05000346/FIN-2009503-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Use Classification Scheme for an Alert |
| Description | A licensee identified finding and associated Apparent Violation (AV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) was identified for the failure to implement the emergency classification and action level scheme during an actual event to declare an Alert after an explosion in the switchyard. The operators failed to verify, assess, and classify the situation in conjunction with the Davis-Besse Emergency Plan Table of Emergency Action Level Conditions. Specifically, immediately following an electrical fault and catastrophic failure of a voltage transformer in the switchyard resulting in an explosion, fires, and damage to several switchyard components which affected plant operations, the operators failed to recognize the hazard to the stations operations met the emergency action level conditions for declaring an Alert. The station entered a Limiting Condition for Operation per Technical Specifications. The finding was screened to be more than minor because the failure to declare an Alert adversely affected the Reactor Safety - Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public during a radiological emergency. The performance deficiency has the attribute of Emergency Response Organization Performance associated with Actual Event Response. The performance deficiency involving the failure to properly utilize the emergency classification and action level scheme during an actual Alert meets the criteria of the Emergency Preparedness SDP for a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard of event classification. The failure to classify was a result of the licensees errors in recognition, was not due to competing safety-related activities, and denied offsite authorities the opportunity to make decisions regarding protecting public health and safety. The finding was screened to be a failure to implement the risk significant planning standard associated with classification at the Alert level and was screened to be preliminarily White. Additionally, the cause of the deficiency had a cross-cutting component in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process and failed to obtain adequate reviews on the decisions (H.1(a)) |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2009503 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: White |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Boland C Pederson G Gulla H Peterson K Korth P Pelkeh Petersonr Russell |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2009503 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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