05000333/FIN-2012003-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Installation of Reactor Water Recirculation Motor- Generator Scoop Tube Positioners |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4, Procedures, because Entergy staff did not provide adequate procedures for installation of a plant modification to replace the reactor water recirculation (RWR) motor-generator (MG) scoop tube positioners during the 2010 refueling outage. Specifically, excessive torque was specified for use on positioner ball joint fasteners, which damaged one of the ball joints and resulted in subsequent binding during attempted operation. As a result, on November 11, 2010, the B RWR MG scoop tube positioner bound when operators attempted to reduce pump speed, and released the following day which resulted in an unexpected power reduction of approximately 1.5 percent (40 megawatts thermal (MWt)). As immediate corrective action, control room operators reduced flow in the A RWR loop to restore compliance with the TS requirement for balanced loop flow, then locked the scoop tubes for both RWR MGs pending further evaluation of the event. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2010-07782. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to example 4.b in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that it resulted in a plant transient. The finding also affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined the finding was not a loss of coolant accident or external events initiator, and did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because Design Engineering personnel did not ensure that accurate design documentation and procedures were available to assure successful implementation of the RWR MG scoop tube positioner modification. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2012003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Fuller J Furia M Gray T Fish E Gray F Arner E Knutson B Sienel D Kern R Rolph C Crisden |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |
Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||