12-15-2003 | On December 1, 2003, it was determined by the Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations that the following event was reportable as a significant safety hazard.
On October 3, 2003, the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) was performing solid state testing. The testing is in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 345.037, Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Testing. At 1300, Master Relay K507, which actuates the Feed Water Isolation circuits upon Hi/Hi Steam Generator Water Level, failed to actuate. This component was a master relay with a paper wrapped coil, manufactured by MidTex (part number [P/N] 156-14D200).1- A Non-Conformance Notice (NCN 03-3099) was written, and the master relay was replaced on October 3, 2003.
The cause of the master relay failure was determined to be an open circuit in the coil resulting from corrosion caused by off-gassing of chlorine contamination from the paper used to wrap the coil, or the adhesive used to attach the paper to the coil. An investigation into other master relays at VCSNS revealed that three additional MidTex P/N 156-14D200 relays with paper wrapped coils were installed in the Solid State Protection System. Although none of these had actually failed, they were replaced during Refueling Outage 14. The majority of the MidTex P/N 156-14D200 relays installed at VCS have cloth wrapped coils, and showed no evidence of corrosion.
This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) and 10 CFR 21.21. |
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PLANT IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor
EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION
Solid State Protection System Master Relay K507
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT
This event was identified during performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 345.037, Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Testing. Master Relay K507 failed to actuate during the test. This condition was identified in Condition Evaluation Report (CER) 03-3099 as a Non-Conforming condition.
EVENT DATE
October 3, 2003 (Date of determination of significant safety hazard - December 1, 2003)
REPORT DATE
December 15, 2003
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
The plant was in Mode 1, at 100% Power.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On October 3, 2003, the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) was performing solid state testing on the 'A' train. The testing is in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 345.037, Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Testing. At 1300, Master Relay K507, which actuates the Feed Water Isolation circuits upon HVHi Steam Generator Water Level, failed to actuate. This component was a master relay with a paper wrapped coil, manufactured by MidTex (part number [P/N] 156-14D200). MidTex has no address, as they are no longer in business.
A Non-Conformance Notice (NCN 03-3099) was written, and the master relay was replaced on October 3, 2003.
The affected master relay was sent to Pentas, Inc. for a Root Cause of Failure Analysis.
The failure analysis results attributed the failure to be an open circuit in the coil resulting from corrosion caused by off-gassing of chlorine contamination from the paper used to wrap the coil, or the adhesive used to attach the paper to the coil. 'Another MidTex P/N 156-14D200 relay with a paper wrapped coil, sent to Pentas, Inc. for follow-up analysis, showed evidence of the same type of corrosion. Therefore, this failure is considered to be a manufacturing defect in a basic component, which could cause a loss of safety function.
An investigation into other master relays at VCSNS revealed that three additional MidTex P/N 156-14D200 master relays with paper wrapped coils were installed in 'A' Train Solid State Protection System cabinet XPN7010. Although none of these had actually failed, they were replaced with Potter & Brumfield relays during Refueling Outage 14 (November 2003). The majority of the MidTex P/N 156-14D200 relays installed at VCS have cloth wrapped coils, and showed no evidence of corrosion.
This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) and 10 CFR 21.21.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
Although the redundant train for K507, which had a different type of master relay, was operable and could have actuated the Feed Water Isolation Valves on a HUHi Steam Generator Water level, VCSNS has determined that this condition should be reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), since multiple components were potentially affected in various trains and systems by the corrosion due to off-gassing.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The potentially affected master relays have been identified and replaced with Potter & Brumfield relays.
PRIOR OCCURRENCES
None
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