IR 05000155/1990004
| ML20012E784 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1990 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012E780 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-90-04, 50-155-90-4, NUDOCS 9004060295 | |
| Download: ML20012E784 (9) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-155/90004(DRP)
L Docket No. 50-155 License No. OPR-6
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Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue j!
f Jackson, MI 49201
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Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant
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. Inspection At: Charlevoix, Michigan i
Inspection Conducted:
February 6 through March 12, 1990
Inspectors:
E. A. Plettner L
t N. R. Williamsen
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Approved By:
Ro e t De ayette, Chie,
Reactor Projects Section 2B Oate Inspection Summary t
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t Inspection on February 6 through March 12,1990 (Report No. 50-155/90004(DRP))
l Areas Inspected: The inspection was routine, unannounced, and conducted by the senior resident inspector and the resident inspector. The functional
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areas inspected consisted of the following:
follow-up on previous inspection findings consisting of one open item in the Site Emergency. Plan and two i
violations involving failure to follow procedures; management meetings; surveillance activities; maintenance activities on various components; operational safety verification which included the reactor depressurization system; the emergency preparedness program; and follow-up on a Licensee Event Report dealing with a failure to follow procedure and an informational Licensee
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Event Report on containment valve seal degradation.
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Results: The licensee has responded in a timely manner to issues and concerns presented to it by the NRC. The open item and violations were reviewed and corrective actions were completed in a timely manner to ensure safety. The surveillance, maintenance, and operational safety programs appeared to be performed in a manner to ensure public health and safety.
Licensee Event Reports were reviewed and corrective actions were found to ensure safety.
No significant safety items were identified in this report.
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t 9004060295 900326 PDR ADOCN 05000135 G
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L DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted i
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'W.'Beckman, Plant Manager
- L, Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- H. Hof fman, Maintenance Superintendent L-R. Garrett, Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor
- W. Trubilowicz, Plant Operations Superintendent
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- G. Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent
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- R. Alexander, Technical Engineer
- E. Zienert, Director Human Resources
- P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator
- J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent L
- D. Lacroix, Nuclear Training Administrator D. Hughes, Quality Assurance Manager R. Beeker, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Technical Departments.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on March 12, 1990.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702)
a.
(Closed) Open Item (88027-01(DRSS)): This open item involved Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the Site Emergency Plan.
These EALs were in the sections of Engineered Safeguards, Station Power, Fire, Natural Phenomenon, and Miscellaneous External Events.
For some of these EAls, the restriction to " power operation only" was too encompassing. The licensee has reevaluated these EALs and revised them in the. Site Emergency Plan, Appendix M. " Classification of Emergency Conditions," Revision 94, February 5,1990. The revision reflects the current NRC operation philosophy of declaring an event
regardless of the operating state of the reactor, b.
(Closed) Violation (89013-01( A)):
This violation involved a failure to control, by utilization of either a tether or log sheet, the various tools and materials used on the reactor building crane during l
refueling operations. The root cause was operator error.
Corrective i
action was taken to perform a complete inspection and clean-up of the
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crane area and to issue a " Plant Material Control Policy" outlining
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management's expectations of workers in dealing with material and I
plant status control. The NRC inspector verified by visual inspection that the tools and materials used on the reactor building crane during refueling operations had controls to prevent misuse.
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(Closed) Violation (89013-01(B)):
This violation involved numerous
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individuals who failed to complete all the required entries on the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Entry Log Sheet (Form BRP-051), which is part of the Radiation Work Permit.
The root cause was personnel error in being inattentive to detail. The corrective actions were to
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t neufy.the departmental supervisors of the need for them to instruct their workrs to complete all the requested infor' nation on the RWP
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and for the salth Physics Department to revise the Radiation Work
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Permit System o ensure a more positive control of ingress and egress
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to the Radiological Controlled areas, to enhance RWP form completion, i
L These actions were completed in December 1989.
However, these
corrective actions appear to have been ineffective, since a
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subsequent violation has been issued, documented in Insp6ction
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Report 155/90002(DRP), Item 90002-01.
Additional corrective actions
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regarding RWPs will be documented under violation number (155/90002-01).
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LClosed) Violation (89013-02)): This viol dion involved a failure to
't adequately review six controlled plant procedures which contained various typographical errors and in several procedures steps were
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absent or information was missing. The root cause was personnel error
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in being inattentive to detail. The licensee revised the procedures to
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correct the deficiencies before the procedures were used by licensee
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r personnel. Other corrective actions included issuing a letter to all
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i procedure sponsors and department heads regarding the violation, and i
L performing an independent review of a sample of plant working level
l procedures by Quality Assurance (QA) personnel. As a result of the k
review by QA, additional procedures were found which needed
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corrections. The procedures were submitted for revision. The L.
licensee continues to monitor the program and make additional changes
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as necessary to ensure an adequate review process. One of the changes r
is to conduct instruction / training meetings with procedure sponsors to enhance identification of omissions and typographical errors.
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3.
Management (30703)
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On February 21 and 22, several staff members from the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation made a site visit to Big Rock Point. The primary i
objective of the visit was to obtain information on the Radwaste and Containment Vent Systems in order to answer a petition filed by the
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Concerned Citizens for the Charlevoix Area to close the Big Rock Point
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plant. All information required was obtained and the staff members
expressed satisfaction that the petition could now be addressed, i
L A secondary objective of the trip was to facilitate the change in NRC project manager from R. Pulsifer to A. Masciantonio.
The status of all
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ongoing activities was reviewed with plant licensing personnel to reaffirm
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the schedules and responsibilities for the tasks. Activities expected in
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the near future were also discussed.
No formal entrance or exit meetings were held because the site visit was
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not an inspection and was not intended to provide a forum for substantive l".
discussions with the licensee.
Rather, it was characterized as a site visit to gather information.
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On March 5 and 6, the Section Chief, Reactor Projects Branch, Section 28, visited the site and conducted several inspections. Areas inspected
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included the turbine deck, machine shop, station power room, uninterruptible
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Power supply bettery rooms 4 control room Technical Support Center, inside l
the contai nent sphere, ar.d the emergency diesel generator room.
Routine j
housekeeping and general radiological controls appeared adequate.
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On March 9,1990, the senior resident inspector inet with D. Hughes and l
R. Beeker to discuss quality assurance issues.
The discussions focused on f
performance based inspection and the committee the licensee has formed to l
help improve the Quality Assurance department functions.
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On March 9,1990, the senior resident inspector attended the licensee's l
Safety System Functiona) Assessment ($$FA) exit roteting, part of the i
licensee's self assessment program, The $$FA covered all aspects of the
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' Electrics) Power 3ystem design for Big Rock Point.
The tearti had eleven i
total observations in the areas of operations, design, maintenance, and j
surveillance and testing. None of the observations had high safety
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significance. The report shoilld be issued to plent menagernent by 1ste l
March or early April, g
, Month'iy Surgit?snee Obnrvation (617P6)
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$tation tyrveillarece activities listed below were observed to verify that the activities were conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures. The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test and pt ocest, instrumentation was verified to be in their current cycle of calibration, personnel performing the tosts appeared to be qualified, and test data was reviewed fer accuracy and cotApleter.ess.
The NRC inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identitled were reviewed and resolved.
The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's performance of the following surveillance tests on the indicated dates; February 13:
T7-24. " Battery Pilot Cell Readings," Revision ll, May 17, 1989.
February 14:
T90-07, "RDS ! solation Valve Test Operate," Revision 30, June 27, 1988, for isolation valve "D".
February 14:
T30-59, "RDS Channel Test," Revision 0, January 25, 1990, for channel "D".
February 14:
T1-09, " Heat Balance Calculation," Revision 13, December 23, 1989.
February 14:
T1-02, " Primary System Lealage Test," Revision 16, May 16,
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February 27 T7-04, " Weekly Reactor Protection Logic System Test,"
Revision 11, September 19, 1989.
February 27:
T7-18, " Bypass Vaive Test," Revision 12, December 8, 1989.
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February 28:
730 59,'"RDS Channel Test," Revision 0, January 25, 1990, for che.nnel "0".
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T30-01, " Monthly Reactor Protection $ystem Test at Power,"
Revision 14, February 15, 1990.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
$tation maintenance activities of safety related syt,tems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
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in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications,
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for oper& tion vers mst while components or systems were re nved t
from Jervice; yprovals were obtair.ed prior to initiating the work;
Jctivities wore accomplished using approved procedures and wero Inspttted i
as aptc11 cable; functional testing and/or ualibrations were perforud prior to returning components or systems to service; qualdy control records l
were maintained; activities were accomrlished by qualified personnet, parts and materials used v' eve certified; and radiological ano fire
prevention controls were implereented.
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Work repe8ts were rev'ewed to determir6 wtai,un of octstanding jobs and to
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asscre that prierity was usigned to safety re)a'eed equip'nent maintenance
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which may cffect sy8 tem performa?.ce.
The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's performance of the following
maintenance work orders on the indicated dates:
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February 7:
No. 90-RD$-002, dated January 12, 1990, for calibrating the steam drum level instruments, in conjunction with Procedure i
1R05-5, " Calibration and Testing of the Steam Drum
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Evacuation Alarm Switches," Revision 6 March 22, 1989, i
February 6:
No. 90-EPS 0027, dated February 6, Sa90, for preventive maintenance on the RDS battery bank "C", in conjunction j
with Procedure T30-20. " Monthly Stationary Battery Voltage
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and $pecific Gravity Readings," Revision 23, December 20,
1989.
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No. 89-FHS-0013, dated October 26, 1989, for moving a spent
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fuel storage rack inside containment.
February 12:
No. 89-R$D-0021, dated October 19, 1989, for preventive I
maintenance and adjustment of safety relief valve Serial i
No. A-2, using Procedure MR$0-4, " Maintenance and/or
Pressure Adjustment of Crosby $tyle HC Relief Valves,"
Revision 3, October 16, 1989.
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February 13:
No. 904PS-0031, dated February 5,1990, for monthly maintenance and testinj of the Reactor Depressurization
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System battery bank, V)$-D, in conjunction with Procedure T30-20. " Monthly $tationary Battery Voltage t
and Specific Gravity Readings " Revision 23 December 20,
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February 16:
No. 90-NMS-0012, dated February 16, 1990, DC WRM's f
calibration, i
l No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
A 6.
pperational Safety _ Verification (71707)
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The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable i
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logs, and conducted discussions with control f oom operators delit g the
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inspection period.
IfMrument% tion and rer. order traces wre examined for
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abnwsa11 tits and discussed with the control room operators, as was the
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il states of control room annunciators. Reviews wer) conducted tu wonfirm
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that the required leak rate calculations were pnrformed and w rs within
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Technical Specification limits.
It was observed that the Plant Manager
and the Operations Superintencent w9re well infermed on tna everall status of the plant making visits to the cmini room 4nd to'fing the plant.
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Supervisors were well inf arr.ed on the overall status u thir plant and they d
F.ade fiequent '/ifits to the tentr;,1 room and regularly toured the plant.
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A system walkoown wat performed to verify the operability of tha R9sttor
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Deprusurization system (RD$)
Tours of the r.ontainitent sphere and
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turbine building were conducted to eserve plar.t ecuipmer.t conditions,
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including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, anf excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
Radiation protection controls were inspected, including Radiation Work Permits, calibration of radiation detectors, and proper posting and observance of radiation and/or contaminated areas.
The inspectors observed site security measures including access control of personnel and vehicles, proper display of identification badges for personnel within the protected area, and compensatory measures when security equipment had a failure or impairment.
The NRC inspector accompanied an Auxiliary Operator on his tour and also a Health-physics Technician on his " Daily Survey" to observe them in the performance of their duties.
They appeared to be knowledgeable and competent.
During an inspection by the resident inspector, a degraded condition was noted in the liquid-tight flexible conduits leading to two of
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the four Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) isolation valves, j
The licensee was notified and took corrective action.
The licensee
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entered a seven day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) to facilitate repairs. Repairs and post-maintenance testing were completed successfully and the equipment returned to service and the LCO exited within the seven day limit. The safety significance was low because the liquid-tight flexible conduits are used only for physical protection; the electrical
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conouctors were environmentally qualified and were not affected by the
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noted degraded condition of the flexible conduits.
The root cause could not be determined.
j On March 1,1990, at 8:57 a.m. (E.5.T.) with the reactor at full power, an Auxiliary Operator inadvertently bumped a pressure switch for a r
lubrication-oil protection circuit, thus tripping the No I reactor feed pump.
Subsequent licensed operator action was to trip a reactor core recirculation pump, in this case the No.1 pump. The operator's followup actions were to implement Off Normal Procedure (ONp)-2.20. " Loss of Feedwater " Revision 83, October 4, 1989, and ONP-2.27 " Loss of Reactor Recirculation Flow," Revision 133, September 27, 1989, thus reducing reactor power while maintaining steam drum water level control.
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Specifications allow for single loop power operation. The event was atsessed and the tripped feed pump wat, returned to service.
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oreNtcrs completed recovery f rom the event using"Standsrd Operating
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Procedure ($CO) 29 " Nuclear Steam Supply System, Revision 144, July 14,
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rdS9: Techn. cal Data Boot 15.5.1.2, " Control Rod Witheirawal and Insertion d,.
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$eqwnce - Cyde 24." Revision RB, Jult M 1989; and General Operating
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procedure (G0f) *6. "Pwer Operation," Revision 143, October 13, M89.
The reactor vas returned to full power on M.rcA 2.
The operatod s rapid
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and correct re5xnse to this event was excellent and may nave prevented a
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ra&ct4r scrom Wo violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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pyer_stional 5tatus of tre Energe_ney PreparednfEProgram f,87701)
c The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the licensee's emergency preparedness program was maintained in a state of operational readiness.
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The resident inspector observed the performance of the Annual Medical Radiation Emergency drill conducted on March 6, 1990.
Drill objectives were well defined and used to critique the drill, precautions and initial conditions were discussed with appropriate personnel prior to drill performance by the coordinator. The drill was performed in a professional manner using appropriate procedures.
Discrepancies were noted and discussed at the drill critique.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Licensee Event Reports Fo11owup 192700)
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, timely immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical
$pecifications..In addition, the event was evaluated for previous similar events, root cause, and potential generic applicability.
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I (Closed) LER 155/89004)):
" Technical Specification Violation - Failure L
I to FoTTow Procedure." On April ll, 1989, during review of surveillance
records, the. licensee discovered that an Auxiliary Operator on March 30,
b 1989, found the specific gravity reading on an Alternate Shutdown (ASD)
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system battery pilot cell was low and had confirmed that the battery was l
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on " equalize charge". However, he failed to notify the Shift Supervisor,
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as required by procedure.
Upon discovery of the error the Shif t l
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l Supervisor verified by battery log review that all specific gravity
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readings were within required limits. Additional corrective actions were:
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(a) To assign the readings to Maintenance personnel using revised i
Procedures T7-24, " Battery Pilot Cell Readings," Revision ll, i
May 17,1989, and T30-20, " Monthly Stationary Battery Voltage and i
Specific Gravity Readings," Revision 22, May 16, 1989.
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(b) Review the battery capacity and the output caoacity of the A$D
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O battery charger. The review resulted in revisir,g Standard Dperating
Procedure (50P)-17 " Vain Steam Systea," Revisirn 14k July 26, IM9,
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and SCP-28, " Station Power," Revision h5, May 17,1999, to provice
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guidance to operations pe? sonne) abcSt battery operability af ter i
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nultipin stroles of certain motor +opeiated valves.
t (c) During the 1989 refuelling /maiatenance outage a representative
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t from the battery verdor arrived on site to overne the codition of
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electrolyf e to the batteries to t esture degraded conditions resulting i
frem suspected electrolyte dilution due to spillage &nd svbsequent
refilling with demineralized water.
Following the eiectrolyte addition, the vendor rtpresentative evaluated the catteries as beiag I
in good condition.
(d) The various licensee personnel were counselled on Technical Specification and procedural requirements for the ASD batteries.
The root cause was operator error.
The safety significance was low because the specific gravity of the pilot cell had returned to the required level by the next daily reading.
(Closed) LER 155/89005)):
Informational LER - Containment Vent Valve Seal Degradation." The report was written to inform other licensees of a degradation problem in the rubber seal / seat material used in a 24-inch Atwood-Morr11 ventilation supply check valve, Model 60-1515. The defective seat was later analyzed at the licensee's laboratory where the root cause was determined to be degradation due to age.
Licensee corrective actions were the installation and acceptance testing of the new seat; testing the exhaust vent valve, also a 24-inch Atwood-Morril check valve, for satisfactory operation; and revising procurement documents to include both shelf-life and durometer (hardness) testing requirements.
In-stock items were updated to include the appropriate information.
The safety significance was low because the second isolation valve in series with the check valve was operable throughout the event.
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9 9.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
. throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The
)icensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also discussed the
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likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to
documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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lhe licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as
proprietary.
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