05000456/FIN-2011005-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Maintain Adequate Circulating Water Blowdown Procedure During Liquid Radiological Releases |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, when licensee personnel failed to adequately maintain procedure BwOP CW-12, Circulating Water Blowdown System Fill, Startup, Operations, and Shutdown. The Circulating Water Blowdown system was used during certain liquid radiological releases. Specifically, the licensees procedure did not provide sufficient guidance to prevent the system from being operated outside analyzed limits. The potential consequence of not operating this system within the design assumptions was an unplanned and unmonitored release of radioactive material to the environment. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 1299273. Corrective actions included the implementation of an Operations Standing Order to prohibit the operation of the Circulating Water Blowdown lineup and an assignment to formally revise the procedure. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Programs and Processes attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure of radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operations. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, since the finding was associated with the licensees Radioactive Effluent Release program. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it was not a failure to implement the effluent program and no unplanned or unmonitored release actually occurred. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Decision Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area H.1(a) since licensee personnel failed to demonstrate that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to make risk-significant decisions when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions to ensure safety was maintained |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2011005 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Pr Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop A Garmoe B Bartlett B Palagi E Duncan J Benjamin J Nance M Learn M Perry R Jicklin T Go V Megani |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||