05000255/LER-2002-001, Re Noncompliance with Technical Specification Requirements for Safety Injection Tank T-82D
| ML023610181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/2002 |
| From: | Cooper D Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 02-001-00 | |
| Download: ML023610181 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2552002001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Committed to NucleMrExce/
Palisades Nuclear Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC December 19, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 DOCKET 50-255 LICENSE DPR-20 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 02-001, NONCOMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY INJECTION TANK T-82D Licensee Event Report (LER)02-001 is attached. The LER describes exceeding the action completion time specified by Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition B, for an inoperable safety injection tank. A request for enforcement discretion had been granted to allow for this condition.
This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS This I tter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.
ou as E.Cooper Site Vice-President, Palisades CC Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region III Project Manager, USNRC, NRR NRC Resident Inspector, Palisades Attachment 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
- Covert, Ml 49043 Telephone: 616.764 2000
I
I
Abstract
On November 11, 2002, at approximately 1339 hours0.0155 days <br />0.372 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.094895e-4 months <br />, with the plant operating at 100% power, operations noted apparent leakage from safety injection tank T-82D via trending of multiple plant parameters. Subsequently, non-isolable leakage from safety injection tank T-82D was observed visually. Safety injection tank T-82D was declared inoperable at 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br /> on November 11, 2002.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC requested enforcement discretion to extend the completion time for Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition B, by 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, for a total of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, to allow for restoration of safety injection tank T-82D to operable status. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission verbally exercised discretion at 1332 hours0.0154 days <br />0.37 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06826e-4 months <br /> on November 12, 2002. Nuclear Management Company reduced plant power to approximately 60% and performed the required repairs to safety injection tank T-82D, which was subsequently declared operable at 0906 on November 13, 2002.
This occurrence is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, since safety injection tank T-82D was not restored to operable status within the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition B.
NRC FORM 366 (7.2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The action completion time of Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition B was knowingly exceeded under an approved Notice of Enforcement Discretion.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
Extension of the allowed outage time was evaluated from a probabilistic risk standpoint. The risk associated with maintaining the reactor at power for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with safety injection tank T-82D inoperable was determined to be lower than the risk associated with performing a reactor shutdown.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Required repairs were made to restore safety injection tank T-82D to operable status.
A license amendment was not required because the plant was returned to compliance with the existing license in a short period of time.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
The root cause of the safety injection tank T-82D level-sensing line joint failure was determined to be high-cycle fatigue. The same joint failed in 1992. The root cause was believed to be a manufacturing defect. However, re-examination of the previous failure, along with the information from the recent failure, indicates that the failure mechanism for both failures was high-cycle fatigue.
PREVIOUS LERs None