05000324/FIN-2013003-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Work Order to Perform a Modification to the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System |
Description | An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified, for the licensees failure to have an adequate instruction or procedure to perform a modification to the control room emergency ventilation system (CREV). The licensee took immediate action to return CREV to service and entered this issue into the CAP as NCR 578363. The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to have an adequate procedure for installing a jumper on the 2A CREV system was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to have an adequate procedure to install a jumper on the 2A CREV system resulted in the safety system functional failure of CREV. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, issued June 19, 2012, the SDP for Findings At- Power, the inspectors determined the finding screened to a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function and smoke or toxic atmosphere function of the control room barrier. The regional SRA performed a Phase 3 analysis on the finding. A screening calculation was performed to estimate the impact the finding would have on the facility for conditions that would lead to plant shutdown, or failure of the filtering function of the ventilation system. The low likelihood of failure to recover the system, combined with the short time the deficiency existed, resulted in a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control attribute because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant when installing a ring lug jumper on the 2A CREV subsystem. |
Site: | Brunswick |
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Report | IR 05000324/2013003 Section 1R12 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Catts M Schwieg R Taylor G Hopper J Dodson |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2013003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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