05000456/FIN-2011005-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow and Establish Adequate Hazard Barrier Impairment Procedures |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, when the licensees process for the control of hazard barriers failed to manage the risk of temporarily impairing barriers under certain circumstances. Specifically, the licensees Risk Management and Plant Barrier Impairment (PBI) Processes provided generic approval for the impairment of a hazard barrier door function to permit movement of heavy equipment through the door provided the duration was less than 30 minutes and the door was not blocked open. The inspectors were concerned that this would not restrict activities in which the equipment being moved would prevent the door from closing and providing its hazard barrier function during the 30 minute time frame. The licensee communicated to the inspectors that the 30 minutes had no regulatory basis, but was used, in part, because it was reasonable. In addition to this example, the inspectors identified two examples in which licensee personnel failed to adhere to the stations PBI Program, which adversely affected the stations ability to manage risk. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1282782 and IR 1307401. As a result of the inspectors observations, the licensee revised procedure BwAP 1110-03, Plant Barrier Impairment Program, to include additional guidance on the control of hazard barriers. The licensee was also considering whether additional training of personnel on the control of hazard barriers was warranted. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone questions in Table 4a and, as a result, the finding screened as having very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area P.2(b) since licensee personnel failed to adequately utilize operating experience (i.e., Regulatory Information Summary 2001-009, Control of Hazard Barriers ) to ensure that station procedures provided adequate controls for effectively managing risk when hazard barrier doors could be impaired during activities to facilitate maintenanc |
Site: | Braidwood |
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Report | IR 05000456/2011005 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop A Garmoe B Bartlett B Palagi E Duncan J Benjamin J Nance M Learn M Perry R Jicklin T Go V Meganim Holmbergm Perry N Feliz Adorno R Ng T Go V Meghani A Garmoe B Bartlett C Moore C Zoia D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Jandovitz J Laughlin J Robbins |
CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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