IR 05000155/1986011
| ML20214F881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1986 |
| From: | Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214F866 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-86-11, IEB-86-002, IEB-86-2, NUDOCS 8611250470 | |
| Download: ML20214F881 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/86011(DRP)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Charlevoix, MI 49720 Inspection Conducted:
July 11, 1986 through September 23, 1986 Inspector: S.'Guthrie Approved By:
D.
. Boyd, Chief
//-/7-N ProjectsSection20 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on July 11, 1986 through September 23, 1986 (Report No. 50-155/840ll(DRP))
Areat Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector of Licensee Actions on previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, IE Bulletins, Licensee Event Report Followup, Regional Requests, Headquarters Requests, Training, and Licensing Actions.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, one violation and no deviations were identified (Section 3.f - failure to take corrective action following unsuccessful monthly communicatioris tests).
No significant safety items were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- F. Buckman, V.P. Nuclear Operations, CPCo
- D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent G. Pettijean, Planning and Administrative Services Superintendent
- G. Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Alexander, Technical Engineer-R. Abel, Production and Plant Performance Superintendent.
- L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent R. Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator P. Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities Dept.
D. Swem, Senior Engineer G. Sonnenberg, Shift Supervisor D. Staton, Shift Supervisor
- K. Berry, Director Nuclear Licensing
- J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent E. Evans, Senior Engineer J. Tilton, General Engineer D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor D. Ball, Maintenance Supervisor W. Blosh, Maintenance Engineer L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor J. Horan, Shift Supervisor R. May, Shift Supervisor R. Scheels, Shift Supervisor J. Warner, Property Protection Supervisor T. Fisher, Senior Quality Assurance Administrator S. Bartosik, General Quality Assurance Consultant R. Krchmar, General Quality Assurance Analyst
- G. Slade, Executive Director Nuclear Assurance
- R. Frisch, Senior Licensing Analyst The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Departments.
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
- Denotes those present at management meeting discussed in Section 3.c.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (OPEN) (155/86007-01) Severity Level IV violation Regarding Mispositioned Control Rods.
The occurrence was the subject of a management meeting discussed in Section 12 of this report.
By letter dated August 18, 1986, the licensee committed to implement, by September 15, procedural changes to require operator manipulation of the reactivity switch to ensure no drives are selected.
Notification of this new requirement was issued by letter to all Shift Supervisors and operators on August 22.
The licensee further committed to the development of a preventive maintenance program for control rod drive selector valves to be
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implemented following startup from the next refueling outage. At the close of the inspection period the procedural changes were in routing for Plant Review Committee (PRC) review and approval.
While the procedures were not in place by the committed date the inspector received the letter issued to shift personnel on August 22 and found it to be an adequate interim measure.
(CLOSED) (155/85022-04) Severity Level IV violation Regarding the Licensee's Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action to Address Inadequate Battery Powered Lighting Required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
The licensee's corrective action is discussed in Section 4.f of this report.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the i
inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected
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emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and exce:sive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Liquid Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization, Post Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
Other safety related activities addressed included:
a.
During the inspection period the inspector reviewed the minutes of the Big Rock Point Plant Safety Committee Meetings as part of an ongoing observation of plant personnel safety practices.
The aggressive approach and technical expertise of the plant safety coordinator is apparent in the volume and variety of issues under review.
Safety problems and near-misses from other licensee plants, as well as other industry input, are regularly reviewed for applicability to Big Rock.
Preventive measures are evident in many areas ranging from back injury to electrical shock and heat exhaustion.
Corrective actions required to correct safety deficiencies are generally prompt.
Conversations with various plant staff members indicate individuals are generally involved with personnel safety and regularly bring safety issues to the attention of the committee.
The involvement of the Plant Superintendent as committee chairman is evident.
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b.
The turbine stop valve failed to close from the control room during a scram on July 2.
The cause of the scram was determined to be erratic behavior of the neutron instrumentation.
Details describing licensee corrective actions are presented in Report No. 155/86007(DRP)
Paragraphs-4i and 4j.
Prior to startup of the reactor on July 12.the inspector reviewed licensee activities to: ensure procedural and Technical Specifications requirements ~were met.
During startup the licensee test operated from the control room the turbine stop valve from approximately 1,150 RPM turbine speed and determined it performed satisfactorily.
Corrective measures aimed at neutron instrumentation repairs were apparently successful as no erratic behavior of circuitry or power level indication was observed by operators.
c.
During the inspection period the inspector reviewed licensee progress on revision of-Administrative Procedures (AP).
The project was originally due for corpletion by August 1, but the scope of the project resulted in delays.
The project is approximately 85%
complete and is being given a high priority.
The inspecticn incluced review of the licensee's progress in revising the Quality Assurance Requirements Matrix (QARM).
As discussed in the licensee's response to Open Item No. 155/85010-04, the QARM was to be updated as AP's were reviewed by Quality Assurance (QA)
reviewers.
The revised QARM was to be published August 1, 1986, but has also been delayed.
Licensee review of the QARM during July determined that many requirements of.the basis documents were not present in the QARM, a determination that substantiates earlier findings by licensee reviewers that the Nuclear Operation Department Standards (N0DS) were significantly deficient in listing all applicable basis document requirements.
The inspector reviewed the activities and approach of the site QA reviewer charged with ensuring the new AP's, now near completion, contain all applicable requirements of the basis documents.
The inspector noted that the reviewer's efforts compare the AP requirements to those contained in the N0DS and indexed in the QARM were made difficult because of the deficiencies in those documents.
Deficiencies in the QARM identified during the AP review process are transmitted to the group now revising the QARM for inclusion in future revisions.
The inspector expressed his concern that use of a deficient QARM to review new AP's, many of which have already been issued, would result in AP's with built-in deficiencies.
The licensee stated that they expect to have to update the AP's with future reviews after the QARM is complete.
On September 9 the inspector met with licensee corporate management to discuss these observations.
The licensee indicated an understanding of the concerns and an appreciation of the
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significance of commitmentsLmade t'o NRC to implement tfie'N005.
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t The licensee indicated that increased managerial.. involvement and-dedicated st'aff addressing deficiencies should have a significant,
positive impact on tire project.
The inspector pointed out thaC completion of the QARM.as an accurate reference document was only
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tha:first step in addressing the broader issues of NODS and AP's~
thataredeficientin_conveyingQAregMrements.
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d.
On July 29 the inspect'or observed the shi'pment of contaminated '
tools used by contractor personnel in the spent fuel pool.
Dose rates on contact, at two meters, and in the trdck cab were below
regulatory limits.
A review of administrative requirements associated with the shipment showed all procedural requirements had been met, e.
00 July 29 it was brought to the< inspectors attention by the Director of Emergency Services fomCharlevoix County that telephone comunication between Big Rock Plant and the County Sheriff's
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dispatcher using the designated line was not operable.
This
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commercial primary line replaced a dedicated hot line between the two locations, but the number was not incorporated into surveillance procedures to ensu're the operability of the line on the monthly or
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quarterly ccmmunications checks required by the Site Emergency Plan (SEP) or tis list of Primary and Secondary Communications.
The backup numbar.for the primary number is the regular commercial -
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telephone iiusber (547-4461/4462)
publ,ic in contacting the Sheriff' published for use.by the general i
s office.
The b'ackup number was the:only nun.ber. appearing on monthly and quarterly surveillance checks performed by technicians.
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Althoughthebackupnumberwastheonlynumidr~ubjecttofermal L,
s verification via surveillance, the on duty Shift Supervisor (SS)
i on March 1,1986, attempted unsuccessfully to contact the' Sheriff's office using the auto-dialer an( primary number.
After verification that the phone did not ring, thE SS directed that the backup number on the auto-dialer be used until the primary number was repaired.
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No maintenance order wa's issued. A yellow stick-on note was attached to the auto dialer directing use of the backup number.
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On April 5 an ideetical -test produced the same results with en additional yellow stick.on note being attached to the auto dialer.
The primary number was still inoperabic wher< tested July 29.
The inspector:'4 review of the iniident concluded that:
(1) the plant personnel were 'not awareif the designatiort of the new number as the primary; tine of commJniGdiori.
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(2) that responsible plant personnel did not report the failure,
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i investigate it, or ihitiate repairs.
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(3) ' that p1 Ant pr7sonnel have been conducting monthly and quarterly
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checks psing the backup numbers as required by the surveillance
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procedure.
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,y (4) that plant personnel did not know what communications were available in the Sheriff's office or their configuration.
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The licensee initiated repairs and, on August 4, the primary number was verified to be working. The inspector verified that surveillance procedures now test the correct number.
The licensee's SEP, which is required to be maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47b requires communications drills be conducted monthly to verify
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comunications with state and local governments.
The licensee's SEP Implementing Procedure 6J, Communications Tests, requires that s
for system failures or incorrect telephone conbers, " corrections are made by the Plant Nuclear Emergency Planm.r or designate".
The licensee's failure to include the primary number in surveillance J
procedures, maintain its operability, and initiate repairs when required is a violation (155/86011-01(DRP)).
This violation has been adequately addressed by the licensee and the inspector has no i
further questions.
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In view of the above noted violation, the inspector decided to
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e review some other requirements of the SEP to verify that periodic s
drills, tests, and audits required by the Plan were also performed.
r In addition to the monthly and quarterly tests referenced above, the inspector reviewed the annual audits of the SEP and Implementing Procedures required by Technical Specifications 6.5.2.8.2.d and found them to be comprehensive.
The inspector reviewed the General Office audit findings of the annual review required by
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Section 9.8.3.1 of the SEP and expressed to the licensee the concern that numerous findings presented to the plant on December 6, 1985 had still not been implemented in the SEP. These findings included incorrect telephone numbers, outdated terminology for facilities and site organization, and an inadequate notification scheme.
At the close of the inspection period the licensee was preparing to submit to FRC revisions to the SEP which includes the audit
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findings. The revised and approved SEP is expected to be issued at year-end, approximately one year after the audit.
The licensee 4['
,was encouraged to emphasize increased sensitivity to audit findings and prompt corrective action, e
f.
On August 6 the licensee informed the inspector of an incident of contaminated items found outside the security fence and left
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unattended.
The previous day a Health Physics Technician had delivered to the training area anti-contamination clothing for purposes of employee suit-up training.
The clothing was determined to have a small amount of fixed contamination.
The contaminated clothing was immediately removed and replaced with new articles never used in the plant.
The incident represents a violation of the requirements of Administrative Procedure No. 5.11, " Radioactive Material Control", and Procedure No. RM56, " Radiological Clearance for Offsite Removal of Material".
Both of these procedures call for monitoring, tagged control, and written authorization of radioactive material leaving the plant perimeter fence.
Because
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self-identified events, no violation is being issued in this report.
The licensee identified the root cause of the incident to be lack of awareness of the requirements by the technician.
Long term corrective action emphasizes training on this requirement, g.
On August 11 the licensee became aware of a penetration in the floor i
of the plant's telephone equipment room.
The hole, discovered when a telephone equipment cabinet was moved, is directly above the air compressor room in an area requiring fire barriers. The penetration was placed on a one-hour fire watch until repairs were completed the next day.
h.
On August 18 the ir.spector observed the ahrival and delivery inside
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containment of new fuel bundles packaged in shipping containers.
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Container accelerometers were. intact, indicating container integrity
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was preserved during transit. Quality control and radiological
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control personnel were present.
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On August 19 the licensee determined they were unable to calibrate the process monitor for canal water. Additional sampling and analysis was performed as required by Technical Specifications.
Previous sampling and analysis requirements had been overlooked
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and were the subject of LER 86-003.
j.
On September 4 the inspector observed portions of drug testing activities conducted by the licensee.
Sixty randomly selected individuals were sampled.
The licensee informed the insp'ector that all, samples indicated no drug usage.
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The inspector reviewed with the licensee a special test of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) successfully conducted
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' September 8.
The MSIV, which is required for containment isolation, has a' history of failure to operate.
In the past the valve was
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tested once per cycle during startup from refueling outages.
The purpose of this test was to validate a proposed monthly surveillance test to verify. operability of the MSIV.
The test involves closing from the f_ull open position for 4-8 seconds and verifying valve movement by control room position indication and by monitoring motor current draw.
The test is being developed at this time
/because changes in the power supply to the MSIV resulting from the construction of the alternate shutdown system now make it possible to obtain accurate current draw data.
1.
On September 10 the facility was reduced from full power to approximataly 42 MWe (within the capacity of one Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) to repair the No. 2 RFP inboard bearing oil deflector ring.
Repairs were completed promptly and the plant returned to full power.
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One violation and no deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items v;ere considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests etere reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
a.
On July 14 the licensee adjusted packing on M0-7067 Bypass Valve Isolation Valve and cycled the valve from its normally open position to verify post maintenance operability.
The valve failed to respond to two attempts to open the valve from the shut position which sees a high, differential pressure across the valve.
The valve was manual lly moved off its seat and then successfully returned to the open position remotely from the control room.
The valve is normally open during operation but would be called upon to operate on demand in the event of bypass valve failure.
Initial maintenance department activity involved resetting the valve operator torque switch bypass settings which permit full operating torque to be applied to the stem for pulling the disc off the seat for the first 5% of valve stem travel.
The switch was reset to apply full torque for'the first 10% of stem travel.
At the close of the period M0,-7067 was still caution tagged and operators had been cautioned that if the valve is shut it may have to be opened by hand.
The subject of torque and limit switch settings will be the subject of a future inspection, b.
On July 29 the inspector observed overhaul of Control Rod Drive System Selector Valves for Control Rod B-1.
Repairs included 0-ring replacements.
The maintenance worker demonstrated familiarity with the equipment and procedural requirements of the job.
Operator involvement in informing the maintenance worker of the limits of tagged component isolation and radiation protection technician involvement was evident. The inspector informed the licensee that the brass tags identifying valves used for isolation on B-1 were
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marked in a manner likely to confuse an operator not familiar with the system configuration.
The licensee incorporated the inspectors concerns into its ongoing component identification program.
The inspector will continue to monitor this issue.
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c.
On August 4 the inspector observed preventive maintenance performed on spare D.C. breakers.
The work was conducted according to procedure, and the maintenance person was aware of both the technical and electrical safety aspects of the task.
The inspector reviewed the mechanic's training background and its effectiveness in preparing him for the job.
The mechanic indicated that while the preventive maintenance being performed utilized skills learned previously on the job, his recent course work has had a positive impact on his performance.
d.
During the first week of August the Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) experienced several actuations of the auto-test alarm.
The auto-test circuitry is driven by its own clock and rapidly and continuously scans the four RDS channels to detect circuit faults and system malfunctions. On August 8 the licensee concluded that the problem was within the auto-test circuitry and no problems with RDS actuation circuitry could be identified.
Repairs to the auto-test circuitry were initiated, but trouble shooting was hampered by the sporadic nature of the failures.
Trouble shooting continued through August 19 when faulty auto-test circuit modules were identified and replaced. Trouble shooting of RDS channels resulted in six entries into Limiting Condition for Operation because of Technical Specification requirements to. test the remaining three channels when one channel is removed from service.
One such test on August 18 identified RDS Channel A as being inoperable in the closed position.
Required testing of other channels was completed and repairs were initiated.
Concurrent with the problems with RDS auto-test circuitry, the licensee's surveillance program identified low specific gravity in two cells of RDS battery D".
Overcharging resolved the problem in one cell, but the second remained below the !imit of 1.20.
Prior to removing RDS channel D from service for battery cell replacement the licensee took the conservative step of verifying the operability of the other three RDS channels.
Technical Specifications require at least three operable RDS channels for plant operation.
Corrective action involved overhaul by the vendor of modules used in RDS auto test clock circuitry and the purchase of new modules for use as spares.
Licensee procedures for bench testing of modules were revised based on vendor input.
e.
On August 19 the licensee determined the presence of a steam leak on ten inch diameter extraction steam piping to the high pressure feed heater.
The equipment is located in the pipe tunnel.
Site maintenance personnel successfully welded closed a crack in the pipe wall approximately one-half inch long and located in the nozzle which is integral with the heater.
A metal patch was then welded over the crack. To reduce pressure in the extraction line, reactor power was reduced to approximately 2 per cent.
Repairs were completed in approximately three hours and the reactor returned to full power.
The Licensee has added to the refueling outage work list non-destructive testing intended to accurately determine piping thickness and conditions for the high pressure feed heater and extraction steam piping.
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f.
On August 22 the inspector observed maintenance activities that-installed and tested 24 battery powered emergency area lighting units.
Previously_the licensee had 24 units, each equipped with two bulbs.
The failure of these two bulb units to meet eight hour full j
discharge tests was addressed in Section 7 of Inspection Report No. 155(85022(DRS)).
In response to a violation issued under that Report No. (155/85022-04) for failure to take timely corrective action to address the deficiency, the licensee committed to install identical units adjacent to the existing twenty four units by_
September 1, 1986.
The licensee's engineering staff determined that periodic full discharge and immediate recharge of all units served to increase the full discharge test duration.
In its final configuration each lighting location will have two battery units each with only one bulb installed, thus providing no reduction in available illumination and extended test duration.
Initial testing indicated full discharge with one bulb of up to 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
g.
During August the licensee established a program to purchase all packing from a single vendor in an attempt to address a history of packing problems.
On August 26 and 27 a vendor representative conducted training sessions on packing and 3 and adjustment for
Maintenance and Operation personnel. The plant intends to replace old packing with that provided by the vendor on an as-required basis.
h.
During the week of September 1 the inspector observed portions of repairs to the canal sample pump and its suction line.
Repairs included removal of the suction 1ine to remove sand and replacement of mechanical seals and the pump's impeller.
Following maintenance the pump experienced difficulty maintaining prime and operators were observed to be attentive to the need for reestablishing prime and sampling if necessary.
i.
On September.19 the inspector observed portions of maintenance activities to rebuild spare RDS top assemblies.
j.
During the inspection period the inspector reviewed the establishment of a Material Survey Group within the organizational structure.
The Group was established March 1 in response to INP0 and QC determination that the procurement storage and spare parts inventory control activities at the site required additional personnel and facilities.
The group consists of a supervisor, a requisition engineer on rotating assignment, and clerks and stockmen, and has, as its first goal, the construction of appropriate warehouse facilities to provide Q and non-Q storage.
The group is currently involved in identifica-tion of an extensive inventory of parts purchased to maintain components or perform modifications but which are not identified as to component or system application.
On completion, the group expects to publish a computerized listing of all parts in inventory.
The group expects to coordinate its activities with the newly created Planning Group in providing material services for outage and maintenance activities.
Involvement of site Quality Control will remain unchanged from present recent inspections.
The group had identified additional goals, including:
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- control of calibrated tools
- establishment of automatic reorder system for consumables with known shelf life
- establishment of in plant stores issue areas for common, high volume items like nut and bolts
- control of an anti-contamination clothing and radioactive waste shipping containers
- expansion of spare parts inventory
- eventual coordination of all procurement activities with site engineering staff and the corporate purchasing department No violations or daviations were identified in this area.
5.
Surveillance Observation On July 22 the inspector observed portions of Surveillance T-30-20, monthly check of Station Batteries.
The verification of UPS Battery specific gravity was conducted per procedure using calibrated instruments.
6.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins The inspector reviewed the licensee's July 24 response to IE Bulletin No. 8602, Static "0" Ring Differential Pressure Switches.
The licensee uses two pressure switches of the model specified and determined that neither are subject to electrical equipment qualification or Technical '
Specifications.
The concerns of the Bulletin are incorporated into the licensee's Operating Experience Review Program.
This Bulletin is considered to be closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Licensee Event Reports Followup 7.
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was acccmplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(CLOSED) LER 86004 and Revision 1, Battery Service Test Technical Specification Contradiction.
The contradiction involves a battery test of 61 minutes being performed since 1977 while Technical Specifications requires an eight hour test, and is discussed in detail in Section 3.h. of Inspection Report No. 155/86007(DRP)). The
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licensee has comitted to submit a Technical Specification Change Request which will initiate an analysis by NRR.
The licensee's comitment calls for resolution of the question in time to permit required testing during the next refueling outage.
Revision 1 of this LER removed the August 1, 1986 deadline for the Technical Specificati0n Change submittal to NRR.
-(CLOSED) LER 86005, Neutron Monitoring System Cable Failure Resulting in Reactor Trip.
Details of the reactor trip are presented in Section 6 of Inspection Report No. 155/86007(DRP).
A review of the licensee's start up activities is documented in Section 3.b of this report.
8.
Licensing Activities By letter dated July 11, 1986, the Comission issued Amendment No. 86 to i
Facility Operating License No. DPR-6 for Big Rock Point.
The Amendment adds to Technical Specifications a provision allowing the Shift Supervisor (SS) to designate a Reactor Operator as shift comander, thus allowing the SS to leave the area to investigate and assimilate overall plant j
performance.
9.
Training a.
On July 18 the inspector reviewed the licensee's training program for fire watches used during welding or other hot work.
The program is considered adequate to acquaint personnel with their duties and required response to fires.
b.
On July 23 the inspector attended Annual General Employee Fire Training.
The two hour presentation involved audio-visual presentations on the nature and causes of fires, reviewed instructions to workers and fire watches in the event of fire, and emphasized employee response requirements for office workers in the east office building.
Hands-on-training in the use of hand held fire extinguishers was provided for employees hired since the last training session after a video presentation describing extinguisher types ar.d usage.
c.
During the first week of August the inspector observed portions of fire brigade classroom and hands on training.
The training was extensive and comprehensive.
10.
Headquarter's Request During the inspection period the inspector reviewed licensee actions in response to INP0 Significant Operating Event Report (50ER) No. 84-1, Cooling Water System Degradation Due to Aquatic Life.
The review indicated the licensee has an establisned program to inspect open cycle heat exchangers and monitor flow, and that the licensee is conscientious in observing microbiological conditions in Lake Michigan using special environmental inspections.
The review was requested by Temporary Instruction No. (TI)2515/77 - Survey of Licensee Response to Selected Safety Issues.
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This item is considered to be closed.
11. Regional Requests On September 19 the inspector reviewed for applicability a possible generic problem with Model No. AKF-25 breakers used as a field breaker on recirculation pump motor generator (MG) sets and containing a trip coil associated with Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) mitigating
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systems.
Big Rock Point does not have a recirculating pump MG set and l
the pump breakers used do,not address an ATWS function. The subject breaker does not appear on-the Big Rock Point equipment list as being used in any other site application.
On September 12 the inspector reviewed for applicability a potential generic prcblem concerning drifting level switch set points on Barton Model No. 288A differential pressure switches. A review of the licensee's computerized Equipment Database Listing indicated Model No. 288A was not installed in any application at Big Rock Point.
I 12. Management Meeting On July 21 members of licensee management participated in a Management Meeting in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, on the subject of repeat occurrences of mispositioned control rods.
The third and most recent incident resulted in violation 155/86007-01. The licensee concurred with the.
details related to the three occurrences, and stated that operator training was considered to be adequate on the subject of. rod control.
The Plant Superintendent indicated that corrective action would emphasize individual operator accountability for safe reactor operation, and expressed confidence that once management's high expectations of performance were clearly communicated to operators, those operators have the capability to meet those expectations.
The licensee was informed that future occurrences of mispositioned control rods would result in escalated enforcement action.
13.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector.during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as
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