IR 05000155/1990006
| ML20042G624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1990 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042G619 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-90-06, 50-155-90-6, NUDOCS 9005150174 | |
| Download: ML20042G624 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
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REGION III
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Report No. 50-155/90006(DRP)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. OPR-6 Licensee:- Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Charlevoix, Michigan
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i inspection Conducted: March 13 through April 30, 1990
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Inspectors:
E.A. Plettner
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N.R. Williamsen D. Schrum
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d Approved By:
R. 4. DeFayette, tief,
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Reactor Projects Section 28 Date
j-i inspection Summary.
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Inspection on March 13 through April 30, 1990 (Report No. 50-155/90006(DRP))
hreas Inspected: The inspection was routine, unannounced, and conducted by the senior resident inspector, the resident inspector, and the project
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i inspector. The functional areas inspected consisted of the following:
surveillance activities; maintenance activities'on various components; operational safety verification which included the Post-Incident (Core Spray / Containment Spray) system; Engineered Safety Feature system walkdown of the Post-Incident (Core Spray / Containment Spray) system; and-follow-up on licensee event reports.
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Results: The licensee has responded in a timely manner to issues and concerns presented to them by the NRC. The surveillance, maintenance, and operational safety programs appeared to be performed in a manner to ensure public health and safety. No significant safety items were identified in this report.
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I 9003150174 900508 PDR ADOCK 05000153 o
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'I DETAILS'
1.
Persons Contacted
- W..Beckman, Plant Manager L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent H. Hoffman, Maintenance Superintendent R. Garrett, Chemistry / Health Physics Supervisor.
W. Trubilowicz, Operations Superintendent
- G' Withrow, Plant Engineering Superintendent:
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- R. Alexander, Technical Engineer E. -Zienert, Director Human Resources
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- P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator
- J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics ' Superintendent-
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DRLaCroix, Nuclear' Training _ Administrator ~-
- G. Boss',. Acting Operations Superintendent-
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- T. Dugan, Plant Safety Coordinator
- R. Hill, Acting-Quality Assurance Superintendent
- E. Mose_1y,-. Acting Maintenance Superintendent The inspectors-also contacted other~ licensee personnel.in the Operations;
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Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Technical Departments.
- Denotes-those present at the' exit interview on April 27, 1990.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation -(61726)
Station surveillance activities listed below were observed to verify that a
the activities were conducted in accordance with the Technical
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Specifications and surveillance procedures.. The applicable procedures.
j were reviewed for adequacy, test and process instrumentation were verified
to be in their current cycle of calibration,Lpersonnel: performing the tests appeared to be qualified, and-test data was reviewed for accuracy
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and completeness. The NRC-inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies.'
identified were reviewed and resolved. The NRC inspectors observed'the licensee's' performance of the following surveillance tests on_thei
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indicated dates:
q March 14:
T7-28', " Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Test Start,"' Revision:
I 9. December 8,1989.
March 22: ET30-14 " Core Spray Heat Exchanger Leak Test,". Revision 17,
- l October 9,-1989.
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March 27:
T30-22, " Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Tests," Revision
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33, Ju l,9 19,1989, with Procedure Change Form 1 dated September 27, 1989.
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March 27:. T30-24, " Emergency Core Cooling System Flow Recorder Test and-l Containment Level and Pressure Recorder Channel Check," Revision 13,
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August 22, 1988.
April 4:
T7-33, " Weekly Check of ASD System Equipment," Revision 1, February 1,1989,
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April 9: T90-23, " Portable. Pump Function and Capacity Test," Revision-2, DecerGr 13, 1989.
April 10:
T90-23, " Portable Pump Function and Capacity Test " Revision-2,; December 13, 1989, with Procedure Change Form dated April 10, 1990.
-April 16:
T7-20, " Diesel Fire Pump Auto Start," Revision 20, October 4, 1988.
April 26:
T30-14, " Core Spray Heat' Exchanger Leak Test," Revision 17, Octoberc9, 1989.
April 27:
T30-03, " Monthly Drive Selector Valve Reduced Pressure Test,"
Revision 11,-October 20, 1989.. This~ surveillance was for selector' valve B-3, only, 'following maintenance on thef valve.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
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listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted j
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides,~ and. industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this_ review:
the Limiting
'l Conditions'for Operation were met while components or systems were
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the-
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work; activities were accomplished using, approved procedures and were
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inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or. systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by._
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were certified; and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and
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to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The inspectors discussed with the maintenance supervisor the operation of
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the air-line oilers on the Reactor Depressurization System (RDS)
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isolation valve operators. The inspectors had a concern about the oiler
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when during a full-stroke test of one of the four RDS isolation valves, the valve operator exhaust port did not show any evidence of entrained oil. The maintenance supervisor conducted a review of records and held
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discussions with his workers to determine.if oil had been added to the
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oilers in recent years, indicating usage.
No definite conclusion could be reached by the licensee. The licensee will continue to investigate-the concern.
System operability has been proven by a quarterly surveillance test which all valves have passed for the last five years.
During normal plant tours the inspectors noted several minor discrepancies associated with plant equipment. These discrepancies were given to the appropriate plant staff for corrective actions, which were completed
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during the inspection period. One of these items involved 01.1 that'had.
~ dripped from three of the sixteen nitrogen bottle isolation valves in the high-pressure nitrogen system, which is used when initiating the Liquid Poison System.
The licensee was notified of this unexpected oil in the'
nitrogen system and took corrective = actions.
The licensee determined that the source of oil was the nitrogen charging unit used to pressurize the
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high-pressure nitrogen bank. A: record review showed that the' oldest bottle had been connected to the nitrogen bank in 1987 and, in addition, licensee operators believed that no oil had been added-to the charging unit in recent years, implying that any accumulation of oil would have been small.
The licensee opened <the charging line at a low spot and; collected less than 2 teaspoons of oil. The line was cleaned _out and returned to service. Although oil should: not have_ been in the line, the.
small amount of oil found in thet line-would not have prevented the system '
from. performing its intended. safety ' function.
During the week of April 2, the licensee had contractor personnel on site -
i to identify the source of a small in-leakage to the condenser system.
The contractor had installed some test equipment which-would monitor a-sample _ stream coming from, and returning to, the condenser off-gas
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system. The off-gas normally has some radioactive gasses, especially R
noble gasses.
To assure the integrity of the contractor's test equipment, the attending health physics (HP) technician allowed the contractor to-run the equipment for two minutes while the HP technician
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took an air sample with a portable sampler.
The test equipment then was j
turned off and the air sample was removed for analysis. While the HP
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technician was taking the sample to the laboratory for this analysis,-he j
was informed by other HP. personnel that radiation levels were increasing
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in the turbine building. _ He immediately ordered the condenser in-leakage
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test postponed pending further. investigation.
The out_come was seven-l individuals were temporarily contaminated with small amounts of radioactive
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material identified as noble gas. Decontamination was accomplished by i
waiting 20 to 30 minutes for the natural decay and dispersion 'of-the i
gasses to occur.
No administrative or regulatory requirements were l
exceeded as a result of the event, to either the environment or-to the i
personnel. The investigation identified the root cause of the event l
as a faulty component in the contractor's test < rig.
Repairs-were made to
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the test equipment and the leak-testing of the condenser off-gas system
was completed.
Repairs to the components causing the in-leakage were j
completed later. This event will be part of a follow-up inspection by j
region-based NRC-inspectors.
The NRC inspectors observed the licensee's performance of the following'
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maintenance work orders on the indicated dates:
March 14: No. 90-EPS-0059, dated March 5, 1990, to replace one of the
3-ce11 uninterruptible power supply batteries in the "A" bank, using i
Procedure MEPS-11, " Single Cell Replacement of Stationary Batteries,"
l Revision 0, September 29, 1988.
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March 16:
No. 90-CDS-0008, dated February 22, 1990, and tagging order T90-0188, for cleaning the condensate Demineralizer Strainer No. 1, DS-5753. While performing the task the licensee noted that the fine-mesh screen was missing and the handle on the strainer was broken off. A new strainer was obtained, installed, and the unit returned to service.
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licensee generated a deviation report for tracking and evaluating possible causes of the problem.
March 16:
No. 90-RCS-0007, to inspect / repair the clean-up pump, dated February 15, 1990,. in conjunction with Repair Procedure MRCS-6,
" Inspect / Repair Clean-up Pump," Revision 13, dated October 2, 1989.
March 18:" No. 90-FWS-0012, dated. April 17, 1990, to clean nozzles for the Feedwater Control-system, in conjunction with Procedure IFWS-1,
" Cleaning Nozzles' on Pneumatic Feedwater Control System," Revision 13,
-dated November 10 -1989.
i March 21:
No. 90-DWS-0003,' dated February 22, 1990,_to calibrate Homestic water accumulator instruments.
March 22: Nos. 90-FPS-0048, -0049, -0051, -0053, -0060, dated February -
21, 199U, for preventive maintenance on fire protection valves, Nos.
I VFP-14,. -15, -17-19, and -69, respectively.~
March 29: No. 90-PIS-0006, dated March.21, 1990, for calibrating core
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spray pump instruments, Nos. PI-414, PS-638, and DPI-7808.
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April 11, 26: No. 89-FHS-0014, dated December 7,1989', for removing fuel-i sipping equipment.from.the spent fuel pool.
April 26:
No. 90-EPS-0083, dated April 10,.1990, to repair a-battery-backup emergency lighting ; unit.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The NRC inspectors observed control room' operations, reviewed applicable
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' logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the j
inspection period.
Instrumentation.and. recorder. traces were examined for i
abnormalities and discussed with the' control room operators, as was the
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status of control room annunciators.
Reviews were. conducted to confirm that the required-leak rate calculations were performed and were within Technical Specification limits.
It was observed that the Plant Manager j
and the Operations Superintendent were well informed on the overall status j
of'the plant, making frequent visits to the control room and touring the
plant. System walkdowns were perforued to verify the operability of the
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Post-Incident (Core Spray / Containment Spray) system. Tours of the -
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containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant
equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that main.tenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
Radiation protection controls were inspected, including Radiation Work Permits, calibration of radiation' detectors, and proper posting and observance of radiation and/or i
contaminated areas. The inspectors observed site security measures
including access control of personnel and vehicles, proper display of identification badges for personnel within the protected area, and compensatory measures when security equipment had a failure or impaument.
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On March 20, 1990, reactor power was reduced to facilitate repairs to No'.
I reactor feed pump vent valve and-sealing gland. The Senior Resident Inspector observed the repair work being performed under Maintenance Work Order-90-FWS-0006, dated February._3,- 1990, to #1 RFP casing vent,'using jumper link and bypass #90-006 and tagging order ~ #90-0199. Radiological procedures were observed and monitored by an.on-station health physicist.
Repairs and post-maintenance. testing were satisfactorily completed.
Power escalation began in the early morning-of March 21. The control room operators used Standard'0perating Procedure SOP-29, " Nuclear Steam Supply System," Revision 144, July-14, 1989; Technical Data Book 15.'5.1.2,
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" Control: Rod Withdrawal and -Insertion Sequence -: Cycle 24," Revision ~ 88,
- July 25,1989; and General Operating Procedure GOP-5, " Power Operation,"
Revision 143, October 13, 1989. The reactor was returned to full power-
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later in the day.-
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On April 12, 1990, the Plant Manager went.on a tour of-the plant with the-Senior Resident: Inspector. Minor discrepancies.were noted and given to the-appropriate plant staff for correctiveLaction. The material-condition of the plant continues to. improve. Plant personnel. continue to be diligent in pursuit of excellence in plant cleanliness and the material condition of their assigned: areas.
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Violation--Failure to Review Safety-Related Proposed Modification," and.
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TwoLicenseeEventReports;(LER)~90-001,=" Technical. Specification l
LER 89-006, Revision 1, " Technical Specification Violation--Discovered Defects in Fire Penetration Seals," were issued during.this! inspection period. Both items will be closed in a later_ inspection report when corrective actions have been' completed.
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During the inspection period several new and updated procedures were approved and issued by the licensee.
The licensee has completed 65% of
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the procedure upgrade project. Of particular interest was the formal
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implementation of a Root Cause Analysis Procedure program which the licensee had committed to formally approve by April of 1990, as documented in Inspection Report 155/89019(DRP),Section3.b. The procedure is
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contained in Administrative Procedure 1.13, " Corrective Action," Revision
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71710)-
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I The NRC inspectors verified the operability of the Post-Incident (Core
Spra / Containment Spray) system which is an Engineered Safety Feature
(ESF system.
The verification included a complete walkdown of the
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dCCessible portions of the system.
Included were vertrication of valve labels, equipment condition, correct valve and breaker positions and i
dpparent operdbility of support systems essential to the ESF system. A i
detailed review was conducted to confirm that the licensee's system lineup procedure matched the applicable as-built drawings; this included the following documents:
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Drawing No. 0740G44019
" Fire Protection System Valve Line-Up Sheet 1 Diagram (S-019)," Revision 12, dated December 15, 1989.
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t Procedure 0-TGS-1,A-8
" Post Incident System Check-Off List,"
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Revision 37, dated September 29, 1989.
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Drawing No. 0740G40123
-" Piping)& Instrument Diagram Fire System (M-123," R o
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Drawing No. 0740G40123
" Piping & Instrument Diagram, Post Sheet 2-AccidentSystem(M-123),"RevisionH, dated January 5,1990. -
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The review revealed 'ome labeling discrepancies on the drawings and'some s
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identification tags which were missing on valves in the plant. These were brought to the licensee's attention and corrective actions are in
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progress.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700).
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and'
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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that reportability requirements were fulfilled, ~ timely immediate
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corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent ~
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
In addition, the event was evaluated for previous similar events, root cause, and potential. generic applicability.
(Closed)LER 155/89007:
" Technical Specification Violation - Omission of'
Fire Detector Testing." On August 16,.1989, the licensee was performing
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a Quality Assurance (QA) Fire Protection audit, and discovered' that~ two-L heat detectors in the Emergency Diesel Generator room and four1 heat
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detectors in the screenhouse had not been tested within the' required six
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month interval. Upon discovery, the detectors were declared inoperable
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and a fire watch was established per Technical Specifications-(TS). The detectors were tested for operability and returned to. service on August 16, 1989, subsequently terminating the fire watch. The root cause was an inadequate surveillance test procedure.
The corrective action was to
revise T180-16, " Functional Test of the Fire Detector System," Revision 10, November 1,1989, to ensure procedural clarification and
comprehensive detector inspection.
The safety significance was-low
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because the detectors demonstrated operability during testing and have
'i proven by past performance to be reliable devices requiring little or no i
maintenance / adjustment between-surveillances.
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(Closed)LER 155/89008:
" Reactor Trip Resulting from Turbine Control
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Failure." On August 22, 1989, at 6:45 a.m. (EDT), the reactor scrammed i
when all three neutron wide-range monitors tripped on high flux
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i-indication. The flux increase was the result of equipment failure (bellows assembly) in the Turbine Control system.
Following the scram s
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all aafety systems responded as required with no noted abnormalities.
The failed bellows assembly was later analyzed at the licensee's off-site laboratory where the root cause was determined to be stress-corrosion cracking of the stainless steel bellows, due to contaminants in the
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bellows. The vendor of the bellows assembly, General Electric Company,
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was notified of the problem so corrective actions could be implenented to ensure that future bellows assemblies would be free from contaminants i
upon shipnent from the f actory.
The licensee plans to pressure-test the bellows assembly during each refueling / maintenance outage. The safety-significance of the event was minimal since the plant responded to the turbine admission valve closure as designed and the reactor protection
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system initiated prompt control rod insertion. No other engineered
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safety features were initiated to mitigate the event.
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(Closed)LER 155/89009:
" Informational LER - Garlock Style #938 packing N5fiTiiiiis.".The report was written to-inform other licensees of a binding problem that occurred in a nonsafety related valve packed with Garlock
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style #938 packing.. The licensee's use and installation of the material o
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met vendor recommendations. The material underwent a transformation from a flexible material to a hard brittle material resulting in valve stem binding..thus making the valve inoperable.
Root cause of the valve stem
binding was attributed to heat,and pressure.
Corrective action'taken by the licensee was to identify and remove the pteking in all motor operated valves containing Garlock style #938 and to replace:it with original-type-packing material. This included an ESF system with two valves which were tested for operability prior to packing replacement and achieved acceptable results. Thus, the safety significance was minimal because the ESF valves were operable. Two small manual-isolation valves in a nonsafety system containing the packing passed an operability test and will be repacked o
during the refueling and maintenance outage scheduled for' September 1990.
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and
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-summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. Tha licensee acknowledged these findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The-licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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