Letter Sequence Request |
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Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
- Acceptance, Acceptance
- Supplement
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MONTHYEARML0725500632007-08-30030 August 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0019, Revision 2 Project stage: Request ML0730605502007-09-0707 September 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0040 Project stage: Request ML0727402482007-09-20020 September 2007 NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0011, Revision 2 Project stage: Request ML0727402622007-09-20020 September 2007 NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0038 Project stage: Request ML0727402682007-09-20020 September 2007 NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0039 Project stage: Request ML0727402552007-09-28028 September 2007 NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0019, Revision 3 Project stage: Request ML0728200152007-10-0808 October 2007 NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0005, Revision 2 - Definition of a Fire Protection Program (FPP) Change for Harris Project stage: Request ML0735100822007-11-12012 November 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0025, Revision 3 (Corrected Version) Project stage: Request ML0735500232007-11-12012 November 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0033, Revision 1 Project stage: Request ML0733200282007-11-26026 November 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0012, Revision 5, Determining Manual Actions That Require a Change Evaluation During Transition Project stage: Request ML0733700252007-12-0303 December 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0008, Revision 8, Alternative Method for Fire Protection Engineering Analyses Project stage: Request ML0734001472007-12-0606 December 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 06-0025, Revision 3 Project stage: Request ML0735500252007-12-20020 December 2007 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0036, Revision 1 Project stage: Request ML0807004112008-03-10010 March 2008 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0032, Revision 1, Clarification of 10 CFR 50.48(c), 50.48(a), and GDC 3 Project stage: Request ML0809101362008-03-28028 March 2008 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0039, Revision 1, Lessons Learned - NEI 04-02 B-2 and B-3 Tables Project stage: Request ML0813006972008-05-0909 May 2008 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0032, Revision 2 Project stage: Request ML0814300412008-05-22022 May 2008 NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant FAQ 07-0040, Revision 2 Project stage: Request ML0815606412008-05-29029 May 2008 Request for License Amendment to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Project stage: Request HNP-08-061, Redacted Public Version of Transition Report NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition2008-05-29029 May 2008 Redacted Public Version of Transition Report NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Request ML0820410142008-05-30030 May 2008 Public Version of Enclosures 2 Through 6 of License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA-805 Project stage: Request ML0816901212008-06-17017 June 2008 Forthcoming Closed Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., to Discuss the May 29, 2008, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Transition the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (Harris) to National Fire Protection Association (Nfpa) Project stage: Meeting ML0818406962008-07-0707 July 2008 Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss the 05/29&30/2008, License Amendment Requests to Transition Shearon Harris, Unit 1, and Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3 to NFPA Standard 805 Project stage: Meeting ML0818905292008-07-11011 July 2008 Summary of Closed Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas Regarding May 29, 2008, License Amendment Request to Transition the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1, to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based.. Project stage: Meeting ML0820703912008-07-17017 July 2008 Meeting Handouts from 7/17/08 Public Meeting on the Harris and Oconee LARs to Transition to NFPA-805 Project stage: Meeting ML0820605362008-08-0707 August 2008 Summary of Mtg. with Progress Energy Carolinas, and Duke Energy Carolinas to Discuss the LARs to Transition the Shearon Harris and Oconee Nuclear Plants to National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA-805 Project stage: Approval ML0824202652008-09-0808 September 2008 Summary of Conference Call with Progress Energy Re License Amendment Request HNP-08-061 for Shearon Harris Project stage: Other ML0826007362008-09-17017 September 2008 Notice of Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (Pec), to Discuss the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (HNP) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 License Amendment Request (LAR) Project stage: Meeting ML0827011582008-09-26026 September 2008 Acceptance Review Regarding the License Amendment Request to Transition to NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Acceptance Review ML0828700162008-09-26026 September 2008 Nc Warns Response to Board Notification - Enclosure P-1 - Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 - Acceptance Review NFPA-805 License Amendment Request, September 26, 2008 Project stage: Request ML0830900742008-11-12012 November 2008 Summary of Category 2 Public Meeting Held to Discuss National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 Pilot Plant Process: Current Lessons Learned from the Pilot License Amendment Request Reviews (TAC Nos. MD8807, MD8832, MD8833, & MD8834) Project stage: Meeting HNP-08-113, Supplement to Request for License Amendment, to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standards for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)2008-11-14014 November 2008 Supplement to Request for License Amendment, to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standards for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Project stage: Supplement ML0829601532008-11-17017 November 2008 Summary of Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., to Discuss Shearon Harris Unit 1 National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 License Amendment Request Project stage: Meeting HNP-08-121, To Request for License Amendment to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)2008-12-11011 December 2008 To Request for License Amendment to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) Project stage: Request ML0903000302009-01-30030 January 2009 Acceptance Review Regarding Amendment to Adopt National Fire Protection Association 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Project stage: Acceptance Review ML0902903272009-03-10010 March 2009 Regulatory Audit in Support of the License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program as Allowed by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.48(c) Fire Protection Project stage: Other ML0909900182009-04-10010 April 2009 04/21-22/2009, Notice of Meeting with Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Topics Involving the License Amendment Requests to Transition the Shearon, Unit 1 and the Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 Project stage: Meeting ML0916002812009-06-11011 June 2009 Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for a Hearing Project stage: Other ML0921707152009-08-0606 August 2009 Request for Additional Information Regarding Amendment to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor . Project stage: RAI HNP-09-076, 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report2009-08-0606 August 2009 90-Day Inservice Inspection (ISI) Summary Report Project stage: Request HNP-09-084, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Generating Plants2009-08-13013 August 2009 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Generating Plants Project stage: Response to RAI HNP-09-086, Second Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor.2009-08-28028 August 2009 Second Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor. Project stage: Response to RAI HNP-09-094, Third Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor..2009-10-0909 October 2009 Third Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor.. Project stage: Response to RAI HNP-09-096, Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants2009-12-16016 December 2009 Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Request ML1001302542010-01-14014 January 2010 Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plant Project stage: RAI 05000400/LER-2010-002, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak2010-01-14014 January 2010 Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak Project stage: Request HNP-10-008, Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Anfp Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants2010-02-0404 February 2010 Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Anfp Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Request ML1006009872010-03-0909 March 2010 Discussion of Clarification Questions Related to the License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance - Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light . Project stage: Approval HNP-10-040, Response to 3rd Round of RAI License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants2010-04-0505 April 2010 Response to 3rd Round of RAI License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Request HNP-10-064, Additional Items Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for LWR Generating Plants2010-06-0909 June 2010 Additional Items Related to License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for LWR Generating Plants Project stage: Request ML1017506022010-06-28028 June 2010 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Adoption of National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants Project stage: Approval 2008-07-11
[Table View] |
LER-2010-002, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 4002010002R00 - NRC Website |
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text
3P~r gress-nergy JAN 14 2010
'Serial: HNPý10-'010 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. 'Nuclear RegulatoryCommission ATTN: Document Control Desk
.Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/RENEWED LICENSE ýNO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2010-002-00' Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2010-002-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A), an event or condition that resulted in manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. This report describes an event in which an oil leak from the Hydrogen Seal Oil System required a manual reactor trip. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) requirements, this LER is submitted within 60 days following the event.
This document contains no Regulatory Commitments.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
SSinc er el1.y Kelvin Henderson Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant KH/jmd Enclosure cc:
Mr. J. D. Austin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, HNP Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II Ms. M. G. Vaaler, NRC Project Manager, HNP Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562
NRC'FORM 366
- - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104
'EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 Estimated burden,per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information (See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000400 1 'f 3
- 4. TITLE Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE 1
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000 NUMBER NO.N/05 0
Il_
i i
_ IFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 15 2009 2010 - 002 -
00 01 14 2010 N/A 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
[I 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(x)
E] 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
E3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
John M. Doorhy Jr. - Licensing Specialist 1 (919) 362-2137CAS YTMCMOET MANU-REPORTABLE CAS YTMCMOET MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX
CAUSE
COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPIX D
TI STIR Cuno Eng.
N Corp.
I
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On November 15, 2009, at 100% power, the Harris plant experienced a significant oil leak from the Hydrogen Seal Oil system. A non-licensed operator notified the Main Control Room (MCR) that the handle rotated each shift by Operations on the Air Side Seal Oil self-cleaning strainer became disconnected during manual rotation after approximately 1/4 turn, resulting in the oil leak. Based on this report and due to receipt of a "Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Low Level" alarm, a decision was made to initiate a unit shutdown. The unit was manually tripped at 22:42 by the Main Control Room Operators. The plant promptly attained normal operation no-load temperature and pressure. Following the reactor trip, the "B" steam generator Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) failed to fully close on demand, but was closed due to field actions at 23:03.
The root cause of the Hydrogen Seal Oil leak was that for past maintenance performed on the Air Side Seal Oil strainer, the Graded Approach to Planning and Scheduling instructions and Decision Tree was too generic. When considering the level of planning detail, the work coordination management procedure, WCM-006 does not provide guidance on considering the vulnerabilities to the plant as a result of the work being performed on the component. As a result, the thrust collars that hold the filter handle in place were not installed during past maintenance which allowed the filter handle to eject.
Immediate corrective actions were to stabilize the plant, and secure the Turbine Seal Oil/Lube Oil systems to stop the leak.
Aqueous foam was sprayed on the oil to prevent a fire hazard. The oil was cleaned up and the Air Side Seal Oil strainer replaced. Planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to revise and implement WCM-006 such that Level "A" work activities (Quality Critical) are classified based on Equipment Classification that could cause a plant transient or shutdown and define other criteria for Level "A" (Quality Critical).
NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
--4U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION REPORT
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL I REVISION, Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Y
T NUMBER NUMBER 05000-400 2010 002 00 2
OF 3
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets
- 1.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event which could have contributed to the event. On November 15, 2009, at 100% power, the Harris plant experienced a significant oil leak from the Hydrogen Seal Oil system [TI]. A non-licensed operator notified the Main Control Room (MCR) that the handle rotated each shift by Operations on the Air Side Seal Oil self-cleaning strainer became disconnected during manual rotation after approximately 1/4 turn, resulting in the oil leak. Based on this report and due to receipt of a "Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir Low Level" alarm, a decision was made to initiate a unit shutdown. The unit was manually tripped at 22:42 by the Main Control Room Operators. The plant promptly attained normal operation no-load temperature and pressure. Following the reactor trip, the "B" steam generator Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) [SB] failed to fully close on demand, but was closed due to field actions at 23:03. The handle rotated each shift by Operations on the Air Side Seal Oil self-cleaning strainer [STR] became disconnected during manual rotation after approximately 1/4 turn, resulting in the oil leak. Aqueous foam was quickly sprayed on the oil to prevent a fire hazard. The loss of approximately 9,500 gallons of lube oil to the 261 ft elevation of the turbine building occurred with a small amount reaching the nearby gravel. No oil reached the Harris Lake. The oil was cleaned up and the Air Side Seal Oil strainer replaced. The Hydrogen Seal Oil/Lube Oil system was replenished and the unit was returned to service on November 20, 2010, at 2020.
11. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The root cause of this failure was that during past maintenance on the Air Side Seal Oil strainer, the Graded Approach to Planning and Scheduling procedure (WCM-006) instructions and Decision Tree was too generic.
When considering level of planning detail, WCM-006 does not provide guidance on considering the vulnerabilities to the plant as a result of the work being performed on the component. This resulted in maintenance being performed on a critical component without the use of vendor drawings to validate that all parts are installed as designed. Troubleshooting indicated that the thrust collars that hold the filter handle in place were not installed during past maintenance, allowing the filter handle to eject.
I1l.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), an event or condition that resulted in manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The actual consequences resulted in a manual reactor trip and spillage of large quantities of oil to the turbine building floor and some smaller amounts to the ground. No oil reached the Harris Lake. The manual reactor trip is bounded by the analysis in Chapter 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The operating staff performed the required actions for the trip and there were no adverse
safety consequences
Potential environmental consequences could have resulted if oil had reached the lake. Damage to plant equipment, and/or personal injury also could have occurred.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate corrective actions were to stabilize the plant, and secure the Turbine Seal ýOil/Lube Oil systems to stop the leak. Aqueous foam was sprayed on the oil to prevent a fire hazard. The oil was cleaned up and the Air Side Seal Oil strainer replaced. Planned corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to revise and implement WCM-006, Graded Approach to Planning and Scheduling such that Level "A" work activities (Quality Critical) are classified based on Equipment Classification that could cause a plant transient or shutdown and define other criteria for Level "A" (Quality Critical). Planning Level "A" is used for tasks that require additional rigor in preparation, oversight and implementation because the task can significantly impact plant operation or equipment.PRiNTED ON RECYCLED PAPERPRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION REPORT
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL
- REVISION, Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 1
NUMBER NUMBER 05000-400 2010 002 00 3
OF 3
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of License Event Reports for the previous five years did not reveal any similar events at the Harris Plant.PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
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| 05000400/LER-2010-001, Unit 1 Regarding Clearance Error Results in Required Equipment Becoming Inoperable | Unit 1 Regarding Clearance Error Results in Required Equipment Becoming Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000400/LER-2010-002, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak | Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Hydrogen Seal Oil Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000400/LER-2010-003, For Harris, Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications When Non-Seismic System Was Aligned to Refueling Water Storage Tank | For Harris, Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications When Non-Seismic System Was Aligned to Refueling Water Storage Tank | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000400/LER-2010-004, Unit 1 Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of B-SB 6.9kV Safety Bus | Unit 1 Valid Actuation of B Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of B-SB 6.9kV Safety Bus | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000400/LER-2010-005, For Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Inoperable for Greater than Time Allowed by Technical Specifications | For Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Regarding Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Inoperable for Greater than Time Allowed by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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