05000397/LER-1991-001, :on 910108,RCIC Turbine & Equipment Area Temp Alarms Received & Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failure of Electronic Component Re Printed Circuit Input Card.Circuit Card Replace

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:on 910108,RCIC Turbine & Equipment Area Temp Alarms Received & Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failure of Electronic Component Re Printed Circuit Input Card.Circuit Card Replace
ML17286A582
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 02/07/1991
From: John Baker, Reis M
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GO2-91-022, GO2-91-22, LER-91-001, LER-91-1, NUDOCS 9102140070
Download: ML17286A582 (6)


LER-1991-001, on 910108,RCIC Turbine & Equipment Area Temp Alarms Received & Outboard Isolation Valve Automatically Closed.Caused by Failure of Electronic Component Re Printed Circuit Input Card.Circuit Card Replace
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation
3971991001R00 - NRC Website

text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

~

~

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9102140070 DOC.DATE: 91/02/07 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project,'nit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION REIS,M.P.

Washington Public Power Supply System BAKER,J.W.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 91-001-00:on 910108,RCIC turbine

& equipment area temp alarms received

& outboard isolation valve automatically closed. Caused by failure of electronic component re printed circuit input card. Circuit card replace.W/910207 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident pt, etc.

NOTES

,RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA ENG,P.L.

INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 2

2 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 1,

1 3

3 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB SD S/S BSD1 02 RGN5 FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

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1 1

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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 33 ENCL 33

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM F.O. Box 968

~ 3000 George Washington Way

~ Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.

50-397 February 7, 1991 G02-91-022

" Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO.

2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.91-001

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.91-001 for the WNP-2 Plant.

This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportabi lity, corrective action

taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, J.

W. Baker (M/D 927M)

WNP-2 Plant Manager JWB:lr

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.91-001 cc:

Hr. John B. Hartin, NRC Region V

Mr. C. Sorensen, NRC Resident Inspector (M/D 901A)

INPO Records Center Atlanta, GA Mr. D. L. Williams, BPA (H/D 399)

NRC Resident Inspector walk over copy 0~000397 0 9i0207 POR ADOCK

~

pDR 8

NRC FORM 366 (64)9)

V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 31504)104 EXPIRES: 4I30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFO4MATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 H4S. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATO4Y COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555. ANDTO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104),

OFF ICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503'ACILITY NAME (1)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (1)

PA E

o so oo3971OF03 utoma

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a) e ectronic Component In Leak Detection System EVENT DATE (6)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILI'TIES INVOLVED(6)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEOVENTIAL NUMBER REVISION m;: NUMBER MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBE4(S) 0 5

0 0

o 0

1 08 919 1

001 0 0 0 2 0

7 91 0

5 0

0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)

POWER LEYEL 1

0 0 20.402(II) 20.405(olllllI) 20AOS(e)())(E) 20.405(o l(1)I(ill 20AOS(o) II) (Iv) 10.405(o)(1)(vl 20AOS(c) 50.36(c) II )

50.36(c) l1) 50.73( ~ )l2)(I) 50.73(el(2) (ii) 50,73(o)(2)liiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) 50 73( ~l)2)liv) 60.73(ol(2) (v) 60.73(v ) (2 I (vill 50.73( ~l(2)(villi(A) 50.73(el(2)(viiil(B) 50.73( ~)(2)lil 0 THE RLOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (): IChrch onr or moro or thr Iorlowinp) III)

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 73.71(S) 73.71(c)

OTHER ISprciry In Ahrtrrct Orrow envoi in Trit, IIRC Fohn 36SAI NAME M. P. Reis Com liance Lead En ineer TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 50 937 7-COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT I'13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER r vp'v vc'v REPORTABLE

',', ~%'u TO NPRDS

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CAUSE

SYSTFM COMPONENT MANUFAC TV4ER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS I J M

ON 080 FILfINN cvicvi i '.o. c

c'ra'

". ~c SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES IIIyrr, COmpinr EXPECTED SUSAIISSIOIV DATEI X

NO ABSTRACT ILimitto 1400 rprcrr, ir., rpproiimrrrly firrrrn rinplr.rprcr rypewrirrrn IinNI (16)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE IISI MONTH DAY YEAR At 0727 on January 8,

1991, alarms indicating high Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine and equipment area temperatures were received in the control room.

Concurrently the outboard isolation valve for the RCIC turbine steam

supply, RCIC-V-8, automatically closed.

Redundant Control Room instrumentation and inspection of the RCIC locale showed no abnormal temperatures in the RCIC equipment areas.

=The

cause

of the isolation was traced to a failed component in the Leak Detection System, which provides input into the RCIC isolation logic.

Operations correctly entered the action statements for Technical Specifications 3.7.3 (RCIC operability) and 3.3.2 (Isolation Actuation Instruments) within one hour of the event.

Operations reported the event to the NRC at

0850, since automatic closure of RCIC-V-8 is an ESF actuation, requiring' 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification (50.72 (b)

(2) (ii).

The defective component was replaced and the Leak Detection and RCIC systems returned to service.

The apparent

cause

of this event was an isolated failure of a electronic component associated with one printed circuit input card in Leak Detection

Monitor, LD-MON-lA.

The root

cause

is indeterminate at this time.

Vendor analysis of the failed component has been requested.

This event presented no threat to plant personnel or to the public.

NRC Form 366 (64)9)(6419)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVE REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 E XPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTI ATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 503) HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P4130). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET,WASHINGTON,DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

SEOUENTIAL

@'UM ER o REVISION NUM ER PAGE (3)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 TEXT /llmoro 4/roco /4 ror/o/rod, Pro oddi)/onrr//VRC %%drin 3/ISAB/ (12) o s

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o 397 91 0 1 0 0 OF 0 3

Plant Conditions

Power Level - 100%

Plant Mode -

1 (RUN)

Event Descri tion

't 0727 on January 8,

1991, alarms indicating high Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine and equipment area temperatures were received in the control room.

Concurrently the outboard isolation valve for the RCIC turbine steam

supply, RCIC-V-8, automatically closed.

Redundant Control Room instrumentation and inspection of the RCIC locale showed no abnormal temperatures in the RCIC equipment areas.

The

cause

of the isolation was traced to a failed component on a printed circuit card in the Leak Detection System.

The Leak Detection-System provides input into the RCIC isolation logic.

The failure was of an electronic component located on one of six input cards within Leak Detection

Monitor, LD-MON-lA.

The function of this card is to accept thermocouple output signals and provide input to alarm and isolation logic within the monitor panel.

An instantaneous failure within the panel will not normally

cause

an isolation, since the electronics can differentiate between internal failures and actual out of tolerance conditions.

However it is believed that in this event the component failed slowly enough to simulate a

high temperature condition and

cause

the alarm and isolati'on functions.

Since 'A'rain of the LD system is configured to isolate the outboard RCIC isolation valve on a

one-out-of-one logic basis, the single failure within the card caused RCIC-V-8 to close.

The card continued to fail to the point where the electronics recognized the internal failure and removed the isolation signal.

Immediate Corrective Action

The defective printed circuit card was replaced in LD-MON-lA and the Leak Detection and RCIC systems were returned to service at 2156 on the day of the event.

'I Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.

Further Evaluation Operations correctly entered the action statements for Technical Specifications 3.7.3 (RCIC operability) and 3.3.2

( Isolation Actuation Instruments) within one hour of the event.

Operations reported the event to the NRC at

0850, since automatic closure of RCIC-V-8 is an ESF actuation, requiring a

4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification, in accordance with

50. 72 (b)

(2) (ii).

This LER is being submitted in compliance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv).(649)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVE REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 31504104 EXPIRES: 6/30/92 ES ATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANDTO 1ME PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND SUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

YEAR oo~. SEQUENTIAL (eJ(o'tve10es NVMBER

'.sm NVM Em PAGE (3)

Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 0

5 0

o o

3 9

7 9.1 0 1

TEXT //ffnofe epecm /e feqm(ned, m>> edsIIdone/HRC Form 30843/ (12) 0 0 3

OF 0 3

WNP-2 is the first nucl ear pl ant to install this type of Leak Detection System.

The system was installed in 1988.

This is the first failure of this type at WNP-2.

The manufacturer of the component is General Electric.

The model number is 304A3714.

The purchase part drawing for the card with the failed component is GE 213A9364G001.

The apparent

cause

of this event is an isol ated failure of an el ectroni c component on the input card.

The root

cause

is indeterminate at this time.

The failed card is to be sent to the vendor for further analysis.

There were no structures, systems or components inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to the event.

B.

Further Corrective Action The vendor's failure analysis report wi 11 be evaluated for any necessary additional corrective action(s).

Based on the failure analysis

report, the formal root

cause

analysis will be amended as necessary.

If significant changes in the root

cause

are discovered or additional corrective actions warranted, a supplemental LER will be submitted.

Safet Si nificance This event is of no safety significance and presented no threat to plant personnel or to the public.

All equipment responded as expected for. the given failure.

No challenges requiring the RCIC function were experienced during this event.

d At the time of the

event, HPCS was operabl e and avail abl e to perform the hi gh pressure injection function.

The containment isolation function was preserved by RCIC-V-8 closure and the operability of the redundant inboard valve.

Similar Events

None EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference

~Sstem

~Com anent RCIC System LD System RC IC-V-8 LU-TE-4A LD-MON-1A BN'J BN IJ IJ V

TE NON NR C F onm 366A (649)

~

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