05000348/LER-1917-001, Regarding Entry Into Mode of Applicability with Component Cooling Water (CCW) Isolation Valve Inoperable Due to Configuration Error
| ML17272A669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/2017 |
| From: | Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-17-1597 LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17272A669 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3481917001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
.~ Southern Nuclear Date: 9/28/17 Dennis R. Madison VIce President - Farley Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 7388 North State Hwy 95 Columbia. Alabama 36319 334.814.4511 tel 334.814.4575 fax drmadiso @southernco.com Docket Nos.: 50-348 NL-17-1597 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 Entry into Mode of Applicability with Component Cooling Water CCCWl Isolation Valve Inoperable due to Configuration Error Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2}(i)(B}, Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report for Unit 1.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Gene Surber, Licensing Supervisor, at 334-814-5448.
Respectfully submitted, AtJ~;a,L*
D. R. Madison Vice President - Farley DRM/RGS/cbg Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 cc:
Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager-Farley Senior Resident Inspector-Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017*001*00 Entry into Mode of Applicability with Component Cooling Water (CCW) Isolation Valve Inoperable due to Configuration Error Enclosure Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2017*001*00
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- 2. DOCICET M-.R 3.PAGE Joseph M. Farley Nadar Plant. Unit 1 05101 348 1 OF 3
4.1111.E Elltly into Mode of Applicabili1¥ with Component Cooling Water Isolatioo Valve Iaopcrable due to c:onfipndioo error.
LEVENTDATE t. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE L OTHER FACIUTIES INVOLVED YEAR ~~~
REV FlU:Urf-DIICIIET._
IIION1H Do\\Y YEAR NO.
IIONTH Do\\Y YEAR 09 IW:UI'f-DIICIIET..._
10 01 2016 2017 -
001 - 00 29 2017 050110 I. OPERAllNG IIODE
D 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(1) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1)(A) oao.73(a)~
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D 60.73{a)(2)(vtii)(B) 0 20.2203(*><1>
0 20.2203(8}{4) 0 50.73(a)(2)00 0 50.73(a)(2){1x)(A)
D 20.2203(a){2)(1)
D 50.38(c)(1){1){A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(1v)(A) 0 50.73(a}(2)(X}
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(11) 0 50.38(c)(1)(11){A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(Ri)
D 50.38(c)(2) 0 50.73(a}(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(1v) 0 so.48(a)(3)(11) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 n.ncaK1>
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- 12. UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CQNTACI' NUMBER (lllclll* Mil CodtJ GeDe Surber, Lia:using Supervisor (334) 814-.5448
- 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAIWRE DESCRIBED IN TtiS REPORT
CAUSE
SYSJEY COIIPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSJEY COIIPCitENT MANU-REPORTABlE FACTURER TOEPIX FACruRER TOEPIX A
cc ISV N/A y
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1&. EXPECTED MONTH Do\\Y YEAR D YES (Nyu, ctJmplete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
[l) NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (l.lmllo 1400*~ le., tppiOidmat.ly 15 ~
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On July 31, 2017with Unit 1 atlOOo/oRated Thermal Poweritwas identified thatQ1Pl7HV2229-Norm/Biock Switch (Norm/Block Switch) was out ofposidon (aligned to the "SI BLOCK" position). This is a key operated switch which controls the operation of valve Q1Pl7HV2229 (HV-2229), Component Cooling Water (CCW) Supply to Sample Coolers. HV-2229 functions to automatically isolate the non-seismic portion of the CCW system which includes the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Sample Coolers. The Norm/Block switch allows a Safety Iqjcction (SI) signal to be blocked to allow alignment ofCCW to the RCS Sample Coolers for post-accident sampling. The Norm/Block Switch was returned to normal posidon on August 1, 2017 at 0415.
HV-2229 also receives a closed signal on low level CCW Surge Tank which will override the Norm/Block switch regardless of position. Thus, in the event of an Sl concurrent with a CCW leak, the safety function of CCW would have still been met. Since HV-2229 was blocked ftom closing and would not have met Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.7.2 ftom October 29, 2016 (entry to MODE 4) to August 1, 2017, the station unknowingly operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications which is reportable under S0.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Corrective actions include procedure changes, communications and training to close knowledcge gaps associated with system operation.
NRC FORM 31111 (04-2017)
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EVENT DESCRIPTION
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Cllllc:la On July 31, 2017 with Unit 1 at 100% Rated Thermal Power an operator was preparing to lift a clearance order on the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System. The operator noticed that the Q1P17HV2229-Norm/Biock Switch (Nonn/Biock Switch) was not in the correct position. The Norm/Block Switch was not part of the clearance order. The Norm/Block switch allows a Safety Injection (51) signal to be blocked to allow alignment of CCW to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Sample Coolers for post-accident sampling. The operator notified shift supervision.
An Investigation was conducted to Identify when the Norm/Block SWitch was last manipulated. Based on Interviews, records, and plant conditions it was determined that the most probable date the Norm/Block Switch was operated occurred on October 1, 2016 during chemistry sampling following a reactor trip. Farley Unit 1 began a refueling outage following this reactor trip.
EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS
An analysis of the event Identified organizational shortfalls In both procedure quality and human performance. The Chemistry operating procedure for obtaining the RCS sample did not provide a method of maintaining configuration control for the Norm/Block Switch. Procedural guidance on the Norm/Block SWitch operation was only located In the precautions and limitations portion of the procedure and not in the instruction portion of the procedure. Additionally, communication between the Chemistry Technician and the Control Room Supervisor (key control) was not sufficient because the Chemistry Technician did not understand system status or realize that operation of the Norm/Block switch was not required for sampling since the Sl signal had been resel The Chemistry Technician operated the Norm/Block SWitch based on knowledge of the switch function obtained from reading the precautions and limitations. The Chemistry Technician left the switch In the "51-Block" position when returning the key to the control room. Upon return of the key to the control room no challenge was provided on the configuration of HV-2229 or the Norm/Block Switch.
REPORT ABILITY AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT:
The auto closure of HV-2229 during an Slls surveilled per Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3. 7. 7.2. This SR requires that "each CCW automatic valve In the flowpath that Is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal". The last scheduled performance of the surveillance testing of HV-2229 was performed April 4, 2015. Per SR 3.0.1, failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be a failure to meet the LCO. With the inability to automaticaUy close HV-2229 on an Sl signal due to the position of the Norm/Block Switch Farley Unit 1 unknowingly operated In a condition prohibited by Technical Specification upon entry into MODE 4 at 0632 on October 29, 2016. This condition Is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)Q)(B).
This event would not have prevented CCW from meeting Its safety function and has very low safety significance because HV-2229 also receives a closure signal from a CCW Surge Tank Low Level signal. The Low Level Surge Tank signal overrides the Norm/Block Switch regardless of position. Therefore, this event Is not reportable for loss of safety function per 50.73(a)(2)(v).
NRC FORM 3811A (04-al17)
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NARRATIVE
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The cause of the event Is that the manipulation of the Norm/Block SWild1 was not tracked using approved processes.
Barriers that broke down Include;
- 1. Procedural guidance was not adequate for the task to maintain con1lguratlon.
- 2. Personnel knowledge level of the plant Impact for performing the task cld not meet standards.
- 3. Communications I Questioning attitude to obtain authorization were inadequate for the performance of the task.
- 4. The preparation and procedure use and adherence of the task was inadequate.
Farley has initiated corrective actions to address the organizational shortfals and knowledge gaps associated with the event This event was immediately communicated to the Department, Site and Reet personnel. A b'alnlng needs analysis is being conducted In Chemistry and Operations on the knowledge gaps and procedural guidance. The Site specific procedure for operation of the system has been revised to address configuration control of the Nonn/Biock switch.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None OTHER SYSTEMS AFFECTED:
No systems other than those mentioned In this report were affected by this event NRC FORM 3eBA (0441117)
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