laboratory near Dawsonville, Georgia.

The purpose of the inspection was to discuss the shutdown and deco==issioning plans and schedule of the Radiation Effects Reactor and liuclear Laboratory facilities and to establish the status of the RER and adherence to the Technical Specification require =ents.

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SUMARY Safety Items - None

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Noncemoliance Items - Four items of noncompliance were detected during the inspection:

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v-CO Rpt. No.- 50-172/70-2.

-2-1. ' Contrary to Paragraph C.2 of the Technical Specifications, grab samples of the primary coolant system water were not collected routinely and analyzed for gross beta-gamma-alpha activity.

(See Section E.).

Contrary to Paragraph E.2.c of the Technical Specifications, the 2.

systems utilized in automatic operation of the diesel generator were not routinely checked to assure operability, and the diesel

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generator was not being started on a weekly basis.

( See Section N.)

3.

Contrary to Table 4 of the Technical Specifications, the minimm operating instrumentation required during periods of reactor shutdown was not being maintained.

(See Section C.)

4.

Contrary to Paragraph L.1.c of the Technical Specifications,: the Reactor Safety Co=mittee was not maintained and the Safety Coc=ittee failed to meet at least quarterly as required.,(See Section E.2.)

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A For: AEC-592 will be issued, Unusual Occurrences - None Status of Previousiv Retorted Problems -

There were two items of noncompliance noted in the previous inspection report, and a Form AEC-592 was issued. A satisfactory response to the Form AEC-592 was received from the Lockheed-Georgia Company on April 13, 1970.

Other Sienificant Items -

Operation of the RER has been terminated, the core has been unloaded 1.

and placed in the pool for storage, and plans are now being fon::ulated

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for decoc=issioning of the reactor and decontamination of the entire-Uuclear Laboratory.

(See Section U.)

2.

A Procedure Review Co::=ittee has been established to review the Emergency Plan that is to be developed for the deco =missioning work, the health physics procedures, fuel handling and other procedures associated with the decontamination and decom=issioning of the RER and nuclear facility.

(See Section B.3.)

3.

The entire facility is scheduled to be shut dcun on September 30, 1970, and at that time the Lockheed personnel will consist of the Reactor Supervisor, one HP, one ".aintenance Technician, and security s

personnel for 24-hour per day coverage.

(See See:1cn 3.4.)

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CO Rpt.'So. 50-172/70-2-3 -

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'b ' The proposed Technical Specifications submitted to DRL covering

- the Lockheed activities with respect to the RER reactor during the decommissioning phase were reviewed and discussed with the licensee

'by the Compliance inspector.

(See Section D.2.)

Followun Items - See Exhibit A for current status of followup items.

Management Interview - A formal management interview was not conducted

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at the termination of the inspection as the entire inspection and discussion was conducted in the presence of all parties concerned. However, a recap following the day's activities was conducted by the inspectors with Dewar, Krull, Amend and Ham. The following items were discussed:

1.

Four items of noncompliance:

Dewar concurs with the inspector's findings that Lockheed is in noncompliance with the operating Technical Specifications and stated that the four items were as a result of closing down of the RER and the impossibility of complying with the operating Tech Specs in the present configuration.

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The inspector informed Dewar that a Fom AEC-592 would probably be issued for the noncompliance items. Dewar indicated that they were receptive to receiving a 592 and would be prepared to respond.

2.

The ambiguous terms used in the proposed Technical Specifications (e.g., maintain a reserve supply of demineralized water; brief periods; maintain desired level of water purity; etc.):

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Dewar stated that he concurred that the tems were not definitive and that DRL would be contacted the following day and a change would be submitted to the proposed Technical Specifications which would contain numerical values.

The inspectors expressed concern that the magnitude of the

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decommissioning effort may not be appreciated by personnel involved, in that only one HP will remain for the decommissioning effort which

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involves a large amount of decontamination and in areas remote from one another. Dewar stated that he appreciated the inspector's comment and would relay it to his management for the purpose of attempting to secure additional HP personnel.

DETAILS A.

Persons Contacted M. A. Dewar - Heading Task Force for Decommissioning W. E. Krull - Scientist B. D. Dodd - Coordinator for Site Closeout (Non-Nuclear)

F. L. Amend - Reactor Supervisor M. M. Ham - Health Physicist f,I

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CO Ept.' No. 50-172/70-2-4-o B.

Adnhistration and Organization 1.

Organization and Personnel Since the previous inspection, the RER has been shut down for decommissioning (see Section C) and employment of the operating personnel have been terminated with exception of the Reactor Supervisor (Amend} and the chief Health Physicist (Ham).

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' Amend is to remain at the nuclear site until transfer of the irradiated and new fuel elements and decommissioning of the PIR have been completed. Ham will remain at the site until complete decommissioning and decontamination of all facilities and soil have been completed. Dewar stated that at the present, Lockheed plans to contract out all work.

2.

Reactor Safety Committee

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Paragraph L.1.c of the Technical Specifications establishes a Reactor Safety Committee and requires that the Safety Committee meet at least quarterly and also specifies by job descriptions the membership of the Safety Committee.

Contraq to Paragraph L.l.c of the Technical Specifications, the last Reaccor Safety Co=mittee meeting was held in April 1970.

Due to an internal reorir.anization of Lockheed in June 1970, the Reactor Safety Committee was disselved. Dewar stated that at that time the termination of operation at the PIR was known and Lockheed management decided not to name another Safety Review Com=ittee. Dewar stated that he was aware that they were in nonce =pliance with the Technical Specification requirement.

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Procedure Review Committee

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A Procedure Review Committee was established on August 14, 1970, and charged with the responsibility of reviewing all procedures and activities that transpire within the RER exclusion fence area. The Procedure Review Com=ittee consists of Dewar who is appointed Chaiman of the Committee, Amend (Reactor Supervisor),

Ham (Health Physicist) and Krull (Scientist).

A review of the minutes of the Procedure Review Committee dated August 26, 1970, was conducted by the inspector. The minutes stated that top priority is to be given to updating the Emergency Plan to reflect the manpower md equipment available before and after September 30, 1970. This Emergency Plan is to include not

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C0Rpt.'No.50-172/70-2-5-

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only potential emergencies at the Radiation Effects Facility,

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i but also at other locations on the Lockheed-Georgia Nuclear Laboratory site, and involving other AEC and State of Georgia licenses. The minutes also reflect that the appropriate regulatory agencies are to be advised as soon as the Fmergency Plan is completed.

The Procedure Review Committee is discussed in Paragraph 41.2

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and Addendum 1 of the Proposed Technical Specifications dated August 14, 1970.

4.

Security

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Dewar stated that there has been no reduction in the security force, and that security is maintained 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, 7 days

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per week. Dewar also stated that consideration is being given to increasing the security force as Lockheed is already experiencing an increase in theft, with the. decrease of personnel.

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The criticality alarms from the fuel storage in the CEL facility and the irradiated fuels stored in the RER pool are sounded in the security station since this is the only facility that is

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manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.- The inspectors discussed the monitoning of the criticality alam during periods.that security is touring l-the exclusion fence, which requires a period of six hours once per week that he is absent from the security station. Dewar stated that presently the criticality system and pool level would not be monitored during those periods of time; however,

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he stated that they would investigate the feasibility of connecting the alarm system into the portable radio carried by the security gua M during those periods that he is not at the security station. Dewar stated that another consideration would

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be to add an additional health physicist, then this individual could be used for criticality monitoring during the absence of r

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C.

Oeerations The Logbook reflects that the last reactor operation was teminated from a 3 Mwt level at 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br /> on July 16, 1970, with 4,082 33 Mwh on the installed core. Another Logbook entry states that unloading of the core was completed and that the pools and storage tanks were filled with demineralized water on July 29, 1970.

Table 4 of the Technical Specifications entitled " Minimum Instr =entation Channels" contains a list of the nuclear and process instru=entation that is provided for normal operation, reactor shutdown, startup, routine operation, and loading. The inspector interprets that the instr =ents j f:

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CD Rpt. No. 50-172/70-2-6-

' listed under the reactor shutdown column in Table 4 are the instruments required to be energized during periods of reactor shutdown. The instruments listed under the reactor shutdown column are the primary coolant flow, primary coolant temperature, bypass domineralizer, pool conductivity, and conductivity.

Contrary to +5e instrumentation listed in Table 4, the only instruments

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energized an2 operating during periods of the inspection were the conductivity recoder and a gama radiation monitor in the reactor building serving as a criticality monitor for the irradiated core stored in the pool.

Amend took exception to the inspector's interpretation that the Technical Specifications require that these instruments be on during periods of reactor shutdown. Dewar telephoned the inspector the day subsequent to the inspection and stated that they concur with the inspector's interpretation that they are in violation with the minimm instrumentation required during periods of reactor shutdown. -

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Facility Procedures 1.

F.mernency Plan

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The Procedure Review Comittee has assigned top priority to the development of an Emergency Plan that reflects the current status of the RER and Nuclear Laboratory site.

Amend has been assigned responsibility for development of the plan that will cover the interim period of reactor shutdown and the subsequent decommissioning of the site.

Dewar stated that procedures will be developed for the control of all critical items such as fuel handling and other items associated with the decommissioning and decontamination of the

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site. Dewar also stated and the Proposed Technical Specifications confirm that the procedures are to be reviewed by the Procedure Review Committee.

2.

Review of Procesed Technical Scecifications A review of the Proposed Technical Specifications for use during the reactor shutdown and prior to decommissioning effort was reviewed by the inspector and comments discussed with Dewar, Krull, Dodd, Amend, and Ham. The Region II comments are documented by a memorandum to file and a copy was forwaded to Compliance Headquarters on September 11, 1970. Dewar informed the inspectors that he would contact DRL the day fol. lowing the inspection (September 10) and discuss those items that need to be defined and/or chanEed.

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!4 CO Rpt. No. 50-172/70-2-7-E. 'Pria m System Paragraph C.2 of the Technical Specifications states that grab samples of the primary coolant system and reactor pool water are coIlected routinely and analyzed for gross beta-gamma-alpha activity.

In response to the inspector's question about water sampling and analyzing, Amend stated that only the pool water was being sampled as there was a

free interchange between the primary system and the reactor pool water through the top of.the reactor vessel from which the head was removed.

Therefore, the single sample would show the pH, conductivity and activity of both the primary coolant systems and the pool water.

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During a subsequent tour of the facility, the inspector observed that although the reactor head was indeed removed, the top of the reactor vessel was at an elevated position some five feet above the level of the reactor pool water. Consequently, there was no inter-change between the primary system and pool water, and the activity, pH, and conductivity would differ in the two systems.

Amend and Ham concurred that the sampling of the primary coolant was in noncompliance with the Technical Specification requirements.

G.

Core and Internals

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The fuel elements were removed from the pressure vessel and stored in the pool surrounding the pressure vessel on July 29, 1970.

(See Section C.)

The low level pool alarm is sounded in the security office approximately two miles from the RER facility. The building radiation monitor is used to monitor the condition of the core. It has an alam setting

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of 20 mr/hr ga=ma and serves as a criticality monitor which also alams

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in the security office.

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Dewar stated that a question exists as to the ownership of the fuel elements and that Lockheed maintains that the fuel elements were purchased from GSA at the time that the reactor and site were purchased, but AEC maintains that the fuel ele =ents were on loan to Lockheed and therefore are AEC property. Dewar stated that as soon as ownership is established, the fuel elements will be shipped from the site.

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kernenev Power Paragraph E.2.c of the Technical Specifications states that the systems utilized in automatic operation of the generator are

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routinely checked to assure operability, and the diesel generator is started on a weekly basis. Contrary to the Technical Speci-fication requirement, the automatic systems have not been checked 4 :'

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CO Rpt. No. 50-172/70-2-8-since July and the diesel generator has not been started on a weekly basis since August 28, 1970. Amend stated that emergency power was not required with the reactor shut down, and that the diesel generator operation had been teminated.

Dewar concurred that they were in noncompliance with the Technical Specification requirements.

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Miscellaneous Tentative Plans for the Site Dewar stated that the facility will close en September 30, 1970, and the only personnel remaining after that date will be Amend, Ham, and security personnel, with the possible exception of one maintenance technician remaining at the site for an indefinite period of time.

Dewar stated that at present there -are ::everal considerations being _

pursued.

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Donation of a portion of the land to the State of Georgia to be used for a nuclear burial ground with I4ckheed having free burial privileges.

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Maintain security indefinitely.

Transport all activated and contaminated material including the seepage pit soil to an authorized burial ground.

'Recent newspaper articles in the Atlanta papers indicate that the '

Atlanta City Government is considering the Lockheed 11,000-acre site as a location for a second Atlanta airport.

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Concurrent with the inspection of the PIR, inquiry was made as to the status and plans for the shutdown, cleanup and disposition of materials for licensed Lockheed-Georgia facilities at Dawsonville other than the RER. Dewar stated that special nuclear materials are still on hand under AEC License No. SNM-260, consisting of four

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plutonium-berynium neutron sources and about 130 grams of U-235 contained in scrap. He said that about 80,000 curies each of cobalt 60 and cesium 137 are on hand under a State of Georgia

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license.

It was explained by Dewar that efforts are being made to resolve disposition of the enriched uranium through the Production Division, CR00, and transfer other bulk quantities of licensed material to license-authorized recipients. Dewar stated that current plans call for cleanup of all Lockheed-Georgia facilities at Dawsonville to the extent that unrestricted use will result. Dewar

said that no schedule for the disposals and clesnup has teen established.

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He said that' it is not known what contractual arrangements may be

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made for the disposals and cleanup. Ham infomed the inspector that he has made no changes in basic health coverage for the plant and.has no intention of doing so without. official management notification.

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Ihvironment A review of the Environmental Monitoring Program in effect and after shutdown of the RER was reviewed by the inspectors. The

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review re.vealed-that there has been no change in the Environ = ental'

Monitoring Program from that conducted during operation of the RER and it is in acconiance with Paragraph C.5 of the Technical The Environmental Monitoring Progra= consists of Specifications.

remote area monitors, continuous particulate air samplers as described in Paragraph C.5, two liquid sa=plers which sample the Etowah River, and soil and vegetable samples collected on a quarterly basis for gross beta-ga. a-alpha analysis.

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The Proposed Technical Specifications would delete the air sa=pling requirement and the remainder of the Environ = ental Monitoring Program would continue unchanged.

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Attachments

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Exhibit A

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LICEUSEE Lockheed Aircraft Corv rat!tr

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FACILITY Radiation Effects Reae'.or (9'.H)

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DOCKET 2: LICFJISE NOS.

50-17.', R :%

REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITD4S ITEM Cl.0 SED IDENTIFIED

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3/3.t,/70, 70-1 Failure to follow operating procedures Ltr 592 Response 4/13/70 D 21., g 3/3.L./0,70-1 Failure to routinely check automatic systems of Ltr 592 Response.

N, 3 emerg.ncy diesel generator 4/13/70 9/11/'70, 70-2 Failure to routinely check and start emergency N, 5 diesel generator

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9/11/ 70, 70-2 Failure to routinely sample and analyze primary Cep., E coolant loop 9/11/70, 70-2 Failure to maintain a safety committee and failure B22., E of committee to hold meetings

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9/11/70,70-2 Failure to maintain required minimum operating C*

E instrumentation during reactor shutdown

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HC - noncompliance or nonconforr'ance 3 - cafety item; Iry itcmt IFF - Renctor Insucetlen Ft-IDEUTI/IED Column:

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and F.nT6reccent branch request; O - other source of identil'ication

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'W.' Exhibit A (brJ cfJ t speclfy)

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