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U S. NUCLEUd 5 EiULATORY COMMISS4086 NRC Peene 308 G.Ji APPROvt0 oms NO 315.-410 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
F ACILITY NAME in DOCKET NUMGER 12t PAGE Ge Joseph M. Farley - Unit 1 015 l 0 l0 l 0 l 3l418 1 lOFl 0l 2 Tif LE t.#
Unsealed Gaps Above Masonry Fire Walls EvtNT CATE 15, LER NUMetR ist REPORT DATE 177 QTHER F ACILiTIES INVOLVED 18)
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J. M. Farley - Unit 2 015 l 0 l 010 l31 6l 4 0l2 1l4 85 8l5 0l d 1
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Gaps along portions of the tops of two fire walls were not sealed within seven days as required by Technical Specification 3.7.12.
At approximately 1500 on 2-14-85 it was discove, red that unsealed gaps existed between the tops of two masonry fire walls and the ceilings of the rooms.
These gaps were located above portions of the west wall of the cable spreading room of both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Design drawings showed that these gaps should have had steel angle running on both sides of the gap with the steel angle anchored to the ceiling and RTV sealant between the steel angle and the wall.
The design was not implemented fully due to physical constraints. At the time of installation, engineering evaluations had been performed to justify the absence of the steel angle.
However, these evaluations were based on structural considerations and did not address fire protection considerations.
A plantwide walkdown of three-hour rated masonry fire walls revealed eighteen unsealed gaps at the tops of fire walls. Firewatch patrols were established as required in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Design changes have been developed and implemented for sealing these gaps.
l The work was completed 9-20-85 for both units. Health / safety of the public l
was not affected.
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a b: e a m 3644 U 5. NUCLEAJ EEGULATORY COMMIS$lON LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AreRovEo oMi Nn 3 iso-oio4 EXPIRES 8/31 r85 F ACIL1 f Y NAME til DOCKET NUMBtR (2)
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Gaps along portions of the tops of two fire walls were not sealed within seven days as required by Technical Specification 3.7.12.
At approximately 1500 on 2-14-85 it was discovered that unsealed gaps existed between the tops of two masonry fire walls and the ceilings of the rooms. These gaps are located above portions of the west wall of the cable spreading room of both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The gaps between the wall and the ceiling ranged from less than one-half inch to two inches in height.
It was not possible to close the gaps found on 2-14-85 per the originai design because the tops of the walls were inaccessable. A review of design documents indicated that these gaps should have had steel angle running on both sides of the gap with the steel angle anchored to the ceiling and RTV sealant between the steel angle and the wall. Further investigation revealed that the gap between the wall and ceiling existed for seismic considerations and that the purpose of the steel angle was to limit horizontal movement of the wall during a seismic event.
The absence of the steel angle was approved by the design organization. However, this approval was based on structural considerations. The design organization was not able to determine the basis for accepting this design a,s a three-hour rated fire wall.
Design changes to modify the Farley Nuclear Plant masonry walls to be in compliance with IE Bulletin 80-11 were issued by the design organization in 1980.
Design procedures in effect at that time required the, design organization to review any design changes for conformance to ANSI N45.2.11 which requires the design review to include the effect of the design change on fire protection and fire resistance.
A review of design records does not indicate that fire protection considerations were addressed in the review of the design changes for the interface between the wall and the ceiling. The design for this interface was part of the original design of the walls.
In December 1983, APCo issued instructions to the design organization to provide further assurance that fire protection and fire resistance was evaluated for each design change. These instructions require the designer to determine, as a part of each safety evaluation checklist, if the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation or Appendix R requirements are affected. This action provides increased assurance that design changes will be evaluated for their adequacy relative to fire protection and resistance.
When it was determined that the design did not meet the requirements for a three-hour rated fire wall, a plantwide walkdown of three-hour rated masonry fire walls was initiated. This walkdown was completed on 2-21-85 and found eighteen unsealed gaps at the tops of masonry firewalls.
Firewatch patrols were established as required in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Designs have been developed and implemented to upgrade affected walls to three-hour fire wall status.
Production Change Notice (PCN) 85-1-3148 implemented the new design for Unit I and PCN 85-2-3149 implemented the new design for Unit 2.
The work was completed on 9-20-85 for bcth units.
Nec 8049 yea e dit
Malling Address Alabama Power Company 600 Nort,' 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090 R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President Flintridge Building Alabama Power
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October 21, 1985 Docket No. 50-348 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report No. LER 85-001-01
Dear Sir:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Licensee Event Report No. LER 85-001-01 is being voluntarily submitted.
If you have any questions, please advise.
t Yours very truly
- (
W' R. P. Mcdonald RPM /J AR:ddb-D-LER Enclosure cc:
IE, Region II 4
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| 05000348/LER-1985-001, :on 850214,gaps Along Portions of Tops of Two Fire Walls Not Sealed within 7 Days as Required by Tech Spec 3.7.12.Firewatch Patrols Established.Design Changes Developed & Implemented for Sealing Gaps |
- on 850214,gaps Along Portions of Tops of Two Fire Walls Not Sealed within 7 Days as Required by Tech Spec 3.7.12.Firewatch Patrols Established.Design Changes Developed & Implemented for Sealing Gaps
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-001-01, :on 850214,unsealed Gaps Discovered Between Tops of Two Masonry Fire Walls & Room Ceilings.Cause Unknown.Design Changes Developed to Seal Gaps |
- on 850214,unsealed Gaps Discovered Between Tops of Two Masonry Fire Walls & Room Ceilings.Cause Unknown.Design Changes Developed to Seal Gaps
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-001, :on 850119,nine Tubes in Steam Generator 2A Plugged Based on Eddy Current Testing Results.Cause Not Stated |
- on 850119,nine Tubes in Steam Generator 2A Plugged Based on Eddy Current Testing Results.Cause Not Stated
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-002-01, :on 850313,reactor Tripped.Caused by lo-lo Water Levels in Steam Generators 1B & 1C Due to Spurious Actuation of Limit Switch on Msiv.Switch Replaced.Msiv Turbine/Reactor Trip Functions Verified |
- on 850313,reactor Tripped.Caused by lo-lo Water Levels in Steam Generators 1B & 1C Due to Spurious Actuation of Limit Switch on Msiv.Switch Replaced.Msiv Turbine/Reactor Trip Functions Verified
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-003-01, :on 850413,ESF Equipment Actuated Inadvertently While Testing.Caused by Electrician Shorting Circuit W/Tool. Tools for Procedure Will Be Properly Insulated to Prevent Short Circuits |
- on 850413,ESF Equipment Actuated Inadvertently While Testing.Caused by Electrician Shorting Circuit W/Tool. Tools for Procedure Will Be Properly Insulated to Prevent Short Circuits
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-004-01, :on 850415,both Doors of Containment Auxiliary Air Lock Discovered Open.Caused by Worker Improperly Exiting Containment Through Airlock.Caution Tag Placed on Interior Door of Air Lock to Prevent Recurrence |
- on 850415,both Doors of Containment Auxiliary Air Lock Discovered Open.Caused by Worker Improperly Exiting Containment Through Airlock.Caution Tag Placed on Interior Door of Air Lock to Prevent Recurrence
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-004, :on 850126,required Continuous Fire Watches Terminated Inproperly.Caused by Personnel Error.Foreman Counseled Re Establishment & Termination of Continuous Fire Watches |
- on 850126,required Continuous Fire Watches Terminated Inproperly.Caused by Personnel Error.Foreman Counseled Re Establishment & Termination of Continuous Fire Watches
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-005-01, Forwards Results of Testing/Insp of 11 Tendon Anchor Heads, Based on Commitment in 850812 LER 85-005-01 to Conduct Addl Tests & Insps on Tendon Anchor Heads Which Failed Due to Hydrogen Stress Cracking.Anchor Heads Acceptabl | Forwards Results of Testing/Insp of 11 Tendon Anchor Heads, Based on Commitment in 850812 LER 85-005-01 to Conduct Addl Tests & Insps on Tendon Anchor Heads Which Failed Due to Hydrogen Stress Cracking.Anchor Heads Acceptable | | | 05000364/LER-1985-005, :on 850127,prior to Integrated Leak Rate Testing of Containment,Grease Cover for Shop End of Containment Vertical Tendon V17 Found Deformed.Caused by Broken Field Anchor.Insp Program Initiated |
- on 850127,prior to Integrated Leak Rate Testing of Containment,Grease Cover for Shop End of Containment Vertical Tendon V17 Found Deformed.Caused by Broken Field Anchor.Insp Program Initiated
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-006, :on 850201,Train B wide-range Containment Sump Level Recorder Had Ink Cartridge Installed for Only Blue Pen,Making Recorder Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Counseled |
- on 850201,Train B wide-range Containment Sump Level Recorder Had Ink Cartridge Installed for Only Blue Pen,Making Recorder Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Counseled
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-006-01, :on 850423,tube in Steam Generator 1c,plugged During Refueling Outage,Exceeded Pluggable Limit.Cause Not Stated.Results of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Insp Will Be Reported |
- on 850423,tube in Steam Generator 1c,plugged During Refueling Outage,Exceeded Pluggable Limit.Cause Not Stated.Results of Steam Generator Tube Inservice Insp Will Be Reported
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-007-01, :on 850411,Fire Door 401 Declared Inoperable & Could Not Be Repaired within 7 Days.Caused by Loose auto- Closure Mechanism & Loose Astragal.Fire Watch Established. New Door Assembly Ordered |
- on 850411,Fire Door 401 Declared Inoperable & Could Not Be Repaired within 7 Days.Caused by Loose auto- Closure Mechanism & Loose Astragal.Fire Watch Established. New Door Assembly Ordered
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-007, :on 850301,while Reviewing Limiting Condition for Operation Forms During Shift Turnover,Fire Watch Requirements for Inoperable Fire Barrier Incorrectly Determined.Caused by Personnel Error |
- on 850301,while Reviewing Limiting Condition for Operation Forms During Shift Turnover,Fire Watch Requirements for Inoperable Fire Barrier Incorrectly Determined.Caused by Personnel Error
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-008, :on 850328,reactor Trip Occurred Due to lo-lo Level in Steam Generator 2A.Caused by Personnel Error. Technician Counseled |
- on 850328,reactor Trip Occurred Due to lo-lo Level in Steam Generator 2A.Caused by Personnel Error. Technician Counseled
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-008-01, :on 850506,suction Valves a & B Closed When RHR & Overpressure Mitigation Sys Made Inoperable by Common Cause.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy & Personnel Error. Procedure Revised |
- on 850506,suction Valves a & B Closed When RHR & Overpressure Mitigation Sys Made Inoperable by Common Cause.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy & Personnel Error. Procedure Revised
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-009, :on 850330,reactor Tripped Due to lo-lo Level in Steam Generator 2A.Caused by leak-by of Isolation Valve to Condenser Vacuum Pressure Transmitter PT502,due to Loss of Steam Generator 2B Feed Pump.Valve Replaced |
- on 850330,reactor Tripped Due to lo-lo Level in Steam Generator 2A.Caused by leak-by of Isolation Valve to Condenser Vacuum Pressure Transmitter PT502,due to Loss of Steam Generator 2B Feed Pump.Valve Replaced
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-009-01, :on 850517,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred When lo-lo Water Level Signal in Steam Generator 1B Indicated.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Inadequate Instructions.Personnel Counseled |
- on 850517,reactor Protection Sys Actuation Occurred When lo-lo Water Level Signal in Steam Generator 1B Indicated.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Inadequate Instructions.Personnel Counseled
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-010-01, :on 850715,during Steady State Operation, Reactor Trip Occurred Due to High Negative Flux Rate.Caused by Voltage Surge Due to Lightning.Shortly After Trip, Generator Output Breaker Opened Prematurely |
- on 850715,during Steady State Operation, Reactor Trip Occurred Due to High Negative Flux Rate.Caused by Voltage Surge Due to Lightning.Shortly After Trip, Generator Output Breaker Opened Prematurely
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-010, :on 850608,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Underfrequency on Reactor Coolant Pump Buses.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedural Inadequacy.Personnel Counseled & Procedures Revised |
- on 850608,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Underfrequency on Reactor Coolant Pump Buses.Caused by Personnel Error & Procedural Inadequacy.Personnel Counseled & Procedures Revised
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-011-01, :on 850717,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Low Steam Generator Level.Caused by Apparent Failure of Feedwater Regulating Valve a to Respond in Manual Control. Valve Exercised & Checked Thoroughly |
- on 850717,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Low Steam Generator Level.Caused by Apparent Failure of Feedwater Regulating Valve a to Respond in Manual Control. Valve Exercised & Checked Thoroughly
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-011, :on 850620,maint Work Inadvertently Performed on Train B Pressurization Heater Control Circuit Instead of Train A.Caused by Unspecified Maint Work Request & Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled |
- on 850620,maint Work Inadvertently Performed on Train B Pressurization Heater Control Circuit Instead of Train A.Caused by Unspecified Maint Work Request & Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-012-01, :on 850802,reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Failure of Inverter 2B While Overtemp delta-T in Tripped Condition.Inverter Repaired |
- on 850802,reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Failure of Inverter 2B While Overtemp delta-T in Tripped Condition.Inverter Repaired
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-012, :on 850623,reactor Trip Occurred Due to High Negative Flux Rate.Caused by Shutdown Bank & Control Rods E-11 & L-11 Dropping Into Core Due to Electrical Short.Fuses Replaced & Cables Reterminated.Module Ordered |
- on 850623,reactor Trip Occurred Due to High Negative Flux Rate.Caused by Shutdown Bank & Control Rods E-11 & L-11 Dropping Into Core Due to Electrical Short.Fuses Replaced & Cables Reterminated.Module Ordered
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-013-01, :on 851113,discovered That Fire Watch Requirements Determined Incorrectly When Fire Detector on Both Sides of Inoperable Fire Barrier Made Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error |
- on 851113,discovered That Fire Watch Requirements Determined Incorrectly When Fire Detector on Both Sides of Inoperable Fire Barrier Made Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-013, :on 850717,during Steady State Operation at 100% Power,Reactor Trip Occurred Due to lo-lo Water Level in Steam Generator 1B.Caused by Spurious Indication of Excessive Thrust Bearing Wear |
- on 850717,during Steady State Operation at 100% Power,Reactor Trip Occurred Due to lo-lo Water Level in Steam Generator 1B.Caused by Spurious Indication of Excessive Thrust Bearing Wear
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-014, :on 850828,ESF Equipment Actuation Occurred When Diesel Generator 2C Started Automatically.Caused by Technician Accidentally Bumping Manual Operator of Emergency Start Relay.Technician Counseled |
- on 850828,ESF Equipment Actuation Occurred When Diesel Generator 2C Started Automatically.Caused by Technician Accidentally Bumping Manual Operator of Emergency Start Relay.Technician Counseled
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-014-01, :on 851121,new Fuel Assembly T-15 Damaged During Removal of Fuel Assembly from Shipping Container. Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Instructions Added to Fuel Handling Procedure |
- on 851121,new Fuel Assembly T-15 Damaged During Removal of Fuel Assembly from Shipping Container. Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Instructions Added to Fuel Handling Procedure
| | | 05000364/LER-1985-015-01, :on 851212,positive & Negative Rate Trips on Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel N-43 Discovered Improperly Calibr on 851210.On 851211,both Rate Trip Circuitry Channels Inoperable |
- on 851212,positive & Negative Rate Trips on Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel N-43 Discovered Improperly Calibr on 851210.On 851211,both Rate Trip Circuitry Channels Inoperable
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-015, :on 850925,determined That Positive & Negative Rate Trip Settings Existing Before 850619 Outside Tech Spec Tolerance.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Vendor Info. Procedure Revised |
- on 850925,determined That Positive & Negative Rate Trip Settings Existing Before 850619 Outside Tech Spec Tolerance.Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of Vendor Info. Procedure Revised
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-016, :on 851002,plant Experienced Electrical Shorts Between Conductors in GE Series 100 Low Voltage Control Electrical Containment Penetration Modules.Caused Attributed to Separated Adjacent Connectors |
- on 851002,plant Experienced Electrical Shorts Between Conductors in GE Series 100 Low Voltage Control Electrical Containment Penetration Modules.Caused Attributed to Separated Adjacent Connectors
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-017, :on 851007,fire Dampers Found Inoperable & Not Repaired within 7 Days.Caused by Personnel Failing to Ensure That Procedure Contains Requirements.Procedure Revised & Individual Counseled |
- on 851007,fire Dampers Found Inoperable & Not Repaired within 7 Days.Caused by Personnel Failing to Ensure That Procedure Contains Requirements.Procedure Revised & Individual Counseled
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-018, :on 851009,air-operated Valve Failed to Stroke During Testing.Caused by Valve Actuator Cylinder Exhaust Breather Cap Being Painted Over During Installation.Breather Caps on Affected Unit 1 & 2 Valves Replaced |
- on 851009,air-operated Valve Failed to Stroke During Testing.Caused by Valve Actuator Cylinder Exhaust Breather Cap Being Painted Over During Installation.Breather Caps on Affected Unit 1 & 2 Valves Replaced
| | | 05000348/LER-1985-019, :on 851023,fifth,sixth & Seventh Smoke Detectors in Fire Protection Sys 1A-32 Discovered Inoperable Since 850709.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Initiated |
- on 851023,fifth,sixth & Seventh Smoke Detectors in Fire Protection Sys 1A-32 Discovered Inoperable Since 850709.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Initiated
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