05000333/FIN-2011005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Mode Switch in Shutdown Scram Function Inoperable in Excess of the TS Allowed Outage Time due to Personnel Error |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, because FitzPatrick operators did not take required action within the allowed completion time in response to an RPS relay failure. Specifically, following failure of RPS channel \'B\' shutdown scram reset interlock logic relay 5A-K178, which caused the reactor mode switch to shutdown manual scram to be disabled, action was not taken by operators to insert a half-scram on RPS channel \'B\' within one hour as required by TS 3.3.1.1 Condition C. After further evaluation of the issue, operators inserted a half scram on RPS channel \'B\'. The issue w as entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2O11-06625. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the delay in implementing the TS required actions resulted in additional accrual of more than two hours of reactor operation with the reactor mode switch to shutdown manual scram bypassed. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Phase 1, lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined this finding was not a design qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, decision making, because operators did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and promptly apply readily available information contained in the alarm response procedure and TS Bases to determine TS applicability for the alarm condition |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2011005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Gray S Mccarver E Knutson B Bickett B Sienel R Rolph |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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