05000397/LER-2012-006, Regarding Both Divisions of SDC Isolation Valves Made Inoperable

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Regarding Both Divisions of SDC Isolation Valves Made Inoperable
ML12328A015
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 11/19/2012
From: Hettel W
Energy Northwest
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-12-170 LER 12-006-00
Download: ML12328A015 (4)


LER-2012-006, Regarding Both Divisions of SDC Isolation Valves Made Inoperable
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3972012006R00 - NRC Website

text

W. Grover Hettel Columbia Generating Station

/

ENERGP.O.

Box 968, PE23 ORichland, WA 99352-0968 Fig NOPh.

509.377.8311 I F. 509.377.4150 whettel @ energy-northwest.com November 19, 2012 G02-12-170 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2012-006-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2012-006-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). The attached report discusses being in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat and to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. ZK Dunham at (509) 377-4735.

Respectfully, WG Hettel Vice President, Operations Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2012-006-00 cc: NRC Region IV Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C AJ Rapacz - BPA/1 399 WA Horin - Winston & Strawn

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Columbia Generating Station 05000397 1 OF3
4. TITLE Both Divisions of SDC Isolation Valves Made Inoperable
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 19 2012 2012-006-0 11 19 2012 05000

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 El 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[1 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

[3 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

El 20.2203 (a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

[3 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 [E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

[1 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in Further Corrective Actions:

The correction action process to determine corrective actions is still in progress. This information will be provided in the supplemental report.

Assessment of Safety Consequences

Each occurrence took place when the plant was in Mode 5 with the reactor vessel in a flooded condition. No operations with a potential to drain the vessel were in progress. The inoperability of the RHR SDC isolation valves was not due to equipment failure. If a loss of reactor level was detected, the isolation valves could be quickly restored to an operable condition. All required TS conditions were entered. Compliance with all TS actions was maintained. There was no significant impact on safety consequences.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Information EIIS codes are bracketed [] where applicable in the narrative.

26158 R5