05000482/FIN-2009004-04

Finding

Title

Failure to Implement Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Technical Specifications Results in Missed Mode Change

Description

On August 22, 2009, the inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3 in which both trains of Technical Specification 3.3.2 engineered safety features actuation system interlock function 8.a were bypassed with jumper wires in accordance with a plant procedure. Function 8.a is the interlock for reactor trip signal coincident with lo Tave signal. Wolf Creek blocked the signal from the feedwater valves with jumper wires during control rod drive motor-generator testing in Mode 3. The inspectors and the NRR technical specification branch found this to be contrary to the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the technical specifications, the technical specification bases, and the NRC safety evaluations supporting the technical specifications. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report 19318. The inspectors found that the failure to implement Technical Specification 3.3.2 interlock, function 8.a was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and screened the finding to Phase 2 because the finding represents a loss of a systems function. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A and screened the finding to the NRC senior reactor analyst for review because there was not an acceptable equipment deficiency in the pre-solved worksheet. The senior reactor analyst determined that the finding is Green because he solved Table 3.10 of the Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Wolf Creek Generating Station, Revision 2.1a and found that the loss of feedwater isolation signal for less than 3 days resulted in a 1E-7 (Green) outcome. The inspectors also determined that the cause of the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area associated with decision making because Wolf Creek failed to make a risk significant decision using a systematic process. This issue was evaluated more than once and those evaluations sought to justify bypassing the interlock rather than seek the full regulatory basis for the interlock H.1.a] (1R15)

04
Site:	Wolf Creek
Report	IR 05000482/2009004 Section 1R15
Date counted	Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.15
Inspectors (proximate)	C Long C Peabody C Ryan G Apger G Miller G Tutak J Adams P Jayroe S Alferinkc Longc Peabody G Miller G Werner M Shannon N O'Keefe P Jayroe R Kellar S Garchow
CCA	H.13, Consistent Process
INPO aspect	DM.1
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v • d • e

Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2009004

1(0)2(9)3(3)4(8)5(18)201(0)301(0)302(1)401(0)402(0)403(1)

IR 05000482/2009004: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2009Q3

CCA Matrix: 2009Q3

	Q	CCA	Title
05000482/FIN-2008005-03	2008Q4	H.13	Equipment Out-of-Service Log Definitions Redefined Outside of Procedure Change Process
05000482/FIN-2008010-05	2008Q4		Operator Actions Affect the Ability to Operate Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment
05000482/FIN-2008010-02	2008Q4		Failure to Ensure a Fire Pump Would Automatically Start for One Fire Area
05000482/FIN-2008005-01	2008Q4	H.14	Maintenance Causes Unplanned Increase in Reactor Power
05000482/FIN-2008010-01	2008Q4		Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Procedure did Not Identify Diagnostic Instrumentation
05000482/FIN-2008010-03	2008Q4		Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program May Not Meet NRC Acceptance Criteria
05000482/FIN-2008010-04	2008Q4		Operator Actions May Create the Potential for Secondary Fires
05000482/FIN-2008005-02	2008Q4		Residual Heat Removal Suction Piping Saturation Temperature and Pressure
05000482/FIN-2008010-06	2008Q4		Failure to Evaluate Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program
05000482/FIN-2009002-01	2009Q1	H.13	Untimely corrective actions result in room temperature below boric acid solubility limit
05000482/FIN-2009002-02	2009Q1	P.1 P.1(a)	Degraded fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater
05000482/FIN-2009002-06	2009Q1	P.2	Unacceptable preconditiong of control rods prior to surveillance testing
05000482/FIN-2009002-08	2009Q1		Inattentive on-duty senior reactor operator
05000482/FIN-2009002-07	2009Q1	H.14	Failure to correct component cooling water valve closures
05000482/FIN-2009002-04	2009Q1	P.2	Failure to follow 10 CFR 50.65a(2) for containment isolatio valve failures
05000482/FIN-2009002-03	2009Q1	H.8	Failure to implement foreign material exclusion control procedure for spent fuel pool
05000482/FIN-2009002-05	2009Q1		Seismic operability of Emergency Diesel Generator A due to overspeed limit switch degradation
05000482/FIN-2009003-02	2009Q2	P.5	Inadequate Fuse Thermography Procedure Resulted in Blown Fuses and Unplanned Reactor Trip
05000482/FIN-2009003-01	2009Q2	H.5	Inadequate Testing Equipment Used for Alignment Verification of Emergencey Diesel Lube Oil Piping
05000482/FIN-2009003-03	2009Q2	P.1	Inadequate Testing Results in P-6 Interlock Failure to Energize Source Range on Reactor Trip
05000482/FIN-2009004-04	2009Q3	H.13	Failure to Implement Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Technical Specifications Results in Missed Mode Change
05000482/FIN-2009006-01	2009Q3	P.2	Failure to Report Conditions Prohibited by Technical Specifications, and Safety System Functional Failures
05000482/FIN-2009004-06	2009Q3	P.2	Performing Prohibited Elective Maintenance on Safety Bus NB02 Channel 4 During Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance
05000482/FIN-2009004-05	2009Q3	P.3	Use of Nonsafety-Related Power to Ensure Operability of Safety-Related Boric Acid System
05000482/FIN-2009004-03	2009Q3	P.2	Inadequate Evaluation of Emergency Diesel Generator for Common Cause Failure in the Supporting Essential Service Water System
05000482/FIN-2009004-02	2009Q3	H.4 H.5	Inability to Perform Manual Actions for Risk Assessment
05000482/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q3	P.2	Failure to Log Foreign Material in Spent Fuel Pool After Extent of Condition Evaluation
05000482/FIN-2009006-02	2009Q3	P.2	Inadequate Instructions for Changing Modes of Operation of the Residual Heat Removal system
05000482/FIN-2009004-08	2009Q3	H.2(a) H.6	Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program Without Prior Staff Approval
05000482/FIN-2009004-07	2009Q3	P.2	Failure to Report Conditions that Could have Presented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)

	Q	Title
05000482/FIN-2008005-04	2008Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000482/FIN-2008005-05	2008Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Wolf Creek Findings full list]

05000482/FIN-2009004-04

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