05000346/FIN-2010008-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The team identified a NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion IX for the licensees failure to perform repair welding on control rod drive mechanism nozzle No. 4 using a qualified weld procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the weld procedure supplement PS0140-002 controlled heat input to less than that demonstrated in the supporting weld procedure qualification. To restore compliance, the licensee completed a new weld coupon, tested the coupon, and documented the results in a new procedure qualification record. The procedure qualification record recorded heat inputs for the weld coupon that bound the heat input used for the weld repairs completed on CRDM nozzle No. 4 and the weld coupon test results demonstrated the weld properties were acceptable.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to use a qualified weld procedure could become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would not have completed a Code qualified weld repair on Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle No. 4 prior to returning the reactor vessel closure head to service. The repair weld lacked qualification tests to demonstrate that the mechanical properties (toughness, ductility or strength) were adequate, which could have placed the RVCH at an increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or nozzle failure. Therefore, this finding adversely affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The issue was corrected promptly, the unqualified repair weld was not placed in service, and the team answered no to the Phase I screening question that asked assuming the worst case degradation would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for any reactor coolant system leakage. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices per IMC 0310 (Item H.4(c)) because the licensee did not provide adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities including contractors such that nuclear safety was supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate oversight in the review and acceptance of the unqualified vendor weld procedure supplement. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2010008 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Bilik J Rutkowski A Wilson D Hills A Shaikh C Nove J Collins M Holmberg J Jandovitz |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2010008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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