05000458/FIN-2014301-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure of the Plant Referenced Simulator to Demonstrate Expected Plant Response with Four Examples |
| Description | Title 10 CFR Part 55.46(c)(1), Plant-Referenced Simulators, states, in part, A plant referenced simulator used for the administration of the operating test...must demonstrate expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and emergency conditions to which the simulator has been designed. Contrary to this, Operators were unable to open the main steam isolation valves because the River Bend Station simulator did not correctly model the differential pressure across the main steam isolation valves. Because of this, the job performance measure had to be rejected and another developed. This modeling deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2014-965. On multiple occasions, the River Bend Station simulator randomly initiated a main turbine runback when plant conditions did not warrant this action. After unsuccessful attempts were made to resolve this modeling deficiency, the applicants were briefed to ignore this event should it occur. This modeling deficiency was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2014-965 and CR-RBS-2014-1496. The River Bend Station simulator initiated a control rod drift during a scenario where plant conditions did not support this response. After identification, the licensee entered the issue into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2014-1496. These failures of the plant-referenced simulator to demonstrate expected plant response during conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems needed to respond to initiating events to prevent undesired consequences. Specifically, the incorrect simulator response could adversely affect the operating crews ability to assess plant conditions and take actions in accordance with approved procedures. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, and the associated Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), Block 15, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the deficient simulator performance did not negatively impact operator performance in the actual plant during a reportable event. Following the operating test, it was discovered the modeling deficiencies were introduced as part of a simulator upgrade more than ten years ago and therefore, are not considered to be a reflection of current performance. The hardware failure associated with the main steam line pressure gauge was determined to have no actual operator impact and was not a generic training issue. Therefore, this finding has no cross-cutting aspect associated with it. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2014301 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Bloodgood S Garchow T Buchanan V Gaddy |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 55.46 |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2014301 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2014Q1
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