05000482/FIN-2009005-09
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Finding | |
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| Title | Positive Reactivitiy Addition Prohibited by Technical Specifications while in Mode 2 |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1, Condition I, for making positive reactivity addition prohibited by technical specifications in Mode 2 because one source range nuclear instrument channel was inoperable. Following a reactor transient, one of the source range nuclear instrument channels experienced an unanticipated increased count rate and was declared inoperable. Wolf Creek restored the channel in an operability evaluation which cited the cause as a problem in a component which was later determined not to exist in the installed configuration; however, the improperly restored equipment had already been used for to support plant startup on August 22, 2009. Wolf Creek replaced the detector during Refueling Outage 17. This issue was entered into the correction action program as Condition Report 20208. Reactivity addition with source range channel Nuclear Instrument-31 inoperable is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control (reactivity control) attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding screened to Green because the finding only affected the fuel barrier. Additionally, the cause of the finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect in the area associated with the decision making. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt requirements to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action, when performing an operability evaluation for the source range Nuclear Instrument 31 detector prior to restarting from a forced outage H.1(b) (Section 1R15) |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2009005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Vasquez J Drake P Jayroe R Kopriva S Alferink A Fairbanks C Alldredge C Cauffman C Long C Peabody D Graves D Loveless G Miller |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2009005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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