05000498/FIN-2014002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform a Fill and Vent Results in an Inoperable Essential Chilled Water Train |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for an inadequate procedure because train C essential chilled water system was rendered inoperable by failing to remove air from the system following maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to require a system fill and vent in Procedure 0PMP05-CH-003, York Chiller Inspection & Maintenance 300 Tons, Revision 6, following maintenance on the essential chilled water system. The condition was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report 13-12492. The licensee has modified the essential chilled water maintenance procedure to require a full system fill and vent following maintenance. The failure to require filling and venting of the essential chilled water system following maintenance that may introduce air into the system is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, air left in the system rendered the train inoperable. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not affect the design or qualification of the structure, system, and component; did not represent a loss of system or function; did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees Maintenance Rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The inspectors determined that the cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the resources area of human performance because the licensee did not ensure that this procedure was adequate to support nuclear safety by ensuring that the essential chilled water system was operable when it was returned to service [H.1] |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2014002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Hernandez N O'Keefe P Hernandez A Sanchez I Anchando J O'Donnell L Ricketson N Greene |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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