05000416/FIN-2013002-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Removal of a Foreign Material Exclusion Plug |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, for the failure to provide adequate instructions to remove foreign material from the exhaust port of relief valve 1B21F047A. As a result, the valve failed to close at its reset setpoint following a reactor scram on December 29, 2012. The valve failed to close at its reset setpoint of 1013 psig and remained open until pressure fell to approximately 675 psig. The immediate corrective actions were to remove the foreign material exclusion plug from the exhaust port of valve 1B21-F047A and to ensure no plug was installed in any other safety relief valve. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2013-00100. The failure to provide adequate instructions to remove foreign material from the exhaust port of relief valve 1B21F047A is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that the issue affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors determined that the issue has very low safety significance (Green) because after a reasonable assessment of the degradation, the finding could not result in exceeding the reactor coolant leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident because the configuration of the safety relief valve was such that it would close at approximately 675 psig. Also the finding did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss of coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not use a systematic process to make a safety-significant decision. |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
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| Report | IR 05000416/2013002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Rice D Proulx J Braisted J Laughlin R Smith S Achen S Hedger S Makor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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