05000456/FIN-2012004-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Analyze RHUT Inlet Piping Loads |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated cited violation (VIO) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, when licensee personnel failed to evaluate the effect of dynamic loads on inlet piping from Unit 1 and Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction relief valves that discharge to the Recycle Holdup Tank (RHUT); and, as a result, failed to verify the adequacy of the RHUT design to withstand design loads that resulted from a discharge from RHR system suction relief valves into the RHUT. As of September 30, 2012, IR 649581, Assignment 8 to resolve the potential over-pressurization of the RHUT had not been completed. At the end of the inspection period, licensee efforts to complete and refine a model to determine whether physical modifications were necessary were still in progress. It remained unclear whether a physical modification would be necessary; when that determination would be made; and if a physical modification was necessary, when that modification would be completed. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to evaluate the effect of dynamic water hammer loads on inlet piping from Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR suction relief valves that discharge to the RHUT was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensees existing design and piping configuration had not addressed water hammer effects when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RHR suction relief valves were aligned to discharge to the RHUT, which could rupture the inlet piping and potentially affect offsite dose consequences. The NRC Senior Reactor Analysts (SRAs) concluded that the risk significance associated with the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions to address a previously issued NCV. |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2012004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Perry R Winter C Brown E Duncan J Benjamin J Lennartza Garmoeb Bartlett D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Robbins M Perry R Langstaff R Ng T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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