05000458/FIN-2012012-04

Finding

Title

Failure to Correct an Identified Condition Adverse to Quality

Description

The inspector identified a finding associated with the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Station Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee identified that both inadequate guidance and oversight of a supplemental worker as a cause for the inadequate crimp on the B reactor feedwater pump, however the corrective actions taken only addressed the oversight of supplemental workers, and no actions were taken to address the insufficient guidance provided by the station work order. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2012-07253. The failure to follow the requirements of Station Procedure EN-LI-102 and correct a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and is therefore a finding, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power, the inspector determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action component, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes

04
Site:	River Bend
Report	IR 05000458/2012012 Section 4OA4
Date counted	Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4)
Type:	Finding: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 95001
Inspectors (proximate)	J Josey R Hagar
CCA	P.2, Evaluation
INPO aspect	PI.2
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012012

1(0)2(10)3(7)4(4)5(6)6(0)9(8)10(8)11(0)12(5)13(0)301(0)403(2)404(1)503(0)801(0)31(0)

IR 05000458/2012012: 1 2 3 4 5

Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q4

CCA Matrix: 2012Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000458/FIN-2012002-09	2012Q1		Failure to Properly Fabricate and Install the mid-Standard Turbine Shaft Brush
05000458/FIN-2012002-08	2012Q1	H.2	Failure to Control Access to a High Radiation Area
05000458/FIN-2012002-07	2012Q1	H.8	Failure to Perform a Radiation Survey
05000458/FIN-2012002-06	2012Q1	H.7	Inadequate Maintenance Instructions for the Suppression Pool Cooling Isolation Valves
05000458/FIN-2012002-05	2012Q1	H.8	Inadequate Relief Valve Configuration Control Results in a Reactor Downpower
05000458/FIN-2012002-04	2012Q1	H.7	Failure to Appropriately Set Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Flow Controller High Output Limit
05000458/FIN-2012002-03	2012Q1	H.14	Failure to Verify Assumptions used in Standby Equipment Room Temperature Analysis
05000458/FIN-2012002-02	2012Q1	H.8	Failure to Appropriately Assess and Manage Risk for Internal Flooding Events
05000458/FIN-2012002-01	2012Q1	H.9	Failure to Adequately Monitor the Performance of the Digital Radiation Monitoring System
05000458/FIN-2012003-04	2012Q2		Failure to Properly Assemble Turbine Control Valve Push ROD-SPRING Housing Coupling
05000458/FIN-2012003-03	2012Q2	P.1	High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Bearing Lubrication Deficiencies
05000458/FIN-2012003-02	2012Q2	H.13	Failure to Follow Severe Weather Operations Procedure
05000458/FIN-2012003-01	2012Q2	H.2	Failure to Follow Procedure to Protect Sensitive Plant Areas
05000458/FIN-2012003-05	2012Q2		Failure to Specify Manual Actions for Safety Relief Valve Operations During a Station Blackout Event
05000458/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3		Improper Hydrogen Igniter Breaker Trip Coil Setting
05000458/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3	H.6	Untimely Corrective Actions to Ensure Reliability of the 480 Vac Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Unitized Motor Starters
05000458/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Appropriately Tune the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Turbine Speed Controller
05000458/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3	H.5	Inadequate Verification of Leading Edge Flow Meter Functionality
05000458/FIN-2012009-01	2012Q3		Main Control Room Annunciator Control and Conduct of Operations
05000458/FIN-2012009-02	2012Q3		Past Operability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
05000458/FIN-2012009-03	2012Q3		Implementation of the Procedure for Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions
05000458/FIN-2012009-04	2012Q3		Corrective Action Program Implementation for Prior Lockout Relay Failure in February 2011
05000458/FIN-2012009-05	2012Q3		Implementation of Vendor and Industry Recommended Relay Testing and Maintenance
05000458/FIN-2012009-06	2012Q3		Implementation of the Station Cable Reliability Program
05000458/FIN-2012009-07	2012Q3		Onsite Safety Review Committee Implementation
05000458/FIN-2012009-08	2012Q3		Ability to Promptly Staff the Fire Brigade at All Times During Plant Operation
05000458/FIN-2012010-07	2012Q3	H.13	Loss of Onsite Safety Review Committee Independence
05000458/FIN-2012010-06	2012Q3	P.5	Failure to Establish an Adequate Cable Reliability Program
05000458/FIN-2012010-05	2012Q3		Failure to Est Lockout Relays in Accordance with Vendor Testing Practices
05000458/FIN-2012010-04	2012Q3	H.5	Failue to Implement Effective Corrective Actions for Lockout Relay Failures
05000458/FIN-2012010-08	2012Q3	H.7	Failure to Prevent Conflicts of Duty for Fire Brigade Members
05000458/FIN-2012010-01	2012Q3		Failure to Correct Spurious Isolation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
05000458/FIN-2012010-03	2012Q3	H.14	Failure to Establish an Adequate Controlling Procedure for Stroking Safety Relief Valves at LOW Power
05000458/FIN-2012010-02	2012Q3	H.14	Failure to Declare Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable
05000458/FIN-2012012-01	2012Q4	H.8	Failure to Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality
05000458/FIN-2012012-02	2012Q4	P.4	Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality
05000458/FIN-2012012-03	2012Q4		Failure to Maintain Design Control of the Feedwater Control System
05000458/FIN-2012012-04	2012Q4	P.2	Failure to Correct an Identified Condition Adverse to Quality
05000458/FIN-2012012-05	2012Q4	P.2	Failure to Correct the Maintenance Organizations Inadequate Procedure Use and Adherence
05000458/FIN-2012403-02	2012Q4		Security
05000458/FIN-2012403-01	2012Q4		Security
05000458/FIN-2012005-04	2012Q4	H.12	Failure to Follow Procedure for Lifting Leads Results in Inoperability of Standby Service Water Fan
05000458/FIN-2012005-03	2012Q4		Failure to Implement Effective Corrective Actions for Defects in Masterpact Breakers
05000458/FIN-2012005-02	2012Q4	P.2	Inadequate Procedures for Lubrication of the Standby Liquid Control Pump Motor Bearings
05000458/FIN-2012005-01	2012Q4		Failure to Maintain Design Control of the Control Building Chilled Water System

Self-Identified List (River Bend)

	Q	Title
05000458/FIN-2012002-10	2012Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2012003-06	2012Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2012003-07	2012Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2012404-01	2012Q2	Security
05000458/FIN-2012005-05	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000458/FIN-2012005-06	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[River Bend Findings full list]

05000458/FIN-2012012-04

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