3F1091-14, Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 91-06, Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, 'Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies.' Generic Ltr Should Have Received Current Review by CRGR

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Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 91-06, Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, 'Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies.' Generic Ltr Should Have Received Current Review by CRGR
ML20085L501
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/25/1991
From: Beard P
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-30, REF-GTECI-EL, TASK-A-30, TASK-OR 3F1091-14, GL-91-06, GL-91-6, NUDOCS 9111040191
Download: ML20085L501 (6)


Text

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Florida I Power to%eona1ie%

i Crystal River Unit 3 i Dcket No. 'i0 301 l October 25, 1991 3fl091-14 1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20b55

Subject:

Generic letter 91-06 Resolution of Generic issue A 30 Adequacy of Safety Related DC Dower Supplies

Dear Sir:

The encicsure to this letter provides florida Power Corporation's (IPC) response to Generic Letter 91-06 for Crystal River 3.

fPC believes that the subject Generic letter should have received a current review by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR). (It had been over two years between review by CRGR and publication of the Generic Letter.) The Generic Letter did not effectively communicate the staff concerns and potential issues *. hat thc Enclosure I survey questions address. This would have permitted licen2ees to better understand some of the questions and, thus, prepare an appropriate response, for example, questions 5 and 9 regarding justifying existing design features and operating practices appear to go beyond the intent of a 10 CFR 50.54(f) request.

Sincerely,

!. J

. M. ,-rd, Jr.

Senior e.e President Nuclear u g rations PMB:AEf:ff Attachment xc: Regional Administrator, Region 11 NRR Project Manager Senter Resident inspector olito nioi >ito;n s

[UR twoc L 0300(602 e PDh GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 mrty fourin street soutn . P o Don im?

  • si Petersbuig, f kmda 3n33 * (813) 8 % 5151 A Florida Progress Company n * (- .n

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STATE OF FLORIDA AITACllMLN1 10 3I1091-14 COLIN 1Y OF PINELLAS P. H. Beard, Jr. states that he is the Senior Vice President, Nuc1 car Operations for florida Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge information, and belief.

c 3/tsu)h .- -, . __

P. H. Board, Jr. i Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations j i

1 i

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County above named, this 25th day of October 1991. )

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.- N-l N' :qix,LL b).hiaj& Lw- l

! Notary Public Notary Public, State of florida at large, i Hy Commission Expires: Juer 4?j N13 i

i

__ _ _ _ , . _ . . . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ __. _ . - _ - - - , ~ , - _ . - . , , . . , , _ _ . _ _ _ _ , . . , . . _ -

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[NCLOSURL l 10 CTR 50.54(f) RCQUEST - CCNfRIC ISSUE (GI) A 30 "ADlQUACY Of [

SAffly RfLAllD DC p0WER SUPPLIES"  !

i L0ELLIID_1VELY i-Llorida Power CorporationiLt.esponses for LtnlALRiyer 3..ttt_underlinti

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The following information is to be provided for each unit at each site, t

1. Unit Crystal River Unit 3 i i
2. a. The number of independent redundant divisions of Class lE or safety-related dc power for this plant is _

_2 1 (include any separate Class IE or safety related dc, f.uch as any dc dedicated to the diesel generators.) i

b. The number of functional safety related divisions of de power .

necessary to attain safe shutdown for this unit is 1 .

l 3._ Does the control room at this unit have the following separate, '

independently annunciated alarms and indications for each division of dc  !

power?

a, alarms

1. Battery disconnect or circuit breaker open? ((pLhgytyrrug I tnodification is _ planned to add this alarm.
2. Battery charger disconnect or circuit breaker open (both input ';

at and output de)? -No.

3. de system ground? Yes. Computer readout on a CRT above the  ;

main conical board _is teparate. Annunciator window iLtotnmon 10 both division L I t

4. de bus undervoltage? Yes. Sepata19 dam. patter tcadonLLan_A.JR1  :

Ahnte the main tonitalitaard is nCay1drL

5. de bus overvoltage? les. SeparA1Lt9mplLter_ttadonlLon a CRT above the m3jn control _ board is Etqy.ide L l 1
6. Battery charger failure? Its. Cstmnuier_teadanL91LA CRLah91e liULLn Ain_ con t ro l haard_.1LignattismAanunc i a t o r _ w i ndodi (Anin.0a._lthot h divi sion s,
  • 7 Battery discharge? Yes.

l' b. Indications

1. Battery float charge current? JL
2. Battery circuit output current? _ Na, ,

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3. Battery discharge? Hg.,
4. Bus voltage? Its. Plant (panuter poin12 l
c. Does the unit have written proc 0dures for response to the above alarms and indications? lei, for annuncialgtalarmLpal32
4. Does this unit have indication of bypassed and inoperable status of  !

circuit breakers or other devices that can be used to disconnect the battery and battery charger from its de bus and the battery charger from  !

its ac power source during maintenance or testing? _ No_.

5. If the swer to any part of question 3 or 4 is no, then provide '

informat sn justifying the existing design features of the facility's safety-r A ted de systems.

Ihgadeggev of the design features for _the DC systems at Cry 11AL_Riygr 3  ;

LCE-3) has been reviewed and apprayedy the NRC_ as nart_gMhe_ plant O licensing _bglls. That rryttw is dolumented _in_1he_SAltty.lyaluatlQn 4 Report (SER) for CrJ1Lal River 3,_prenred by {he U.Sv Atomic Enerav -

Commission. and dated July.5m_1974.

As a resuit of this reyJew it n i concluded that a manual butcross-tic _ system preyenttdhtdtilan_f.rps meetina the reouirements of General Delign Criteripn (GDC) 17 Ihg review alsp stated. "Sub.iect_.to the sallilattQry_imalement AllotLgGhc Ahnve mentiongd desian commitments and satis 1Asipry_tgiglution of the_RQ KV switetYard brealtti_ Control poggI_.iggg[11]ppL(Stttfon 7.9.4) and indrngndence of the-CR-3 battery rooms (Sec11gn 7.9.3L_ythAyttoncluded ihlt the d c emergency onsite power sv11ts_1glisfies M(_Enl.17_ anOR, IEEE Std. 30]L-J9JfL_Regg]atorLEgide_L6 and _is artsp1Ahle." la_

Eupplement I to the Safety Evaluation Report for CR 3. dated January _lh 1975. the revised .dgilgnLissultina from the outstandina issues in tjig oriainal SIR were discussed. in each syse the cDntluilon was dgcumented that the revised desian confprmed to the ap211 table reguirements and_.yal, thpiefore. acceptable.

6. (1) Have you conducted a review of maintenance and testing activities to minimize the potential for human error causing more than one dc division to be unavailable? No. and (2) do plant procedur , prohibit maintenance or testing on redundant dc divisions at the same time? ltL .

Practices at CR-3 address these as nart of procedyr tdgyrlonm_ ant.. work control et(2 1 i

If the facility Technical Specifications have provisions equivalent to those found in the Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications for maintenance and surveillance, then question 7 may be skipped and a statement to that effect may be inserted here. '

The _ technical specifications for Babcock and WilenL(MW)_plantLerploffng Slandard TechnigA]_ Specifications (SIS) were mqdelled alter EVR[G-01.03_1B1W

~

SlS). Crystal River Unit 3 was modelled _1f ter Revision 0 af_1h11_dntuentu lhe_elistinq_STS recuirementi are hf1D9 Sig!LillCAntly modified ai_part of the TSIP nro9r_am f.Qrtlt_t{UREG-1430) to reflect many improvementL Itte reviscLS15 will aenerally reflec1_IEEE 450_yhich his been dcyclopffLwillL1RhilAntial N.RC IDput. CR-3 is the lead plant for_thLDAbtpIA_4nd WilcoLihfatr11tqup_jB

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l iPPlcetaling ihe ncW_itandar3LlethaitaLSecc10ta11ontanda11119tutuur ciferts in thaLarsA4

7. Are maintenance, survelliance and test procedures regarding stations batteries conducted routinely at this plant? Specifically:
a. At least once per 7 days are the following verified to be within acceptable limits:
1. Pilot cell electrolyte IcVel? Yes.
2. Specific gravity or charging current? . let.
3. float voltage? Ici;J19xcrera_the_nterfdurri_dtno1JnttilyJltat ihLDallfrLhL9B_flualtlarSCA
4. lotal bus voltage on float charge? Itsjjtowty.cL_the Prncfdurft dLanLipitiLLthaLihthalittylton_tionLtlarsea
5. physical condition of all cells? flg,_
b. At least once per 92 days, or within 7 days af ter a battery discharge, overcharge, or if the pilot cell readings are outside the 7-day surveillance requirements are the following vertfled to be within acceptable limits:
1. Electrolyte level of each cell? Ici. ALltailsntt_rer_2LdAyn
2. The average specitic gravity of all cells .ffe.
3. The specific gravi'y of each cell? len_AlleatLontLper_RZ duit
4. The average electrolyte temperature of a representative number  :

of cells? lei 4_ at leaELonte_pfr_9Lflay1. [1etirghis lemneratuttuttli_and torretttd_sncrilitarrd1.yJLrerntdedi

.lhere is AD_artRPlautf_cIlitria for _snetillc_gtgy,ilyas r10Vitc3LbyJ.cibnical_ Sntcl{1calinnu_heyeytt,_nq_Atteplattiltty lintLL9n_.tcenttature is imensid2

5. The float voltage of each cell? leii_at __least ontLPar JLdayL
6. Visually inspect or mear.ure resistance of terminals and I connectors (including the connectors at the de bus)? let att-
  • lea 1LQRCLnRE 2LdLYix +
c. At least every 18 months are the following verified:
1. Low resistance of each connection (by test)? Yes.
2. physical condition of the battery? __JtL___
3. Battery chargcc capability to deliver rated ampere output to the dc bus? Ygi;Jgwav_en 11tthaltery_tttar9er_tapabillly_il lefiedalinLdumyLindi  !

.- --, . . - - - - - . _ . - . _ . _ . _ - . . _ . . . . . _ _ , . . , . . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . - - ~ - - - _ . - , . - -.-

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4. The capability of the battery to deliver its design duty cycle to the de bus? Yes: hgnytt the billLrympJbility ii_tgittd usina dumy loaL.
5. Each individual cell voltage is within acceptable limits during the service test? Yes. individgALcell voltLqes are mqaiuntd Drior to testina, followina the_dittbarge cycle. and following trcharaina: however no actsplability limit is imp.giet

? d. At least every 60 month, is capacity of each battery verified by performance of a discharge test? Yet _

e. At least annually, is the battery capacity verified by performance discharge test, if the battery shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the expected service life? No.
8. Does this plant have operational features such that following loss of one safety-related de power supply or tus:
a. Capability is maintained for ensuring continued and adequate reactor cooling? Yes,
b. Reactor coolant system integrity and isolation capability are maintained? Yes.
c. Operating procedures, instrumentation (including indicators and annunciators), and control functions are adequate to initiate systems as required to maintain adequate core cooling? Yes.
9. If the answer to any part of question 6, 7 or 8 is no, then provide your basis for not performing the maintenance, surveillance and test procedures described and/or the bases for not including the operational -

features cited.

Minimum testina requirementLttaisure the operability of saf tiLrflated DC systems are eitablished by the lechnical Spfcifications. The Technical Soccifications for CR-3 were issued by the NRC as Appendix A to lhe_0peratina licente and are_ implemented _hy plant orocedures. Itte oriainal Technical SpecificationL ipLCR 3 were reviewed by the U.$2 j

A smic Enerav Commission. The results of that reviey is documented in 1he SER dated July 5. 1974. That SER stattL. "On the basis of ont Igylew. we capclude that ... the limitira conditions for operation and

. surveillance reagirements will assure that necessary enaineered safety features will be ay_ailable in the event 01 malfunctions within the plant." The surveillance requirements for the DC systems are the sama laiav as those described in_the SER. As noted above. the imortygd Standard Technical SDecifications will includf new reogtrement.iu