IR 05000010/1979022
| ML19257B244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Barker J, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257B242 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-79-22, 50-10-79-22, 50-237-79-26, 50-249-79-24, NUDOCS 8001150405 | |
| Download: ML19257B244 (8) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:* U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-10/79-22; 50-237/79-26; 50-249/79-24 Docket No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 License No. DPR-2; DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL Inspection Conducted: October 1-November 2, 1979 I M- ' Inspector: J.L. Baker [ //!/f!7'/ "{' / ,<,x4 - Approved By: R. L. Spessard, Chief //!/6f7'l Reactor Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on October 1-November 2, 1979, (Report No. 50-10/79-22; 50-237/ 79-26; 50-249/79-24) Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of maintenance activities; plant operations; physical protection-security organization, physical barriers, access control (identification, authorization, badging, search and escorting), and communications; and followup on licensee event reports.
The inspection involved 121 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, there were no items of noncom-pliance identified in six areas. One item of noncompliance (Infraction - failure to follow procedures - Paragraph 3) was identified in one area.
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. DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
- J. Eeingenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- B.
Shelton, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent
- D.
Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor C. Sargent, Unit 1 Operating Engineer J. Wujciga, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer E. Budzichowski, Unit Support Operating Engineer D. Adam, Waste Systems Engineer J. Parry, Rad-Chem Supervisor B. Sanders, Station Security Administrator
- E. Wilmere, QA Coordinator The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument personnel, and contract security personnel.
- Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews conducted on October 5, 12, 19, 26 and November 2, 1979.
2.
Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and compon-ents were reviewed to ascertain that they are conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; maintenance activities were accomplished using approved procedures; maintenance activities were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to an operating status; quality control records were maintained for maintenance activities; and maintenance activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspector observed maintenance in progress concerning the fol-lowing work requests: (1) Unit 2, WR 2082, Unit 2 Quarterly Inspec-tion, and WR 2432, 2A LPCI Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve; (2) Unit 2/3, WR 2185, 2/3A SBGT System; and (3) Unit 3, WR 2357, SRM Drive Mechanism i749 175-2-
. and WR 2207, Replace Cell on 24/48 Battery. The inspector reviewed . the following completed work packages: (1) Unit 2, WR 2208, Torus Vent Valve 2-1601-60, and (2) Unit 3, WR 2187, Unit 3 Fuel Pool ARM, WR 2202, IRM Channel 17.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the month of October, 1979. The inspector observed plant operations during four offshifts during the month of October, 1979.
The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period.
This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifi-cations, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for the period was conducted to verify that no violations of the licensee's Technica? Specifications were made. The inspector conducted a tour of Units 1, 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant house-keeping conditions / cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel. The inspector observed sampling and chemical analysis of water chemistry samples to verify that water chemistry was being maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The following unusual events, which occurred during October, 1979, were reviewed by the resident inspector: a.
At 2230 hours on October 25, 1979, the resident inspector received a telephone call from the licensee reporting that an inexperienced operator had incorrectly performed a valving evolution which resulted in Unit 3 spent fuel pool overflowing into the ventilation system and distributing approximately 2000 gallons of low level radioactivily contaminated liquid on all levels of Unit 3 reactor building. Through further discussions with the licensee, the inspector satisfied himself that there were no personnel contaminated, that there was no release outside the reactor building, that there were no airborne radiation problems, that the affected areas were properly roped-off and 1749 176-3-
. access controlled, and that a survey and cleanup of the affected
areas would be implemented in a timely manner.
The inspector reviewed circumstances surrounding the incident on October 26, 1979. He determined that an unqualified equipment attendent ("B" man trainee) had been allowed to make the valving operations specified in DOP 2000-2-M1, "A and B Waste Collector Filters Manual Valve Line-up Checklists," without proper super-vision by a qualified equipment attendant. As a result, the condensate tie, valve 2-1904-5-27, to the fuel pool was opened instead of the precoat discharge valve, 2001-27B. This failure to follow procedures is contrary to Technical Specifications Section 6.2.A.1 and is considered an item of noncompliance.
(249/79-24-01) The inspector determined by review of the survey results and observation that the loose surface contamination was isolated to the extreme west end on all levels of Unit 3 reactor building, was extremely low in activity (all areas less than 2000 counts per minute), and was properly controlled to ensure there was no danger to personnel. All contaninated areas were decontaminated by October 27, 1979.
The inspector's major concern was not with the overflow of the spent fuel pool because the contamination levels were extremely low, properly controlled, and not an immediate danger to health and safety of the public, but with the fact that an unqualified equipment attendant was allowed to perform evolutions without proper supervision which could affect the health and safety of the public. These concerns were discussed with Mr. B. Stephenson on October 26, 1979, and the inspector was told that the licensee's professional committee investigation team would fully investigate all the circumstances and implement corrective action to ensure such an indicent would not recur. The inspector will follow the corrective action closely.
b.
At 2330 hours on October 25, 1979, the resident inspector received a telephone call from the licensee indicating that there was a bomb threat at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station which was due to ignite at 2400 hours on October 25, 1979.
The inspector immediately proceeded to the site. Upon entering the control room the inspector observed a trip of Unit 3 reactor. He observed that all systems functioned normally and operators followed their emergency procedures.
The unit tripped during a search by plant personnel for a bomb which was concluded with negative results. A shift foreman had opened the door to the Essential Services Elec-trical Panel in the Auxiliary Electric Room, and when the door was shut, a relay on the door was vibrated and tripped, which placed a transient on the Essential Services Motor Generator output and resulted in Unit 3 reactor tripping.
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. The inspector observed the trip recovery and verified that the . licensee performed the recovery in accordance with their approved procedures. The unit was returned to service at 1302 hours on October 26, 1979.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Physical Protection - Security Organization The inspector verified by observation and personnel interview (once during each operating shift) that at least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization was onsite at all times; verified by observation that the security organization was properly manned for all shifts; and verified by observation that members of the security organization were capable of performing their assigned tasks. There were no weapons qualifications conducted during this monthly inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Physical Protection - Physical Barriers The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commit-ments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protected area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in vital area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Physical Protection - Access Control (Identification, Authorization, Badging, Search, and Escorting) The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identified and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA), all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed identifi-cation badges, records of access authorized conformed to the PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance to regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles authorized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA; and verified by review of the licensee's authorization document that the escort observed above was authorized to perform the escort function.
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.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Physical Protection - Communications The inspector verified by observation (during each operating shift) that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily at the beginning of and at other prescribed time (s) during the security personnel work shift and that all fixed and roving posts, and each member of the response team successfully communicate from their remote location; and verified that equipment was operated consistent with requirements in the PSP and security procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Unit 2 LER 79-44, Failure of Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator LER 79-45, Unit 2 Diesel Generator Made Inoperable Because of water in Crankcase Oil LER 79-47, Unit 2 Diesel Generator Inoperable Due to Output Breaker Failure LER 79-48, 2A Stack Gas Monitor Failure LER 79-49, Failure to Take Oil Samples During April 1979 on Unit 2 and 2/3 Diesel Generator LER 79-50, Failure to Perform Surveillances on Reactor Building Overhead Crane Prior to Use LER 79-51, Drywell High Pressure Switch (PS 2-1632-D-1) Tripped in Excess of Technical Specification Limits LER 79-52, Unit 2 Diesel Generator Declared Inoperable LER 79-53, Failure of "A" SBGT System LER 79-54, Drywell Ventilation Line 2-1605-10 Declared Inoperable as a Result of IEB 79-14 Inspection )[49 }[9-6-
. LER 79-55, Drywell Ventilation Isolation Valve 2-1601-60 Failed to
Shut LER 79-56, 2D Electromatic Relief Valve Inoperable LER 79-57, Three MSIV Limit Switches Tripped in Excess of Technical Specification Limits Regarding LER 79-54, the construction branch of the Region III office will followup on all deficiencies identified by IEB 79-14 inspections when the licensee completes all inspections required.
(237/79-26-01) Regarding LER 79-49, the inspector determined that an offsite QA audit revealed that oil samples on Unit 2 and 2/3 diesel generators were not taken during April 1979. This is contrary to Technical Specifications Section 4.9.C and is considered a licensee identified item. The inspector has no further concerns.
Regarding LER 79-50, the inspector determined that an offsite QA audit revealed that DOS 800-6, " Surveillance of the 2/3 Reactor Building Crane Prior to Operation in the Restricted Mode," was not completed prior to lifting the TN-9 spent fuel cask and placing it in close proximity to the restricted area. This is contrary to Technical Specifications Section 4.10.F and is considered a licensee identified item. The inspector has no further concerns.
Unit 3 LER 79-17, Channel "A" Fuel Pool ARM Inoperable LER 79-18, Primary Containment Vacuum / Relief and Isolation Valve Made Inoperable LER 79-19, SRM Channel 21 Tripped in Excess of Technical Specification Limits LER 79-21, 3A Off gas Monitor Power Source Failure LER 79-22, Isolation Condenser Condensate High Flow Switch Tripped in Excess of Technical Specification Limits LER 79-25, LPCI Heat Exchanger Valve MO 3-1501-3A Inoperable LER 79-26, Steam Jet Air Ejector Valve 3-5401-B Failed to Shut LER 79-27, Condenser Pit Flooding Switch Made Inoperable During DC Ground Isolation Procedures LER 79-28, LPCI Drywell Spray Header Declared Inoperable as a Result of Inspection Required by IEB 79-14 1749 180-7-
. . Regarding LER 79-28, the construction branch of the Region III office will followup on all deficiencies identified by IEB 79-14 inspections when the licensee completes all inspections required.
(249/79-24-02) No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection November 2, 1979 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the item of noncompliance and special concerns denoted in paragraph 3.
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