text
ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
~
~
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9102140070 DOC.DATE: 91/02/07 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project,'nit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION REIS,M.P.
Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W.
Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 91-001-00:on 910108,RCIC turbine
& equipment area temp alarms received
& outboard isolation valve automatically closed. Caused by failure of electronic component re printed circuit input card. Circuit card replace.W/910207 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident pt, etc.
NOTES
,RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA ENG,P.L.
INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB SD S/S BSD1 02 RGN5 FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 33 ENCL 33
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM F.O. Box 968
~ 3000 George Washington Way
~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.
50-397 February 7, 1991 G02-91-022
" Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT NO.
2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.91-001
Dear Sir:
Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.91-001 for the WNP-2 Plant.
This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportabi lity, corrective action
- taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.
Very truly yours, J.
W. Baker (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager JWB:lr
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No.91-001 cc:
Hr. John B. Hartin, NRC Region V
Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (M/D 901A)
INPO Records Center Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (H/D 399)
NRC Resident Inspector walk over copy 0~000397 0 9i0207 POR ADOCK
~
pDR 8
NRC FORM 366 (64)9)
V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)
APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)104 EXPIRES: 4I30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFO4MATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 H4S. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATO4Y COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555. ANDTO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104),
OFF ICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503'ACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (1)
PA E
o so oo3971OF03 utoma
>c osure ctua
>on ue o
a) e ectronic Component In Leak Detection System EVENT DATE (6)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILI'TIES INVOLVED(6)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEOVENTIAL NUMBER REVISION m;: NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBE4(S) 0 5
0 0
o 0
1 08 919 1
001 0 0 0 2 0
7 91 0
5 0
0 0
OPERATING MODE (9)
POWER LEYEL 1
0 0 20.402(II) 20.405(olllllI) 20AOS(e)())(E) 20.405(o l(1)I(ill 20AOS(o) II) (Iv) 10.405(o)(1)(vl 20AOS(c) 50.36(c) II )
50.36(c) l1) 50.73( ~ )l2)(I) 50.73(el(2) (ii) 50,73(o)(2)liiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) 50 73( ~l)2)liv) 60.73(ol(2) (v) 60.73(v ) (2 I (vill 50.73( ~l(2)(villi(A) 50.73(el(2)(viiil(B) 50.73( ~)(2)lil 0 THE RLOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): IChrch onr or moro or thr Iorlowinp) III)
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 73.71(S) 73.71(c)
OTHER ISprciry In Ahrtrrct Orrow envoi in Trit, IIRC Fohn 36SAI NAME M. P. Reis Com liance Lead En ineer TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 50 937 7-COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT I'13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER r vp'v vc'v REPORTABLE
',', ~%'u TO NPRDS
. ~. i g~j
CAUSE
SYSTFM COMPONENT MANUFAC TV4ER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS I J M
ON 080 FILfINN cvicvi i '.o. c
c'ra'
". ~c SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES IIIyrr, COmpinr EXPECTED SUSAIISSIOIV DATEI X
NO ABSTRACT ILimitto 1400 rprcrr, ir., rpproiimrrrly firrrrn rinplr.rprcr rypewrirrrn IinNI (16)
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE IISI MONTH DAY YEAR At 0727 on January 8,
- 1991, alarms indicating high Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine and equipment area temperatures were received in the control room.
Concurrently the outboard isolation valve for the RCIC turbine steam
- supply, RCIC-V-8, automatically closed.
Redundant Control Room instrumentation and inspection of the RCIC locale showed no abnormal temperatures in the RCIC equipment areas.
=The
cause
of the isolation was traced to a failed component in the Leak Detection System, which provides input into the RCIC isolation logic.
Operations correctly entered the action statements for Technical Specifications 3.7.3 (RCIC operability) and 3.3.2 (Isolation Actuation Instruments) within one hour of the event.
Operations reported the event to the NRC at
- 0850, since automatic closure of RCIC-V-8 is an ESF actuation, requiring' 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification (50.72 (b)
(2) (ii).
The defective component was replaced and the Leak Detection and RCIC systems returned to service.
The apparent
cause
of this event was an isolated failure of a electronic component associated with one printed circuit input card in Leak Detection
- Monitor, LD-MON-lA.
The root
cause
is indeterminate at this time.
Vendor analysis of the failed component has been requested.
This event presented no threat to plant personnel or to the public.
NRC Form 366 (64)9)(6419)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVE REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 E XPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTI ATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 503) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P4130). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET,WASHINGTON,DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
SEOUENTIAL
@'UM ER o REVISION NUM ER PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 TEXT /llmoro 4/roco /4 ror/o/rod, Pro oddi)/onrr//VRC %%drin 3/ISAB/ (12) o s
o o
o 397 91 0 1 0 0 OF 0 3
Plant Conditions
Power Level - 100%
Plant Mode -
1 (RUN)
Event Descri tion
't 0727 on January 8,
- 1991, alarms indicating high Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine and equipment area temperatures were received in the control room.
Concurrently the outboard isolation valve for the RCIC turbine steam
- supply, RCIC-V-8, automatically closed.
Redundant Control Room instrumentation and inspection of the RCIC locale showed no abnormal temperatures in the RCIC equipment areas.
The
cause
of the isolation was traced to a failed component on a printed circuit card in the Leak Detection System.
The Leak Detection-System provides input into the RCIC isolation logic.
The failure was of an electronic component located on one of six input cards within Leak Detection
- Monitor, LD-MON-lA.
The function of this card is to accept thermocouple output signals and provide input to alarm and isolation logic within the monitor panel.
An instantaneous failure within the panel will not normally
cause
an isolation, since the electronics can differentiate between internal failures and actual out of tolerance conditions.
However it is believed that in this event the component failed slowly enough to simulate a
high temperature condition and
cause
the alarm and isolati'on functions.
Since 'A'rain of the LD system is configured to isolate the outboard RCIC isolation valve on a
one-out-of-one logic basis, the single failure within the card caused RCIC-V-8 to close.
The card continued to fail to the point where the electronics recognized the internal failure and removed the isolation signal.
Immediate Corrective Action
The defective printed circuit card was replaced in LD-MON-lA and the Leak Detection and RCIC systems were returned to service at 2156 on the day of the event.
'I Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.
Further Evaluation Operations correctly entered the action statements for Technical Specifications 3.7.3 (RCIC operability) and 3.3.2
( Isolation Actuation Instruments) within one hour of the event.
Operations reported the event to the NRC at
- 0850, since automatic closure of RCIC-V-8 is an ESF actuation, requiring a
4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification, in accordance with
- 50. 72 (b)
(2) (ii).
This LER is being submitted in compliance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv).(649)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVE REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 31504104 EXPIRES: 6/30/92 ES ATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1ME PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND SUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR oo~. SEQUENTIAL (eJ(o'tve10es NVMBER
'.sm NVM Em PAGE (3)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0
5 0
o o
3 9
7 9.1 0 1
TEXT //ffnofe epecm /e feqm(ned, m>> edsIIdone/HRC Form 30843/ (12) 0 0 3
OF 0 3
WNP-2 is the first nucl ear pl ant to install this type of Leak Detection System.
The system was installed in 1988.
This is the first failure of this type at WNP-2.
The manufacturer of the component is General Electric.
The model number is 304A3714.
The purchase part drawing for the card with the failed component is GE 213A9364G001.
The apparent
cause
of this event is an isol ated failure of an el ectroni c component on the input card.
The root
cause
is indeterminate at this time.
The failed card is to be sent to the vendor for further analysis.
There were no structures, systems or components inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to the event.
B.
Further Corrective Action The vendor's failure analysis report wi 11 be evaluated for any necessary additional corrective action(s).
Based on the failure analysis
- report, the formal root
cause
analysis will be amended as necessary.
If significant changes in the root
cause
are discovered or additional corrective actions warranted, a supplemental LER will be submitted.
Safet Si nificance This event is of no safety significance and presented no threat to plant personnel or to the public.
All equipment responded as expected for. the given failure.
No challenges requiring the RCIC function were experienced during this event.
d At the time of the
- event, HPCS was operabl e and avail abl e to perform the hi gh pressure injection function.
The containment isolation function was preserved by RCIC-V-8 closure and the operability of the redundant inboard valve.
Similar Events
None EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference
~Sstem
~Com anent RCIC System LD System RC IC-V-8 LU-TE-4A LD-MON-1A BN'J BN IJ IJ V
TE NON NR C F onm 366A (649)
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| 05000397/LER-1991-001, :on 910108,RCIC Turbine & Equipment Area Temp Alarms Received & Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failure of Electronic Component Re Printed Circuit Input Card.Circuit Card Replace |
- on 910108,RCIC Turbine & Equipment Area Temp Alarms Received & Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failure of Electronic Component Re Printed Circuit Input Card.Circuit Card Replace
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-002, :on 910110,reactor Recirculation Sys Jet Pump Operability Surveillance Testing Did Not Meet Literal Compliance W/Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Procedure. Procedure Revised |
- on 910110,reactor Recirculation Sys Jet Pump Operability Surveillance Testing Did Not Meet Literal Compliance W/Tech Specs.Caused by Inadequate Procedure. Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000397/LER-1991-003, :on 910201,review of Sp for Testing Downstream Standby Gas Treatment HEPA Filters Indicated That Methods Used Not in Compliance W/Tss Due to Inadequate air-aerosol Mixing.Appropriate Procedures Modified |
- on 910201,review of Sp for Testing Downstream Standby Gas Treatment HEPA Filters Indicated That Methods Used Not in Compliance W/Tss Due to Inadequate air-aerosol Mixing.Appropriate Procedures Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-004, :on 910328,two Deficiencies Noted in Thermolog Application on Critical Cable Tray Running Through Div 1 Area.Caused by Inadequate Installation of Thermolog.Fire Tour of Cable Spreading Room Retained |
- on 910328,two Deficiencies Noted in Thermolog Application on Critical Cable Tray Running Through Div 1 Area.Caused by Inadequate Installation of Thermolog.Fire Tour of Cable Spreading Room Retained
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-005, :on 910402,determined That Oxygen Concentration in Wetwell Not Being Verified Once Per Seven Days,Per TS Due to Inadequate Procedures.Contractor Hired to Review TS SRs Against Plant Procedures (Pp) & Pp 7.0.0 Revised |
- on 910402,determined That Oxygen Concentration in Wetwell Not Being Verified Once Per Seven Days,Per TS Due to Inadequate Procedures.Contractor Hired to Review TS SRs Against Plant Procedures (Pp) & Pp 7.0.0 Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-006, :on 910412,plant Shutdown Due to Inoperability of Div 1 Edg.Caused by Inadequately Cleaning DG 1 Lube Oil Sys & Oil Changes Recommended by Mfg Inadequate to Reduce Contamination.Addl Reservoir Installed |
- on 910412,plant Shutdown Due to Inoperability of Div 1 Edg.Caused by Inadequately Cleaning DG 1 Lube Oil Sys & Oil Changes Recommended by Mfg Inadequate to Reduce Contamination.Addl Reservoir Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-006-01, Corrected Forwarding Ltr for LER 91-006-01,superceding Which Contained Incorrect Rept Number | Corrected Forwarding Ltr for LER 91-006-01,superceding Which Contained Incorrect Rept Number | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-007, :on 910415,reactor Scram & Shutdown Cooling Insulation Occurred Causing Automatic Actuation.Caused by Inadequate Work Instruments.Plant Control Room Operators Reset Scram Signal |
- on 910415,reactor Scram & Shutdown Cooling Insulation Occurred Causing Automatic Actuation.Caused by Inadequate Work Instruments.Plant Control Room Operators Reset Scram Signal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-008, :on 910416,reactor Declared in Mode 5 (Refueling) W/Average Reactor Coolant Temp of 140 F.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedures.Temp Reduced & Upper Temp Limits Incorporated Into Plant Procedures |
- on 910416,reactor Declared in Mode 5 (Refueling) W/Average Reactor Coolant Temp of 140 F.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedures.Temp Reduced & Upper Temp Limits Incorporated Into Plant Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-009-01, Informs NRC That Seismic Monitor Will Remain at Present Location & Required 10 Day Rept Will Be Submitted Each Time Monitor Is Inoperable for More than 30 Days,Per Change Delineated in Ref Special Rept,Ler 91-09 & LER 91-09- | Informs NRC That Seismic Monitor Will Remain at Present Location & Required 10 Day Rept Will Be Submitted Each Time Monitor Is Inoperable for More than 30 Days,Per Change Delineated in Ref Special Rept,Ler 91-09 & LER 91-09-01 | | | 05000397/LER-1991-009, :on 910417,ESF Actuation & RWCU Isolation Occurred When Electricians Cut Wires to Plug of Wind Direction Recorder,Causing Voltage Drop.Caused by Equipment Installation Error.Wires Reversed |
- on 910417,ESF Actuation & RWCU Isolation Occurred When Electricians Cut Wires to Plug of Wind Direction Recorder,Causing Voltage Drop.Caused by Equipment Installation Error.Wires Reversed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(c)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(c)(2)(iv) | | 05000397/LER-1991-010, :on 910422,inability to Isolate Primary Containment Due to Wiring Separation Error Caused by Inadequate Work Instructions.Initiated Hourly Fire Tour for Accessible Areas |
- on 910422,inability to Isolate Primary Containment Due to Wiring Separation Error Caused by Inadequate Work Instructions.Initiated Hourly Fire Tour for Accessible Areas
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-011, :on 910429,ESF Actuation Occurred as Wire in Control Room Panel Inadvertently Cut.Caused by Equipment/ Design Deficiency.Operators Replaced Blown Fuse & Reset Isolation Logic Signal |
- on 910429,ESF Actuation Occurred as Wire in Control Room Panel Inadvertently Cut.Caused by Equipment/ Design Deficiency.Operators Replaced Blown Fuse & Reset Isolation Logic Signal
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-012, :on 910506,manual Initiation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred Due to Low Scram Air Header Pressure.Caused by Hose Failure.Hose Replaced |
- on 910506,manual Initiation of Reactor Protection Sys Occurred Due to Low Scram Air Header Pressure.Caused by Hose Failure.Hose Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-013-02, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/91-46.Corrective Actions:Quality Action Team Has Been Authorized to Recommend Potential Improvements in TS Surveillance Program,As Documented in LER 91-013-02 | Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/91-46.Corrective Actions:Quality Action Team Has Been Authorized to Recommend Potential Improvements in TS Surveillance Program,As Documented in LER 91-013-02 | | | 05000397/LER-1991-013, :on 910507,non-compliances W/Tech Specs Identified as Part of Program of Surveillance Procedure Verification.Further Evaluation Performed.Quality Action Team to Be Chartered to Evaluate Program |
- on 910507,non-compliances W/Tech Specs Identified as Part of Program of Surveillance Procedure Verification.Further Evaluation Performed.Quality Action Team to Be Chartered to Evaluate Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-014, :on 910510,RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred Due to Less than Adequate Design Drawing Info. Affected Drawings Revised & Tagging Sys to Indicate Sys Interrelationship Updated |
- on 910510,RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation Occurred Due to Less than Adequate Design Drawing Info. Affected Drawings Revised & Tagging Sys to Indicate Sys Interrelationship Updated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-015, :on 910602,high HPCS Sys Pump Suction Switchover from Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Operator Involved Ack & Reset Alarm |
- on 910602,high HPCS Sys Pump Suction Switchover from Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Operator Involved Ack & Reset Alarm
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(8) | | 05000397/LER-1991-016, :on 910707,ESF Actuation Occurred.Caused by Blown Rupture Disk.Corrective Actions Taken to Replace Blown Rupture Disk & to Test Relief Valves for Proper Operating Pressure |
- on 910707,ESF Actuation Occurred.Caused by Blown Rupture Disk.Corrective Actions Taken to Replace Blown Rupture Disk & to Test Relief Valves for Proper Operating Pressure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000397/LER-1991-017, :on 910708,EDGs Automatically Started While on Backfeed Due to Undervoltage Condition,Initiated by 500 Kv Grid Disturbance.Caused by Personnel Error.Returned Unit to Startup Power Source |
- on 910708,EDGs Automatically Started While on Backfeed Due to Undervoltage Condition,Initiated by 500 Kv Grid Disturbance.Caused by Personnel Error.Returned Unit to Startup Power Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000397/LER-1991-018, :on 910712,control Room Emergency Filtration & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Carbon Absorber Surveillances Not Performed Per TS 4.7.2 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Carbon Replaced |
- on 910712,control Room Emergency Filtration & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Carbon Absorber Surveillances Not Performed Per TS 4.7.2 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Carbon Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-019, :on 910716,determined That Failure to Rept Five Periods in Excess of 30 Days of Inoperability of Rv Seismic Monitor in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedures. Procedures Revised |
- on 910716,determined That Failure to Rept Five Periods in Excess of 30 Days of Inoperability of Rv Seismic Monitor in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedures. Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-020, :on 910716,discovered That RHR Valve B Capability to Shutdown in Event of Fire Could Be Jeopardized Due to Hot Short in Control Circuits.Caused by Design Deficiency.Wiring Changes Implemented.W/Undated Ltr |
- on 910716,discovered That RHR Valve B Capability to Shutdown in Event of Fire Could Be Jeopardized Due to Hot Short in Control Circuits.Caused by Design Deficiency.Wiring Changes Implemented.W/Undated Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-021, :on 910801,determined That Tritium Sampling Was Not Being Performed During Startup,Shutdown & 15 Percent Power Change Evolutions.Caused by Inadequate Procedure/ Procedure Review.Changed Procedure |
- on 910801,determined That Tritium Sampling Was Not Being Performed During Startup,Shutdown & 15 Percent Power Change Evolutions.Caused by Inadequate Procedure/ Procedure Review.Changed Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000397/LER-1991-022, :on 910905,inboard RHR Sys Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Automatically Isolated on High Suction Line Flow Signal.Caused by Instrumentation Drift.Sys Realigned & Loop B Placed Back in Svc |
- on 910905,inboard RHR Sys Shutdown Cooling Supply Valve Automatically Isolated on High Suction Line Flow Signal.Caused by Instrumentation Drift.Sys Realigned & Loop B Placed Back in Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-023, :on 910906,HPCS Sys Pump Suction Switchover from Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool Occurred During Maint Testing.Caused by Incomplete Planning & Scheduling.Operators Realigned HPCS Suction |
- on 910906,HPCS Sys Pump Suction Switchover from Condensate Storage Tanks to Suppression Pool Occurred During Maint Testing.Caused by Incomplete Planning & Scheduling.Operators Realigned HPCS Suction
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-024, :on 910909,unanalyzed Condition Associated W/ Postulated Main Steam Line Failure Outside Containment Discovered by Ge.Caused by Failure to Consider Iodine Source Term.Procedure Re Cold Startup Changed |
- on 910909,unanalyzed Condition Associated W/ Postulated Main Steam Line Failure Outside Containment Discovered by Ge.Caused by Failure to Consider Iodine Source Term.Procedure Re Cold Startup Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-025, :on 910911,train a of Containment Atmosphere Control Sys Rendered Inoperable for More than 30-day Limit Permitted by Ts.Caused by Loss of Oil from Recombiner Blower.Train a & Recombiner Blower Repaired |
- on 910911,train a of Containment Atmosphere Control Sys Rendered Inoperable for More than 30-day Limit Permitted by Ts.Caused by Loss of Oil from Recombiner Blower.Train a & Recombiner Blower Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(9) | | 05000397/LER-1991-026, :on 910918,main Control Room Received Alarms, Indicating RWCU HX Room High Temp & RWCU Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failed Electric Component.Circuit Input Card Replaced |
- on 910918,main Control Room Received Alarms, Indicating RWCU HX Room High Temp & RWCU Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failed Electric Component.Circuit Input Card Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000397/LER-1991-027, :on 910930,question on Jet Operability & Surveillance Applicability in Operational Conditions 1 & 2 Below 25% Rated Thermal Power Raised.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Ts Amend Request Will Be Submitted |
- on 910930,question on Jet Operability & Surveillance Applicability in Operational Conditions 1 & 2 Below 25% Rated Thermal Power Raised.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Ts Amend Request Will Be Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-028, :on on 910930,containment Airlock Door Seal Leakage Test Not Performed within Allowable Surveillance Interval.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Work Practices. Master Startup Checklist Amended |
- on on 910930,containment Airlock Door Seal Leakage Test Not Performed within Allowable Surveillance Interval.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Work Practices. Master Startup Checklist Amended
| | | 05000397/LER-1991-029, :on 911031,discovered That Incorrect Containment Atmospheric Control Recycle Flow Control Controllers Installed in Both Divs in Control Room.Caused by Less than Adequate Design.Procedures Changed |
- on 911031,discovered That Incorrect Containment Atmospheric Control Recycle Flow Control Controllers Installed in Both Divs in Control Room.Caused by Less than Adequate Design.Procedures Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-030, :on 911104,small Leak Noted in Welded Connection Between RHR Sys Drain Valve & RHR Loop a Shutdown Cooling Return Valve.Caused by Const Fabrication Defect.Rhr Valve V-161A Isolated from RCS |
- on 911104,small Leak Noted in Welded Connection Between RHR Sys Drain Valve & RHR Loop a Shutdown Cooling Return Valve.Caused by Const Fabrication Defect.Rhr Valve V-161A Isolated from RCS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-031, :on 911104,determined That intermediate-range Monitor Control Rod Block Channel Calibrs Not Performed at TS Required Frequency.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedures.Calibr Procedures Performed |
- on 911104,determined That intermediate-range Monitor Control Rod Block Channel Calibrs Not Performed at TS Required Frequency.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedures.Calibr Procedures Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii) | | 05000397/LER-1991-032, :on 911119,reactor Scram Occurred as Result of Main Turbine Governor Valve Fast Closure.Caused by Failed Capacitor in Feedwater Summation Circuitry.Plant Maneuvered to Safe Shutdown Condition |
- on 911119,reactor Scram Occurred as Result of Main Turbine Governor Valve Fast Closure.Caused by Failed Capacitor in Feedwater Summation Circuitry.Plant Maneuvered to Safe Shutdown Condition
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-033, :on 911120,250 Volt DC Bus Inoperable Due to Lack of Adequate Fuse Coordination.Caused by Less than Adequate Design Analysis.Fuses Replaced |
- on 911120,250 Volt DC Bus Inoperable Due to Lack of Adequate Fuse Coordination.Caused by Less than Adequate Design Analysis.Fuses Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000397/LER-1991-034, :on 911123,residual Heat Removal Sys Differential Pressure Indicating Switch Found Isolated.Cause Indeterminate.Surveillance completed.RHR-DPIS-12B Restored to Svc |
- on 911123,residual Heat Removal Sys Differential Pressure Indicating Switch Found Isolated.Cause Indeterminate.Surveillance completed.RHR-DPIS-12B Restored to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000397/LER-1991-035, :on 911220,plant Manually Scrammed to Complete Controlled Shutdown Due to High Coolant Conductivity. Caused by Failed Tube in Main Condenser.Condenser Tube Plugged |
- on 911220,plant Manually Scrammed to Complete Controlled Shutdown Due to High Coolant Conductivity. Caused by Failed Tube in Main Condenser.Condenser Tube Plugged
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000397/LER-1991-036, :on 911226,missed ASME Section XI Test for Fuel Pool Cooling Relief Valve FPC-RV-117B Violated TS Sections 4.0.2 & 4.0.5.Cause Not Identified.Required Surveillance Testing Performed on FPC-RV-117B |
- on 911226,missed ASME Section XI Test for Fuel Pool Cooling Relief Valve FPC-RV-117B Violated TS Sections 4.0.2 & 4.0.5.Cause Not Identified.Required Surveillance Testing Performed on FPC-RV-117B
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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