05000348/LER-2015-001, Regarding Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System When the 1B SGFP Was Tripped
| ML15183A314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/2015 |
| From: | Pierce C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-15-0963 LER 15-001-00 | |
| Download: ML15183A314 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3482015001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Charles R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director JUL 0 % 201*5 Docket Nos.: 50-348 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35242 Tel 205.992.7872 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 NL-15-0962 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2015-001-00 Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System When the 1 B SGFP was Tripped Ladies and Gentlemen:
This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions regarding the submittal, please contact Ms. Julie Collier at (334) 814-4639.
Sincerely, C.1i ~
C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director CRP/jac/lac Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2015-001-00
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-15-0962 Page2 cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Best, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. M. D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President-Engineering Ms. B. L. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. S. A. Williams, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. P. K. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector-Farley
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2015-001-00 Enclosure Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System When the 18 SGFP was Tripped
[NRC FORM 368 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES: 1131/2017 1().2010) stimated, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME
~* DOCKET NUMBER
~*PAGE Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000 348 Page 1 of3
~*TITLE Automatic Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System When the 1 8 SGFP was Tripped
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV MONTH DAY YEAR J:ACILITY NAME poCKET NUMBER NUMBER NO.
05 05 2015 2015-001-00 2015 FACILITY NAME pocKET NUMBER
~*OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201 (b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)0) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vil) 2 p 20.2201 (d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(il) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vili)(A) p 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(1) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(ili) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1x)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL
~. 20.2203(a)(2)(1i) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 18150.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(111) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) 1%
b)_ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER p 20.2203(a)(2)(vl) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Speclfy In Abstract below or In NRC Form 368A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA
)
FACILITY NAME ELEPHONE NUMBER (lnc/uda Allla Coda)
Julie A. Collier-Licensing Engineer 334) 814-4639 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU*
REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TOEPIX FACTURER TO EPIX N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 181 NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On May 5, 2015 at 04:22 CDT with Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 in mode 2 and the 1 A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, an Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) autostart signal was received due to a manual trip of the 18 SGFP. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps due to the auto start signal not being defeated. When the actuation signal was received, both the A and 8 MDAFW pumps were already in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG). The effects of this actuation were that the AFW Flow Control Valves were fully opened and the SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves were isolated. These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset.
The human performance cause of this event was that the operating crew did not meet expectations for effective
- teamwork to ensure proper decision making. While responding to a degrading condenser vacuum, the operating crew made the decision to trip the 18 SGFP instead of securing it per the standard operating procedure, which would have been adequate for preventing the event. Corrective actions included individual remediation plans. Planned corrective actions include the installation of bump preventer covers with caution placards, and management intervention on teamwork and decision-making.
7 2
~C=
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse-Pressurized Water Reactor
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the Information collection.
YEAR 2015
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUEN11AL I NUMBER 001 REV NO.
00 3.PAGE 2 of3 Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX].
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On May 5, 2015, at 04:22 COT, Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 was in mode 2 and reactor power was approximately 1 percent. With the 1 A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, an Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) autostart signal was received due to manually tripping of the 18 SGFP. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps due to the auto start signal not being defeated. When the actuation signal was received, both the A and 8 MDAFW pumps were already in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG). The effects of this actuation were that the AFW Flow Control Valves were fully opened and the SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves were closed.
These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset.
Just prior to the event the 18 SGFP was rolling on boiler control and not providing feed flow. Due to a degrading condenser vacuum which had started at approximately the same time that the feed pump was started, the Shift Supervisor, after consultation with the Shift Manager and the Outage Control Center, gave specific direction to the Unit Operator to decrease the 18 SGFP speed to 2400 rpm and to then "trip" the SGFP, instead of securing it. A peer check was performed to "trip" the 1 8 SGFP; however the peer check operator had only overheard the reason for tripping the SGFP, assumed an abnormal operating mindset, and did not take the time to challenge the decision or method in which the pump was to be secured. The task performer did not challenge the directions from the Shift Supervisor because of familiarity with the task and because the terminology "trip the SGFP" was used in specific directions by the Shift Supervisor.
When the only running SGFP was secured all the automatic actuations occurred as expected. Steam generator blowdown was secured and the flow control valves went full open. Both motor driven auxiliary feed water pumps were already running. The operating crew reset the flow control valve main control board hand switches to gain control of AFW.
CAUSE OF EVENT
This was a human performance-related event. The cause was that the operating crew did not meet expectations for effective teamwork to ensure proper decision making. While responding to a degrading condenser vacuum, the operating crew made the decision to trip the 18 SGFP instead of securing it per the standard operating procedure, which would have been adequate for preventing the event.
REPORT ABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
YEAR 2015
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I N1JMBER 001 REV NO.
00 3.PAGE 3 of3 This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
When the only running SGFP was secured all the automatic actuations occurred as expected. Steam generator blowdown was secured and the flow control valves went full open. Both motor driven auxiliary feed water pumps were already running. The operating crew reset the flow control valve main control board hand switches to gain control of AFW. There was no impact on Steam Generator water level.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Corrective actions included individual remediation plans. Planned corrective actions include the installation of bump preventer covers with caution placards, and management intervention on teamwork and decision-making.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Other system affected:
No systems other than those mentioned in this report were affected by this event.
Commitment Information:
This report does not create any licensing commitments
Previous Similar Events
No similar previously reported events were identified