05000498/FIN-2013007-05
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Design Control of Safety Injection Pump Room Cooler |
| Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, prior to February 13, 2014, documented requirements in purchase specification 3V259VS0005 were not correctly translated into specifications, drawings, and instructions evaluated in calculations MC-06482 and MC-06482A for the safety injection pump room coolers. In response to this issue, the licensee revised the associated calculations and established that the room coolers remained operable. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 14-2673. The team determined that the failure to maintain design control of the safety injection pump room cooler was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, not maintaining design control and performing a proper heat transfer calculation had the potential to challenge the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety injection pump room cooler and in turn the safety function of safety injection pumps. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. The team determined that this finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2013007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Okonkwo S Kobylarz T Farnholtz T Skaggs Ryan C Cowdrey G Replogle J Dixon J Zudans |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (South Texas) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||