05000400/LER-2008-002, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to Main Condenser Exhaust Boot Failure
| ML082900578 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/2008 |
| From: | Henderson K Progress Energy Carolinas, Progress Energy Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-08-103 LER 08-002-00 | |
| Download: ML082900578 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4002008002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Progress Energy OCT 8 2008 Serial: HNP-08-103 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2008-002-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2008-002-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report describes a Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to Main Condenser Exhaust Boot Failure.
This document contains no new Regulatory Commitment. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, Kelvin Henderson Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant KH/adz Enclosure cc:
Mr. M. E. Pribish, Acting NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, HNP Ms. M. G. Vaaler, NRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct digits/characters for each block) or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information digis/carater foreac blck)collection.
- 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000400 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to Main Condenser Exhaust Boot Failure
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH FACLITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.
N/A 05000 OPEATIG I
I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 11 2008 2008 -
002 -
00 10 08 2008 N/A 05000 9.OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
[1 20.2201(d)
[l 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1) 0l 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0l 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[1 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0l 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 021 [E 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[I OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in III.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), An event or condition that resulted in manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The manual reactor trip at approximately 21% power is bounded by the analysis in Chapter 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The operating staff performed the required actions for the trip and there were no adverse safety consequences. The plant promptly attained normal operation no-load temperature and pressure and no unusual conditions, or additional actuations, were observed for plant equipment following the reactor trip and turbine trip.
Potential Safety Consequences:
This type of event is classified as an ANS Condition II event. The plant is designed for this type of event and responded as expected for the condition. The initial plant conditions were well within the bounding conditions for the plant design. The potential safety consequences under alternate conditions are also bounded by the FSAR Chapter 15 events.
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The main condenser exhaust boot seals were replaced and the unit was returned to service on 08/21/08 at 0958.
Planned corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence include revising the condenser exhaust boot seal replacement frequency based on operating experience and vendor recommendations. This replacement will include requirements to inspect and remove rough edges from mounting hardware and mating surfaces. All preventative maintenance deferrals prepared since June 2005 that deferred SPV outage maintenance items will be reviewed to ensure technical adequacy.
Additionally, plant staff will revise the Nuclear Generation Group procedure governing Preventative Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration to provide guidance on Single Point Vulnerability deferrals and identify the appropriate approval levels.
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Two main condenser exhaust boot failures occurred in July of 1992. The cause of the failure in both cases was determined to be fatigue failure due to aging. These failures are detailed in LERs92-007 and 92-010. A review of corrective actions developed from the exhaust boot failures in 1992 concludes that:
- 1. The actions were identified that would have prevented recurrence, if implemented.
- 2. The corrective action to establish a PM route/schedule for replacement did not result in a PM to periodically replace the boot seal.
- 3. The corrective action to complete the redesign of the hardware and the evaluation of the boot seal did not result in a hardware redesign or an evaluation of the seal.
The knowledge and assumption based errors were due primarily to the poor documentation of corrective actions from the past exhaust boot failures. Incorrect conclusions concerning life expectancy, clamp hardware design, and validity of inspections were reached based on face value of the historical documents available.