05000456/FIN-2012004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Evaluate Operations Crew Performance for a Reactor Trip and Failure to Adequately Evaluate Emergency Operating Procedure Standards |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) when licensee personnel failed to implement a Caution Note in Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 2BwEP ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, during a July 30, 2009, Unit 2 reactor trip; failed to identify that deficiency during a 4.0 Crew Critique to evaluate Operations response to that event; and failed to adequately evaluate a concern identified during this inspection period that was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) related to the requirement to follow the EOP guidance. In particular, licensee personnel incorrectly concluded that a reactor trip involving reactor coolant system (RCS) natural circulation would not require the initiation of an RCS cooldown within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following the shutdown despite the licensees Analysis of Record (AOR) and Technical Specification (TS) bases documents that required a cooldown be initiated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to ensure that an adequate volume of water was available in the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to cool down the RCS without utilizing the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Corrective actions included revising 1/2BwEP ES-0.1 to relocate the Caution Note in the procedure and alleviate any future confusion with the cooldown requirement. Additionally, the Caution Note was modified to be consistent with the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) analysis of the CST and Operations management discussed the issue with the Operations crew staff and supervision to ensure that the Caution Note would be performed as required by 1/2BwEP ES-0.1. The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the EOP Caution Note during the July 30, 2009 Unit 2 reactor trip; the failure to identify this deficiency during the 4.0 Crew Critique assessment associated with this reactor trip, and the failure to adequately evaluate an issue entered into the CAP regarding this requirement was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance and Design Control attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). The inspectors evaluated this finding using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, which directed the finding to be screened using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. The inspectors determined that because the station operated and nominally maintained CST level significantly above the minimum CST TS level prior to the June 30, 2009 Unit 2 reactor trip, the CST maintained its operability and functionality, and therefore this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the CAP component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to adequately evaluate Operations response to the July 30, 2009, reactor trip and subsequently failed to adequately evaluate an issue identified within the CAP. |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2012004 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Learn M Perry N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Ng T Daun T Go V Meghani A Dahbur A Dunlop A Garmoe A Sallman E Duncan J Benjamin J Neurauter J Robbinsa Garmoeb Bartlett D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Robbins M Perry R Langstaff R Ng T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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