05000400/LER-2008-003, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System During Shutdown Rod Position Indication Surveillance Testing
| ML083030136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/2008 |
| From: | Henderson K Progress Energy Carolinas, Progress Energy Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HNP-08-107 LER 08-003-00 | |
| Download: ML083030136 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 4002008003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
& Progress Energy OCT 1 7 2008 Serial: HNP-08-107 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2008-003-00 Ladies and Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2008-003-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report describes a Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System during Shutdown Rod Position Indication Surveillance Testing.
This document contains no new Regulatory Commitment. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor -
Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.
Sincerely, Kelvin Henderson Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant KH/adz Enclosure c c Mr. K. J. Korth, Acting NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, HNP Ms. M. G. Vaaler, NRC Project Manager, HNP Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 J
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct disfor each block) or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information digits/characters collection.
- 3. PAGE Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000400 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System During Shutdown Rod Position Indication Surveillance Testing
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH FACLITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.
N/A 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 19 2008 2008
- - 003 -
00 10 17 2008 N/A 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0l 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[1 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
E] 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[3 50.36(c)(2)
El. 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[1 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[1 73.71(a)(5) 000 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER [I 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in Ill.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The Rod Control malfunction during OST-1 112 was an Urgent Failure originating in the Rod Control Power Cabinet lAC. At the time or the failure, the plant was in Mode 3. The malfunction precluded motion of all Control Bank rods and Shutdown Banks A and B. Shutdown Bank C could have been moved using the bank select mode since its motion is not controlled through the standard Rod Control circuits.
The availability of systems or components that are needed to maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident were not impacted by this event. The operating staff performed the required actions for the trip and there were no adverse safety consequences.
Potential Safety Consequences:
Reactor coolant boron concentration was more than adequate to ensure shutdown margin was maintained during the performance of OST-1 112. Had this event occurred at power, all Control and Shutdown Bank rods were capable of being tripped into the core to ensure adequate reactor protection..
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The failed fuse and three degraded fuses in the Rod Control system were replaced and the control rods were successfully retested at 1010 on 8/20/08, per OST-1 112 for rods in Control Banks A, B, and C, and Shut Down Bank B following the maintenance activities. The system was declared Operable at 1300 on 8/20/08.
Planned corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence includes replacing, during the next refueling outage, Rod Control bus duct and DC Hold Cabinet fuses and establishing a PM to replace the Rod Control bus duct and DC Hold cabinet fuses on a periodic basis.
V.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
LER 2004-003 was associated with an automatic reactor trip due to a Rod Control Power Cabinet Card failure. Diagnostic tests and visual examinations were completed for the installed Power Cabinet Cards.
LER 2007-001 was generated for a Rod Control Urgent alarm and entry into TS 3.0.3 due to a failed Slave Cycler Logic Card in the Westinghouse Rod Control System. The most likely mechanism for the Slave Cycler Logic Card failure was aging of a Z4 chip.
LER 2007-002 was generated for a Rod Control Urgent alarm and entry into TS 3.0.3 due to a failed Master Cycler Counter Card in the Westinghouse Rod Control System. The most likely mechanism for the Master Cycler Counter Card failure was aging of the Z1 3 and Z1 5 logic chips.
The events detailed in the above LERs relate to failures of active components such as circuit cards. The current structured PM program of card inspection and testing will not prevent a failure of passive components such as fuses. As a result of this event, the existing PM program will be modified to include periodic replacement of bus duct and DC Hold Cabinet fuses to prevent recurrence.