IR 05000155/1990011

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Insp Rept 50-155/90-11 on 900501-0611.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt,Surveillance/Maint Activities & Operational Safety Verification,Including Instrument Air Sys & ESF Sys Walkdown of Instrument Air Sys
ML20055D181
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/1990
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055D180 List:
References
50-155-90-11, NUDOCS 9007050090
Download: ML20055D181 (8)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

-Report No. 50-155/90011(DRP)

Docket No. 50-155'

License No.'DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant

Inspection At:

Charlevoix, Michigan

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Inspection-Conducted: May'l through June 11, 1990 s

' Inspectors:

E. A. Plettner i

N. R. Williamsen D. S. Butler 6Mf/Nd Approved By:

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Reactor Projects Section 28.

Date Inspection Summary Inspection'on May 1 through June 11, 1990 (Report No. 50-155/90011(DRP))

Areas Inspected: The inspection was routine, unannounced, and conducted by-Lthe Senior Resident Inspector,-Resident Inspector, and Regional Inspectors.

The functional areas inspected consisted of the following:

licensee action on previous inspection findings; management; surveillance activities; maintenance activities on various components; operational safety verification which included the Instrument Air System; Engineered Safety Feature System walkdown of the Instrument Air System; follow-up on a licensee event report dealing with a fuse breaker coordination study; and licensee action on a Generic Letter.

Results: The licensee has responded in a timely manner to issues and concerns presented to it by the NRC.

The surveillance, maintenance, and operational safety programs appeared to be implemented in a manner to ensure public health and safety. A Licensee Event Report was reviewed and corrective actions were

.found adequate to ensure safety.

No significant safety items were identified-in this report, h 050090 900628 g

ADOCK 05000155 PDC

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted W. Beckman, Plant Manager L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent

  • H. Hoffman, Maintenance Superintendent R. Garrett, Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor
  • W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
  • G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent
  • R. Alexander, Technical Engineer E. Zienert, Director Human Resources
  • P._Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator
  • J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent D. Lacroix, Nuclear Training Administrator

"R. Hill, Senior Quality Assurance Consultant The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Technical Departments.

  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 12, 1990.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Violation (88012-01A): This part of the violation involved the failure to have a procedure for the disassembly / assembly of Limitorque SMA-000 and SMA-00-Operators.

The procedure for SMA-000 was completed in_ Maintenance Procedure MGP-25, " Disassembly and Assembly of SMA-000 Limitorques," Revision 0, dated May 26, 1988.

SMA-00 procedures were completed in Maintenance Procedures MGP-26, " Inspection and Repair of SMA-00 Single Torque Limitorque Valve Operators," Revision 0,-dated April 20, 1990, and MGP-27, " Inspection and Repair of SMA-00 Double Torque Limitorque Valve Operators," Revision 0, dated April 25, 1990.

It should be.noted that the licensee informed the NRC that the maintenance procedures for SMA-00 would be delayed due to workload priorities in the

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1989 refceling outage as documented in a letter to the NRC dated June 6, 1989.

(Closed) Violation (88012-018):

This part of the violation involved the failure to have appropriate steps for disassembly of the limit switch ~and lubrication requirements in Procedure MGP-14, " Disassembly and Assembly of SMA-0 through SMA-4 Limitorques." The licensee's corrective actions were to revise Maintenance Procedure MGP-14 to include the ' appropriate

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steps and lubrication requirements.

This was accomplished in Revision 3 of Procedure MGP-14, dated April 27, 1988, and in a review of maintenance records for all environmentally qualified operators requiring grease replacement.

Three operators were identified and were immediately inspected and lubricated with the appropriate grease during the 1988 refueling outage. Non-environmentally qualified safety-related operators were inspected and lubrication changed as necessary through the routinely scheduled preventive maintenance program and when corrective maintenance was performed.

The inspector is satisfied with the licensee's corrective tctions and considers this item closed.

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L(Closed) Violation (90002-01):

This violation involved: numerous

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y individuals who failed to complete'all the re

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Radiation' Work Permit. (RWP) Entry Lcog Sheet (quired entries on theForm BRP

.of-the Radiation Work Permit. The root cause was personnel error in being f

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inattentive to detail.' The corrective action included immediately checking -

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'all recent RWPs to ensure information had been filled out completely and correctly. Administrative Procedure Volume I, Procedure 5.5, " Radiation Work Permit," was revised to clarify RWP completion-requirements.

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Management'(30703]_

i On May 4,1990, the Big Rock Point plant manager met with the Deputy

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Regional Administrator for Region III, the Director, Division of Reactor 1

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O Projects, and other personnel from Region III in Glen Ellyn, Illinois,

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._to discuss general issues related to the operation of the Big Rock Point N

Plant. :The. Plant Manager briefed the NRC personnel on the effects that

the Consumer Power Company's early retirement program is having on Big 1>

Rock Point (there are no immediate effects).

The discussion included the s

.' general plans for operating the plant until the expiration of the full

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term operating. license in the-year 2000.

It was-noted that one area of

- potential concern is replacement of experierred personnel; bm.ause of its-

.f remote' location and the plant's relatively s6rt remainingLlife time, it-

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could become difficult-to recruit and retain qualified personnel,.

o especially in the engineering disciplines.

The NRC plans to monitor y

this-potential problem..

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'On May ~18: and ' June 4 through 7,1990, the Section Chief visited the; site-

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and-Conducted)several inspections.

The areas inspected included the turbine deck, machine shop, station power room, uninterrupted: power t

' supply battery rooms, control room,. technical support center, inside

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p the containment = sphere, and the emergency diesel generator room. :The

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Emergency.0ff-Site facility was toured and issues were~ discussed with the:

plant Senior Emergency Coordinator concerning the upcoming emergency

' exercise in December 1990. Routine housekeeping' and general radiological

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controls appeared adequate.. The-Section Chief-and the Plant Manager

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discussed upcoming plant issues, including the plant tour by

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Commissioner Rogers'on June 29, 1990.

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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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Station surveillance activities listed below were observed to verify that= the activities were conducted _in accordance with the Technical

Specifications and surveillance procedures. The applicable procedures-

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were reviewed for adequacy, test and process instrumentation were verified

'to be-in their current cycle of calibration, personnel performing the tests appeared to be~ qualified, and test data was reviewed ~ for accuracy and completeness. The NRC inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies

~ identified were reviewed and resolved. The NRC inspectors'_ observed the licensee's performance of the following surveillance tests on the indicated dates:

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May 2:. T30-59, "RDS [ Reactor Depressurization System] Channel Test,"

Mev sion 1, April 13,1990, for Channel "A"..

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May-4:- T90-23, " Portable Pump Function and Capacity Test," Revision 2,

-l December 13, 1989, with Procedure-Change Form dated April 10, 1990.

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May 16:

T30-59, "RDS Channel Test," Revision 1, dated April'13, 1990.

The Senior: Resident Inspector observed the performance of this-surveOlance.

In a0dition to the normally assigned people to perform the surveillance,

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an auxiliary operator trainee was also ~present. During-performance of the survei!1er.ce the trainee' noted a minor discrepancy in the procedure, (a i

verification block'was present where none was required). The test was

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halted and the procedure was corrected. The test was then completed'

satisfactorily-and the equipment was returned to service.

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May 16:.T-90-09, " Core Spray Instrument Trip Test,"' Revision 13 dated

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February 13, 1990,'in conjunction with Maintenance Order No. 90-PIS-0009, dated March 10, 1990.

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June 5:

T7-18, " Bypass Valve Test," Revision 12, dated December 8,1989..

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June 5:

T30-01, " Monthly Reactor Protection. System Test at Power,"

i Revision 14, dated February 15, 1990.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

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Station-maintenance activities of safety related systems and components

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listed.below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with. approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.-

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'The following items were considered during this review:

the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were

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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

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inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality l

e control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by'

i h-qualified personnel; parts and materials used were certified; and

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radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.

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Work requests were reviewed to determine the statas of outstanding jobs

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and to.assura that priority was assigned to sa4ty related equipment maintenance which may effect system performance.

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The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's performance of the following maintenance work orders on the indicated dates:

May 3: No. 90-CDS-0010, dated March 8, 1990, for preventive maintenance on Basket Strainer BS-5755 at the No. 3 Condensate Demineralizer.

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'May 8:- No. 90-CRD-0040,- dated May 4,1990, to change out the filters on control Rod Drive C-4, in order to improve the cooling water flow.-

Preparation for maintenance included Procedure 0-CRD-5, " Disabling a Scram Inlet Valve for Personal Protection," Revision 5, November 3,

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q May 8:.No. 90-NMS-0045, dated May 8,-1990, for performing a flux-wire-irradiation in order to calibrate the in-core neutron detectors.

'May 10: No. 90-SEM-0002, dated May 10, 1990, for adjusting the gas, sampTe flow thro gh the stack gas monitor, j

May 10: No. 90-NMS-0046, dated May 10,11990,:for adjusting the wide range neutron monitors.

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May 11: No. 90-RDS-0018, all 4 channel indications " read" and

"dlarm" set-points vary.

Investigate and repair.

In Conjunction with ' Procedure IRDS-6, " Testing and Calibration of the RDS:(Reactor Depressurization System) Discharge Pipe' Temperature Indicator and Alarm,"

Revision 5, dated. February 9,1989.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Operational Safety Verification (71707)

i The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the-

' inspection' period.

Instrumentation and recorder traces were examined for-abnormalities and discussed with the control room operators, as was the i

status of control room annunciators. ~ Reviews were conducted to confirm

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.that the required leak rate calculations were performed and within l

Technical' Specification limits.

It was' observed that the Plant Manager

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and.the Operations Superintendent were well informed on the status of.the

'i plant. They made frequent visits-to the control room and toured the plant.

System walkdowns were performed to verify the operability of the ; Instrument

Air System. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were

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' conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential

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- fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify

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that maintenance requests had oeen initiated for equipment in need of

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maintenance. Radiation protection controls were inspected, including-

. Radiation Work Permits, calibration of radiation detectors, and proper

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' osting and observance of radiation and/or contaminated areas. The p

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inspectors observed site security measures including access control of personnel and vehicles, proper display of identification badges.for

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personnel within the protected area, and site compensatory measures o

L when security equipment had a failure or impairment.

A potential violation involving a failure to follow security procedures Wds observed by the Senior Resident Inspector. The incident was discussed with the licensee and regional management.

The follow-up will be performed by a regional security inspector in a subsequent inspection report.

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On May 2, 1990, a special Plant Review Committee (PRC) meeting was convened to discuss an issue assnciated with the diesel fire pump engine being magnetized and to determine the operability status of the diesel fire pump engine. The possible magnetization problem was discovered when a repairman was taking an oil sample from the diesel fire pump engine in accordance with procedure. The repairman noted that the dip-stick-and tube were magnetized. The licensee notified the NRC and the local Caterpillar dealer was contacted to determine if the condition was abnormal.

Although magnetism could indicate a problem, the committee determined that the diesel' fire pump engine was operable based on the fact that:

(a)an oil 's_ ample that was analyzed for metellic pieces showed no excessive increase from the previous oil samples indicating no excessive wear had taken place inside the engine; and (b) the engine had a low number of total hours of operation.

In addition the conunittee requested an increase in the frequency of oil samples taken for analysis. The licensee is investigating to determine the source of the magnetization and will conduct an inspection of the engine during the 1990 refueling outage.

The NRC inspectors accompanied Auxiliary Operators on their tours to observe them in the performance of their duties. The operators appeared to be knowledgeable and competent.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)

The NRC inspectors verified the operability of the Instrument Air System which is a support system to most of the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF),

systems. The verification included a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.

Included were verification of valve iabels, equipment condition, and correct valve and breaker positions. A review was conducted to confirm that the lineup procedure matched the applicable as-built drawings; this included:

Drawing.No. 0740G40133 " Piping and Instrument Diagram, Service and Instrument Air Systems (M-133)," Revision P dated December 12, 1989.

Drawing No. 0740G44009 " Reactor Depressurizing System Valve Line-Up Diagram (S-009)," Revision 17, dated September 14, 1989.

Procedure 50P-27

" Service and Instrument Air System,"

Revision 110, dated July 26, 1989.

The review revealed some minor labeling discrepancies on the drawings.

These discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and corrective actions are in progress.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)-(62705)_

(Closed)LER 155/89001: " Potential Loss of Alternate Shutdown Battery-Due to Inadequate Breaker Coordination." Regional inspectors performed an in-office review of the Big Rock Point Coordination Analysis _which was

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completed by the licensee on Janu_ary 13, 1989.

Deficiencies identified j

by the licensee were prioritized within the following three categories q

for resolution:

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Deficiencies which directly affected system operability in which

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P performance of a needed safety function could not be assured. These--

deficiencies required intnediate resolution. The problem described in LER 89-01 dealing with coordination of ASD breaker and fuses fell (

into this category because redundancy did not exist.

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Deficiencies in which assumed faults could cause loss of safety-related equipment for which operator action would be required

_j to restore the system or equipment. These items did not cause loss

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of a needed safety function due to redundancy or time available for -

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It was determined that these concerns did not

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require ininediate resolution, but that correction actions should

.i be pursued. Most of. the deficiencies fell in-this category, c.

Deficiencies that do not cause loss of-safety-related equipment.

These items did not require prompt resolution and could be left as si is. These deficiencies would be reviewed when replacement was

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necessary for other reasons, to upgrade plant desigr. to meet

" good engineering practice" goals,

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q The analysis provided a summary of the protective devices reviewed and j

- their associated coordination curves (I-T). Where a miscoordination-was

discovered, the' analysis proposed appropriate corrective actions. Of the 38 devices analyzed,18 had reasonably acceptable coordination for overload, fault and cable protection. Thirteen (13) devices were

identified with a breaker / fuse miscoordination and seven required the -

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motor heaters to be changed._ The licensee has corrected all of -the 'above except for four miscoordinations and one heater upgrade.

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will correct the items during the fall 1990 outage.

The following is a list of the items remaining to be corrected:

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Breaker 52-1A14, Screen House Structure MCC1C - Coordination

- Breaker 52-1A31, Reactor Shutdown Pump No.1 - Heater

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Breaker 52-1A53, Instrument and Control Transformer 1A -

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Breaker 52-1A2B, Tie Breaker - Coordination i

Breaker 52-2827, Emergency Diesel Generator Time Delay Overcurrent Relay-Coordination

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f The inspectors reviewed the above items for their effect on the Alternate

Shutdown System equipment and safety-related equipment. Tha inspectors concluded there was no impact on the Alternate Shutdown equipment. and that there were sufficient backup safety-related systems and procedures available to safely shut down the plant if a fault were to occur on a safety-related bus.

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Licensee Action on Generic Letter (9270M

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The' inspector reviewed the following selected Generic Letter (GL) to assure that the licensee had reviewed the GL for applicability, that distribution had been made to appropriate personnel at corporatu and at

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the site, and if applicable, the scheduling or performance of applicable

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corrective actions.

(Closed)GenericLetter08-14:

" Instrument Air Supply System Problems-XTfecting Safety-Rrlated Eq'iiTpment." The purpose of the Generic Letter was to request that each licensee review NUREG-1275, Volume 2, and perform a design and operations verification of the Instrument Air system. The licensee's staff reviewed and responded to Generic Letter 88-14 to the NRC in a letter dated February 20, 1989.

The letter stated that actions completed to date did not identify any components that could not perform their intended safety function because of instrument error system

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It also discussed previously planned modifications to improve air system reliability and the completion of those improvements.

The NRC_ responded with_a letter dated November 21, 1989, requesting additional information in order for the staff to adequately address the February 20,1989, response from the licensee.

The licensee provided the NRC the additional information in the letter on February 26, 1990.

The NRC staff completed its review and issued a letter dated April 3, 1990, to the licensee stating that although completion of some actions extend beyond the schedule established in the Generic Letter, the justifications in the alternative schedule provided were acceptable to the staff.

The letter stated if subsequent inspections identify deficiencies in the program the issue will be reopened.

Presently the NRC considers-the -

dCtions Complete.

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Exit Interview Theinspectorsmetwithlicenseerepresentatives(denotedinParagraph1)-

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

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licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also discussed

. the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to

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documents or processes reviewed by the-inspectors during the inspection.

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The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.

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