05000348/LER-2002-003

LER-2002-003,

Docket Number
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3482002003R00 - NRC Website

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX]

Description of Event

On November 6, 2002 at 0950, while at 100% power, it was discovered that a section of the required missile barrier was not in place for the Unit 1 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)[KA] outlet isolation valves to the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)[BA] system. It was determined that this event represents a Technical Specification violation since the CST is required to be operable during severe weather events which can generate missiles.

The CST outlet isolation valves are enclosed in a concrete valve box for protection from horizontal tornado generated missiles, with a 4-section cover plate above the enclosure to protect the valves and piping from dropped objects which may occur during tornado events. Investigation revealed that one section of this plate had been removed on March 19, 2002 for work on the freeze protection system, and was not replaced. This cover plate is above eye level, as viewed from the ground, and not readily visible without climbing above ground level.

A work order for troubleshooting freeze protection circuits in this area was released on March 19, 2002 with LCO being denoted as Not Applicable. At that time, the cover plate was left removed for continuing work. On March 21, 2002, the insulation on the piping between the CST and the transition to the underground pipe chase was removed for inspection of freeze protection wires. On August 7, 2002, continuing work in the area found the plate still removed. The plate was not reinstalled at that time since workers believed more work was to be performed.

Cause of Event

This event was due to lack of policy and administrative controls for removal of missile barriers when accessing equipment behind the missile barriers. Contributing causes were training and work practices in that plant personnel failed to recognize that all sections of the missile barrier were required to be in place to provide adequate missile protection.

Safety Assessment The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. Operability of the CST system was unaffected for all events for which it is required except for severe weather (tornado), and then only for the specific hazard of a dropped object.

This event does not represent a Safety System Functional Failure.

Corrective Action The required missile barrier section was replaced within time limits of Technical Specification 3.7.6 Action A from the time of discovery.

A walkdown of other missile barriers on both units was conducted to identify any other possible missing barriers.

None were identified.

Permanent labels have been placed on the CST concrete valve box enclosure cover plates to require Shift Supervisor notification prior to removal, and gratings have been tack welded in place for positive control until corrective actions are complete.

Shift crews will be informed of this event prior to taking shift.

Appropriate plant personnel will be informed of this event and missile barrier requirements by January 15, 2003.

FNP will establish and communicate policy and administrative controls for missile barriers by January 15, 2003.

Appropriate procedures and preventative maintenance tasks will be revised by January 15, 2003 to require shift supervisor notification if missile barriers are to be removed during work activities.

Additional Information

The following LER has been submitted in the past 2 years related to inadequate policies/procedures: