05000346/FIN-2010008-01
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Finding | |
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Title | |
Description | The team identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion IX for the licensees failure to use a nondestructive examination procedure qualified in accordance with applicable Codes and Standards for detection of flaws in control rod drive nozzle repairs. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that Procedure 54-ISI-244-10 Liquid Penetrant Examination of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations from the Inside Surface, contained a maximum time limit for application of water-wash. The licensee issued a procedure change to incorporate a maximum time limit of 10 minutes for the water-wash application time and demonstrated that this wash time was acceptable.
This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to use a qualified procedure could become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the licensee would not have controlled the maximum times used to wash the penetrant materials off repair weld surfaces. Excessive wash time could have resulted in failure to detect fabrication flaws such as voids and cracks. Undetected cracks returned to service in the repair welds would place the RVCH at increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or nozzle failure. Therefore, this finding adversely affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The issue was corrected promptly, no cracks were returned to service, and the team answered no to the Phase I screening question that asked assuming the worst case degradation would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for any reactor coolant system leakage. Therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices (IMC 0310 (Item H.4(c)) because the licensee did not provide adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities including contractors such that nuclear safety was supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate oversight in the review and acceptance of the unqualified vendor Procedure 54-ISI-244-10. |
Site: | Davis Besse |
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Report | IR 05000346/2010008 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Bilik J Rutkowski A Wilson D Hills A Shaikh C Nove J Collins M Holmberg J Jandovitz |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2010008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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